US-Soldaten in Afghanistan

Project Syndicate


suche-links1 2suche-rechts


"Germany’s Dangerous Nuclear Flirtation"

Wolfgang Ischinger hält die vor kurzem angestoßene Debatte über deutsche Atomwaffen für "gefährlich". Aus geopolitischer Sicht würde sich Deutschland als Atommacht demnach in eine Mattsituation manövrieren. "(...) a German nuclear bomb would damage the strategic environment in Europe – to Germany’s disadvantage. Russia would interpret German steps toward a nuclear arsenal as a direct threat to its own national security and would likely adopt military countermeasures. That, in turn, would make it even harder to pursue the vision of a pan-European order of peace and security, a core foreign-policy goal of all German governments since that of Konrad Adenauer. Moreover, a German nuclear ambition might jeopardize the delicate balance of power in Europe – including between Germany and France, for example – with incalculable consequences for the long-term cohesion of the European Union. (...) There are smarter long-term ways to bolster Europe’s nuclear defense than introducing a German bomb. For example, France might be willing to consider playing an extended nuclear-deterrence role, along with the roles of the US and the United Kingdom within NATO. (...) But these are, at best, long-term options. In short, no matter what Trump says, Germany will remain dependent on the US nuclear umbrella for the foreseeable future."

Mehr lesen


"Liberal World Order, R.I.P."

Richard N. Haass hält das Ende der liberalen Weltordnung angesichts der Abkehr der USA von ihrer bisherigen Wächterrolle für nahezu unausweichlich. "It is increasingly difficult to speak of the world as if it were whole. We are seeing the emergence of regional orders – or, most pronounced in the Middle East, disorders – each with its own characteristics. Attempts to build global frameworks are failing. Protectionism is on the rise; the latest round of global trade talks never came to fruition. There are few rules governing the use of cyberspace. At the same time, great power rivalry is returning. (...) the weakening of the liberal world order is due, more than anything else, to the changed attitude of the US. (...) My point is not to single out the US for criticism. Today’s other major powers, including the EU, Russia, China, India, and Japan, could be criticized for what they are doing, not doing, or both. But the US is not just another country. It was the principal architect of the liberal world order and its principal backer. It was also a principal beneficiary. America’s decision to abandon the role it has played for more than seven decades thus marks a turning point. The liberal world order cannot survive on its own, because others lack either the interest or the means to sustain it. The result will be a world that is less free, less prosperous, and less peaceful, for Americans and others alike."

Mehr lesen


"The Double Threat to Liberal Democracy"

Die liberale Demokratie im Westen werde nicht nur durch illiberale und populistische Bewegungen, sondern auch durch einen "undemokratischen Liberalismus" herausgefordert, der politische Handlungsoptionen und demokratische Verantwortlichkeit gewählter Politiker begrenzt, meint der türkische Ökonom Dani Rodrik. Die heutige EU sei ein Modellfall dieses Trends: "Bureaucratic bodies, autonomous regulators, and independent courts set policies, or they are imposed from outside by the rules of the global economy. (...) The European Union perhaps represents the apogee of this tendency. The establishment of a single market and monetary unification in the absence of political integration has required delegation of policy to technocratic bodies such as the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the European Court of Justice. Decision-making increasingly takes place at considerable distance from the public. (...) In the West, liberalism preceded democracy: separation of powers, freedom of expression, and the rule of law were already in place before elites agreed to expand the franchise and submit to popular rule. (...) Elsewhere, in the developing world, popular mobilization occurred in the absence of a liberal tradition or liberal practices. Liberal democracy was rarely a sustainable outcome. (...) Today’s developments in Europe and the US suggest the vexing possibility that liberal democracy may have been a passing phase there as well."

Mehr lesen


"Why Is Japan Populist-Free?"

Ian Buruma erklärt, warum es in Japan im Gegensatz zu Europa und den USA keine rechtspopulistischen Bewegungen gibt, die den politischen Status Quo grundsätzlich in Frage stellen. "Contemporary Japan may have its flaws, but it is now much more egalitarian than the United States, India, or many countries in Europe. By remaining a country of, by, and for the middle class, where the most affluent tend to be discreet, Japan has avoided the dangerous politics roiling developed and developing countries alike. (...) the domestic Japanese economy remains one of the most protected and least globalized in the developed world. There are several reasons why Japanese governments have resisted the neoliberalism promoted in the West since the Reagan/Thatcher years: corporate interests, bureaucratic privileges, and pork-barrel politics of various kinds. But preserving pride in employment, at the cost of efficiency, is one of them. If this stifles individual enterprise, then so be it."

Mehr lesen


"The Changing Geopolitics of Energy"

Die Schiefergas-Revolution habe zu einer tektonischen Verschiebung in den internationalen Beziehungen geführt, stellt der Politikwissenschaftler Joseph S. Nye fest. Nachdem viele Experten vor zehn Jahren noch vor der Abhängigkeit der USA von Energieimporten gewarnt hätten, scheine die amerikanische Machtposition nun längerfristig gesichert. "As Harvard’s Meghan O’Sullivan points out in her smart new book Windfall, the shale revolution has a number of implications for US foreign policy. She argues that the new energy abundance increases US power. (...) There are also domestic political effects. One is psychological. For some time, many people in the US and abroad have bought into the myth of American decline. Increasing dependence on energy imports was often cited as evidence. The shale revolution has changed that, demonstrating the combination of entrepreneurship, property rights, and capital markets that constitute the country’s underlying strength. In that sense, the shale revolution has also enhanced American soft power."

Mehr lesen


"The Arab Autocracy Trap"

Sechs Jahre nach Beginn des Arabischen Frühlings habe sich die wirtschaftliche und politische Lebenssituation für die meisten Araber spürbar verschlechtert, stellt der frühere israelische Außenminister Shlomo Ben-Ami fest. Länder wie Ägypten, Saudi-Arabien und zum Teil Marokko steckten in einer "Autokratie-Falle", die erneute revolutionäre Umwälzungen fast unausweichlich erscheinen lasse. "Unemployment is rife in the Middle East and North Africa, where two thirds of the population is between the ages of 15 and 29. And throughout the region, regimes have closed off channels for political expression, and responded to popular protests with increasing brutality. The governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and, to some extent, Morocco, epitomize Arab regimes’ seeming inability to escape the autocracy trap – even as current circumstances suggest that another popular awakening is imminent."

Mehr lesen


"The Case for Kurdistan"

Der frühere israelische Außenminister Shlomo Ben-Ami hofft, dass sich die US-Regierung vom "Trugbild" eines stabilen, demokratischen und föderalen Irak verabschieden und die Bildung eines kurdischen Staates im Norden des Landes unterstützen wird. "To be sure, the establishment of a 'greater Kurdistan' that includes all areas where the Kurds comprise a majority remains impossible. If internal Kurdish politics were not enough to prevent such an outcome, geostrategic constraints certainly would be. (...) As the experience in Yugoslavia showed, when ethnic or religious cleavages explode, the most effective path to peace may well be separation. And a Kurdish state has a real chance of thriving: an independent Kurdistan could manage to combine natural-resource wealth with a tradition of stable and pragmatic governance, thereby creating a sustainable democracy. This would amount to a win for pro-Western forces in the Middle East. Even Turkey may be willing to accept such an outcome. The US and Turkish governments agree on distinguishing the Kurds in Iraq from those in Turkey, for whom statehood is not an option."

Mehr lesen


"Germany’s New Power of the Purse"

Die jüngste Verschärfung der deutschen Türkeipolitik deutet nach Ansicht von Mark Leonard vom European Council on Foreign Relations darauf hin, dass Deutschland seine wirtschaftliche Macht künftig verstärkt für strategische Ziele einsetzen könnte. "During the euro crisis, Germany deployed economic means for economic ends within Europe. But in its policies toward Russia, Turkey, China, and the United States, Germany has increasingly been using its economic strength to advance larger strategic goals. (...) Germany’s new approach to great-power politics has evolved incrementally, and in response to seemingly unrelated events. But even if Germany isn’t following a master plan, its core strengths have enabled it to leverage its economic power, use EU institutions and budgets as a force multiplier, and build international coalitions in pursuit of strategic goals."

Mehr lesen


"Why We Need Political Islam"

Der frühere israelische Außenminister Shlomo Ben-Ami hält es für falsch, politische Islamisten auszugrenzen oder, wie von US-Präsident Trump angedacht, als Terrororganisation zu verbieten. Derartige Schritte würden nur zu mehr Gewalt durch radikalisierte Anhänger der betroffenen Organisationen führen. Eine politische Teilhabe von Islamisten wie in Marokko und Tunesien würde dagegen zu deren Moderation beitragen. "Where Islamist parties have been given space for political action, they have shown a capacity to take advantage of it, often advocating political participation as a superior alternative to violence. And, indeed, Islamist parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, are engaged in legitimate political activities in several countries – activities that have often driven them to moderate their views. (...) Creating space for benign expressions of Islam in the public sphere is essential to defeat global jihadism. Only when the war against jihadism shifts from the battlefield to the political arena can Arab societies move toward a more secure and prosperous future."

Mehr lesen


"What Liberal World Order?"

Mark Leonard vom European Council on Foreign Relations stellt fest, dass die vielbeschworene "liberale Weltordnung" heute selbst im Westen zu einem umstrittenen Konzept geworden sei. "This is not to say that the liberal world order is an entirely obscure concept. The original iteration – call it 'Liberal Order 1.0' – arose from the ashes of World War II to uphold peace and support global prosperity. (...) After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, a triumphant West expanded the concept of the liberal world order substantially. The result – Liberal Order 2.0 – penetrated countries’ borders to consider the rights of those who lived there. (...) But now the West itself is rejecting the order that it created, often using the very same logic of sovereignty that the rising powers used. (...) In the months ahead, many leaders will need to make a bet on whether the liberal order will survive – and on whether they should invest resources in bringing about that outcome. The West collectively has the power to uphold Liberal Order 1.0. But if the Western powers can’t agree on what they want from that order, or what their responsibilities are to maintain it, they are unlikely even to try."

Mehr lesen


"Ensuring Euro-Atlantic Security"

Der frühere britische Verteidigungsminister Des Browne, der Leiter der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz Wolfgang Ischinger, der frühere russische Außenminister Igor S. Ivanov und Sam Nunn von der Nuclear Threat Initiative schlagen in diesem gemeinsamen Beitrag einige konkrete Schritte zur Stärkung der euro-atlantischen Sicherheit vor. "The first step in acting to advance our common interests is to identify and pursue concrete, practical, near-term initiatives designed to reduce risks, rebuild trust, and improve the Euro-Atlantic security landscape. There are five key areas that such initiatives should cover. · We must reduce the danger of a nuclear weapon being used. (...) · We must reduce the risks associated with keeping nuclear forces on 'prompt-launch' status, whereby they are ready for immediate launch and can hit their targets within minutes. (...) · We must reduce the threat of nuclear and radiological materials falling into the wrong hands. (...) · We must reduce the risks of a military confrontation by improving military-to-military communication through a new NATO-Russia Military Crisis Management Group. (...) · We must reduce the risk of a mid-air incident leading to a political or military conflict."

Mehr lesen


"The Siren Song of 'Strongmania'"

Weltweit seien in der Politik die "starken Männer" auf dem Vormarsch. Grund genug für Minxin Pei, Professor am Claremont McKenna College mit Negativbeispielen davor zu warnen, wohin autokratisch geführte Regierungspolitik mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit führen werde. Nämlich in den wirtschaftlichen Ruin. "One need look no further than Venezuela, where today’s economic meltdown can be traced back to the disastrous rule of populist par excellence Hugo Chávez. People loved Chávez’s social-welfare schemes, seemingly unconcerned that they were based on oil revenues and foreign debt. As long as the benefits flowed, Chávez was free to expropriate industries and otherwise discourage private competition. Unsurprisingly, economic diversification stalled, and when oil prices collapsed, so did the economy. This highlights a key reason why strongmen nearly always lead their countries toward catastrophe. After winning over voters with their apparent decisiveness and directness, such leaders capture enough authority to make quick decisions and demonstrate short-term results – thereby keeping voters on their side as they claim still greater authority. But decisiveness carries a high cost. With nobody checking their behavior, strongmen rarely account for long-term risks. In the end, the prosperity they promised never arrives, at least not for long. Instead, the economy usually ends up in ruins."

Mehr lesen


"Who’s Winning the Middle East’s Cold War?"

Robert Harvey zieht ein Zwischenfazit des "Kalten Krieges" zwischen den beiden Regionalmächten Iran und Saudi-Arabien und stellt fest, dass Teheran im Moment scheinbar im Vorteil sei. Die Saudis hätten darauf mit einer aggressiven Ölpolitik und der militärischen Intervention in Jemen geantwortet. "(...) the long-term outcome of this cold war is not hard to predict. Iran and Russia can never be more than foothold powers in the Arab world. The Shia might be able to maintain influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon (through Hezbollah), but they will be unable to compete more broadly. Some 90% of Arabs are Sunni Muslims, and thus potential Saudi allies. The Saudis can afford to be more mature, and less suspicious than they have been. The US should take steps to reassure them – while never easing up pressure to improve human rights and implement political and economic reforms."

Mehr lesen


"Springtime for Fascism?"

Ian Buruma meint, dass der Begriff "Faschismus" bei der Beschreibung aktueller politischer Entwicklungen im Westen überstrapaziert werde. Einer effektiven Bekämpfung von "Demagogen" wie Trump oder Wilders sei dies sogar hinderlich. "The problem with terms like 'fascism' or 'Nazi' is that so many ignorant people have used them so often, in so many situations, that they have long ago lost any real significance. Few still know firsthand what fascism actually meant. It has become a catch-all phrase for people or ideas we don't like. (...) As a result, we are too easily distracted from the real dangers of modern demagoguery. After all, it is not hard for Trump – or the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders, or Putin, or Duterte – to refute accusations of being fascists or Nazis. (...) Today’s populist leaders should not yet be compared to murderous dictators of the fairly recent past. But, by exploiting the same popular sentiments, they are contributing to a poisonous climate, which could bring political violence into the mainstream once again."

Mehr lesen


"Do We Want Powerful Leaders?"

Angesichts der Kontroversen um den türkischen Präsidenten und die US-Präsidentschaftskandidatur Donald Trumps fragt Joseph S. Nye, Jr., welchen Platz "mächtige Anführer" in der heutigen Demokratie hätten. Letztlich komme es auf die politischen Institutionen an, die den Aufstieg bzw. die Machtfülle "narzisstischer" Persönlichkeiten wie Trump begrenzten. "In the early United States, James Madison and the new country’s other founders saw that neither leaders nor followers would be angels, and that institutions must be designed to reinforce restraints. They concluded from their study of the ancient Roman Republic that what was needed to prevent the rise of an overweening leader like Julius Caesar was an institutional framework of separation of powers, whereby faction would balance faction. Madison’s answer to the possibility of an 'American Mussolini' was a system of institutional checks and balances ensuring that the US would never resemble Italy in 1922 – or Russia, China, or Turkey today. The American founders wrestled with the dilemma of how powerful we want our leaders to be. Their answer was designed to preserve liberty, not maximize government efficiency."

Mehr lesen


"Is Globalization Really Fueling Populism?"

Daniel Gros vom Center for European Policy Studies in Brüssel widerspricht dem Argument, dass der linke und rechte "Populismus" in den USA und in Europa vor allem von "Globalisierungsverlierern" befeuert werde. "(...) if these factors account for the rise of populism, they must have somehow intensified in the last few years, with low-skill workers’ circumstances and prospects deteriorating faster vis-à-vis their high-skill counterparts. And that simply is not the case, especially in Europe. (...) Calling the rise of populism in Europe a revolt by the losers of globalization is not just simplistic; it is misleading. If we are to stem the rise of potentially dangerous political forces in Europe, we need to understand what is really driving it – even if the explanation is more complex than we would like."

Mehr lesen


"Roman Europe?"

Anatole Kaletsky schreibt, dass Italien in der EU angesichts einer zunehmenden Desillusionierung mit der deutschen Europapolitik eine zunehmend eigenständige Führungsrolle übernehme. "(...) where can a Europe disillusioned with German leadership now turn? The obvious candidates will not or cannot take on the role: Britain has excluded itself; France is paralyzed until next year’s presidential election and possibly beyond; and Spain cannot even form a government. That leaves Italy, a country that, having dominated Europe’s politics and culture for most of its history, is now treated as 'peripheral.' But Italy is resuming its historic role as a source of Europe’s best ideas and leadership in politics, and also, most surprisingly, in economics."

Mehr lesen


"A Latin American Spring?"

In lateinamerikanischen Ländern kommt es immer häufiger zu öffentlichen Protesten gegen die verbreitete Korruption von Regierungen und Behörden. Luis Alberto, Präsident der Inter-American Development Bank, betrachtet die Demonstrationen als Teil einer positiven Entwicklung der Region. "Since returning to democratic rule in the 1980s and 1990s, many Latin American countries have been quietly working to strengthen their political systems’ checks and balances, from enhancing the legislature’s authority to analyze budgets and monitor spending to reinforcing the judiciary’s capacity to prosecute complex financial crimes. (...) These are the kinds of unglamorous changes that rarely generate headlines. Yet they are indispensable to building trust in public institutions – which in turn is essential to economic progress. (...) By and large, Latin America’s elected officials are getting the message and rushing to join good governance initiatives, such as the multilateral Open Government Partnership. It is time for the private sector, which has all too often tolerated corruption as an unavoidable cost of doing business, to take a stand as well."

Mehr lesen


"Ending Blowback Terrorism"

Der US-Ökonom und Entwicklungsexperte Jeffrey D. Sachs hält die Terroranschläge in Paris für eine unbeabsichtigte Folge der zum Teil verdeckten westlichen Militär- und Geheimdienstoperationen im Nahen Osten, Afrika und Zentralasien. "Three steps are needed to defeat ISIS and other violent jihadists. First, US President Barack Obama should pull the plug on CIA covert operations. (...) Second, the US, Russia, and the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council should immediately stop their infighting and establish a framework for Syrian peace. (...) Finally, the long-term solution to regional instability lies in sustainable development. The entire Middle East is beset not only by wars but also by deepening development failures: intensifying fresh water stress, desertification, high youth unemployment, poor educational systems, and other serious blockages."

Mehr lesen


"Avoiding Conflict in the South China Sea"

Der Politikwissenschaftler Joseph S. Nye, Jr. ist sicher, dass die Territorialstreitigkeiten zwischen China und anderen Ländern im Südchinesischen Meer durch internationale Diplomatie und über Rechtsverfahren des United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS) gelöst werden können. "The irony is that the US Senate’s failure to ratify UNCLOS means that the US cannot take China to ITLOS [International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea] over its efforts to convert reefs into islands and claim exclusion zones that could interfere with the right of free passage – a major US interest. But, because China has ratified UNCLOS and the US respects it as customary international law, there is a basis for serious direct negotiation over clarification of the ambiguous nine-dashed line and the preservation of freedom of the seas. With properly managed diplomacy, a US-China conflict in the South China Sea can and should be avoided."

Mehr lesen


"A New Cold War Order?"

Michail Gorbatschow, letzter Präsident der Sowjetunion, warnt in diesem Beitrag, dass Europa in einem neuen Szenario des "Kalten Krieges" der große Verlierer sein würde. Die Erfahrung der 1980er Jahre lehre, dass diese Entwicklung durch einen ernsthaften Dialog beider Seiten verhindert werden könnte. "Promising signs are now emerging, though initial efforts have yielded only modest and fragile results: the Minsk agreement on a ceasefire and military disengagement in Ukraine; the trilateral gas agreement concluded by Russia, Ukraine, and the European Union; and a halt to the escalation of mutual sanctions. We must continue to move from polemics and mutual accusations to a search for points of convergence and a gradual lifting of sanctions, which are damaging to both sides. As a first step, the so-called personal sanctions that affect political figures and parliamentarians should be lifted, so that they can rejoin the process of seeking mutually acceptable solutions. One area for interaction could be to help Ukraine overcome the consequences of fratricidal war and rebuild the affected regions."

Mehr lesen


"The Era of Disorder"

Richard N. Haass, Präsident des Council on Foreign Relations, ist der Ansicht, dass wir gegenwärtig Zeuge des Endes einer weltpolitischen Ära seien. Die neue Ära werde sehr viel ungeordneter und weniger friedlich sein, so seine Prognose. "This is not to argue that we are in for a new Dark Ages. Interdependence acts as a brake on what governments can do without hurting themselves. The world economy has recovered somewhat from its nadir six years ago. Europe is mostly stable, as is Latin America and an increasing share of Africa. There is also the possibility of pushing back against the new disorder. (...) But what can be accomplished is likely to be limited by countries’ domestic politics, the absence of international consensus, and the waning of US influence, which no other country is able to replace and few are willing even to support in promoting order. The result is a world less at peace, less prosperous, and less adept at meeting the challenges it faces than it was in the post-Cold War era."

Mehr lesen


"Europe in a Multipolar World"

Volker Perthes von der Berliner Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik schreibt, dass sich sowohl Europa als auch Russland um eine diplomatische Lösung der Ukraine-Krise bemühen sollten, wenn sie ihre Position in der künftigen multipolaren Welt nicht gefährden wollten. Aus Sicht Europas sei z.B. auffällig, dass viele blockfreie Staaten eine klare Verurteilung der Ukraine-Politik Russlands vermieden hätten. "The implicit message from the new non-aligned is straightforward: Why should we care about a territorial conflict in Europe when you Europeans fail to act decisively on Palestine, Kashmir, or territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas? Instead, many of these countries are calling on the West to de-escalate the crisis (...) if Europe is unable to resolve the Ukraine crisis with diplomacy, its global influence, and that of Russia, will surely fade. Russia has reminded the world that it is possible to bully one’s neighbors and steal their territory using brute force; but, in a globalized, multi-polar system, this alone will not be enough to rally other countries to its cause. And the EU, as a highly sophisticated paper tiger, would be no more attractive."

Mehr lesen


"America’s Late Imperial Dilemma"

US-Präsident Obama werde sowohl von liberalen Interventionisten als auch von konservativen Falken vorgeworfen, "Schwäche" auszustrahlen und einen internationalen Rückzug der USA voranzutreiben, schreibt Ian Buruma in seinem kurz vor der aktuellen Irak-Krise veröffentlichten Beitrag. Obamas Kritiker glaubten nach wie vor, dass es die Mission der USA sei, der Welt den amerikanischen Willen aufzuzwingen, sei es nun im Namen der Demokratie oder aufgrund von Machtinteressen. Obama selbst habe dagegen erkannt, dass die Reichweite der amerikanischen Macht in der neuen Weltordnung begrenzt sei. "At least he has recognized the limits of America’s power to impose a global order by force. His success as a president rests less on the good things he has done (although he has done plenty) than on the stupid things he has avoided, like getting into more unnecessary wars. This does not resolve the late imperial dilemma of how to reduce dependency on the hegemon without causing more tyranny and violence. But that painful and risky process will have to be launched eventually, and it will be better served by Obama’s brand of caution than by the tough talk of his critics."

Mehr lesen


"Alarmglocken in Asien"

Der amerikanische "Schwenk nach Asien" stehe bereits wieder vor seinem Ende, schreibt Brahma Chellaney, Strategie-Experte vom Center for Policy Research in Neu-Delhi. Angesichts der "zunehmend brachialen Außenpolitik" Chinas hätten die USA keine Führungsrolle übernommen, sondern einen "neutralen Kurs" eingeschlagen. "Während die USA China besänftigen, werden Länder wie Japan, Indien, die Philippinen und Vietnam gezwungen hinzunehmen, dass sie mit Chinas militärischem Eindringen alleine fertigwerden müssen. Deshalb müssen sie ihre Bemühungen verstärken, glaubhafte militärische Kapazitäten aufzubauen. Dieser Trend könnte zu einem Comeback von militärisch unabhängigen asiatischen Mächten führen, die enge strategische Freunde der USA bleiben. In diesem Sinne würden sie in die Fußstapfen von zwei engen US-Verbündeten treten – dem Vereinigten Königreich und Frankreich –, die eindrucksvolle Abschreckungsmittel aufgebaut haben, anstatt ihre Sicherheit den USA zu überlassen. Das wäre eine Entwicklung für Asien, die USA und die gesamte Welt, die alles verändern würde."

Mehr lesen


"Stopping Russia Starts in Syria"

Anne-Marie Slaughter glaubt, dass die USA Russland durch eine militärische Intervention im syrischen Bürgerkrieg beeindrucken sollten. Moskau und auch Peking würde dadurch gezeigt, dass Washington nach wie vor fähig und willens sei, das eigene Militär offensiv zur Verteidigung eigener Interessen einzusetzen. "Obama took office with the aim of ending wars, not starting them. But if the US meets bullets with words, tyrants will draw their own conclusions. So will allies; Japan, for example, is now wondering how the US will respond should China manufacture a crisis over the disputed Senkaku Islands. To lead effectively, in both the national and the global interest, the US must demonstrate its readiness to shoulder the full responsibilities of power. Striking Syria might not end the civil war there, but it could prevent the eruption of a new one in Ukraine."

Mehr lesen


"The West’s Financial Arsenal"

Der Wirtschaftshistoriker Harold James schreibt, dass der Westen in seiner Reaktion auf das russische Vorgehen in der Ukraine eine neue Art "finanzieller Kriegführung" betreibe. Aus guten Gründen werde eine militärische Intervention zur Verteidigung der Regierung in Kiew ausgeschlossen, die Geschichte zeige jedoch, dass ein Krieg auch durch ein finanzielles "Wettrüsten" herbeigeführt werden könnte. "The arms race that preceded World War I was accompanied by exactly the same mixture of military reluctance and eagerness to experiment with the power of markets. (...) At that time, financial-reform efforts were driven by the notion that building up financial buffers would make the world safe. But this belief fueled excessive confidence among those responsible for the reforms, preventing them from anticipating that military measures would soon be needed to protect the economy. Instead of being an alternative to war, the financial arms race made war more likely – as it may well be doing with Russia today."

Mehr lesen


"Will the IMF Lose Ukraine?"

Mitchell A. Orenstein, Politikwissenschaftler an der Northeastern University, stellt fest, dass der Westen bei seiner Wirtschaftshilfe in der Ukraine offenbar nicht auf Wachstum, sondern ein hartes Austeritätsprogramm setzen wolle. Die hohen Subventionen, z.B. bei den Energiepreisen, seien tatsächlich ein Problem, ihre abrupte Reduzierung durch eine nicht gewählte Regierung könnte allerdings politisch folgenreich sein, so Orenstein. "No successful Eastern European government has been asked to impose a dramatic austerity and reform program prior to democratic elections; it would be utter folly to start now. In Poland, the region’s star reformer, and elsewhere in post-communist Europe, citizens were asked to make the sacrifices that economic reform requires only after the government had gained a popular mandate. Ukraine is still a step away from this politically. If the IMF insists that the interim Ukrainian government impose austerity immediately, the country will be forced to break uncertain new ground at a particularly dangerous time."

Mehr lesen


"Duties Without Borders"

Sollte die US-Regierung aus moralischen Gründen militärisch in sicherheitspolitische Krisen wie die in Syrien eingreifen? Joseph S. Nye, Politikwissenschaftler an der Harvard University, analysiert die Komplexität dieser Entscheidungen, die nicht zuletzt davon abhingen, ob die Opfer der Krise von den möglichen Helfern als Mitglieder einer geteilten "vorgestellten Gemeinschaft" angesehen werden. "We may admire leaders who make efforts to increase their followers’ sense of moral duties beyond borders; but it does little good to hold leaders to an impossible standard that would undercut their capacity to remain leaders. As Obama wrestles with determining his responsibilities in Syria and elsewhere, he faces a serious moral dilemma. As Appiah says, duties beyond borders are a matter of degree; and there are also degrees of intervention that range from aid to refugees and arms to different degrees of the use of force. But even when making these graduated choices, a leader also owes his followers a duty of prudence – of remembering the Hippocratic oath to first of all, do no harm."

Mehr lesen


"Friendless China"

Nach Ansicht von Brahma Chellaney, Politikwissenschaftler am Center for Policy Research in Neu-Delhi, hat China bei seinem geopolitischen Aufstieg die beiden "Vasallen" Myanmar und Nordkorea vor den Kopf gestoßen und steht heute ohne echte Verbündete da. "The question now is whether the United States and other powers can use this development to create a diplomatic opening to North Korea that could help transform northeast Asia’s fraught geopolitics."

Mehr lesen

suche-links1 2suche-rechts

Hier finden Sie die Redaktion der Sicherheitspolitischen Presseschau.

Mehr lesen



Europa, Asien, Afrika, Amerika und weltweite Phänomene und Institutionen. Die bpb bietet ein breites Angebot zu internationalen Themen.

Mehr lesen


Informationsportal Krieg und Frieden

Wo gibt es Kriege und Gewaltkonflikte? Und wo herrscht am längsten Frieden? Welches Land gibt am meisten für Rüstung aus? liefert wichtige Daten und Fakten zu Krieg und Frieden.

Mehr lesen auf


Innerstaatliche Konflikte

Vom Kosovo nach Kolumbien, von Somalia nach Süd-Thailand: Weltweit schwelen über 280 politische Konflikte. Und immer wieder droht die Lage gewaltsam zu eskalieren.

Mehr lesen

Zahlen und Fakten


Kaum ein Thema wird so intensiv und kontrovers diskutiert wie die Globalisierung. "Zahlen und Fakten" liefert Grafiken, Texte und Tabellen zu einem der wichtigsten und vielschichtigsten Prozesse der Gegenwart.

Mehr lesen

Publikationen zum Thema

Coverbild Internationale Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert

Internationale Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert

Die internationale Sicherheit ist fragil und bedroht. Wie können und müssen demokratische Systeme ...

Internationale Sicherheitspolitik Cover

Internationale Sicherheitspolitik

Seit Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts hat sich die internationale Sicherheitspolitik deutlich verändert....

Zum Shop