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08.06.2018

"The French President Has Described America Like a Rogue State"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/macron-trump-g7-trade/562421/?utm_source=feed

Mit seinem Auftritt auf dem G7-Gipfel hat US-Präsident Trump Uri Friedman zufolge auch Frankreichs Präsident Macron vor den Kopf gestoßen, der zuvor versucht habe, Trump auch auf persönlicher Ebene näher zu kommen. "At first he attempted to become Trump’s best friend. But now he approaches the U.S. president with a tone that sounds almost injured. And on Thursday he made perhaps his starkest statement yet regarding his concerns about where Trump’s policies could lead the United States and the rest of the world. (...) The leader of America’s oldest ally also stated that the U.S. needed to be persuaded to remain in the 'community of nations' — to stay not in the narrow confines of the Paris accord or the Iran deal or some free-trade agreement with the European Union, not even in the broader transatlantic alliance, but in the broadest dimension of the civilized world. The implication was that, left to his own devices, the American president might go rogue and defy both the values that bind his country with its allies and the international laws and norms that the United States, France, and other partners helped construct out of the ashes of World War II. But in the effort to keep America in line, Macron said, according to his own translation of the remarks, 'we must never sacrifice our interests or values.'"

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06.06.2018

"Trump Is Choosing Eastern Europe"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/trump-is-choosing-eastern-europe/562130/?utm_so
urce=feed

Thomas Wright betrachtet die Kontroverse um den US-Botschafter in Deutschland, Richard A. Grenell, im Kontext der neuen Europa-Politik der US-Regierung, die vor kurzem von Staatssekretär Wess Mitchell erläutert worden sei. "The main message of his thoughtful, well-written, and strategic speech: The United States views Europe through the lens of a strategic competition between Western civilization and a Russian and Chinese alternative. Mitchell effectively announced a pivot in America’s Europe policy away from western Europe and toward the East (his natural stomping ground) and the South. In fact, Mitchell criticized western Europe for failing to take strategic competition seriously, particularly on defense spending and confronting Iran. (...) In private briefings, multiple Trump administration officials have said they are adopting a new approach to the EU. Past administrations, they believe, have been too supportive of European integration, which has turned out to be a source of instability, they believe. The Trump administration would let Europeans make their own decisions. Yet the president has commented repeatedly on their politics, while Ambassador Grenell actively intervenes in their domestic debates and the Commerce Department tries to influence Brexit negotiations. Even setting all that aside, the shift in policy toward the EU is clear. At best, the United States is neutral; viewed less charitably, it is hostile."

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05.06.2018

"How Sanctions Feed Authoritarianism"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/iran-sanctions-nuclear/562043/?utm_source=feed

Die Geschichte von westlichen Sanktionen gegen autoritäre Staaten zeigt Peter Beinart zufolge, dass in den betroffenen Ländern in der Regel immer die Hardliner profitiert haben. Dies werde sich aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach im Iran bestätigen. "The academic literature is clear: Far from promoting liberal democracy, sanctions tend to make the countries subject to them more authoritarian and repressive. In 2009, University of Memphis political scientist Dursen Peksen found that, between 1981 and 2000, sanctions contributed to a significant erosion of human rights in the countries on which they were imposed. The following year, in a study co-authored with the University of Missouri’s Cooper Drury, he found that sanctioned countries grew less democratic too. The reason is that sanctions shift the balance of power in a society in the regime’s favor. As sanctions make resources harder to find, authoritarian regimes hoard them. They make the population more dependent on their largesse, and withhold resources from those who might threaten their rule. (...) In 2003, American leaders fantasized about a liberal, democratic, non-expansionist Iraq only to find that America’s own sanctions policies had helped destroy that dream. Now another Republican administration — led by some of the same foreign-policy officials — is spinning similar visions about Iran. The Iranians most invested in that vision warn that America’s policies are making it impossible."

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04.06.2018

"The Threat to Kim Jong Un Within North Korea"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/the-threat-to-kim-jong-un-within-north-korea/56
1950/?utm_source=feed

Das Atomwaffenprogramm in Nordkorea sei in der Bevölkerung über Generationen hinweg als Schlüssel zu Sicherheit und Wohlstand dargestellt worden, erklärt Uri Friedman. Sollte Staatschef Kim Jong-un tatsächlich auf das Programm verzichten wollen, könnte er deshalb auf internen Widerstand stoßen. "How do you pivot away from an arduous decades-old program, which you and your father and grandfather have lauded as the centerpiece of your country’s security and prosperity, without alienating a whole lot of people? As the Korea expert Van Jackson recently wrote, 'North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has birthed a large bureaucratic and elite constituency in Pyongyang — an entire nuclear 'industry' of scientists, engineers and warfighters, and a corresponding maintenance and supply chain. The resource and human capital commitment to North Korea’s nuclear weapons enterprise means denuclearization could generate internal enemies, especially if declared by an unproven leader,' even one who has proven ruthless in purging high-ranking rivals since coming to power in 2011."

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04.06.2018

"Cyberattacks Are 'Ticking Time Bombs' for Germany"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/germany-cyberattacks/561914/?utm_source=feed

Sumi Somaskanda vom Berlin Policy Journal meint, dass die pazifistische Tradition in Deutschland effektive Schutzmaßnahmen gegen drohende Cyberangriffe erschwere, da es immer noch großen Widerstand gegen eine spürbare Erhöhung der Verteidigungsausgaben gebe und offensive Cyber-Missionen nur schwer zum Selbstbild der Bundeswehr passten. "These tensions came to a head in 2016, when Der Spiegel reported that the Bundeswehr’s Computer Network Operations, an elite team of hackers, broke into a cellphone provider’s network in Afghanistan to access information on a kidnapped German aid worker. Some lawmakers considered this an offensive action, and objected that they were not informed. Last year, von der Leyen triggered controversy when she said the Bundeswehr’s cyber forces are, in fact, permitted to 'offensively defend' their networks if attacked."

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29.05.2018

"Why Europeans Turned Against Trump"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/trump-europe-iran-bush/561401/?utm_source=feed

Richard Wike erläutert die Ursachen des neuen Antiamerikanismus in Europa und vergleicht dabei die Bush-Ära mit der Präsidentschaft Donald Trumps. "The current round of anti-Americanism is taking place at a moment of anxiety about the fate of the U.S.-led world order and the relative decline of American power. Anti-American sentiments in Europe have often been linked to fears about expanding U.S. military power, economic clout, or the pervasiveness of American culture. These days, by contrast, Europeans seem less concerned about an unrestrained 'hyperpower' flexing its muscles around the world, and more worried about an America withdrawing from the transatlantic relationship. (...) So while Trump’s ratings resemble Bush’s from a decade ago, the tone of Europe’s critique is somewhat different. Whether it’s Iran, trade, climate change, or calling into question the value of long-standing alliances such as NATO, Europeans now regularly lament U.S. disengagement rather than an overreach of American power. Many see an America pulling away from the world order it shaped, the colossus at twilight, turning inward as other powers rise."

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27.05.2018

"How South Korea Pulled Trump and Kim Back From the Brink"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/trump-kim-summit-south-korea/561197/?utm_source
=feed

Dass es nach den turbulenten Entwicklungen am vergangenen Wochenende nun doch zu einem Gipfeltreffen zwischen Donald Trump und Kim Jong-un kommen könnte, sei vor allem Südkorea zu verdanken, schreibt Uri Friedman. "The story of how South Korea nearly managed to bring Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un together for an unprecedented meeting, and to help pull the American and North Korean leaders back from the precipice of war, is often told as if it begins with the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in South Korea. But the tale actually starts much earlier — and it’s still unfinished. (...) [Chung In Moon, a special adviser to President Moon Jae In for foreign affairs and national security,] (...) told me that implementation of the inter-Korean declaration depended on the 'success or failure of the Trump-Kim summit.' And at the time he acknowledged success was not guaranteed. 'The U.S. cannot make North Korea surrender,' he said. 'We all know what we want from North Korea. But we do not know what North Korea wants [and] what Trump can give to North Korea.' These, he noted, are the 'variables in the equation.' Last week the variables did not resolve in South Korea’s favor, highlighting the limits of its control over the diplomatic process that it carefully crafted. But variables, by their nature, just might surprise us yet again."

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26.05.2018

"North Korea Wants to End up Like Pakistan, Not Libya"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/north-korea-pakistan-libya/561341/?utm_source=f
eed

Während die USA in den Verhandlungen mit Nordkorea eine Abrüstung nach dem Vorbild Libyens erreichen wolle, hoffe Nordkorea, dem Vorbild Pakistan folgen zu können, schreibt Dominic Tierney. "From North Korea’s perspective, the Pakistan model must look compelling. First of all, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have successfully deterred India. The 1960s and 1970s were a time of humiliating military defeats for Pakistan, including the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, when Pakistan lost 56,000 square miles of territory, which became the new state of Bangladesh. Nuclear weapons have essentially removed the possibility of a large-scale Indian invasion. (...) In addition, Pakistan’s nuclear capability led the West to handle the country with kid gloves. The United States provided millions of dollars of material assistance to guard Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile, including helicopters and nuclear detection equipment. Pakistan’s nuclear capability is also one reason why Washington continued to provide billions of dollars in military and economic aid, even though Islamabad supported the Taliban insurgency that battled U.S. troops in Afghanistan."

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25.05.2018

"Is the U.S. Bringing Europe and Russia Closer Together?"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/is-the-us-bringing-europe-and-russia-closer-tog
ether/561008/?utm_source=feed

Der Rückzug der USA aus dem Atomabkommen mit dem Iran hat Europa und Russland Yasmeen Serhan zufolge die unerwartete Gelegenheit verschafft, das gemeinsame Interesse an einer Aufrechterhaltung des Abkommens zu verfolgen. Eine darüber hinausgehende Annäherung sei allerdings vorerst nicht zu erwarten. "Though Europe and Russia now find themselves on the same side of the Iran deal issue — opposite the U.S. — it’s still a far cry from complete rapprochement. 'It’s short-term, circumstantial community of interest,' Mathieu Boulègue, a research fellow focusing on Russia and Eurasia at the London-based Chatham House, told me. Not only have Europe and Russia backed opposing sides in the ongoing war in Syria, but Europe also, along with the U.S., continues to impose heavy sanctions on Moscow over its annexation of Crimea in 2014. (...) Boulègue said these differences shouldn’t compromise Russian-European cooperation when it comes to Iran. 'This is the core of diplomacy,' he said, adding: 'It’s not because you’re not friends on one issue that you cannot be friends on another.'"

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23.05.2018

"Former South Korean National-Security Adviser: The U.S. May Have to Withdraw Some Troops"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/us-forces-korea-chun-yungwoo/560852/?utm_source
=feed

Der frühere südkoreanische Nationale Sicherheitsberater Chun Yung Woo hat gegenüber Uri Friedman seine Überzeugung geäußert, dass eine Einigung mit Nordkorea nicht ohne Zugeständnisse im Hinblick auf das Bündnis mit den USA möglich sein wird."(...) a top aide to former South Korean President Lee Myung Bak told me that South Koreans will 'have to live with' a reduction in American forces in Korea 'if that’s necessary and there’s no other way to denuclearize North Korea.' 'If we can make a deal with the U.S. on the basis of partial withdrawal — a drawdown of U.S. troops — that’s something I think we should discuss seriously,' said Chun Yung Woo, who served as national-security adviser to Lee — a conservative hard-liner on North Korea and champion of the U.S.–South Korea alliance — from 2010 to 2013."

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22.05.2018

"Saudi Arabia Hits the Brakes on Reforms"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/saudi-arabia-hits-the-brakes-on-reforms/560870/
?utm_source=feed

Mit der Festnahme einer feministischen Aktivistin in Saudi-Arabien habe das Reformer-Image von Kronprinz Mohammed bin Salman deutliche Kratzer erhalten, schreibt Simon Henderson. "What is happening in the kingdom? MbS may want to discourage any popular protests seeking additional social or political changes. (Over the weekend, one American official told me that the arrests reflected the prince’s personal style, even if his name was not publicly linked to them.) His reforms were always likely to provoke opposition from within Saudi Arabia’s male-dominated, hierarchical society, which follows a strict interpretation of Islam. The apparent need to arrest women activists suggests that MbS is having to rethink his grand plans. (...) Maybe the crown prince now believes that the reform movement he kicked off has spun out of his control. Or maybe he sees that he moved too fast, unsettling the old elites who now need soothing. Or perhaps his father advised him — or was told to advise him — that he needs to slow down."

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17.05.2018

"A Top Adviser to the South Korean President Questions the U.S. Alliance"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/moon-south-korea-us-alliance/560501/?utm_source
=feed

Ein enger Berater des südkoreanischen Präsidenten hat Uri Friedman zufolge in einem Interview die Zukunft der Allianz Südkoreas mit den USA in Frage gestellt. "A top adviser to South Korea’s president says he would eventually like to see the U.S.–South Korea alliance end. In language that sounded almost Trump-like, Chung In Moon, a special adviser to President Moon Jae In for foreign affairs and national security, said in an interview that alliances in general are a 'very unnatural state of international relations' and said that, 'for me, the best thing is to really get rid of alliance.' In the meantime, he says, he 'strongly' supports 'the continued presence of American forces' in Korea, despite hoping for an arrangement that he thinks would better serve his nation’s interests. (...) Moon, who presented his ideas as his personal views, was discussing the future of the alliance as a theoretical question about Asia’s security architecture, not as a matter to be determined in nuclear talks. But his comments nevertheless suggested that if those talks succeed and overhaul geopolitics on the Korean peninsula, the alliance could come due for a reckoning."

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14.05.2018

"In Photos: Chaos and Bloodshed in Gaza"

https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2018/05/in-photos-chaos-and-bloodshed-in-gaza/560333/?utm_source=feed

Alan Taylor mit einer Bilderserie über die gewaltsame Konfrontation zwischen palästinensischen Demonstranten und israelischen Soldaten an der Grenze zu Gaza. "Protests along the Gaza-Israel border were met with tear gas and live fire from Israeli forces, leaving dozens dead and hundreds wounded on Monday. The Palestinian demonstrations marked a confluence of events, including the opening of the new U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem, (moved from Tel Aviv after President Donald Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel), and the upcoming 70th anniversary of what Palestinians call the nakba, or 'catastrophe,' the day thousands were driven from their homes in 1948."

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11.05.2018

"Iran vs. Israel: Is a Major War Ahead?"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/iran-israel-syria/560210/?utm_source=feed

Avi Issacharoff glaubt nicht, dass die aktuelle Konfrontation zwischen Israel und Iran in Syrien zu einem offenen Krieg zwischen beiden Ländern führen wird. "Tehran has no intention of retreating from Syria with its tail between its legs. Israel, on the other hand, has made it clear that it will oppose Iranian entrenchment in Syria at all costs. This makes further rounds of clashes all but inevitable. For two reasons, however, such clashes are unlikely to escalate into all-out war. First, since Iran and Israel do not share a border, it is difficult to see how the present hostilities could spiral into a wide-ranging confrontation involving ground operations. On the other hand, if Iran chooses to involve its proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon, which does share a border with Israel, matters would look quite different, especially given Hezbollah’s exceptional rocket arsenal. This brings us to a second reason war is unlikely: No party regards a full-scale conflict between Israel and Iran as in its strategic interests — Israel and Iran themselves don’t, nor do the U.S. or Russia, or even Hezbollah and Syria."

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10.05.2018

"Singapore: The Safe Choice for Trump's Meeting With Kim Jong Un"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/trump-kim-summit/560129/?utm_source=feed

Das Gipfeltreffen zwischen US-Präsident Trump und dem nordkoreanischen Staatschef Kim Jong Un soll am 12. Juni in Singapur stattfinden. Uri Friedman schreibt, dass mit diesem Verzicht auf Symbolik eine sichere Wahl getroffen worden sei. "Singapore has no special connection to the Korean conflict or the North Korean nuclear crisis. But it does have the distinction of maintaining relatively good relations with both the United States and North Korea, and thus serves as neutral territory. (...) Kim Jiyoon, a senior fellow at the Seoul-based Asan Institute for Policy Studies, said that while a U.S.-North Korea summit in Singapore could focus solely on North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program, a meeting in a place like Panmunjom or the North Korean capital of Pyongyang would suggest something different. It would draw attention not just to denuclearization but also to 'the peace process on the Korean peninsula and … America’s [military] presence in Northeast Asia.' The United States and North Korea may not be prepared to have the latter conversation yet."

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08.05.2018

"The Three Crises Sparked by Trump's Withdrawal From the Iran Deal"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/iran-deal/559964/?utm_source=feed

US-Präsident Donald Trump werde es schwer fallen die Folgen zu ignorieren, die sich aus seiner Entscheidung, das Atomabkommen mit dem Iran aufzukündigen ergeben werden, konstatiert David Frum in The Atlantic. "The first will be a crisis with allies and other partners. Will they agree to reimpose their sanctions on Iran? It’s not just nato countries that will have to be cajoled or coerced. Complying with UN-voted sanctions, India reduced its dependence on Iranian crude oil from 13 percent of its imports in 2009–2010 to 5 percent in 2014–2015. Iran, the second-largest oil supplier to the world’s third-biggest oil importer before the sanctions hit, is rapidly recovering its market share—and India plans to double its imports in the coming year. What’s the plan for getting India back on board?"

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08.05.2018

"Iran Hawks Are the New Iraq Hawks"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/iraq-war-iran-deal/559844/?utm_source=feed

Peter Beinart fühlt sich durch die Präsentation vom Geheiminformationen über das iranische Atomwaffenprogramm durch den israelischen Ministerpräsidenten Bejamin Netanjahu an eine Szene vor 15 Jahren erinnert, als der damalige US-Außenminister Colin Powell vor der UNO über angebliche Massenvernichtungswaffen des Iraks berichtet hatte. "I had a flashback. It was to February 5, 2003, when then-Secretary of State Colin Powell unveiled secret information that supposedly proved that Iraq was deceiving the world about its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. Like Netanyahu’s, Powell’s presentation was dramatic. He informed the United Nations Security Council that some of the material he was about to present came from 'people who have risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to.' He went on to play a secretly recorded conversation of two Iraqi officials supposedly plotting to mislead weapons inspectors. He later presented a photo of bunkers that allegedly held 'active chemical munitions' but were 'clean when the inspectors get there.' Saddam, Powell insisted, wants 'to give those [of] us on this Council the false impression that the inspection process was working.' Powell’s presentation was designed to prove that it was not."

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06.05.2018

"Turkey's Dangerous Game of 'Hostage Diplomacy'"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/turkey-andrew-brunson-erdogan-coup-gulen-kurds/
559748/?utm_source=feed

Der türkische Präsident Erdogan betreibt seine in Deutschland scharf kritisierte "Geisel-Diplomatie" offenbar auch gegenüber den USA. Diego Cupolo berichtet, dass der amerikanische Pastor Andrew Brunson im Oktober 2016 in Izmir wegen angeblicher Spionage und Terrorverbindungen festgenommen worden sei. Brunsons Prozess hat demnach erst eineinhalb Jahre später am 16. April begonnen, ihm drohen 35 Jahre Haft. "For Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Turkey, Brunson’s case offered a chance to engage in a sort of hostage diplomacy. In a speech last fall, Erdogan appeared to link Brunson’s release to his demands for the extradition of Gulen by the Trump administration. (U.S. officials claim they have yet to receive adequate evidence to fulfill the request.) ''Give us the pastor back', they say. You have one pastor as well. Give him to us,' Erdogan said, referring to Gulen. 'Then we will try him [Brunson] and give him to you.'"

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30.04.2018

"What Netanyahu Did and Didn't Say About Iran's Nuclear Program"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/netanyahu-iran-nuclear-program/559295/?utm_sour
ce=feed

Krishnadev Calamur analysiert die von Premierminister Netanjahu präsentierten Vorwürfe gegen den Iran im Detail und weist darauf hin, dass die angeblichen Beweise für ein iranisches Atomwaffenprogramm vor allem den Zeitraum zwischen 1999 und 2003 beträfen. Hinweise auf eine iranische Verletzung des aktuellen Atomabkommens habe Netanjahu nicht vorgelegt. "Although Netanyahu said Iran had lied about possessing a nuclear-weapons program, and had hidden its plans for one in the hopes of picking it up at a later date, he did not say the Islamic Republic wasn’t living up to its international commitments. In that, he reflected the consensus of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which must regularly certify Iran’s compliance with the agreement, as well as the other countries that signed the deal — including the U.S."

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24.04.2018

"ISIS Tactics Have Spread to Other Violent Actors"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/toronto-van-incel/558836/?utm_source=feed

Die Amokfahrt von Toronto hat offenbar keinen terroristischen Hintergrund. Graeme Wood meint allerdings, dass der Täter nicht nur seine Taktik vom "Islamischen Staat" übernommen habe. "In fact the alleged driver turns out to be a Canadian of likely Armenian descent, and sympathetic not to ISIS but, according to a Facebook post the company confirmed to be from the suspect’s since-deleted account, to 'incels,' short for 'involuntarily celibate.' Incels, mostly male, want to have sex but find no willing partners. (...) Sexually undesirable losers have long taken out their frustration on others — mostly individual women; but now, after four years of Islamic State R&D, the menu of mayhem is greatly expanded. (...) ISIS grew, as I have shown, out of a number of other movements that before about 2011 were atomized, separated from each other and pursuing different, if compatible, goals. Syria served as a place for condensation, where like-minded strangers could come together and build a kingdom of God on earth. It was a jihadist flash mob. (...) Once the incels griped to themselves, occasionally victimizing others, and sometimes getting over their pathology or finding a partner. Now they can come together online and find others to validate their grievances and encourage them to action. Dating is harder when you spend a lot of time being bitter online. Murder is easier when someone is whispering at you every few minutes, telling you the rest of the world deserves what it gets."

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24.04.2018

"Trump and Macron See the World Very Differently"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/macron-trump-foreign-policy/558695/?utm_source=
feed

Trotz ihrer öffentlich demonstrierten Nähe hätten Präsident Macron und Präsident Trump in zentralen politischen Fragen grundsätzlich unterschiedliche Ansichten, schreibt Uri Friedman. "Macron is currently engaged in no less than a campaign to convince Trump that when it comes to solving the world’s knottiest problems, the American president essentially has it backwards. (...) Macron is trying to chart 'a third way between the nationalist temptation' that Trump finds alluring and 'the globalist creed' that Trump rails against, Paul Zajac and Benjamin Haddad observe in Foreign Policy. He and Trump are both attuned to the populist backlash against globalization at home, they write. But Macron proposes 'a different set of answers' than Trump — arguing that it’s possible to be patriotic without being parochial, to be both a strong actor in the world and a liberal multilateralist, to be simultaneously independent and interdependent."

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23.04.2018

"How the 'French Obama' Became the 'Trump Whisperer'"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/trumps-friendships-with-world-leaders/558515/?u
tm_source=feed

Mit seinem Besuch in Washington habe Frankreichs Präsident Macron seinen Ruf untermauert, einer der engsten internationalen Freunde Donald Trumps zu sein, schreibt Yasmeen Serhan. "Despite their political differences over the Paris climate accord and the Iran nuclear deal, the two seem to share a mutual respect, perhaps best demonstrated by Trump’s reluctance to criticize Macron publicly. 'No I like him, he’s a friend of mine,' Trump told British TV presenter Piers Morgan during an interview in January, in which Morgan asked Trump whether Macron ('who’s been all over you, trying to be your new best friend') should be perceived as a threat to Britain’s ambitions for a U.K.-U.S. trade deal. 'Emmanuel,' Trump repeated, emphasizing each syllable with a smile. 'He’s a great guy.'"

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16.04.2018

"Trump's Syria Strategy Actually Makes Sense"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/trump-syria/558077/?utm_source=feed

Im Gegensatz zu vielen anderen Beobachtern hält Kori Schake vom International Institute for Strategic Studies die Syrienstrategie von US-Präsident Trump angesichts der Umstände durchaus für überzeugend. Im Gegensatz zu Amtsvorgänger Obama verfolge Trump keine "grandiosen Ziele", die ohnehin zum Scheitern verurteilt wären. "His strategy is to limit American involvement, to push responsibility for outcomes in the region back onto states in the region, and to let power determine outcomes. He has no particular affinity for states in the region, and professes to be a devoted friend to each without committing to enduring obligations to any. He is indifferent to government type, and just as likely to be a benefactor to authoritarians as to democrats. It is an approach international relations theorists call 'realism,' of the variant called 'offshore balancing,' as he seeks to withdraw U.S. forces from the region. The one twist from standard realism is the president’s susceptibility to images of suffering. He indulges an occasional sentimentality to Do Something when randomly confronted by video of victims of chemical weapons attacks. (...) he is willing to act punitively and in a limited way to penalize chemical weapons use. This he has done without letting it upend his strategy: It is not a commitment to change the horrible and predictable outcome of the Syrian civil war; it is narrowly constrained to avoid involving Iran or Russia. (...) Obama was self-deterred, whereas Trump — or at least his administration — runs limited risks. Obama generated false hope among reformers and victims; Trump generates no hope. But he does have a strategy, and it does carefully assess and manage risk to achieve its aims."

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09.04.2018

"What Is America Going to Do About Syria Now?"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/trump-assad-chemical-attack-syria/557498/?utm_s
ource=feed

US-Präsident Trump hat angekündigt, den mutmaßlichen Giftgaseinsatz in Syrien "entschieden" zu beantworten. Uri Friedman schreibt, dass der US-Regierung vier Optionen offen ständen: "(1) Massive Military Engagement (...) (2) Limited Military Engagement (...) Rather than aiming to deter Assad from using chemical weapons , a more realistic goal for limited U.S. strikes is to sanction those who commit atrocities and degrade the Syrian military’s ability to harm its own people, [Tobias Schneider, a research fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin,] reasoned. 'There is no shortage of targets: facilities associated with chemical-weapons programs, airbases used for their delivery, and [the] headquarters of the notorious air force intelligence service, which [is believed to have] coordinated the most recent attacks. ... A broader assault could include munitions factories [and] maintenance and supply bases that keep the teetering loyalist forces afloat.' (...) (3) Diplomatic and Humanitarian Engagement (...) (4) Military Withdrawal. James Dobbins, the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan during the Obama administration, told me that in the near term a 'punitive' U.S. strike 'may be necessary to sustain U.S. credibility' regarding the chemical-weapons taboo. But afterwards, he proposed, the United States should offer to remove its troops from Syria and 'normalize relations' with the Assad government once the U.S-allied Kurds are granted autonomy within their enclave of Syria and all foreign militias, particularly those associated with Iran, are withdrawn from the country."

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01.04.2018

"Sisi's Control of Egypt Is Absolute"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/egypt-election-sisi-trump/557030/?utm_source=fe
ed

Nach dem klaren Sieg von Abdel Fattah al-Sisi bei den Präsidentschaftswahlen in Ägypten erwartet H.A. Hellyer, dass der Staatschef seine unangefochtene Machtposition nutzen könnte, um sich mit Hilfe einer Verfassungsänderung eine dritte Amtszeit zu verschaffen. Eine echte Opposition gebe es nicht mehr, nur die relativ niedrige Wahlbeteiligung könnte für Sisi ein Problem sein. "As things stand now, Sisi would seem to have sufficient support from Egypt’s business elite, along with a substantial proportion of the networks of former President Hosni Mubarak. The opposition to Sisi beyond the state apparatus is also too weak to oppose such a move. Opposition from different actors such as disaffected former supporters, pro-revolutionary activists and political groups, and pro-Muslim Brotherhood stalwarts, does exist. But it is an open question as to whether they can muster enough support to thwart any move to change the constitution. Yet, Sisi shouldn’t be too comfortable. The low voter turnout, despite his vigorous attempts to mobilize voters, suggested a significant level of public apathy. That should concern Cairo. In the medium to long term, such apathy can disrupt a healthy political system."

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29.03.2018

"A New Plan to Create an 'Islam of France'"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/islam-france-macron/556604/?utm_source=feed

Frankreichs Präsident Macron hat Karina Piser zufolge angekündigt, einen neuen Anlauf zur Etablierung eines Islams französischer Prägung zu unternehmen. Einige Experten beurteilten den Plan skeptisch: "(...) many Muslims consider a top-down approach to manage Islam domesticating or patronizing, particularly in light of France’s unresolved colonial legacy in the Arab-Muslim world — a way to assimilate Islam to the point of invisibility. There’s another reason why observers may look upon state-run efforts with skepticism. The primary objective — rarely stated explicitly and often folded into rhetorical platitudes about social cohesion — is clear: fighting radicalization. 'It’s always implied that a French Islam is a moderate one, opposed to terrorism,' said Olivier Roy, a scholar on Islam and professor at the European University Institute in Florence. 'But what does it mean for a religion to be moderate?'"

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21.03.2018

"The Return of the Iraq War Argument"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/iraq-north-korea-war/555929/?utm_source=feed

Hardliner in Washington benutzten bei ihren Überlegungen über einen möglichen Präventivkrieg gegen Nordkorea die gleichen Argumentationsmuster wie vor der Irak-Invasion vor 15 Jahren, schreibt Uri Friedman. Interessanterweise habe Präsident Bush die Bedrohung durch Nordkorea damals heruntergespielt. "Fifteen years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, hardliners are applying one of the arguments for attacking Saddam Hussein to Kim Jong Un: that war now, when a rogue leader is on the verge of possessing weapons of mass destruction, is preferable to a much worse war later, when that leader or his vicious allies would be in a position to use those weapons. Conflict is characterized as a calling on behalf of future generations, rather than a choice by the present ones. (...) Even as the Bush administration warned of mushroom clouds stemming from Iraq, which had no nuclear-weapons program, it downplayed the threat from North Korea, which had just disclosed a secret nuclear-weapons program. The Kim regime could be contained and deterred through diplomacy and economic pressure, officials argued. (...) if the Trump administration were to launch a preventive war against the Kim regime, it would be based on an assessment of its adversary that is fundamentally at odds with the conclusion the Bush administration reached 15 years ago. Bush, too, confronted the specter of a North Korea armed with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. And in that case, he did not choose war."

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15.03.2018

"The Rise of Right-Wing Foreign Policy in America"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/trumps-foreign-policy-gop/555644/?utm_source=fe
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Mit Rex Tillerson sei der letzte Vertreter einer moderaten republikanischen Außenpolitik aus der Trump-Regierung ausgeschieden, schreibt Peter Beinart. Condoleezza Rice und Robert Gates hätten Trump 2017 zur Ernennung Tillersons gedrängt, da sie gehofft hätten, dass der Ex-Manager ihre eigene Weltsicht in der Trump-Regierung vertreten würde. Dieser Versuch sei nun gescheitert. "Like Rice and Gates, Tillerson was — in Walter Russell Mead’s terminology — a 'Hamiltonian.' He believed in prudently managing America’s empire so that American business, and by extension the American people, could prosper. He was not a crusader, a risk-taker, or a moralist. And he didn’t see America’s relationships with other powerful nations as zero-sum. In Tillerson, Rice and Gates saw a chance to smuggle into the Trump administration the moderate Republican foreign-policy establishment that they had served for much of their lives. (...) In Pompeo, Trump is turning to a new Republican foreign-policy elite: one whose ideological lineage dates not to Eisenhower but to McCarthy, not to Nixon and Kissinger but to Goldwater, not to George H.W Bush but to Dick Cheney and George W. Bush. The conservative movement, long hostile to its party’s moderate foreign policy establishment, is creating a new foreign policy establishment of its own."

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06.03.2018

"What If Trump's North Korea Bluster Actually Worked?"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/north-korea-trump-talks/554939/?utm_source=feed

Die diplomatische Offensive Nordkoreas wirft Krishnadev Calamur zufolge die Frage auf, ob die aggressive Nordkorea-Rhetorik des US-Präsidenten tatsächlich die gewünschte Wirkung gezeigt habe. Einige Experten seien der Ansicht, dass die Fortschritte der nordkoreanischen Waffenprogramme eine wichtigere Rolle spielen: "Suzanne DiMaggio, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, said she’d be 'very cautious' in giving the administration too much credit. 'If you look at what the North Koreans have been saying, they have made it clear that they were willing to come to the table when they felt they were able to deter an attack from the United States,' she said. 'Well, now they feel that they can do that.' This, she suggested, was less about what’s happening in Washington than what’s been happening in North Korea. DiMaggio, who has visited North Korea several times, pointed out that the North Koreans said earlier this year that they have, in Kim’s words, perfected 'the national nuclear forces.' 'So if [talks with the U.S.] were to move forward, they would be coming to the table as a country that possesses nuclear weapons,' she said. 'That’s a major difference. And I think that maybe that's given the confidence to initiate a return to talks now.'"

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02.03.2018

"Saudi Crown Prince: Iran's Supreme Leader 'Makes Hitler Look Good'"

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/mohammed-bin-salman-iran-israel/557036/

Jeffrey Goldberg hat ein ausführliches Interview mit dem saudi-arabischen Kronprinzen geführt, in dem sich Mohammed bin Salman u.a. zum Iran und zu Israel äußert. "He was jovial to the point of ebullience when I met him at his brother’s compound outside Washington (his brother, Prince Khalid bin Salman, is the Saudi ambassador to the U.S.). Prince Mohammed (who is known widely by his initials, MbS) seemed eager to download his heterodoxical, contentious views on a number of subjects — on women’s rights (he appears doubtful about the laws that force Saudi women to travel with male relatives); on Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who is, in the prince’s mind, worse than Hitler; and on Israel. He told me he recognizes the right of the Jewish people to have a nation-state of their own next to a Palestinian state; no Arab leader has ever acknowledged such a right."

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