US-Soldaten in Afghanistan

Foreign Affairs


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"The Stealth Superpower"

Oriana Skylar Mastro hält die chinesischen Beteuerungen, die USA nicht als globalen Hegemon ablösen zu wollen, für durchaus überzeugend. Das eigentliche Ziel Pekings - die vollständige Dominanz im Indopazifik - sei jedoch für die internationale Stabilität ebenso gefährlich. "In the Indo-Pacific region, China wants complete dominance; it wants to force the United States out and become the region’s unchallenged political, economic, and military hegemon. And globally, even though it is happy to leave the United States in the driver’s seat, it wants to be powerful enough to counter Washington when needed. (...) Although Beijing has pursued an indirect and entrepreneurial strategy of accumulating power, make no mistake: the ultimate goal is to push the United States out of the Indo-Pacific and rival it on the global stage. Until now, China has succeeded in growing without provoking. Yet there is a limit to how powerful a country can get without directly challenging the incumbent power, and China is now reaching that point."

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"How a World Order Ends - And What Comes in Its Wake"

Richard Haass stellt Überlegungen über das mögliche Ende der nach 1945 etablierten liberalen Weltordnung an. Dabei erkennt er historische Parallelen zum "Konzert der Großmächte", das Europa bis zum Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs stabilisiert habe. "From 1815 until the outbreak of World War I a century later, the order established at the Congress of Vienna defined many international relationships and set (even if it often failed to enforce) basic rules for international conduct. It provides a model of how to collectively manage security in a multipolar world. That order’s demise and what followed offer instructive lessons for today — and an urgent warning. Just because an order is in irreversible decline does not mean that chaos or calamity is inevitable. But if the deterioration is managed poorly, catastrophe could well follow."

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"Climate Shocks and Humanitarian Crises"

Joshua Busby und Nina von Uexkull nennen die Länder in Afrika, Nahost und Asien, die ihrer Prognose zufolge in den kommenden Jahren am stärksten unter den Folgen des Klimawandels und den resultierenden humanitären Krisen leiden werden. "(...) several risk factors make some countries more vulnerable than others to the consequences of climate change. Three stand out in particular: a high level of dependence on agriculture, a recent history of conflict, and discriminatory political institutions. Research suggests that in countries that display some or all of these risk factors, climate extremes are especially likely to lead to disastrous outcomes, including violence, food crises, and the large-scale displacement of populations. We have used these factors to identify the countries that are most at risk from climate-related instability and humanitarian crises in the coming years. In doing so, we hope to provide an early warning to policymakers about where climate impacts are likely to prove most destabilizing in the short term, and where efforts to minimize their effects are most needed."

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"The Only Way to End the War in Yemen"

Ein Ende des Krieges in Jemen wird nach Überzeugung von Jeffrey Feltman nicht ohne wesentliche Zugeständnisse Saudi-Arabiens zu erreichen sein. Er empfiehlt eine unilaterale Einstellung der militärischen Operationen, um die Huthi-Rebellen zur Nachahmung zu bewegen. "There is only one expeditious way for Saudi Arabia to end this counterproductive war, and that is to stop its military campaign unilaterally and challenge the Houthis to respond in kind. Doing so will not end all of the fighting inside Yemen. But it will create the conditions necessary for peace talks to gain traction and for Yemeni leaders, supported by regional and international partners, to address the country’s domestic troubles and the growing influence of Iran. The United States should lead an alliance of powers in pushing Saudi Arabia to move first, rather than letting it drag out talks as the war rages on."

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"How Congress Can Take Back Foreign Policy"

Das seit den Kongresswahlen von Demokraten kontrollierte Repräsentantenhaus könnte Präsident Trump nach Ansicht von Brian McKeon und Caroline Tess auch in der Außenpolitik einige Steine in den Weg legen. "Their first step should be returning to standard practice for oversight, a core function of the congressional committees. That means hearings, and lots of them. (...) Congress can’t match the president’s bully pulpit. But hearings and investigations draw attention to neglected issues and can force administrations to rethink decisions. They can divert the executive branch from its priorities and focus the attention of the press, particularly when they stick to a limited set of issues and sustain the pressure. (...) Complementing the work of the full committees, energized subcommittee chairs can use their gavels to focus attention on important issues. The chair of the House subcommittee on human rights, for example, can shine a light on dark places by hearing testimony from leading dissidents and human rights defenders from China, Cuba, the Philippines, Russia, and Turkey. (...) Controlling the purse is one way in which Congress has pushed back successfully against the Trump administration during its first two years. During the next two, the Appropriations Committees will likely do the same in both chambers."

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"How France and Italy’s Rivalry Is Hurting Libya"

Die internationalen Bemühungen zur Stabilisierung Libyens werden Federica Saini Fasanotti und Ben Fishman zufolge auch durch die Rivalität zwischen Frankreich und Italien behindert. Beide Länder hätten die UN-Initiativen vor Ort durch eigene Aktivitäten untergraben. "Italy is now organizing an international conference on Libya set for November 12–13. Rome has an opportunity to help the UN advance several crucial elements of its peace efforts, including organizing Libyan national elections and reaching a lasting security arrangement. Conversely, if the Italian government uses its conference to sideline UN Libya envoy Ghassan Salamé, fight publicly with the French, and trumpet its policies on migration, it will further confuse Libya’s chaotic politics. (...) French-Italian differences are motivated more by politics than by divergent interests in Libya. Macron considers himself — and France — to be the standard bearer for the EU, defending liberal values and international cooperation in a time of rising populist nationalism. Naturally, he sees the new Italian government as a threat to his political vision. (...) The November 12–13 Conference in Palermo provides an opportunity for Italy to make a contribution to Libya’s peace process, but only if Conte and Salvini will elevate the role of the UN and minimize their competition with Macron."

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"The Real Terrorist Threat in America. It’s No Longer Jihadist Groups"

Nach Ansicht von Peter Bergen und David Sterman geht die größte Terrorgefahr in den USA heute nicht mehr von dschihadistischen Gruppen, sondern von Einzeltätern aus, die sich im Internet auf verschiedenste Weise radikalisieren und leichten Zugang zu Waffen haben. "Since 9/11, no foreign terrorist group has successfully conducted a deadly attack in the United States. The main terrorist problem in the United States today is one of individuals — usually with ready access to guns — radicalized by a diverse array of ideologies absorbed from the Internet. (...) Whether expressed in right-wing, left-wing, jihadist, or black nationalist ideological terms, today’s acts of political violence share a common lineage in the above mixture and together have resulted in almost 200 deaths since the 9/11 attacks. The death toll is even higher if one includes other deadly attacks with less traditionally political or clear motivations ranging from the new ideological misogyny of 'incel' violence (incel being a term for a community of people who view themselves as involuntarily celibate and generally frame their perspective in ideological misogyny) to a spate of deadly school shootings. Addressing this threat will require a broad process of renewing U.S. society, a task far more difficult than disrupting a foreign terrorist organization’s operational capacity."

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"If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War"

Elbridge Colby schreibt, dass die Atomstrategie nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges nicht zu Unrecht an den Rand der amerikanischen Sicherheitspolitik gerückt sei. Angesichts der Rückkehr der Großmachtpolitik müsse dies allerdings korrigiert werden. Dabei fordert Colby auch eine Vorbereitung auf den taktischen Einsatz kleinerer Atomsprengköpfe. "Washington’s task is clear. It must demonstrate to Moscow and Beijing that any attempt to use force against U.S. friends and allies would likely fail and would certainly result in costs and risks well out of proportion to whatever they might gain. This requires conventional military power, but it also means having the right strategy and weapons to fight a limited nuclear war and come out on top. (...) the United States needs weapons systems that can bridge the wide gulf between conventional and all-out nuclear war. In particular, Washington should step up its efforts to develop low-yield tactical nuclear weapons and associated strategies that could help blunt or defeat a Russian or Chinese attack on U.S. allies without provoking a nuclear apocalypse."

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"How Europe Can Reform Its Migration Policy"

Auch Alexander Betts und Paul Collier widmen sich der Frage, wie eine nachhaltige Migrationspolitik der EU aussehen sollte. "Europe does indeed have ethical obligations to the rest of the world. At the same time, a well-intentioned but ill-considered policy is likely to produce results such as the ones we have seen in Europe over the last three years: collapsing public trust, political backlash against migration, and bitter disputes between EU member states. A sustainable migration policy must therefore distinguish between Europe’s reciprocal ethical obligations, which arise from transactional relationships of mutual gain, and its nonreciprocal ones — those it has a duty to fulfill regardless of whether it gains anything in return. Rich countries have nonreciprocal obligations to help poor societies develop and to assist refugees fleeing from conflict and persecution. They do not have nonreciprocal obligations — other than humane treatment — to aspirational migrants."

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"The Financial Crisis Is Still Empowering Far-Right Populists"

Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick und Christoph Trebesch machen die anhaltenden Folgen der Finanzkrise von 2008 für den Aufstieg rechtspopulistischer Bewegungen in Europa mitverantwortlich. "(...) the biggest cost of the crisis might be not economic but political: the populist wave that has swept over the world in the last decade, upending political systems, empowering extremists, and making governance more difficult. Financial crises regularly lead to political polarization and populism, but the recent populist surge has lasted longer than those that followed earlier crises — and done more damage. The crash in 2008 and the subsequent eurozone sovereign debt crisis dealt a severe blow to political systems in the West. Crisis fighting became the new normal. Long-standing two-party systems in France and Spain were swept away. Populist far-right forces emerged from the fringes, sometimes achieving major electoral victories."

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"Toward a Neo-Progressive Foreign Policy"

Der aufsteigende linke Flügel der US-Demokraten habe bisher keine Alternative für das zuletzt im Jahr 2016 von Hillary Clinton vertretene außenpolitische Programm präsentiert, stellt Daniel Nexon fest. "Although American progressives — who include left-liberals, social democrats, and democratic socialists — enjoy a rough consensus on many broad domestic policy aims, if not always the means by which to achieve them, recent months have seen an uptick in concern (usually focused on the left) about the lack of a progressive vision for foreign policy. Indeed, the coalition seems divided between two depressingly familiar alternatives: liberal internationalists of the kind associated with the Democratic establishment, and anti-hegemonists, who want to see the United States drastically reduce its pretensions to global leadership. The latter question the desirability of so-called liberal order, which they see as, at best, serving the interests of global capital at the expense of democratic economic governance, and, at worst, a fig leaf for imperialism. (...) All of this is particularly unfortunate. The new gilded age — of corporate power, concentrated wealth, environmental dangers, corruption — demands a strong progressive movement."

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"The Truth About the Liberal Order"

Graham Allison, der die liberale Weltordnung als "Mythos" charakterisiert hat, antwortet hier auf die Kritik, die sein Beitrag vom 14. Juni hervorgerufen hat. "Since the article was published, several scholars have pushed back. Rebecca Friedman Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper argue that the 'liberal order is more than a myth.' And Michael J. Mazarr suggests that I have misread the order’s history and purpose. Their responses are serious and thoughtful, but they do little to undermine my argument."

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"How Daniel Ortega Became a Tyrant"

Gioconda Belli, die das 1979 gestürzte Somoza-Regime in jungen Jahren miterlebt hat, schreibt, dass der damalige Revolutionsführer Daniel Ortega heute selbst zu einem Tyrannen geworden sei. "What never should have happened is happening again in Nicaragua. Since April 18, when the violent suppression of protests against a Social Security Reform triggered a massive civic insurrection, President Daniel Ortega and his wife, Vice-President Rosario Murillo, have abandoned all pretense of tolerance and restraint and unleashed a deadly wave of repression. It is as if Anastasio Somoza — the country’s previous dictator, toppled in 1979 — has returned to Managua."

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"The Unconstrained Presidency"

James Goldgeier und Elizabeth N. Saunders erinnern daran, dass die Machtzunahme der Exekutive in den USA nicht erst seit Präsident Trump ein Problem ist. "In reality, the problem goes well beyond Trump, and even beyond the well-documented trend of increasing presidential power. Constraints on the president — not just from Congress but also from the bureaucracy, allies, and international institutions — have been eroding for decades. Constraints are like muscles: once atrophied, they require bulking up before the competitor can get back in the game. Trump did not create the freedom of action he is now routinely displaying. He has merely revealed just how difficult it is to prevent it."

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"The New Arab Order"

Marc Lynch meint dagegen, dass sich die Staatenordnung im Nahen Osten in den letzten Jahren grundlegend verändert habe. "(...) the upheaval did in fact create a new Arab order — just not the one most people expected. Although the Arab uprisings did not result in successful new democracies, they did reshape regional relations. The traditional great powers — Egypt, Iraq, and Syria — are now barely functional states. Wealthy and repressive Gulf countries — Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — are thriving. The proliferation of failed and weakened states has created new opportunities for competition and intervention, favoring new actors and new capabilities. Regional dynamics are no longer determined by formal alliances and conventional conflicts between major states. Instead, power operates through influence peddling and proxy warfare. (...) Any vision of the region finding a workable balance of power is a mirage: the new order is fundamentally one of disorder."

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"North Korea's Nuclear Program Isn't Going Anywhere"

Zwei Monate nach dem Gipfeltreffen von Singapur habe Nordkorea die klare diplomatische Oberhand gewonnen, stellen Ankit Panda und Vipin Narang fest. "Although Trump is desperate to continue claiming that he 'solved' the North Korean nuclear threat at Singapore, as many predicted, North Korea continues to expand its nuclear and ballistic missile arsenals and has played its diplomatic hand brilliantly. It has burned a lot of time while taking largely cosmetic steps on its nuclear weapons program, such as partially destroying its nuclear test site and engine test facility, neither of which it needs to mass-produce nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. These steps give up just enough to keep Trump at bay and allow Beijing and Moscow to provide Pyongyang with trade and energy, thereby deflating maximum pressure. How did North Korea get to this point, and where do we go from here?"

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"The Myth of the Liberal Order"

In einem begleitenden Essay aus der aktuellen Foreign-Affairs-Ausgabe verfolgt Graham Allison den Aufstieg der liberalen Ordnung von einem "historischen Unfall" zu einer "konventionellen Weisheit". Dabei widerspricht er drei aktuellen "Mythen": "First, that the liberal order has been the principal cause of the so-called long peace among great powers for the past seven decades. Second, that constructing this order has been the main driver of U.S. engagement in the world over that period. And third, that U.S. President Donald Trump is the primary threat to the liberal order — and thus to world peace. (...) Although all these propositions contain some truth, each is more wrong than right. The 'long peace' was the not the result of a liberal order but the byproduct of the dangerous balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States during the four and a half decades of the Cold War and then of a brief period of U.S. dominance. U.S. engagement in the world has been driven not by the desire to advance liberalism abroad or to build an international order but by the need to do what was necessary to preserve liberal democracy at home. And although Trump is undermining key elements of the current order, he is far from the biggest threat to global stability."

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"Which World Are We Living In?"

Foreign Affairs hat ein neues Dossier mit Beiträgen über sechs verschiedene politikwissenschaftliche Modellvorstellungen über den Charakter der Welt von morgen veröffentlicht. Gideon Rose stellt die Autoren in seiner Einleitung vor und schreibt: "Bismarck once said that the statesman’s task was to hear God’s footsteps marching through history and try to catch his coattails as he went past. It’s a great concept, but how do you spot him? With the time clearly out of joint, we dispatched six scouts to look for tracks, and this issue’s lead package presents their findings. Realist world. Liberal world. Tribal world. Marxist world. Tech world. Warming world. A half dozen choices of grand narrative for an increasingly turbulent era."

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"What Will It Take for Syrian Refugees to Return Home?"

Maha Yahya und ihre Kollegen vom Carnegie Middle East Center haben sich mit syrischen Flüchtlingen unterhalten, um herauszufinden, unter welchen Bedingungen deren Rückkehr in ihre Heimat in Frage käme. Die Gespräche haben gezeigt, dass es auch nach einem Friedensschluss in Syrien beträchtliche Hürden für eine Rückkehrerwelle geben würde. "Although experiences of discrimination in their current countries of residence have led many refugees to romanticize pre-conflict Syria, those whom we interviewed overwhelmingly cited safety and security as a chief condition for return. But most do not believe that these security conditions will be met any time soon without some form of political change. The majority of refugees oppose the regime, and for them, safety and security can only be guaranteed if Syrian President Bashar al-Assad goes. (...) But the departure of Assad is not all that refugees want; many believe that safety and security also means demilitarization, which would involve the disbanding of all militias and armed factions and putting an end to arbitrary arrests and checkpoints. (...) going back home will be challenging for even the most committed refugees. Fragmentation of territories, widespread destruction, and new legislation governing property rights will all complicate refugees’ ability to reclaim the lives they left behind. Mass displacement has produced large-scale secondhand occupation of housing, and many poorly equipped camps have been erected on land still legally owned by civilians. These settlements will generate property rights issues for refugees seeking to recover their assets."

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"Beijing’s Building Boom"

Bushra Bataineh, Michael Bennon und Francis Fukuyama beklagen, dass der Westen China das Feld beim Aufbau der globalen Infrastruktur in den letzten Jahren nahezu kampflos überlassen habe. Dies sei vor allem eine Folge von zu strengen Bestimmungen für Infrastrukturprojekte, die westliche Länder auch intern behinderten. "The same factors that keep large infrastructure projects from getting off the ground in the United States and Europe make Western-sponsored projects in developing countries less viable than their Chinese counterparts. China’s approach to infrastructure abroad mirrors its approach at home. Projects are evaluated more on their impact than on the specific viability of the project in question. The Chinese tend to overvalue the beneficial economic spillover effects of infrastructure projects, while undervaluing the potential harms, whether economic, social, or environmental. The Western approach, by contrast, is more transactional and focuses on painstaking due diligence concerning the economic, social, and environmental consequences of a given project. These safeguards are in the interests of ordinary people in developing countries. But Western institutions have become so risk averse that the cost and time to implement such projects have skyrocketed."

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"Why Trump Can Safely Ignore Europe"

Jeremy Shapiro erwartet nicht, dass die Europäer tatsächlich geschlossen und entschieden auf den harten Kurs von US-Präsident Trump reagieren werden. Europäische Regierungen ließen ihrer regelmäßig geäußerten Entrüstung nur selten Taten folgen, da das transatlantische Bündnis für sie letztlich wichtiger sei als für die USA. "Righteous indignation is the language of the day, and predictions about the death of the transatlantic alliance abound. But laments and indignation do not add up to strategy. The real question is not whether Europeans are pissed off but whether they will do anything in response to Trump’s actions. The answer is most likely no. (...) U.S. officials have heard this refrain so many times that they have developed a rather jaundiced attitude toward European 'resistance.' Their view seems to be that Europeans say all manner of things but never do anything in response, so it is not necessary for Washington to pay much attention. (...) The simple answer is that Europeans need the alliance more than the Americans do. For Europe, the transatlantic alliance is its rock of stability in an otherwise ever-changing world and the foundation on which it has constructed European security and European integration."

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"The Challenge of Reinstating Sanctions Against Iran"

Viele Beobachter erwarten, dass US-Präsident Trump das Atomabkommen mit dem Iran am 12. Mai aufkündigen wird. Peter Harrell erläutert, warum die Verhängung neuer "lähmender" Sanktionen gegen Teheran nicht so einfach wäre. "It took the combined efforts of Congress and two U.S. presidents — George W. Bush and Barack Obama — nearly a decade to cripple Iran’s economy. Rebuilding economic pressure after Washington pulls out from the JCPOA would be an even greater challenge, given international opposition to the U.S. withdrawal and scant international support for renewed sanctions. The result could be a 'win-win' situation for Iran, in which it is both freed from the JCPOA’s constraints on its nuclear activity and able to retain at least part of the sanctions relief for which it bargained."

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"Is Democracy Dying?"

Das Magazin Foreign Affairs fragt in seiner aktuellen Ausgabe, ob die Demokratie heute "im Sterben liege". Gideon Rose schreibt in seiner Einleitung, dass die größten Herausforderungen für die führenden Demokratien in der Welt nicht externer, sondern interner Natur seien: "Centralization of power in the executive, politicization of the judiciary, attacks on independent media, the use of public office for private gain — the signs of democratic regression are well known. The only surprising thing is where they’ve turned up. As a Latin American friend put it ruefully, 'We’ve seen this movie before, just never in English.' (...) The time, resources, and opportunity to turn things around are there; the only things missing are political will and leadership. As Benjamin Franklin walked out of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, a woman asked him, 'Well, Doctor, what have we got, a republic or a monarchy?' Franklin replied, 'A republic, if you can keep it.' Two and a quarter centuries on, not much has changed."

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"Eastern Europe's Illiberal Revolution"

Der Politikwissenschaftler Ivan Krastev analysiert die Hintergründe der "illiberalen Revolution", die in vielen Ländern Osteuropas zu beobachten sei. Samuel P. Huntington habe eine solche Reaktion auf die "dritte Welle" der Demokratisierung bereits 1991 vorhergesagt. "In an article for the Journal of Democracy titled 'Democracy’s Third Wave,' Huntington pointed out that the two previous waves of democratization, from the 1820s to the 1920s and from 1945 to the 1960s, had been followed by 'reverse waves,' in which 'democratic systems were replaced ... by historically new forms of authoritarian rule.' (...) Why has democracy declared war on liberalism most openly in eastern Europe? The answer lies in the peculiar nature of the revolutions of 1989, when the states of eastern Europe freed themselves from the Soviet empire. Unlike previous revolutions, the ones in 1989 were concerned not with utopia but with the idea of normality — that is, the revolutionaries expressed a desire to lead the type of normal life already available to people in western Europe. (...) The new populists are not fascists. They do not believe in the transformative power of violence, and they are not nearly as repressive as the fascists were. But they are indifferent to liberal checks and balances and do not see the need for constitutional constraints on the power of the majority — constraints that form a central part of EU law. The main challenge posed by eastern European populism is therefore not to the existence of democracy at the level of the nation but to the cohesion of the EU."

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"National Identity and Political Power"

Andreas Wimmer schreibt in seinen Überlegungen zum Nationalismus, dass nationale Identität einen Patriotismus hervorbringen könne, der bei der politischen Integration vieler Länder eine wichtige Rolle spiele. Dies sei besonders der Fall, wenn ethnische Gruppen in nationalen Regierungen angemessen repräsentiert sind. "Especially for developing countries struggling with political integration, building a sense of national solidarity above and beyond ethnic or regional identities is crucial. An important question for both academics and policymakers, therefore, is why citizens develop much stronger attachments to their nation in some countries than in others. Why, for example, are Americans, Ghanaians, and Thai more patriotic than Germans and Taiwanese? Scholars have offered a number of explanations, including a country’s ethnic diversity (with more homogeneous populations more nationalistic than very diverse ones), integration into the global economy (with more nationalism in globalized countries), or record in war. Yet my own research suggests a different explanation: people identify with their country when they see their own ethnic group represented in the national government. Political representation, in other words, breeds national identification — in diverse countries as much as in more homogeneous ones."

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"New Hope for Iraq?"

Die irakischen Parlamentswahlen am 12. Mai könnten ein positiver Wendepunkt für die Geschicke des Landes werden, hofft Emma Sky. Eine ähnliche Gelegenheit sei im Jahr 2010 nach dem Sieg über die Al-Qaida verschenkt worden, als die US-Regierung sich hinter Premierminister Nouri al-Maliki gestellt habe. Die USA sollten nun alles dafür tun, dass eine Koalition moderater schiitischer Parteien eine Regierung bilden könne, so Sky. "To promote long-term stability in Iraq — a stated U.S. objective — the United States must not repeat the disastrous miscalculation that led it to back one man in 2010. Instead, Washington should help ensure that a coalition of moderate Shiite groups, in alliance with some of the Kurdish and Sunni parties, is able to form a government. (...) Iraqis still consider the United States a major player in their country, and Washington gives Iraqi politicians some leverage when it comes to Tehran. Going forward, the United States needs to provide the necessary incentives to help Shiite moderates in the face of pressure from Iranian and Iraqi hard-liners by pushing Kurdish and Sunni leaders toward them. Critically, Washington needs to demonstrate its long-term commitment to Iraq not only by training security forces but also by helping Iraq diversify its economy away from oil, supporting its efforts to improve relations with the Gulf, and encouraging U.S. companies to invest in the country. Finally, the United States should not withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal."

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"How the U.S. Can Play Cyber-Offense"

Michael Sulmeyer empfiehlt der US-Regierung, sich in ihrer Strategie zur Abwehr von Cyberangriffen nicht nur auf defensive Operationen zu beschränken. "If subtle measures prove insufficient, the United States should be ready to take more offensive action. In situations where the defense of the nation is on the line, U.S. hackers could pursue a campaign of erasing computers at scale, disabling accounts and credentials used by hackers to attack, and cutting off access to services so it is harder to compromise innocent systems to conduct their attacks. Such a campaign would aim to make every aspect of hacking much harder: because hackers often reuse computers, accounts, and infrastructure, targeting these would sabotage their capabilities or render them otherwise useless. (...) Offensive cyber-operations should not be undertaken lightly — the United States must bear in mind its commitments under international law and its relationships with its allies. But excessive caution cannot prevent Washington from defending itself: with the United States’ enemies already attacking it online, the country will need to be more proactive than it has been thus far."

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"The Key to Making Peace in Africa"

Der Hollywood-Schauspieler und Aktivist George Clooney und John Prendergast erläutern in diesem Beitrag, warum die Bekämpfung der Korruption in afrikanischen Ländern auch von sicherheitspolitischer Bedeutung sei. Machthaber wie Salva Kiir in Südsudan verweigerten jegliche Kompromisse zur Beilegung gewaltsamer Konflikte, um sich weiterhin freizügig aus Staatshaushalten und bei nationalen Rohstoff-Unternehmen bedienen und so u.a. ihre Militärapparate finanzieren zu können. "Remarkably, there is currently no coordinated strategy to disrupt the illicit siphoning of money by leaders and their foreign business partners. For leaders, giving up power almost certainly means losing access to their spoils, and it might even mean facing prosecution. Every year, billions of aid dollars pour into Africa: taxpayers and donors around the world fund peacekeeping forces, state-building programs, humanitarian assistance, elections, and peace processes. But none of this support has been able to keep corrupt leaders and their network of beneficiaries from stealing billions of dollars. This is the fatal flaw of peacemaking in Africa: those supporting mediation lack the leverage necessary to stop corrupt figures from using their forces to bomb, burn, imprison, silence, torture, starve, impoverish, kill, and rape to maintain or gain power."

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"How China Interferes in Australia"

Während sich in Europa Berichte über russische Beeinflussungsversuche häufen, sorgt man sich in Australien über ähnliche Aktivitäten Chinas. John Garnaut berichtet, dass die Regierung in Canberra ihre Gegenmaßnahmen angesichts der wirtschaftlichen Abhängigkeit des Landes von China genau kalibrieren müsse. "Over the past 18 months, the country has been shaken by allegations of the Chinese party-state working to covertly manipulate the Australian political system and curate the wider political landscape. (...) The distinctive part of the Australian experience is not what China is doing there but how Canberra is pushing back in the face of threats from Beijing and pressure from local business leaders worried about economic retaliation. Clarity of diagnosis has set the stage for a surgical response — one that manages the risks and targets the harm while attempting to maintain the overall project of engagement. This is not an easy balance to strike, but Australia’s efforts to do so should be closely watched by leaders from Washington, Auckland, Ottawa, and Berlin — who may soon find themselves in a similar position."

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"The President and the Bomb - Reforming the Nuclear Launch Process"

Das bisherige amerikanische Verfahren zur Anordnung eines Atomangriffs ist im US-Kongress im vergangenen November zum ersten Mal seit 41 Jahren offen zur Debatte gestellt worden. Dabei habe sich herausgestellt, dass der Autorität eines möglicherweise impulsiv handelnden US-Präsidenten keine echten Grenzen gesetzt seien, schreiben Richard K. Betts und Matthew C. Waxman. Dies müsse sich ändern: "(...) any presidential order to launch nuclear weapons that is not in response to an enemy nuclear attack should require the concurrence of the secretary of defense and the attorney general. This reform is not aimed at a particular president; it addresses a problem that could arise in any administration. Moreover, adding these checks would not only limit the commander in chief’s power but also buttress it, protecting the launch process from interference by unauthorized parties. (...) As the United States adapts its nuclear strategy to the twenty-first century, it should adapt its nuclear decision-making procedures, too. The founders put a high premium on checks and balances out of a healthy appreciation for the limits of any individual’s virtue or wisdom. There is every reason to apply this logic to the process of starting a nuclear war — the ultimate presidential power."

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Innerstaatliche Konflikte

Vom Kosovo nach Kolumbien, von Somalia nach Süd-Thailand: Weltweit schwelen über 280 politische Konflikte. Und immer wieder droht die Lage gewaltsam zu eskalieren.

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Zahlen und Fakten


Kaum ein Thema wird so intensiv und kontrovers diskutiert wie die Globalisierung. "Zahlen und Fakten" liefert Grafiken, Texte und Tabellen zu einem der wichtigsten und vielschichtigsten Prozesse der Gegenwart.

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Publikationen zum Thema

Coverbild Internationale Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert

Internationale Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert

Die internationale Sicherheit ist fragil und bedroht. Wie können und müssen demokratische Systeme ...

Internationale Sicherheitspolitik Cover

Internationale Sicherheitspolitik

Seit Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts hat sich die internationale Sicherheitspolitik deutlich verändert....

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