US-Soldaten in Afghanistan

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02.04.2019

"The New German Question"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2019-04-02/new-german-question

Im Fall eines Zusammenbruchs der bestehenden EU-Strukturen müsste nach Ansicht von Robert Kagan die "deutsche Frage" neu gestellt werden. In seinem Essay wirft er einen Blick zurück in die deutsche und europäische Geschichte, die nach 1871 vom Zusammenbruch der bis dahin wirkenden Machtbalance auf dem Kontinent geprägt worden sei. "(...) things change quickly. In 1925, Germany was disarmed, a functioning, if unstable, democracy, working with its neighbors to establish a stable peace. French and German leaders reached a historic pact in Locarno, Switzerland. The U.S. economy was roaring, and the world economy was in relatively good health, or so it seemed. A decade later, Europe and the world were descending into hell. Today, it may well be that the German people and their neighbors in Europe can be counted on to save the world from this fate. Perhaps the Germans have been transformed forever and nothing can undo or alter this transformation, not even the breakdown of Europe all around them. But perhaps even these liberal and pacific Germans are not immune to the larger forces that shape history and over which they have little control. And so one can’t help but wonder how long the calm will last if the United States and the world continue along their present course."

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27.03.2019

"The Lost Art of American Diplomacy - Can the State Department Be Saved?"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-27/lost-art-american-diplomacy

William J. Burns, früherer US-Diplomat und aktueller Präsident der Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, schreibt in seinem Essay über die "verlorene Kunst" der amerikanischen Diplomatie, dass die Vernachlässigung des US-Außenministeriums nicht erst mit Präsident Trump begonnen habe. "It has been an episodic feature of the United States’ approach to the world since the end of the Cold War. The Trump administration, however, has made the problem infinitely worse. There is never a good time for diplomatic malpractice, but the administration’s unilateral diplomatic disarmament is spectacularly mistimed, unfolding precisely at a moment when American diplomacy matters more than ever to American interests. The United States is no longer the only big kid on the geopolitical block, and no longer able get everything it wants on its own, or by force alone. (...) What I learned time and again throughout my long career is that diplomacy is one of the United States’ biggest assets and best-kept secrets. However battered and belittled in the age of Trump, it has never been a more necessary tool of first resort for American influence. It will take a generation to reverse the underinvestment, overreach, and flailing that have beset American diplomacy in recent decades, not to mention the active sabotage of recent years."

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19.03.2019

"What a Military Intervention in Venezuela Would Look Like"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2019-03-19/what-military-intervention-venezuela-would-l
ook

Frank O. Mora schreibt, dass dem US-Militär im Fall einer Intervention in Venezuela zwei Optionen offen ständen: eine Invasion mit Bodentruppen und eine Bombenkampagne. Aufgrund der drohenden Worst-Case-Szenarien in beiden Fällen spricht er sich klar gegen eine militärische Antwort aus: "In the worst-case scenario, a precision strike operation would last for months, killing possibly thousands of civilians, destroying much of what remains of Venezuela’s economy, and wiping out the state security forces. The result would be anarchy. Militias and other armed criminal groups would roam the streets of major cities unchecked, wreaking havoc. More than eight million Venezuelans would likely flee. The chaos would likely lead the United States to send in ground troops in order either to finally dislodge the regime and its security forces or to provide security once the dictatorship had collapsed. (...) Rather than launching precision strikes and getting sucked into a ground war later, the United States might choose to go all-in from the beginning. (...) In the worst-case outcome, U.S. forces would quickly defeat the Venezuelan military but then find themselves bogged down in guerrilla warfare with former members of the Venezuelan military, paramilitary groups, Colombian insurgents, colectivos, and some members of the civilian militia — all of them aided by Cuba and Russia. (...) There’s no such thing as risk-free military action. But in this case, the social, economic, and security costs of intervening far outweigh the benefits."

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21.02.2019

"Is the Taliban Making a Pledge It Cannot Keep?"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2019-02-21/taliban-making-pledge-it-cannot-keep

Die US-Regierung erwartet bei den Verhandlungen in Doha u.a., dass die Taliban zusichern, dschihadistische Gruppen, die den Westen gefährden, im Fall ihrer Regierungsübernahme von afghanischem Territorium fernzuhalten. Tricia Bacon meint, dass die Taliban ein solches Versprechen selbst bei gutem Willen nicht einhalten könnten. "The Taliban’s pledge would require it to police over a dozen organizations with ambitions to strike at least five other countries. Making good on such a commitment would be a major undertaking for any government — let alone an insurgent group with long-standing ties to those organizations. (...) Having supported the Taliban’s campaign for more than 17 years, its militant partners certainly expect to see some benefit when the insurgency emerges victorious. The ultimate prize would be safe haven in areas under Taliban control, with the freedom to pursue their external agendas. In pledging to prevent terrorism emanating from Afghanistan, the Taliban is making a promise that it will struggle to keep — if it even intends to try."

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12.02.2019

"The Future of the Liberal Order Is Conservative"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-02-12/future-liberal-order-conservative

Die liberale Weltordnung könnte nach Ansicht von Jennifer Lind und William C. Wohlforth durch einen Verzicht auf die seit 25 Jahren betriebene Strategie eines "aggressiven Exports" der Demokratie gerettet werden. "(...) for the past 25 years, the international order crafted by and for liberal states has itself been profoundly revisionist, aggressively exporting democracy and expanding in both depth and breadth. The scale of the current problems means that more of the same is not viable; the best response is to make the liberal order more conservative. Instead of expanding it to new places and new domains, the United States and its partners should consolidate the gains the order has reaped. The debate over U.S. grand strategy has traditionally been portrayed as a choice between retrenchment and ambitious expansionism. Conservatism offers a third way (...)."

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12.02.2019

"The Importance of Elsewhere - In Defense of Cosmopolitanism"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-02-12/importance-elsewhere

Kwame Anthony Appiah meint dagegen, dass Nationalismus keineswegs als Antithese des Kosmopolitismus verstanden werden muss. "If nationalism and cosmopolitanism are, far from being incompatible, actually intertwined, how has cosmopolitanism become such a handy bugbear for those who, like the political strategist Steve Bannon, seek to ally themselves with the spirit of nationalism? One reason is that some people have made excessive claims on behalf of cosmopolitanism. They have often been seduced by this tempting line of thought: if everybody matters, then they must matter equally, and if that is true, then each of us has the same moral obligations to everyone. Partiality—favoring those to whom one is connected by blood or culture or territory — can look morally arbitrary. The real enemy of those who worry about 'citizens of nowhere' is not a reasonable cosmopolitanism but the different idea, occasionally espoused by people calling themselves 'citizens of the world,' that it is wrong to be partial to your own place or people."

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12.02.2019

"Why Nationalism Works"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-02-12/why-nationalism-works

Das Magazin Foreign Affairs beschäftigt sich in seiner aktuellen Ausgabe mit der heutigen Bedeutung des Nationalismus. In diesem Beitrag erklärt Andreas Wimmer, warum der Nationalismus seiner Ansicht nach als grundlegendes Prinzip demokratischer Staaten und der internationalen Ordnung unverzichtbar bleiben wird. "There is currently no other principle on which to base the international state system. (Universalistic cosmopolitanism, for instance, has little purchase outside the philosophy departments of Western universities.) And it is unclear if transnational institutions such as the European Union will ever be able to assume the core functions of national governments, including welfare and defense, which would allow them to gain popular legitimacy. The challenge for both old and new nation-states is to renew the national contract between the rulers and the ruled by building — or rebuilding — inclusive coalitions that tie the two together. Benign forms of popular nationalism follow from political inclusion. They cannot be imposed by ideological policing from above, nor by attempting to educate citizens about what they should regard as their true interests. In order to promote better forms of nationalism, leaders will have to become better nationalists, and learn to look out for the interests of all their people."

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25.01.2019

"The Venezuelan Opposition’s High-Stakes Assault on Maduro"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2019-01-25/venezuelan-oppositions-high-stakes-assault-m
aduro

Harold Trinkunas hält es trotz der breiten internationalen Unterstützung für den selbsternannten Präsidenten Juan Guaidó immer noch für möglich, dass der "hochriskante Angriff" der venezolanischen Opposition auf Präsident Maduro scheitern könnte. "The opposition’s strategy, conducted in coordination with the United States, is clearly a game changer, but will it work? There are two reasons to be skeptical. First, the Maduro administration continues to have the support and recognition of its most important international allies: China, Cuba, Russia, and Turkey. These countries are lenders of last resort, enablers of the Maduro regime, or both. Second, despite clear signals to the armed forces that they would benefit from a soft landing in the event of a democratic transition, major military commanders publicly declared their support for President Maduro on January 23 and 24. The incentive structure facing the military is still heavily stacked in favor of supporting the government. (...) The opposition’s gamble may end with its leaders imprisoned or in exile. This would leave the Trump administration and the international community in a very difficult position, with fewer diplomatic tools than ever to influence Venezuela’s future in a positive direction."

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18.01.2019

"Trump’s Foreign Policy Is No Longer Unpredictable"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-01-18/trumps-foreign-policy-no-longer-unpredictable

Thomas Wright meint, dass die Außenpolitik von US-Präsident Trump zwei Jahre nach dessen Amtsantritt nicht länger als "unberechenbar" bezeichnet werden könne. Trump selbst verfolge Ziele, die er bereits in den 1980er Jahren formuliert habe. Der Eindruck der Unberechenbarkeit sei entstanden, da er dabei immer wieder in Konflikt mit dem sicherheitspolitischen Establishment in Washington geraten sei. "Until recently, these two camps vied for supremacy, and it was difficult to know which would win on any given issue. At the two-year mark, it is now clear that the president is dominating this struggle, even if he has not yet won outright. For the first time, it is possible to identify a singular Trump administration foreign policy, as the president’s team coalesces around his ideas. This policy consists of a narrow, transactional relationship with other nations, a preference for authoritarian governments over other democracies, a mercantilist approach to international economic policy, a general disregard for human rights and the rule of law, and the promotion of nationalism and unilateralism at the expense of multilateralism."

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17.01.2019

"The Retreat of African Democracy - The Autocratic Threat Is Growing"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2019-01-17/retreat-african-democracy?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-2019
0117

Der lange Zeit zu beobachtende Trend einer Demokratisierung afrikanischer Länder habe sich in den vergangenen Jahren wieder umgekehrt, stellen Nic Cheeseman und Jeffrey Smith fest. "In the decade following the Cold War, Africa saw many democratic success stories. (...) All told, by the middle of the first decade of this century, every major peaceful state in Africa except Eritrea and Swaziland, the continent’s last absolute monarchy, was, at least in principle, committed to holding competitive elections. But in recent years, Africa’s political trajectory has begun moving in the opposite direction. (...) According to Freedom House, a think tank, just 11 percent of the continent is politically 'free,' and the average level of democracy, understood as respect for political rights and civil liberties, fell in each of the last 14 years. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance shows that democratic progress lags far behind citizens’ expectations. The vast majority of Africans want to live in a democracy, but the proportion who believe they actually do falls almost every year."

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03.01.2019

"The Stealth Superpower"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia

Oriana Skylar Mastro hält die chinesischen Beteuerungen, die USA nicht als globalen Hegemon ablösen zu wollen, für durchaus überzeugend. Das eigentliche Ziel Pekings - die vollständige Dominanz im Indopazifik - sei jedoch für die internationale Stabilität ebenso gefährlich. "In the Indo-Pacific region, China wants complete dominance; it wants to force the United States out and become the region’s unchallenged political, economic, and military hegemon. And globally, even though it is happy to leave the United States in the driver’s seat, it wants to be powerful enough to counter Washington when needed. (...) Although Beijing has pursued an indirect and entrepreneurial strategy of accumulating power, make no mistake: the ultimate goal is to push the United States out of the Indo-Pacific and rival it on the global stage. Until now, China has succeeded in growing without provoking. Yet there is a limit to how powerful a country can get without directly challenging the incumbent power, and China is now reaching that point."

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11.12.2018

"Deepfakes and the New Disinformation War"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-12-11/deepfakes-and-new-disinformation-war

Robert Chesney und Danielle Citron erwarten, dass manipulierte Bild-, Audio- und Videoaufnahmen ("Deepfakes") in der Geopolitik der kommenden Jahre eine möglicherweise destruktive Rolle spielen werden. "Deepfakes have the potential to be especially destructive because they are arriving at a time when it already is becoming harder to separate fact from fiction. For much of the twentieth century, magazines, newspapers, and television broadcasters managed the flow of information to the public. (...) Over the last decade, however, more and more people have begun to get their information from social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, which depend on a vast array of users to generate relatively unfiltered content. (...) These dynamics will make social media fertile ground for circulating deepfakes, with potentially explosive implications for politics. (...) Deepfakes will be particularly useful to nonstate actors, such as insurgent groups and terrorist organizations, which have historically lacked the resources to make and disseminate fraudulent yet credible audio or video content. (...) democratic societies will have to learn resilience. On the one hand, this will mean accepting that audio and video content cannot be taken at face value; on the other, it will mean fighting the descent into a post-truth world, in which citizens retreat to their private information bubbles and regard as fact only that which flatters their own beliefs."

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11.12.2018

"How a World Order Ends - And What Comes in Its Wake"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-12-11/how-world-order-ends?cid=cfr-homepage

Richard Haass stellt Überlegungen über das mögliche Ende der nach 1945 etablierten liberalen Weltordnung an. Dabei erkennt er historische Parallelen zum "Konzert der Großmächte", das Europa bis zum Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs stabilisiert habe. "From 1815 until the outbreak of World War I a century later, the order established at the Congress of Vienna defined many international relationships and set (even if it often failed to enforce) basic rules for international conduct. It provides a model of how to collectively manage security in a multipolar world. That order’s demise and what followed offer instructive lessons for today — and an urgent warning. Just because an order is in irreversible decline does not mean that chaos or calamity is inevitable. But if the deterioration is managed poorly, catastrophe could well follow."

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29.11.2018

"Climate Shocks and Humanitarian Crises"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-11-29/climate-shocks-and-humanitarian-crises

Joshua Busby und Nina von Uexkull nennen die Länder in Afrika, Nahost und Asien, die ihrer Prognose zufolge in den kommenden Jahren am stärksten unter den Folgen des Klimawandels und den resultierenden humanitären Krisen leiden werden. "(...) several risk factors make some countries more vulnerable than others to the consequences of climate change. Three stand out in particular: a high level of dependence on agriculture, a recent history of conflict, and discriminatory political institutions. Research suggests that in countries that display some or all of these risk factors, climate extremes are especially likely to lead to disastrous outcomes, including violence, food crises, and the large-scale displacement of populations. We have used these factors to identify the countries that are most at risk from climate-related instability and humanitarian crises in the coming years. In doing so, we hope to provide an early warning to policymakers about where climate impacts are likely to prove most destabilizing in the short term, and where efforts to minimize their effects are most needed."

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26.11.2018

"The Only Way to End the War in Yemen"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2018-11-26/only-way-end-war-yemen

Ein Ende des Krieges in Jemen wird nach Überzeugung von Jeffrey Feltman nicht ohne wesentliche Zugeständnisse Saudi-Arabiens zu erreichen sein. Er empfiehlt eine unilaterale Einstellung der militärischen Operationen, um die Huthi-Rebellen zur Nachahmung zu bewegen. "There is only one expeditious way for Saudi Arabia to end this counterproductive war, and that is to stop its military campaign unilaterally and challenge the Houthis to respond in kind. Doing so will not end all of the fighting inside Yemen. But it will create the conditions necessary for peace talks to gain traction and for Yemeni leaders, supported by regional and international partners, to address the country’s domestic troubles and the growing influence of Iran. The United States should lead an alliance of powers in pushing Saudi Arabia to move first, rather than letting it drag out talks as the war rages on."

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07.11.2018

"How Congress Can Take Back Foreign Policy"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-11-07/how-congress-can-take-back-foreign-polic
y?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-20181108

Das seit den Kongresswahlen von Demokraten kontrollierte Repräsentantenhaus könnte Präsident Trump nach Ansicht von Brian McKeon und Caroline Tess auch in der Außenpolitik einige Steine in den Weg legen. "Their first step should be returning to standard practice for oversight, a core function of the congressional committees. That means hearings, and lots of them. (...) Congress can’t match the president’s bully pulpit. But hearings and investigations draw attention to neglected issues and can force administrations to rethink decisions. They can divert the executive branch from its priorities and focus the attention of the press, particularly when they stick to a limited set of issues and sustain the pressure. (...) Complementing the work of the full committees, energized subcommittee chairs can use their gavels to focus attention on important issues. The chair of the House subcommittee on human rights, for example, can shine a light on dark places by hearing testimony from leading dissidents and human rights defenders from China, Cuba, the Philippines, Russia, and Turkey. (...) Controlling the purse is one way in which Congress has pushed back successfully against the Trump administration during its first two years. During the next two, the Appropriations Committees will likely do the same in both chambers."

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31.10.2018

"How France and Italy’s Rivalry Is Hurting Libya"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/france/2018-10-31/how-france-and-italys-rivalry-hurting-libya?cid
=gue

Die internationalen Bemühungen zur Stabilisierung Libyens werden Federica Saini Fasanotti und Ben Fishman zufolge auch durch die Rivalität zwischen Frankreich und Italien behindert. Beide Länder hätten die UN-Initiativen vor Ort durch eigene Aktivitäten untergraben. "Italy is now organizing an international conference on Libya set for November 12–13. Rome has an opportunity to help the UN advance several crucial elements of its peace efforts, including organizing Libyan national elections and reaching a lasting security arrangement. Conversely, if the Italian government uses its conference to sideline UN Libya envoy Ghassan Salamé, fight publicly with the French, and trumpet its policies on migration, it will further confuse Libya’s chaotic politics. (...) French-Italian differences are motivated more by politics than by divergent interests in Libya. Macron considers himself — and France — to be the standard bearer for the EU, defending liberal values and international cooperation in a time of rising populist nationalism. Naturally, he sees the new Italian government as a threat to his political vision. (...) The November 12–13 Conference in Palermo provides an opportunity for Italy to make a contribution to Libya’s peace process, but only if Conte and Salvini will elevate the role of the UN and minimize their competition with Macron."

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30.10.2018

"The Real Terrorist Threat in America. It’s No Longer Jihadist Groups"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-10-30/real-terrorist-threat-america?cid=nlc-fa
_twofa-20181101

Nach Ansicht von Peter Bergen und David Sterman geht die größte Terrorgefahr in den USA heute nicht mehr von dschihadistischen Gruppen, sondern von Einzeltätern aus, die sich im Internet auf verschiedenste Weise radikalisieren und leichten Zugang zu Waffen haben. "Since 9/11, no foreign terrorist group has successfully conducted a deadly attack in the United States. The main terrorist problem in the United States today is one of individuals — usually with ready access to guns — radicalized by a diverse array of ideologies absorbed from the Internet. (...) Whether expressed in right-wing, left-wing, jihadist, or black nationalist ideological terms, today’s acts of political violence share a common lineage in the above mixture and together have resulted in almost 200 deaths since the 9/11 attacks. The death toll is even higher if one includes other deadly attacks with less traditionally political or clear motivations ranging from the new ideological misogyny of 'incel' violence (incel being a term for a community of people who view themselves as involuntarily celibate and generally frame their perspective in ideological misogyny) to a spate of deadly school shootings. Addressing this threat will require a broad process of renewing U.S. society, a task far more difficult than disrupting a foreign terrorist organization’s operational capacity."

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15.10.2018

"If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/if-you-want-peace-prepare-nuclear-war?cid=nlc-fa
_twofa-20181018

Elbridge Colby schreibt, dass die Atomstrategie nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges nicht zu Unrecht an den Rand der amerikanischen Sicherheitspolitik gerückt sei. Angesichts der Rückkehr der Großmachtpolitik müsse dies allerdings korrigiert werden. Dabei fordert Colby auch eine Vorbereitung auf den taktischen Einsatz kleinerer Atomsprengköpfe. "Washington’s task is clear. It must demonstrate to Moscow and Beijing that any attempt to use force against U.S. friends and allies would likely fail and would certainly result in costs and risks well out of proportion to whatever they might gain. This requires conventional military power, but it also means having the right strategy and weapons to fight a limited nuclear war and come out on top. (...) the United States needs weapons systems that can bridge the wide gulf between conventional and all-out nuclear war. In particular, Washington should step up its efforts to develop low-yield tactical nuclear weapons and associated strategies that could help blunt or defeat a Russian or Chinese attack on U.S. allies without provoking a nuclear apocalypse."

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05.10.2018

"How Europe Can Reform Its Migration Policy"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2018-10-05/how-europe-can-reform-its-migration-policy?cid=
nlc-fa_twofa-20181011

Auch Alexander Betts und Paul Collier widmen sich der Frage, wie eine nachhaltige Migrationspolitik der EU aussehen sollte. "Europe does indeed have ethical obligations to the rest of the world. At the same time, a well-intentioned but ill-considered policy is likely to produce results such as the ones we have seen in Europe over the last three years: collapsing public trust, political backlash against migration, and bitter disputes between EU member states. A sustainable migration policy must therefore distinguish between Europe’s reciprocal ethical obligations, which arise from transactional relationships of mutual gain, and its nonreciprocal ones — those it has a duty to fulfill regardless of whether it gains anything in return. Rich countries have nonreciprocal obligations to help poor societies develop and to assist refugees fleeing from conflict and persecution. They do not have nonreciprocal obligations — other than humane treatment — to aspirational migrants."

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13.09.2018

"The Financial Crisis Is Still Empowering Far-Right Populists"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-09-13/financial-crisis-still-empowering-far-right-populists?
cid=nlc-fa_twofa-20180917

Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick und Christoph Trebesch machen die anhaltenden Folgen der Finanzkrise von 2008 für den Aufstieg rechtspopulistischer Bewegungen in Europa mitverantwortlich. "(...) the biggest cost of the crisis might be not economic but political: the populist wave that has swept over the world in the last decade, upending political systems, empowering extremists, and making governance more difficult. Financial crises regularly lead to political polarization and populism, but the recent populist surge has lasted longer than those that followed earlier crises — and done more damage. The crash in 2008 and the subsequent eurozone sovereign debt crisis dealt a severe blow to political systems in the West. Crisis fighting became the new normal. Long-standing two-party systems in France and Spain were swept away. Populist far-right forces emerged from the fringes, sometimes achieving major electoral victories."

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04.09.2018

"Toward a Neo-Progressive Foreign Policy"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-09-04/toward-neo-progressive-foreign-policy

Der aufsteigende linke Flügel der US-Demokraten habe bisher keine Alternative für das zuletzt im Jahr 2016 von Hillary Clinton vertretene außenpolitische Programm präsentiert, stellt Daniel Nexon fest. "Although American progressives — who include left-liberals, social democrats, and democratic socialists — enjoy a rough consensus on many broad domestic policy aims, if not always the means by which to achieve them, recent months have seen an uptick in concern (usually focused on the left) about the lack of a progressive vision for foreign policy. Indeed, the coalition seems divided between two depressingly familiar alternatives: liberal internationalists of the kind associated with the Democratic establishment, and anti-hegemonists, who want to see the United States drastically reduce its pretensions to global leadership. The latter question the desirability of so-called liberal order, which they see as, at best, serving the interests of global capital at the expense of democratic economic governance, and, at worst, a fig leaf for imperialism. (...) All of this is particularly unfortunate. The new gilded age — of corporate power, concentrated wealth, environmental dangers, corruption — demands a strong progressive movement."

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28.08.2018

"The Truth About the Liberal Order"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-08-28/truth-about-liberal-order?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-20180830

Graham Allison, der die liberale Weltordnung als "Mythos" charakterisiert hat, antwortet hier auf die Kritik, die sein Beitrag vom 14. Juni hervorgerufen hat. "Since the article was published, several scholars have pushed back. Rebecca Friedman Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper argue that the 'liberal order is more than a myth.' And Michael J. Mazarr suggests that I have misread the order’s history and purpose. Their responses are serious and thoughtful, but they do little to undermine my argument."

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24.08.2018

"How Daniel Ortega Became a Tyrant"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/nicaragua/2018-08-24/how-daniel-ortega-became-tyrant

Gioconda Belli, die das 1979 gestürzte Somoza-Regime in jungen Jahren miterlebt hat, schreibt, dass der damalige Revolutionsführer Daniel Ortega heute selbst zu einem Tyrannen geworden sei. "What never should have happened is happening again in Nicaragua. Since April 18, when the violent suppression of protests against a Social Security Reform triggered a massive civic insurrection, President Daniel Ortega and his wife, Vice-President Rosario Murillo, have abandoned all pretense of tolerance and restraint and unleashed a deadly wave of repression. It is as if Anastasio Somoza — the country’s previous dictator, toppled in 1979 — has returned to Managua."

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13.08.2018

"The Unconstrained Presidency"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-08-13/unconstrained-presidency?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-20180830

James Goldgeier und Elizabeth N. Saunders erinnern daran, dass die Machtzunahme der Exekutive in den USA nicht erst seit Präsident Trump ein Problem ist. "In reality, the problem goes well beyond Trump, and even beyond the well-documented trend of increasing presidential power. Constraints on the president — not just from Congress but also from the bureaucracy, allies, and international institutions — have been eroding for decades. Constraints are like muscles: once atrophied, they require bulking up before the competitor can get back in the game. Trump did not create the freedom of action he is now routinely displaying. He has merely revealed just how difficult it is to prevent it."

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13.08.2018

"The New Arab Order"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-08-13/new-arab-order?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-20180823

Marc Lynch meint dagegen, dass sich die Staatenordnung im Nahen Osten in den letzten Jahren grundlegend verändert habe. "(...) the upheaval did in fact create a new Arab order — just not the one most people expected. Although the Arab uprisings did not result in successful new democracies, they did reshape regional relations. The traditional great powers — Egypt, Iraq, and Syria — are now barely functional states. Wealthy and repressive Gulf countries — Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — are thriving. The proliferation of failed and weakened states has created new opportunities for competition and intervention, favoring new actors and new capabilities. Regional dynamics are no longer determined by formal alliances and conventional conflicts between major states. Instead, power operates through influence peddling and proxy warfare. (...) Any vision of the region finding a workable balance of power is a mirage: the new order is fundamentally one of disorder."

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13.08.2018

"North Korea's Nuclear Program Isn't Going Anywhere"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-08-13/north-koreas-nuclear-program-isnt-going-an
ywhere

Zwei Monate nach dem Gipfeltreffen von Singapur habe Nordkorea die klare diplomatische Oberhand gewonnen, stellen Ankit Panda und Vipin Narang fest. "Although Trump is desperate to continue claiming that he 'solved' the North Korean nuclear threat at Singapore, as many predicted, North Korea continues to expand its nuclear and ballistic missile arsenals and has played its diplomatic hand brilliantly. It has burned a lot of time while taking largely cosmetic steps on its nuclear weapons program, such as partially destroying its nuclear test site and engine test facility, neither of which it needs to mass-produce nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. These steps give up just enough to keep Trump at bay and allow Beijing and Moscow to provide Pyongyang with trade and energy, thereby deflating maximum pressure. How did North Korea get to this point, and where do we go from here?"

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14.06.2018

"The Myth of the Liberal Order"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/myth-liberal-order?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-20180621

In einem begleitenden Essay aus der aktuellen Foreign-Affairs-Ausgabe verfolgt Graham Allison den Aufstieg der liberalen Ordnung von einem "historischen Unfall" zu einer "konventionellen Weisheit". Dabei widerspricht er drei aktuellen "Mythen": "First, that the liberal order has been the principal cause of the so-called long peace among great powers for the past seven decades. Second, that constructing this order has been the main driver of U.S. engagement in the world over that period. And third, that U.S. President Donald Trump is the primary threat to the liberal order — and thus to world peace. (...) Although all these propositions contain some truth, each is more wrong than right. The 'long peace' was the not the result of a liberal order but the byproduct of the dangerous balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States during the four and a half decades of the Cold War and then of a brief period of U.S. dominance. U.S. engagement in the world has been driven not by the desire to advance liberalism abroad or to build an international order but by the need to do what was necessary to preserve liberal democracy at home. And although Trump is undermining key elements of the current order, he is far from the biggest threat to global stability."

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14.06.2018

"Which World Are We Living In?"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/which-world-are-we-living

Foreign Affairs hat ein neues Dossier mit Beiträgen über sechs verschiedene politikwissenschaftliche Modellvorstellungen über den Charakter der Welt von morgen veröffentlicht. Gideon Rose stellt die Autoren in seiner Einleitung vor und schreibt: "Bismarck once said that the statesman’s task was to hear God’s footsteps marching through history and try to catch his coattails as he went past. It’s a great concept, but how do you spot him? With the time clearly out of joint, we dispatched six scouts to look for tracks, and this issue’s lead package presents their findings. Realist world. Liberal world. Tribal world. Marxist world. Tech world. Warming world. A half dozen choices of grand narrative for an increasingly turbulent era."

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28.05.2018

"What Will It Take for Syrian Refugees to Return Home?"

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2018-05-28/what-will-it-take-syrian-refugees-return-home?ci
d=gue

Maha Yahya und ihre Kollegen vom Carnegie Middle East Center haben sich mit syrischen Flüchtlingen unterhalten, um herauszufinden, unter welchen Bedingungen deren Rückkehr in ihre Heimat in Frage käme. Die Gespräche haben gezeigt, dass es auch nach einem Friedensschluss in Syrien beträchtliche Hürden für eine Rückkehrerwelle geben würde. "Although experiences of discrimination in their current countries of residence have led many refugees to romanticize pre-conflict Syria, those whom we interviewed overwhelmingly cited safety and security as a chief condition for return. But most do not believe that these security conditions will be met any time soon without some form of political change. The majority of refugees oppose the regime, and for them, safety and security can only be guaranteed if Syrian President Bashar al-Assad goes. (...) But the departure of Assad is not all that refugees want; many believe that safety and security also means demilitarization, which would involve the disbanding of all militias and armed factions and putting an end to arbitrary arrests and checkpoints. (...) going back home will be challenging for even the most committed refugees. Fragmentation of territories, widespread destruction, and new legislation governing property rights will all complicate refugees’ ability to reclaim the lives they left behind. Mass displacement has produced large-scale secondhand occupation of housing, and many poorly equipped camps have been erected on land still legally owned by civilians. These settlements will generate property rights issues for refugees seeking to recover their assets."

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