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24.07.2019

"Max Weber Diagnosed His Time and Ours"

http://https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/central-europe/2019-07-24/max-weber-diagnosed-his-time-and
-ours

Der Historiker Robert Zaretsky meint, dass die Lektüre des deutschen Soziologen Max Weber zum Verständnis der aktuellen politischen Umstände beitragen könne. "In early 1919, Germany risked becoming a failed state. Total war had morphed into a civil war that pitted revolutionaries against reactionaries, internationalists against nationalists, and civilians against soldiers. Munich was the bloodiest arena: over a few short months, the city was ruled by a Bavarian king, a socialist prime minister, and a Soviet republic. The first was overthrown, the second murdered, and supporters of the third slaughtered. “Everything is wretched, and everything is bloody,” Victor Klemperer, a professor at the University of Munich, wrote in his diary, 'and you always want to laugh and cry at once.' These events framed the much-anticipated lecture 'Politics as a Vocation' that Klemperer’s colleague Max Weber gave that same year. One hundred years later, there are few better texts to serve as a guide for the increasingly wretched and violent events now unfolding in our own time and place. In particular, Weber’s discussion of the charismatic politician, as well as his distinction between the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility, has perhaps even greater relevance in our own era than in his."

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17.07.2019

"Why the Strait of Hormuz Is Still the World’s Most Important Chokepoint"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-07-17/why-strait-hormuz-still-worlds-most-important-chokepoi
nt

Allen James Fromherz meint mit Verweis auf die 1980 ausgerufene Carter-Doktrin, dass die USA die Sicherheit der Straße von Hormus auch militärisch garantieren sollten. "One reason for this destabilizing opportunism may be the faulty assumption by U.S. policymakers that the Carter Doctrine, under which the United States vowed to use military force to protect its interests in the Gulf, no longer applies. As the United States consumes less oil from the Middle East, the argument goes, its need to ensure the security of the region also decreases. That, however, misunderstands both history and geopolitics. The United States depends on Gulf security for more than oil. The United States depends on Gulf security for more than oil. First, and most crucially, the rising possibility of nuclear conflict (...). Second, the amount of trade that passes through Hormuz has grown rapidly with the rise of the wealthy oil states along the Gulf. Finally, the United States has invested heavily in naval bases, in Bahrain, Qatar, and elsewhere, that are accessible by sea only through Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz will remain the world’s most valuable and vulnerable trade and maritime chokepoints, no matter how much oil prices might decline. (...) Hormuz needs a steady guarantor of security, even an imperfect one."

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09.07.2019

"Why Turkey Turned Its Back on the United States and Embraced Russia"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2019-07-09/why-turkey-turned-its-back-united-states-and-em
braced-russia

Die Wurzeln der augenscheinlichen Abkehr der Türkei von den USA liegen nach Ansicht von Aaron Stein auch im Irak-Krieg. "(...) since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which paved the way for a more assertive Kurdish regional government, Turkey has viewed the United States as a destabilizing force in the Middle East. U.S. support for Kurdish militias in Syria has cemented that view in Ankara, driving Turkey into Russia’s arms and raising questions about the country’s commitment to NATO. For proof of how little faith Turkey places in Washington these days, look no further than its plan to acquire Russia’s advanced S-400 missile defense system."

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26.06.2019

"Who Says Foreign Policy Doesn’t Win Elections?"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-america/2019-06-26/who-says-foreign-policy-doesnt-win-elect
ions

Dina Smeltz meint, dass die Außenpolitik des US-Präsidenten seinen demokratischen Herausforderern eine "goldene Gelegenheit" bieten würde. "While American attitudes on foreign policy tend to change very slowly, surveys conducted since Trump’s election in 2016 capture some interesting shifts, especially among Democratic voters. In the era of 'America first,' Democrats are even more likely than usual to rally behind U.S. allies and multilateralism. Overwhelming majorities of Democrats support the Iran nuclear agreement, the Paris climate accord, and trade — all of which reads as a rebuke of Trump. What’s more surprising is that the public at large generally shares these views, though by more modest majorities. (...) A recent Pew Research Center survey found that 70 percent of Democrats and those leaning toward the Democratic Party rate improving relationships with U.S. allies as their top foreign policy goal. Large majorities of Democrats also say that U.S. relations with the rest of the world are worsening (85 percent, according an unpublished partisan breakdown of the 2018 Chicago Council Survey) and the United States is losing allies (77 percent, according to the same poll). The broader electorate feels similarly, with 56 percent of Americans saying foreign relations are worsening and 57 percent saying the United States is losing allies. In this light, Trump’s foreign policy 'successes' look more like liabilities. We should expect Trump’s Democratic challengers to exploit them."

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11.06.2019

"A World Safe for Autocracy?"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-06-11/world-safe-autocracy

Jessica Chen Weiss widerspricht der Analyse einiger westlicher Politiker und Experten, die China auf einer Art globalen Kreuzzug gegen die liberale Demokratie sehen. "This fear gets the challenge from Beijing wrong. Not since the days of Mao Zedong has China sought to export revolution or topple democracy. (...) Beijing’s behavior suggests that China is a disgruntled and increasingly ambitious stakeholder in that order, not an implacable enemy of it. In seeking to make the world safer for the CCP [Chinese Communist Party], Beijing has rejected universal values and made it easier for authoritarian states to coexist alongside democracies. (...) At home and abroad, the CCP is fighting a defensive ideological battle against liberal norms of democracy and human rights, but so far at least, it is not engaged in a determined effort to spread autocracy. In order to respond to Beijing’s actions effectively, the United States and its allies will need to be more precise about what exactly China is doing. In the end, the best way to respond to China is to make democracy work better."

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11.06.2019

"The Self-Destruction of American Power"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-06-11/self-destruction-american-power

Fareed Zakaria wirft den USA in seinem Essay für das Magazin Foreign Affairs vor, den "unipolaren Moment" der unangefochtenen Dominanz in den Jahren nach 1989 "verschwendet" zu haben. "There were deep structural forces in the international system that inexorably worked against any one nation that accumulated so much power. In the American case, however, one is struck by the ways in which Washington — from an unprecedented position — mishandled its hegemony and abused its power, losing allies and emboldening enemies. And now, under the Trump administration, the United States seems to have lost interest, indeed lost faith, in the ideas and purpose that animated its international presence for three-quarters of a century. (...) Had the country acted more consistently in the pursuit of broader interests and ideas, it could have continued its influence for decades (albeit in a different form). The rule for extending liberal hegemony seems simple: be more liberal and less hegemonic. But too often and too obviously, Washington pursued its narrow self-interests, alienating its allies and emboldening its foes. (...) What remains, then, are American ideas. (...) The question now is whether, as American power wanes, the international system it sponsored — the rules, norms, and values — will survive. Or will America also watch the decline of its empire of ideas?"

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30.05.2019

"Why Venezuela’s Regime Hasn’t Collapsed"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2019-05-30/why-venezuelas-regime-hasnt-collapsed

Trotz des anhaltenden Drucks auf die Maduro-Regierung deutet Laura Gamboa Gutiérrez zufolge bisher kaum etwas auf einen Durchbruch für Oppositionsführer Guaidó hin. Hauptgrund sei die nach wie vor intakt erscheinende militärisch-zivile Allianz, die Maduro an der Macht halte. "(...) chipping away at Maduro’s military support is only half the equation. The opposition also needs to offer Maduro’s backers a way out. Venezuela’s generals would rather stay penniless but in power than step down and end up imprisoned. Here is where amnesty and transitional justice mechanisms come in: the opposition needs to craft amnesty laws attractive enough for those in office to give up power and comprehensive enough that they will not be overturned by domestic or international courts in the future. So far, attempts to do so have failed. (...) The failure of last month’s uprising does not mean that Maduro will last forever. In fact, seeing how close the opposition got to toppling him might have made Maduro more willing to engage in a meaningful dialogue in Norway. Until that happens, however, the unforgiving logic of regime change will continue to compel his military backers to stand by him — at least for now."

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29.05.2019

"This Is Not a Great-Power Competition"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-05-29/not-great-power-competition

Die aktuelle Rivalität zwischen den USA, China und Russland werde durch den Begriff des "Wettbewerbs der Großmächte" nur ungenau umschrieben, meint Michael J. Mazarr. "To see the state of international relations today as a new great-power competition is not only inaccurate but dangerous. Viewing competitors as mirror images of one another — as standard-issue great powers, motivated in similar ways and subject to the same kinds of influence — prevents U.S. policymakers from making crucial distinctions. Russia and China, for example, pose very different challenges for Washington. Both seek regime security and recognition as equal powers, but Russia aims to disrupt the current U.S.-led order whereas China seeks to supplant the United States’ role at the hub of world politics. Conceiving of the emerging era as a classic great-power competition can not only obscure important differences between competitors but also lead policymakers to overemphasize military power as an instrument to advance U.S. interests. (...) Finally and most perilous, a great-power competition frame risks forfeiting the immense power that comes from heading a largely aligned group of rule-following states. (...) To abandon this role would be to walk away from the greatest competitive advantage any great power has ever known."

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14.05.2019

"A Russian-Chinese Partnership Is a Threat to U.S. Interests"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-05-14/russian-chinese-partnership-threat-us-interests

Die immer engeren Beziehungen zwischen Russland und China sollten von den USA nicht tatenlos hingenommen werden, sind Andrea Kendall-Taylor und David Shullman überzeugt. Es reiche nicht aus, sich einfach darauf zu verlassen, dass die bestehenden strategischen Differenzen beider Länder eine echte Allianz verhindern werden. Washington sollte stattdessen versuchen, die Spannungen zwischen Russland und China anzufachen, so ihre Forderung. "Efforts to split Moscow and Beijing are unlikely to be effective. From the Kremlin’s perspective, the United States is a far less predictable partner than China, and Putin’s anti-Western views run deep. Xi, for his part, views Russia as useful in undermining U.S. global dominance and countering U.S. efforts to limit Chinese leverage in multilateral institutions. Still, Washington should seek to stoke tensions between the two and strain the seams in their relationship. In communicating with Beijing, Washington should underscore Russia’s proclivity for wreaking havoc in democracies that oppose its interests. (...) U.S. policymakers will also have to take care not to drive Russia and China together and consider how policies designed to confront one country could inadvertently hinder efforts to confront the other. The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, for example, was designed to deter Russian aggression by limiting the Kremlin’s revenue from arms exports. Yet these sanctions have prevented some countries, including India, Indonesia, and Vietnam, from purchasing the Russian arms they need to deter China."

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09.05.2019

"The Art of a New Iran Deal - What the World’s Diplomats Really Think of Trump’s Endgame in Iran"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2019-05-09/art-new-iran-deal

Sanam Vakil von der britischen Denkfabrik Chatham House hat mit ihren Kollegen 75 internationale Diplomaten nach deren Meinung zur Iran-Strategie des US-Präsidenten befragt. "From this survey, we can determine how those most in the know — and likeliest to participate in future talks — evaluate Trump’s Iran policy and its prospects of success. The respondents were overwhelmingly skeptical, and many pointed to the same deficits. The U.S. administration has called for something — a deal — that requires diplomacy but then consistently reached only for the bluntest of coercive instruments. Washington has further undercut its prospects by failing to nurture its European alliances or to create favorable conditions for Tehran to engage in talks. (...) Most people we interviewed felt that Washington’s policy of 'maximum pressure' on Iran was not meeting its stated objective of bringing Iran back to the negotiating table. Less than 20 percent of our respondents thought a grand bargain with Iran was achievable. The remaining respondents were divided. (...) When asked why the Trump administration’s policy had not been more successful to date, about half of the interviewees pointed to divisions and competition within the administration over Iran policy. While President Trump has clearly stated his desire for a deal with Iran, other members of the administration have sent contradictory messages, respondents noted."

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16.04.2019

"Killer Apps"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/killer-apps

Paul Scharre schreibt, dass die tatsächliche Gefahr der Entwicklung künstlicher Intelligenz in dem Eindruck liege, dass es sich um ein Wettrennen mit klaren Siegern und Verlierern handle. "(...) the emerging narrative of an 'AI arms race' reflects a mistaken view of the risks from AI — and introduces significant new risks as a result. For each country, the real danger is not that it will fall behind its competitors in AI but that the perception of a race will prompt everyone to rush to deploy unsafe AI systems. In their desire to win, countries risk endangering themselves just as much as their opponents. AI promises to bring both enormous benefits, in everything from health care to transportation, and huge risks. But those risks aren’t something out of science fiction; there’s no need to fear a robot uprising. The real threat will come from humans."

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16.04.2019

"The New Revolution in Military Affairs"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/new-revolution-military-affairs

Nach Ansicht von Christian Brose wird die Entwicklung der modernen Militärtechnologie eine ähnlich revolutionäre Umwälzung strategischer Konzepte auslösen wie vor hundert Jahren. In Washington seien die Folgen dieser Entwicklung bisher nicht angemessen erfasst worden. "This reality demands more than a revolution in technology; it requires a revolution in thinking. And that thinking must focus more on how the U.S. military fights than with what it fights. The problem is not insufficient spending on defense; it is that the U.S. military is being countered by rivals with superior strategies. The United States, in other words, is playing a losing game. The question, accordingly, is not how new technologies can improve the U.S. military’s ability to do what it already does but how they can enable it to operate in new ways. If American defense officials do not answer that question, there will still be a revolution in military affairs. But it will primarily benefit others."

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16.04.2019

"Searching for a Strategy"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/searching-strategy

In der aktuellen Printausgabe des Magazins Foreign Affairs stellen vier Experten Überlegungen über den Stand und die Zukunft der US-Außenpolitik an. Gideon Rose bezeichnet die Bestandsaufnahme in seinen einleitenden Bemerkungen als notwendige "Intervention". "Daniel Drezner explains why we are all here. The time has come to face facts. American hegemony is not coming back, at least not in a form recognizable to those who knew it when. (...) Mira Rapp-Hooper and Rebecca Friedman Lissner then offer some tough love. Washington has to abandon its post–Cold War fantasies of liberalism marching inexorably forward to certain global triumph. It should temper its ambitions, lower its sights, and focus on promoting freedom and openness within the international system where it can. Stephen Walt can’t resist gloating. Realists have been warning about overreach for a generation, but nobody listened. Now the warnings seem prescient. (...) Kori Schake closes on a more supportive note. The situation may not be as irreversibly dire as all of this suggests. There’s still a chance for the United States to regain its footing, shore up the liberal international order, and get the world back on track. But it’s only a chance, and even that has to start with an honest assessment of just how bad things have gotten. Interventions are never pleasant. But sometimes the message gets through. And the first step is acknowledging the problem."

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02.04.2019

"The New German Question"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2019-04-02/new-german-question

Im Fall eines Zusammenbruchs der bestehenden EU-Strukturen müsste nach Ansicht von Robert Kagan die "deutsche Frage" neu gestellt werden. In seinem Essay wirft er einen Blick zurück in die deutsche und europäische Geschichte, die nach 1871 vom Zusammenbruch der bis dahin wirkenden Machtbalance auf dem Kontinent geprägt worden sei. "(...) things change quickly. In 1925, Germany was disarmed, a functioning, if unstable, democracy, working with its neighbors to establish a stable peace. French and German leaders reached a historic pact in Locarno, Switzerland. The U.S. economy was roaring, and the world economy was in relatively good health, or so it seemed. A decade later, Europe and the world were descending into hell. Today, it may well be that the German people and their neighbors in Europe can be counted on to save the world from this fate. Perhaps the Germans have been transformed forever and nothing can undo or alter this transformation, not even the breakdown of Europe all around them. But perhaps even these liberal and pacific Germans are not immune to the larger forces that shape history and over which they have little control. And so one can’t help but wonder how long the calm will last if the United States and the world continue along their present course."

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27.03.2019

"The Lost Art of American Diplomacy - Can the State Department Be Saved?"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-27/lost-art-american-diplomacy

William J. Burns, früherer US-Diplomat und aktueller Präsident der Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, schreibt in seinem Essay über die "verlorene Kunst" der amerikanischen Diplomatie, dass die Vernachlässigung des US-Außenministeriums nicht erst mit Präsident Trump begonnen habe. "It has been an episodic feature of the United States’ approach to the world since the end of the Cold War. The Trump administration, however, has made the problem infinitely worse. There is never a good time for diplomatic malpractice, but the administration’s unilateral diplomatic disarmament is spectacularly mistimed, unfolding precisely at a moment when American diplomacy matters more than ever to American interests. The United States is no longer the only big kid on the geopolitical block, and no longer able get everything it wants on its own, or by force alone. (...) What I learned time and again throughout my long career is that diplomacy is one of the United States’ biggest assets and best-kept secrets. However battered and belittled in the age of Trump, it has never been a more necessary tool of first resort for American influence. It will take a generation to reverse the underinvestment, overreach, and flailing that have beset American diplomacy in recent decades, not to mention the active sabotage of recent years."

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19.03.2019

"What a Military Intervention in Venezuela Would Look Like"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2019-03-19/what-military-intervention-venezuela-would-l
ook

Frank O. Mora schreibt, dass dem US-Militär im Fall einer Intervention in Venezuela zwei Optionen offen ständen: eine Invasion mit Bodentruppen und eine Bombenkampagne. Aufgrund der drohenden Worst-Case-Szenarien in beiden Fällen spricht er sich klar gegen eine militärische Antwort aus: "In the worst-case scenario, a precision strike operation would last for months, killing possibly thousands of civilians, destroying much of what remains of Venezuela’s economy, and wiping out the state security forces. The result would be anarchy. Militias and other armed criminal groups would roam the streets of major cities unchecked, wreaking havoc. More than eight million Venezuelans would likely flee. The chaos would likely lead the United States to send in ground troops in order either to finally dislodge the regime and its security forces or to provide security once the dictatorship had collapsed. (...) Rather than launching precision strikes and getting sucked into a ground war later, the United States might choose to go all-in from the beginning. (...) In the worst-case outcome, U.S. forces would quickly defeat the Venezuelan military but then find themselves bogged down in guerrilla warfare with former members of the Venezuelan military, paramilitary groups, Colombian insurgents, colectivos, and some members of the civilian militia — all of them aided by Cuba and Russia. (...) There’s no such thing as risk-free military action. But in this case, the social, economic, and security costs of intervening far outweigh the benefits."

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21.02.2019

"Is the Taliban Making a Pledge It Cannot Keep?"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2019-02-21/taliban-making-pledge-it-cannot-keep

Die US-Regierung erwartet bei den Verhandlungen in Doha u.a., dass die Taliban zusichern, dschihadistische Gruppen, die den Westen gefährden, im Fall ihrer Regierungsübernahme von afghanischem Territorium fernzuhalten. Tricia Bacon meint, dass die Taliban ein solches Versprechen selbst bei gutem Willen nicht einhalten könnten. "The Taliban’s pledge would require it to police over a dozen organizations with ambitions to strike at least five other countries. Making good on such a commitment would be a major undertaking for any government — let alone an insurgent group with long-standing ties to those organizations. (...) Having supported the Taliban’s campaign for more than 17 years, its militant partners certainly expect to see some benefit when the insurgency emerges victorious. The ultimate prize would be safe haven in areas under Taliban control, with the freedom to pursue their external agendas. In pledging to prevent terrorism emanating from Afghanistan, the Taliban is making a promise that it will struggle to keep — if it even intends to try."

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12.02.2019

"The Future of the Liberal Order Is Conservative"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-02-12/future-liberal-order-conservative

Die liberale Weltordnung könnte nach Ansicht von Jennifer Lind und William C. Wohlforth durch einen Verzicht auf die seit 25 Jahren betriebene Strategie eines "aggressiven Exports" der Demokratie gerettet werden. "(...) for the past 25 years, the international order crafted by and for liberal states has itself been profoundly revisionist, aggressively exporting democracy and expanding in both depth and breadth. The scale of the current problems means that more of the same is not viable; the best response is to make the liberal order more conservative. Instead of expanding it to new places and new domains, the United States and its partners should consolidate the gains the order has reaped. The debate over U.S. grand strategy has traditionally been portrayed as a choice between retrenchment and ambitious expansionism. Conservatism offers a third way (...)."

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12.02.2019

"The Importance of Elsewhere - In Defense of Cosmopolitanism"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-02-12/importance-elsewhere

Kwame Anthony Appiah meint dagegen, dass Nationalismus keineswegs als Antithese des Kosmopolitismus verstanden werden muss. "If nationalism and cosmopolitanism are, far from being incompatible, actually intertwined, how has cosmopolitanism become such a handy bugbear for those who, like the political strategist Steve Bannon, seek to ally themselves with the spirit of nationalism? One reason is that some people have made excessive claims on behalf of cosmopolitanism. They have often been seduced by this tempting line of thought: if everybody matters, then they must matter equally, and if that is true, then each of us has the same moral obligations to everyone. Partiality—favoring those to whom one is connected by blood or culture or territory — can look morally arbitrary. The real enemy of those who worry about 'citizens of nowhere' is not a reasonable cosmopolitanism but the different idea, occasionally espoused by people calling themselves 'citizens of the world,' that it is wrong to be partial to your own place or people."

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12.02.2019

"Why Nationalism Works"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-02-12/why-nationalism-works

Das Magazin Foreign Affairs beschäftigt sich in seiner aktuellen Ausgabe mit der heutigen Bedeutung des Nationalismus. In diesem Beitrag erklärt Andreas Wimmer, warum der Nationalismus seiner Ansicht nach als grundlegendes Prinzip demokratischer Staaten und der internationalen Ordnung unverzichtbar bleiben wird. "There is currently no other principle on which to base the international state system. (Universalistic cosmopolitanism, for instance, has little purchase outside the philosophy departments of Western universities.) And it is unclear if transnational institutions such as the European Union will ever be able to assume the core functions of national governments, including welfare and defense, which would allow them to gain popular legitimacy. The challenge for both old and new nation-states is to renew the national contract between the rulers and the ruled by building — or rebuilding — inclusive coalitions that tie the two together. Benign forms of popular nationalism follow from political inclusion. They cannot be imposed by ideological policing from above, nor by attempting to educate citizens about what they should regard as their true interests. In order to promote better forms of nationalism, leaders will have to become better nationalists, and learn to look out for the interests of all their people."

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25.01.2019

"The Venezuelan Opposition’s High-Stakes Assault on Maduro"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2019-01-25/venezuelan-oppositions-high-stakes-assault-m
aduro

Harold Trinkunas hält es trotz der breiten internationalen Unterstützung für den selbsternannten Präsidenten Juan Guaidó immer noch für möglich, dass der "hochriskante Angriff" der venezolanischen Opposition auf Präsident Maduro scheitern könnte. "The opposition’s strategy, conducted in coordination with the United States, is clearly a game changer, but will it work? There are two reasons to be skeptical. First, the Maduro administration continues to have the support and recognition of its most important international allies: China, Cuba, Russia, and Turkey. These countries are lenders of last resort, enablers of the Maduro regime, or both. Second, despite clear signals to the armed forces that they would benefit from a soft landing in the event of a democratic transition, major military commanders publicly declared their support for President Maduro on January 23 and 24. The incentive structure facing the military is still heavily stacked in favor of supporting the government. (...) The opposition’s gamble may end with its leaders imprisoned or in exile. This would leave the Trump administration and the international community in a very difficult position, with fewer diplomatic tools than ever to influence Venezuela’s future in a positive direction."

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18.01.2019

"Trump’s Foreign Policy Is No Longer Unpredictable"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-01-18/trumps-foreign-policy-no-longer-unpredictable

Thomas Wright meint, dass die Außenpolitik von US-Präsident Trump zwei Jahre nach dessen Amtsantritt nicht länger als "unberechenbar" bezeichnet werden könne. Trump selbst verfolge Ziele, die er bereits in den 1980er Jahren formuliert habe. Der Eindruck der Unberechenbarkeit sei entstanden, da er dabei immer wieder in Konflikt mit dem sicherheitspolitischen Establishment in Washington geraten sei. "Until recently, these two camps vied for supremacy, and it was difficult to know which would win on any given issue. At the two-year mark, it is now clear that the president is dominating this struggle, even if he has not yet won outright. For the first time, it is possible to identify a singular Trump administration foreign policy, as the president’s team coalesces around his ideas. This policy consists of a narrow, transactional relationship with other nations, a preference for authoritarian governments over other democracies, a mercantilist approach to international economic policy, a general disregard for human rights and the rule of law, and the promotion of nationalism and unilateralism at the expense of multilateralism."

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17.01.2019

"The Retreat of African Democracy - The Autocratic Threat Is Growing"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2019-01-17/retreat-african-democracy?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-2019
0117

Der lange Zeit zu beobachtende Trend einer Demokratisierung afrikanischer Länder habe sich in den vergangenen Jahren wieder umgekehrt, stellen Nic Cheeseman und Jeffrey Smith fest. "In the decade following the Cold War, Africa saw many democratic success stories. (...) All told, by the middle of the first decade of this century, every major peaceful state in Africa except Eritrea and Swaziland, the continent’s last absolute monarchy, was, at least in principle, committed to holding competitive elections. But in recent years, Africa’s political trajectory has begun moving in the opposite direction. (...) According to Freedom House, a think tank, just 11 percent of the continent is politically 'free,' and the average level of democracy, understood as respect for political rights and civil liberties, fell in each of the last 14 years. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance shows that democratic progress lags far behind citizens’ expectations. The vast majority of Africans want to live in a democracy, but the proportion who believe they actually do falls almost every year."

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03.01.2019

"The Stealth Superpower"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia

Oriana Skylar Mastro hält die chinesischen Beteuerungen, die USA nicht als globalen Hegemon ablösen zu wollen, für durchaus überzeugend. Das eigentliche Ziel Pekings - die vollständige Dominanz im Indopazifik - sei jedoch für die internationale Stabilität ebenso gefährlich. "In the Indo-Pacific region, China wants complete dominance; it wants to force the United States out and become the region’s unchallenged political, economic, and military hegemon. And globally, even though it is happy to leave the United States in the driver’s seat, it wants to be powerful enough to counter Washington when needed. (...) Although Beijing has pursued an indirect and entrepreneurial strategy of accumulating power, make no mistake: the ultimate goal is to push the United States out of the Indo-Pacific and rival it on the global stage. Until now, China has succeeded in growing without provoking. Yet there is a limit to how powerful a country can get without directly challenging the incumbent power, and China is now reaching that point."

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11.12.2018

"Deepfakes and the New Disinformation War"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-12-11/deepfakes-and-new-disinformation-war

Robert Chesney und Danielle Citron erwarten, dass manipulierte Bild-, Audio- und Videoaufnahmen ("Deepfakes") in der Geopolitik der kommenden Jahre eine möglicherweise destruktive Rolle spielen werden. "Deepfakes have the potential to be especially destructive because they are arriving at a time when it already is becoming harder to separate fact from fiction. For much of the twentieth century, magazines, newspapers, and television broadcasters managed the flow of information to the public. (...) Over the last decade, however, more and more people have begun to get their information from social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, which depend on a vast array of users to generate relatively unfiltered content. (...) These dynamics will make social media fertile ground for circulating deepfakes, with potentially explosive implications for politics. (...) Deepfakes will be particularly useful to nonstate actors, such as insurgent groups and terrorist organizations, which have historically lacked the resources to make and disseminate fraudulent yet credible audio or video content. (...) democratic societies will have to learn resilience. On the one hand, this will mean accepting that audio and video content cannot be taken at face value; on the other, it will mean fighting the descent into a post-truth world, in which citizens retreat to their private information bubbles and regard as fact only that which flatters their own beliefs."

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11.12.2018

"How a World Order Ends - And What Comes in Its Wake"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-12-11/how-world-order-ends?cid=cfr-homepage

Richard Haass stellt Überlegungen über das mögliche Ende der nach 1945 etablierten liberalen Weltordnung an. Dabei erkennt er historische Parallelen zum "Konzert der Großmächte", das Europa bis zum Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs stabilisiert habe. "From 1815 until the outbreak of World War I a century later, the order established at the Congress of Vienna defined many international relationships and set (even if it often failed to enforce) basic rules for international conduct. It provides a model of how to collectively manage security in a multipolar world. That order’s demise and what followed offer instructive lessons for today — and an urgent warning. Just because an order is in irreversible decline does not mean that chaos or calamity is inevitable. But if the deterioration is managed poorly, catastrophe could well follow."

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29.11.2018

"Climate Shocks and Humanitarian Crises"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-11-29/climate-shocks-and-humanitarian-crises

Joshua Busby und Nina von Uexkull nennen die Länder in Afrika, Nahost und Asien, die ihrer Prognose zufolge in den kommenden Jahren am stärksten unter den Folgen des Klimawandels und den resultierenden humanitären Krisen leiden werden. "(...) several risk factors make some countries more vulnerable than others to the consequences of climate change. Three stand out in particular: a high level of dependence on agriculture, a recent history of conflict, and discriminatory political institutions. Research suggests that in countries that display some or all of these risk factors, climate extremes are especially likely to lead to disastrous outcomes, including violence, food crises, and the large-scale displacement of populations. We have used these factors to identify the countries that are most at risk from climate-related instability and humanitarian crises in the coming years. In doing so, we hope to provide an early warning to policymakers about where climate impacts are likely to prove most destabilizing in the short term, and where efforts to minimize their effects are most needed."

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26.11.2018

"The Only Way to End the War in Yemen"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2018-11-26/only-way-end-war-yemen

Ein Ende des Krieges in Jemen wird nach Überzeugung von Jeffrey Feltman nicht ohne wesentliche Zugeständnisse Saudi-Arabiens zu erreichen sein. Er empfiehlt eine unilaterale Einstellung der militärischen Operationen, um die Huthi-Rebellen zur Nachahmung zu bewegen. "There is only one expeditious way for Saudi Arabia to end this counterproductive war, and that is to stop its military campaign unilaterally and challenge the Houthis to respond in kind. Doing so will not end all of the fighting inside Yemen. But it will create the conditions necessary for peace talks to gain traction and for Yemeni leaders, supported by regional and international partners, to address the country’s domestic troubles and the growing influence of Iran. The United States should lead an alliance of powers in pushing Saudi Arabia to move first, rather than letting it drag out talks as the war rages on."

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07.11.2018

"How Congress Can Take Back Foreign Policy"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-11-07/how-congress-can-take-back-foreign-polic
y?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-20181108

Das seit den Kongresswahlen von Demokraten kontrollierte Repräsentantenhaus könnte Präsident Trump nach Ansicht von Brian McKeon und Caroline Tess auch in der Außenpolitik einige Steine in den Weg legen. "Their first step should be returning to standard practice for oversight, a core function of the congressional committees. That means hearings, and lots of them. (...) Congress can’t match the president’s bully pulpit. But hearings and investigations draw attention to neglected issues and can force administrations to rethink decisions. They can divert the executive branch from its priorities and focus the attention of the press, particularly when they stick to a limited set of issues and sustain the pressure. (...) Complementing the work of the full committees, energized subcommittee chairs can use their gavels to focus attention on important issues. The chair of the House subcommittee on human rights, for example, can shine a light on dark places by hearing testimony from leading dissidents and human rights defenders from China, Cuba, the Philippines, Russia, and Turkey. (...) Controlling the purse is one way in which Congress has pushed back successfully against the Trump administration during its first two years. During the next two, the Appropriations Committees will likely do the same in both chambers."

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31.10.2018

"How France and Italy’s Rivalry Is Hurting Libya"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/france/2018-10-31/how-france-and-italys-rivalry-hurting-libya?cid
=gue

Die internationalen Bemühungen zur Stabilisierung Libyens werden Federica Saini Fasanotti und Ben Fishman zufolge auch durch die Rivalität zwischen Frankreich und Italien behindert. Beide Länder hätten die UN-Initiativen vor Ort durch eigene Aktivitäten untergraben. "Italy is now organizing an international conference on Libya set for November 12–13. Rome has an opportunity to help the UN advance several crucial elements of its peace efforts, including organizing Libyan national elections and reaching a lasting security arrangement. Conversely, if the Italian government uses its conference to sideline UN Libya envoy Ghassan Salamé, fight publicly with the French, and trumpet its policies on migration, it will further confuse Libya’s chaotic politics. (...) French-Italian differences are motivated more by politics than by divergent interests in Libya. Macron considers himself — and France — to be the standard bearer for the EU, defending liberal values and international cooperation in a time of rising populist nationalism. Naturally, he sees the new Italian government as a threat to his political vision. (...) The November 12–13 Conference in Palermo provides an opportunity for Italy to make a contribution to Libya’s peace process, but only if Conte and Salvini will elevate the role of the UN and minimize their competition with Macron."

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