US-Soldaten in Afghanistan



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"A Half-Hearted Coup, Extending Zimbabwe's Reign of Terror"

Eli Lake sieht einem vom Militär forcierten Machtwechsel in Simbabwe ohne Optimismus entgegen. "Getting rid of Mugabe is a good thing. He was a tyrant in senescence, known for falling asleep in government meetings. (North Koreans would call him a 'dotard.') But the military coup that unseated him shows no signs of ending Zimbabwe's political and economic decline. This is not a moment of hope like the 2009 power sharing agreement was. It is really a power struggle between his wife and former typist, Grace Mugabe, and his former vice president and all-around enforcer, Emmerson Mnangagwa." Weiter...


"Saudi Arabia Is Putinizing, Not Modernizing"

Auch Leonid Bershidsky meint, dass Kronprinz Mohammed bin Salman Saudi-Arabien nicht wirklich reformieren wolle. Er habe vielmehr einen autoritären Kurs eingeschlagen, der an Russlands Präsident Putin erinnere. "The king, his heir and the Russian president speak the same language: They are leaders who can make quick, momentous decisions without bothering about domestic checks and balances. Their 'anti-corruption campaigns' help them keep opponents in check. Their vanity projects, beneath the candy wrappers with English-language slogans about the future, are about personal ambition on a global scale rather than about fixing their countries' backward, commodity-based economies for future generations. (...) There's a strong temptation for Western commentators, especially U.S. ones, to portray MbS as a reformist trying to bring the House of Saud into the modern world and Putin as a retrograde dictator taking Russia into the past. But the only reason this temptation to differentiate exists is that Saudi Arabia is a traditional U.S. ally, and the enemy of an old enemy - Iran. In reality, there are far more similarities than differences between the world's two most important oil dictatorships." Weiter...


"Colombia's Peacemakers Are Losing Their Mojo"

Die Umsetzung des international viel beachteten Friedensabkommens zwischen der Regierung und den FARC-Rebellen in Kolumbien stoße auf besorgniserregende Hindernisse, berichtet Mac Margolis. "The ultimate risk might not be plunging Colombia back into armed insurgency - the much depleted rebels forces have little stomach for that anymore - but deepening the estrangement of the countryside from the high-minded political elite in Bogota. 'In Colombia, a quarter of the population lives in 80 percent of the territory, and the perception there is that the government simply has not shown up,' said Isacson. Colombians have been here before. While the battle against the Marxist insurgency often took on ideological overtones, the conflict ultimately may have owed more to local dysfunctions. 'The FARC sprang less out of Cold War sensibilities than from the fact they championed neglected people in the countryside,' said Princeton University scholar Robert Karl, author of 'Forgotten Peace,' a history of Colombia’s politics of peace and violence. 'That split still cuts deep in Colombia today.'" Weiter...


"In Catalonia, Let the Long Game Begin"

Im aktuellen Streit um die politische Zukunft Kataloniens ist die Zentralregierung in Madrid nach Ansicht von Leonid Bershidsky bisher als klarer Sieger hervorgegangen. Dies ändere jedoch nichts an den grundsätzlichen Ursachen der Krise, die einigen Experten zufolge langfristig eine Übertragung zusätzlicher Autonomierechte erfordern werden. "There are quite specific things the Spanish government could do within the current constitution to make Catalans happier. Andreu Mas-Colell, a world-renowned microeconomics expert who was minister of economy and knowledge in the previous government until last year, told me there are three distinct things Catalans want: to assert a distinct cultural identity, to live in a less centralized country, and to fix economic transfers. (...) None of what Mas-Colell outlines is unreasonable or unworkable. But to start discussing what is essentially a form of federalization, if by another name, the Spanish government 'would need to be scared,' Berta Barbet Porta, a post-doctoral researcher at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, told me." Weiter...


"Why Some Nations Are Warming to Technocracy"

Leonid Bershidsky führt den in einer neuen Pew-Umfrage diagnostizierten globalen Ansehensverlust der repräsentativen Demokratie darauf zurück, dass viele Menschen die Kompetenz einer Regierung höher schätzen als deren einwandfreie demokratische Legitimität. "Most people can't think of government forms in the abstract. Winners (in every sense - those who are wealthier and more used to freedom, those with more schooling, those who voted for the winning party) are generally happier with the status quo than losers, and that affects their judgment. Societies where most people feel like losers on several counts are understandably more agnostic about the way they're governed and more open to experimentation. What's truly striking about the Pew findings, however, is what kind of experiment people would favor. The only nondemocratic form of government that attracts majorities in some countries is technocracy, in which experts, not elected politicians, determine how to run a nation." Weiter...


"The U.S. Sees an Opportunity in the Palestinian Reconciliation"

Die Unterzeichnung eines Versöhnungsabkommens durch Vertreter der Hamas und der Fatah am vergangenen Donnerstag werde hinter den Kulissen von amerikanischen und israelischen Offiziellen als möglicher Schritt zur Neuordnung der regionalen Machtstrukturen wahrgenommen, berichtet Eli Lake. "Jonathan Schanzer, the senior vice president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told me the recent reconciliation agreement 'is part of an overall attempt to shape the regional architecture.' He said this was a gambit to try to take power out of the hands of Turkey, Iran and Qatar and to reassert the role of the more moderate Sunni Arab powers like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. (...) Put another way, an element of this deal is to make Hamas, which is facing its own political and economic crisis, more reliant on moderate Sunni Arab states, who in turn will try to moderate the radicals." Weiter...


"Why Did the U.S. Even Get Involved in Syria?"

Leonid Bershidsky hat die Memoiren des früheren US-Verteidigungsministers Ash Carter gelesen, der sich dort u.a. zu den Hintergründen der amerikanischen Intervention im syrischen Bürgerkrieg äußert. "To sum up, U.S. interests weren't clearly aligned with: Iraq, Iran, Russia, Turkey, the Assad government in Syria and the Gulf states. Did the U.S. have any enthusiastic allies at all? Well, there were some of the anti-Assad rebels (except the ones wedded to Islamist causes) and, most of all, the Kurds. U.S. support of them, of course, was the main reason Turkey turned from an ally into a 'spoiler.' (...) In fighting ISIS, the U.S. managed to step on everybody's toes in a battered, short-fused region that was already leery of U.S. interference after the Iraq and Libya adventures. Carter's account sheds light on how that happened, as much as into the mechanics of defeating ISIS." Weiter...


"Wanted: Russia Experts, No Expertise Required"

Leonid Bershidsky beklagt anlässlich der Gründung des neuen "Committee to Investigate Russia", dass Nuancen und Expertise in der amerikanischen Russland-Debatte derzeit kaum gefragt seien. "(...) the high-profile Committee to Investigate Russia - and all the other groups interested in Russian meddling with the U.S. democracy - could have found some qualified people to advise them, had they really been interested in the subject matter. Instead, as Samuel Greene, director of the Russia Institute and King's College London, wrote in a recent blog post: 'Too many Russian friends and colleagues living in America – immigrants and American citizens, professionals, journalists, academics, all of them ardent opponents of Putin – keep their heads down and voices hushed in public. Too many American analysts feel compelled to keep their dissenting opinions to themselves. I have spent a decade and a half explaining to Russian politicians, journalists and ordinary citizens that the knee-jerk American Russophobia of the Cold War was dead and buried, only to see it resurrected.'" Weiter...


"Negotiate with North Korea? A Russian Tried"

Leonid Bershidsky hat sich mit dem russischen Filmemacher Vitaly Mansky unterhalten, der im Jahr 2013 in Zusammenarbeit mit nordkoreanischen Behörden einen Film gedreht und dabei insgeheim eine versteckte Kamera eingesetzt hat. Die Erfahrungen Manskys mit den Nordkoreanern lassen ihn daran zweifeln, dass Verhandlungen mit dem Regime Erfolg haben werden. Das gesellschaftliche Klima im Land sei mit der früheren Sowjetunion nicht zu vergleichen. "Mansky's negotiations were with rather senior officials in the North Korean propaganda machine but perhaps things can go better if the supreme leader himself is involved in talks? Mansky doesn't think so. 'Paradoxically,' he says, 'the man at the top doesn't make decisions, either, because he's dependent on the dictatorship he has created.' As Mansky tells it, the Kim dictatorship must maintain the cult that was created to sustain it, absurd rules and all; it's a two-way street of mutual reinforcement. The Communist regime under which Mansky and I both grew up sort of worked like that, too - but North Korea has created a 'perfect, flawless' version of the game, Mansky says". Weiter...


"Travel Barriers Are the Worst of the New Cold War"

Das Scharmützel aus diplomatischen Feindseligkeiten zwischen den USA und Russland sei dabei, in den Beziehungen beider Länder echten Schaden anzurichten, warnt Leonid Bershidsky. Die jüngsten Einschränkungen der Reisefreiheit für russische und amerikanische Bürger seien der bislang größte Schritt zurück in die Zeiten des Kalten Krieges. "I understand the logic of diplomatic tit-for-tat, and it doesn't concern me who started this or whom to blame. One doesn't need to take sides in the old academic argument over whether tourism is an instrument of peace or a beneficiary of peace. It's just plain good sense to see that keeping casual travelers out of a country prevents people from forming an unmediated opinion of it. Stopping Russians who want to see the U.S. from doing it leaves them at the mercy of the Kremlin propaganda machine, which will be happy to tell them its own stories of life in the U.S. Creating obstacles for Americans to travel to Russia leaves them a choice between the increasingly anti-Russian mainstream press and the export version of the same Kremlin propaganda." Weiter...


"Switch to Renewables Won't End the Geopolitics of Energy"

Meghan L. O'Sullivan bezweifelt, dass der globale Wechsel von fossilen zu erneuerbaren Energieträgern die Bedeutung der energiebezogenen Aspekte der Geopolitik grundsätzlich verringern wird. "(...) historically, every big shift in the global energy mix - from wood to coal and from coal to oil - has brought with it its own geopolitical ramifications. Renewables will be no exception. (...) Among the most interesting of possible trends we highlight is the idea that a more renewable-heavy future will likely bring with it new forms of the 'resource curse' - the phenomenon that political and economic development in many resource-wealthy countries seems stymied when compared to resource-poor ones. (...) we may see this curse surface in countries rich in the materials required to produce the components that make renewable energy possible. Many of these resources are rare-earth metals and other commodities deep underground. For example, indium and cobalt - neither is technically a rare-earth metal, but they are still relatively hard to come by - are essential for making solar panels and batteries." Weiter...


"The Alternative to Nuclear War Is a Revolution"

Abgesehen von der Rhetorik des US-Präsidenten unterscheide sich die Nordkorea-Strategie Donald Trumps nicht wesentlich von der Barack Obamas, stellt Eli Lake fest. Die US-Regierung sollte seiner Ansicht nach den Versuch aufgeben, einen "Deal" mit der Regierung in Pjöngjang zu suchen und stattdessen die Voraussetzungen für eine "Revolution" in Nordkorea fördern. "(...) traditional 'regime change' should be off the table. But this should not stop the U.S. and its allies from helping to create conditions for the day when Koreans can take their country back. This requires some patience and imagination. The patient part of the policy should be a combination of sabotage and deterrence. (...) The imaginative part is to continue to give North Koreans a glimpse of a better future. Tom Malinowski, who served as President Barack Obama's assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor, wrote in Politico in June that the U.S. should continue to flood North Korea with information. This may sound strange. But in recent years, the state's ability to control information has waned. More and more Koreans living there have access to portable DVD players and cell phones, which are tools to break the state's control over the minds of their citizens." Weiter...


"The One Big Problem With New Russia Sanctions"

Meghan L. O'Sullivan hält die neuen US-Sanktionen gegen Russland für problematisch, weil dem US-Präsidenten im Gesetz keine Möglichkeit eingeräumt worden sei, die Sanktionen im Fall russischer Zugeständnisse zumindest teilweise aufzuheben. "(...) by taking away the administration’s ability to calibrate sanctions in response to improvements in Russian actions, Congress essentially handcuffed the executive branch in terms of trying to change Russian behavior. Where sanctions have been an effective tool in this approach - such as in the normalization of relations with Vietnam or the more recent effort to get Iran to the nuclear negotiating table - the executive branch needed both flexibility and credibility in promising carrots like the lifting of sanctions to the country in question. But now, the authority to lift or maintain sanctions on Russia effectively rests with the 535 members of Congress. As a result, the Trump administration cannot promise with confidence that a positive move by Moscow will be met with a reciprocal action by the U.S." Weiter...


"Sending 'Defensive' Arms to Ukraine Would Be Deadly"

Amerikanische Waffenlieferungen an die Ukraine könnten nach Ansicht von Leonid Bershidsky zu einer gefährlichen Eskalation des Konflikts im Donezbecken führen. Russische und amerikanische Generäle würden die Kämpfe möglicherweise für einen praktischen Test ihrer neuen Waffensysteme nutzen, so Bershidsky. "Russia treats the battlefields of recent conflicts as testing grounds for its weaponry. President Vladimir Putin has said participation in the Syrian war was a better use of Russia's military exercise budget than exercises: 'Only under battle conditions can we really test what we're using, find out what the problems are and fix them.' There will be a temptation to test the previous and perhaps even the new generation of Russian tanks against the Javelin. U.S. generals are likely also eager for such a test. (...) Two years after both sides have largely kept to existing demarcation lines (minor encroachments aside), it is militarily unnecessary to provide Ukraine with lethal weapons unless the U.S. wants to encourage it to try to reclaim the 'people's republics.' That would be a mistake." Weiter...


"New U.S. Sanctions on Russia Are a Mixed Bag"

Leonid Bershidsky hält das europäische Misstrauen gegenüber den neu geplanten US-Sanktionen gegen Russland für durchaus gerechtfertigt. Der US-Kongress wolle offensichtlich mehrere Fliegen mit einer Klappe schlagen und insbesondere den Export von Flüssiggas vorantreiben. Noch sei allerdings unklar, wie Präsident Trump das verabschiedete Gesetz umsetzen würde. "Trump's administration has criticized the bill, and if he signs it, he won't be overzealous in implementing it. And in relation to the pipeline projects, the legislators have inserted language that directly calls on him to be cautious. The version of the bill passed by the Senate merely empowered the president to impose the pipeline-related sanctions. The latest version, which will probably land on Trump's desk, says the president may introduce the sanctions 'in coordination with allies of the United States.' European companies should be partially reassured by the change, although an assurance that they won't be sanctioned, like the one Barack Obama gave in 2014, would be even better." Weiter...


"The Middle East's New Peacemaker: Israel"

Für die künftigen und wahrscheinlich schwierigen amerikanisch-russischen Verhandlungen im Syrienkonflikt empfiehlt Zev Chafets den israelischen Premierminister Netanjahu als Vermittler. "China isn’t interested. The Western Europeans are too interested. The Saudis and the Iranians are busy with their medieval blood feud. The Arab League is a joke. The United Nations is, as always, useless. Enter Benjamin Netanyahu, matchmaker. The Israeli prime minister is acceptable to both sides. The American-Israeli strategic partnership is longstanding and, under the new administration, highly valued. (...) Putin, like Trump, respects Israel, for the same reasons. He has demonstrated it during his Syrian intervention by keeping an open line to Netanyahu and Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman (who was born and raised in the former Soviet Union and whose first language is Russian). (...) Of course, the prime minister is not a disinterested party. He has his own agenda. (...) This agenda is not identical to American or Russian policy, but does not conflict with the basic interests of the two powers." Weiter...


"How the Ukraine War Spilled Into the U.S. Election"

Neben den Spekulationen über eine russische Unterstützung für den Wahlkampf Donald Trumps im vergangenen Jahr gebe es derzeit auch eine Debatte über eine mögliche Hilfestellung ukrainischer Akteure für Hillary Clinton, berichtet Leonid Bershidsky. Er glaubt allerdings nicht, dass diese Geschichte einen ähnlichen Wirbel erzeugen wird. "The story (...) probably won't cross partisan lines for the simple reason described in a tweet by former Republican National Committee operative Liz Mair: 'The big difference between Clinton/Ukraine and Trump/Russia is that Ukraine is not our enemy; Russia pretty obviously is, per common sense.' A large part of the Republican establishment regards Russia - let's face it, not Putin's Kremlin but the country itself - as a perennial U.S. adversary. (...) Ukraine, by contrast, is a U.S. charity case and a counterweight to Russia in the post-Soviet space. So working with it while almost equating the acceptance of Russian help to treason is not a double standard. Within this context, foreign participation in the U.S. political process is not a problem, but the participation of a foreign adversary is." Weiter...


"How Trump Got Putin Wrong on Cybersecurity"

US-Präsident Trump ist für seine Idee, in Kooperation mit Russland eine gemeinsame Arbeitsgruppe zur Cybersicherheit zu bilden, in den USA scharf kritisiert worden. Leonid Bershidsky hält den Vorschlag, der kurz darauf wieder zurückgezogen wurde, keineswegs für verrückt. "(...) this means setting up a group that would work out clear rules of engagement in cyberspace, as well as notions of what would and wouldn't be permissible and a de-escalation mechanism. It's not the smartest idea I've ever heard, but it's pretty close. Today, Russia and the U.S. are engaged in creeping cyberwarfare against each other, and they may well be working to disable or undermine each other's critical infrastructure. The conflict is potentially deadly and, unlike military interactions between the two adversaries, not subject even to the most rudimentary rules or mutual arrangements. That needs to be fixed, and though a multilateral process under the auspices of the United Nations or perhaps the G-20 would be preferable, a bilateral working group would be a start." Weiter...


"Macron Won't Be Shy About Using French Power"

Der auch außenpolitisch unerfahrene neue französische Präsident Macron könnte sich ersten Anzeichen zufolge bald als "Falke" herausstellen, schreibt Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry. Die EU könnte dabei für Macron möglicherweise nur eine nachgeordnete Rolle spielen. "Macron has signaled that he will leave most of the early steps of his domestic reform to his cabinet, led by Prime Minister Edouard Philippe. Meanwhile, he has shown great interest in the presidency's foreign policy mandate, particularly with regard to the military and the fight against terrorism. (...) Macron is smart enough to realize that EU-level defense policy has always been a chimera, and that military action requires unilateral action, or ad hoc partnerships rather than transnational alliances, as has been the case for France's actions in the Sahel region in Africa, where the French military is spearheading the fight against Al Qaeda-affiliated insurgents in countries like Chad and Mali. (...) In office, therefore, Macron has given many more signals that he intends to be a hawkish commander-in-chief, and one that will act first and seek alliances later." Weiter...


"Why Macron Won and Clinton Lost"

Leonid Bershidsky vergleicht die Kandidaturen von Emmanuel Macron und Hillary Clinton und erläutert, warum sich Macron im Gegensatz zu Clinton gegen die populistische Herausforderung durchgesetzt habe. "To sum this up: - The pro-Le Pen campaign on the social networks failed to travel beyond Le Pen's base, which was more clearly defined than Donald Trump's in the U.S. since Le Pen was far more of a known political quantity; - The spread of fakes was thwarted by French voters' relative sophistication compared with American ones; - Unlike in the U.S., the centrist candidate's campaign had little to hide - or had the good sense not to put sensitive material online. Clinton didn't lose because the internet-based toolkit was used against her. She lost because a sizable number of Americans did not consider her trustworthy. So they easily accepted both the fake news about her and the hints of corruption and dishonesty contained in the leaked emails. Months of postmortems of Clinton’s loss to Trump overshadow one of the simplest explanations: It’s important to convince voters that you are not corrupt." Weiter...


"Why Israel Got Into a Dust-Up With Germany"

In der Diskussion über die Hintergründe der Ausladung des deutschen Außenministers durch Israels Premierminister Benjamin Netanjahu macht Daniel Gordis Sigmar Gabriel mitverantwortlich. "Gabriel defended his position by saying, 'You never get the full picture of any state in the world if you just meet with figures in government ministries,' but even Ha’aretz, Israel’s left-leaning daily, which rarely misses an opportunity to attack the prime minister, noted that foreign ministers generally do not meet with representative of NGOs in democratic countries. Was the visit an inadvertent indication that Israel is not a functioning democracy? (...) The dust-up with Germany was surely not his most elegant moment. Yet Gabriel made a series of probably unintentional gaffes. Around Holocaust Memorial Day, Israelis’ sensitivities about Germany are at their height. So is their fear of weakness." Weiter...


"At 100 Days, Trump's No Russian Stooge or Fascist"

Hundert Tage nach dem Amtsantritt Donald Trumps habe sich gezeigt, dass der neue US-Präsident weder ein russischer "Strohmann" noch ein "Faschist" sei, stellt Eli Lake nüchtern fest. "None of this is to say Trump is doing a great job. He has shown himself to be entirely unfamiliar with the intricacies of policy. His hostility to the press is dangerous and counterproductive. Trump continues to say outrageous falsehoods and is prone to extreme hyperbole. He has failed to address in a meaningful way the many conflicts of interest posed by his business empire. But these flaws have not yet posed an existential threat to the republic. He has obeyed the courts, even as he has derided their decisions on twitter. He has reversed himself on Russia. And slowly but surely, he has begun to resemble something less menacing and more normal than his foes predicted." Weiter...


"Trump Said No to Troops in Syria. His Aides Aren't So Sure."

US-Präsident Trump hat einen Einsatz von US-Bodentruppen in Syrien bislang ausgeschlossen. Eli Lake berichtet allerdings, dass der Nationale Sicherheitsberater General H.R. McMaster sich im Weißen Haus für eine "robuste" Truppenpräsenz in Syrien einsetze, da er die bisherige Strategie zur Bekämpfung des IS für nicht ausreichend halte. "White House and administration officials familiar with the current debate tell me there is no consensus on how many troops to send to Syria and Iraq. Two sources told me one plan would envision sending up to 50,000 troops. (...) Trump must decide whether he wants to wage Bush's war or continue Obama's." Weiter...


"How Terror Threatens to Transform Sweden Amid Calls for Unity"

Der Terroranschlag in Stockholm am vergangenen Freitag könnte dazu führen, dass sich Schweden endgültig von seiner bisherigen vergleichsweise großzügigen Einwanderungs- und Asylpolitik verabschiedet, schreibt Johan Carlstrom. "For now, Swedes are making a vocal show of defending their open and inclusive society following Friday’s terrorist attack, which police say was probably carried out by an Uzbek man sympathetic toward Islamic State and whose residency application had been rejected. (...) But the calls for unity come at a time when Swedish politics is unusually divisive. The finance minister is under pressure over proposed tax changes while the government’s asylum policies are feeding the popularity of the country’s most outspoken anti-immigration party." Weiter...


"Trump Lacks Room to Move on Sanctions on Russia, Economists Say"

Nach Ansicht von Wirtschaftsexperten wird US-Präsident Trump in den kommenden Monaten keinen ausreichenden politischen Spielraum haben, um die westlichen Sanktionen gegen Russland wie geplant zu erleichtern. "'Trump is hogtied on Russia, and can’t ease sanctions,' said Per Hammarlund, chief emerging-market strategist at SEB SA in Stockholm. 'The EU will not ease sanctions before initiating negotiations with Russia, the rebels in eastern Ukraine and the government in Kiev. There is simply no political room for reducing sanctions unilaterally without a quid pro quo.' (...) While the initial set of penalties imposed over Russia’s takeover of Crimea in 2014 will stay, other adjustments in the regime are possible, according to Gunter Deuber, an analyst with Raiffeisen Bank International AG in Vienna. 'Some cosmetic easing of sanctions could be in the pipeline early in 2018, conditional on a decrease in Russian meddling in Ukraine,' he said. 'The U.S. administration may look for some foreign-policy successes and fatigue with Russian sanctions at the EU level may increase in 2017, while Russia might be also more interested in a sanctions easing ahead of the presidential elections.'" Weiter...


"Alexei Navalny Wants Putin’s Job. Here’s What He’d Do With It"

Leonid Ragozin hat ein Interview mit Alexei Navalny geführt, in dem der russische Oppositionspolitiker und mögliche Präsidentschaftskandidat seine politischen Ziele erläutert. Seine Strategie zur Lösung der Ukrainekrise erklärt Navalny folgendermaßen: "The issue of Donbass [a wartorn region of Ukraine] can be solved — just implement the Minsk agreement. The Crimean issue is now in the category of unresolvable territorial disputes, of which there are plenty around the world. Look at Israel. There have been loads of Security Council resolutions, loads of peace conferences, zillions of books written about ways to achieve a peace settlement, but the problem is still there and unlikely to be resolved any time soon. What can we do with Crimea, now that everyone there has been issued Russian passports? [That said,] I promise to hold a normal referendum. It should all be coordinated with the international community." Weiter...


"How to Produce Fewer Terrorists in Prison"

Leonid Bershidsky macht darauf aufmerksam, dass der Attentäter von Westminster, Khalid Masood, sich offenbar wie andere Terroristen vor ihm während eines Gefängnisaufenthaltes radikalisiert hat. Er erläutert, welche Haftbedingungen zu einer solchen Radikalisierung beitragen könnten und hebt dabei u.a. die Organisation deutscher Gefängnisse positiv hervor. "In Germany, where about 20 percent of the prison population in western states and the capital Berlin is Muslim, the state-run prison systems take care to separate inmates who exhibit symptoms of radicalization (certain behaviors, a particular dress code) from others. Moderate imams are brought in to preach to the imprisoned Muslims. There are widespread post-release reintegration programs with a special emphasis on keeping ex-inmates out of the clutches of fundamentalist groups. These efforts aren't centralized, and volunteer organizations take the lead on many of them, but they appear to be more effective than similar attempts in France and Belgium, in part because northern European countries jail fewer people than France, Belgium or Italy. In Denmark, there are 56 inmates per 100,000 population, compared with 98 in France." Weiter...


"Trump Can't Win by Punishing Germany on Defense"

Leonid Bershidsky hält den Vorwurf des US-Präsidenten, dass Deutschland der NATO viel Geld schulde, für völlig haltlos. Der Fokus der US-Regierung auf die nominellen Verteidigungsausgaben ignoriere die Ziele und die Werkzeuge der deutschen Sicherheitspolitik, die über die NATO-Mitgliedschaft hinausgehe: "Russia is considered to be scarier than Germany militarily because it's more prone to take risks, get involved in conflicts and tolerate losses, not because it spends much more. German politicians understand that - and, given their nation's history, they have consciously picked a different path. (...) Merkel has reaffirmed Germany's NATO commitments and moved toward meeting them as fast as she could under the imperative of a deficit-free budget - her party's major promise to voters. Trump doesn't appear to appreciate that, but he has no leverage to force Merkel or her successors to do more. What he'll get instead will be polite assurances that the commitments are still in place as Germany keeps its own advice on what it should do to stay safe. That's how cracks emerge in the most solid of alliances." Weiter...


"Free Speech in Europe Isn't What Americans Think"

Nach dem vom Europäischen Gerichtshof erlaubten Kopftuchverbot am Arbeitsplatz und den Plänen zur Verhängung hoher Geldstrafen bei ungelöschten "Hasskommentaren" in Sozialen Medien in Deutschland stellt Noah Feldman fest, dass die transatlantischen Differenzen bei der Interpretation der Meinungsfreiheit immer deutlicher hervortreten. "The underlying philosophical difference here is about the right of the individual to self-expression. Americans value that classic liberal right very highly - so highly that we tolerate speech that might make others less equal. Europeans value the democratic collective and the capacity of all citizens to participate fully in it - so much that they are willing to limit individual rights. The parallels between the hijab case and the hate speech cases are thus very real. Individual rights win in the U.S. Equality and the group win in Europe. At one time, the different views existed in splendid isolation. Now, the internet and globalization are bringing them into conflict." Weiter...


"Russian Foreign Policy Is Incomprehensible for a Reason"

Der britische Außenminister Boris Johnson hat der russischen Regierung vorgeworfen, im vergangenen Jahr einen Putsch und ein Attentat auf den Premierminister in Montenegro geplant zu haben, um den NATO-Beitritt des Landes zu verhindern. Die Wahrheit ist nach Ansicht von Leonid Bershidsky deutlich komplizierter, da die russische Außenpolitik in Osteuropa von einem nur schwer durchschaubaren Beziehungsgeflecht zwischen offiziellen Stellen und privaten Akteuren geprägt sei. "The Russian ultranationalist community has long taken an interest in the Balkans, and its volunteers fought in the Yugoslav wars in the 1990's. Now, this community, augmented by intelligence veterans, may be trying to run ahead of a more cautious Kremlin in the region. It could be an attempt at guessing Putin's secret wishes and earning a reward; it could just as easily be a move to overcome Putin's caution and involve official Moscow the way it became involved in eastern Ukraine. (...) The symbiotic relationship between the imperialist community and the Kremlin is not formalized in any way; it's one of tolerance. Putin appears to put more faith in the wise Soviet-trained professionals who make his official foreign policy, but he also appears grudgingly to agree with some of the nationalists' ideas. That introduces an element of unpredictability into Russia's game of restoring the Soviet Union's international influence." Weiter...

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Die weltweiten Militärausgaben sind 2013 leicht zurückgegangen - auf 1,7 Billionen US-Dollar. Welches Land gibt wie viel für sein Militär aus? Und wer bezieht die meisten Waffen aus Deutschland? Das interaktive Portal liefert Antworten auf sicherheitspolitische Fragen. Weiter... 


Innerstaatliche Konflikte

Vom Kosovo nach Kolumbien, von Somalia nach Süd-Thailand: Weltweit schwelen über 280 politische Konflikte. Und immer wieder droht die Lage gewaltsam zu eskalieren. Weiter... 

Zahlen und Fakten


Kaum ein Thema wird so intensiv und kontrovers diskutiert wie die Globalisierung. "Zahlen und Fakten" liefert Grafiken, Texte und Tabellen zu einem der wichtigsten und vielschichtigsten Prozesse der Gegenwart. Weiter... 

Publikationen zum Thema

Coverbild Internationale Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert

Internationale Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert

Die internationale Sicherheit ist fragil und bedroht. Wie können und müssen demokratische Systeme ...

Internationale Sicherheitspolitik Cover

Internationale Sicherheitspolitik

Seit Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts hat sich die internationale Sicherheitspolitik deutlich verändert....


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