US-Soldaten in Afghanistan

The New Yorker


»http://www.newyorker.com«

suche-links1 2 3suche-rechts

10.09.2019

"How John Bolton Got the Better of President Trump"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/how-john-bolton-got-the-better-of-president-trump

In seiner recht positiven Bestandsaufnahme der Amtszeit des entlassenen Nationalen Sicherheitsberaters hält Dexter Filkins es für einen Glücksfall, dass John Bolton sich in drei außenpolitischen Fällen erfolgreich gegen den US-Präsidenten durchsetzen konnte. "Someone has to contain [Trump]. My sense was that Bolton understood this from the start (...) A case in point: Trump favored direct negotiations with Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s erratic chieftain (...). Bolton told his aides to support the President, but he made it clear that he believed the strategy was a bad idea. No deal emerged. Another: Trump seems determined to take all remaining American troops out of Afghanistan, and he appointed a special envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, to make a deal with the Taliban. (...) Bolton opposed all of it. And now the deal appears dead. And a third: At Bolton’s urging, Trump withdrew from the deal, forged by the Obama Administration, to restrain Iran’s nuclear-weapons program. But the President was clearly confused about what to do next. Bolton and the others around him wanted to crush the Iranian economy, launch air strikes, and provoke a confrontation. Trump felt uncomfortable with Bolton’s aggressive posture and appeared to long for a chance to do a deal; in 2017, before appointing Bolton, he sent eight invitations, including a dinner request, to the Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani. But no deal has happened. (...) on these three crucial issues, Bolton was able to get the better of Trump. Not all of the outcomes were the direct result of his actions, but his views mostly prevailed."

Mehr lesen


09.09.2019

"The Moral Logic of Humanitarian Intervention"

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/09/16/the-moral-logic-of-humanitarian-intervention

In der Amtszeit von Barack Obama war Samantha Power als Beraterin und UN-Botschafterin des US-Präsidenten tätig. Dexter Filkins schreibt, dass die frühere Aktivistin in dieser Zeit konsequent ihrem Verständnis von humanitären Militärinterventionen gefolgt sei und entsprechende US-Einsätze in Syrien oder Libyen befürwortet habe. Allerdings habe sich schnell herausgestellt, dass wohlmeinende Motive oft katastrophale Folgen haben können, so Filkins. "Power advocated greater interference in countries’ internal affairs in defense of an unwavering principle of humanitarianism. 'Given the affront genocide represents to America’s most cherished values and to its interests, the United States must also be prepared to risk the lives of its soldiers in the service of stopping this monstrous crime,' she wrote. The book inspired a generation of activists, helping to establish the doctrine of 'responsibility to protect,' which held that the United States and other wealthy countries had an obligation to defend threatened populations around the world. (...) The biggest reason that memoirs from the Obama Administration tend to avoid lingering on humanitarian intervention is simply that the record provides little to brag about: a disaster in Libya and in Syria, and a quagmire in Afghanistan, where the prospects of millions of women, empowered by the removal of the Taliban, hang in the balance. (...) Could Obama have done more? In retrospect, the answer is always yes. Would the results look better? Knowing the answer would require, as Power said of the decision to intervene in Libya, a crystal ball."

Mehr lesen


26.08.2019

"Are Spies More Trouble Than They’re Worth?"

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/09/02/are-spies-more-trouble-than-theyre-worth

Adam Gopnik stellt das Buch "The Secret World: A History of Intelligence" von Christopher Andrew vor, dessen komplexe und widersprüchliche Spionagegeschichten bei Gopnik Zweifel am Nutzen staatlicher Nachrichtendienste wecken. "There seems to be a paranoid paradox of espionage: the better your intelligence, the dumber your conduct; the more you know, the less you anticipate. Again and again, a reader of Andrew’s history finds that the countries with the keenest spies, the most thorough decryptions of enemy code, and the best flow of intelligence about their opponents have the most confounding fates. Hard-won information is ignored or wildly misinterpreted. It’s remarkably hard to find cases where a single stolen piece of information changed the course of a key battle."

Mehr lesen


24.06.2019

"Trump Sanctions Iran’s Supreme Leader, but to What End?"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/trump-sanctions-irans-supreme-leader-but-to-what-end

Die neuen Iran-Sanktionen der USA richten sich gegen den Obersten Religionsführer Ajatollah Chamenei. Robin Wright berichtet, dass Präsident Trump bei der Verkündung der Sanktionen kurz davor gestanden habe, formell einen Regimewechsel in Teheran zu fordern. Davon abgesehen schätzen Experten die wirtschaftlichen Folgen der Sanktionen eher gering ein. "Ironically, the punitive new measure may not have major economic impact — at least not to the degree that the Administration advertised. 'It’s a lot of hype, but it doesn’t mean much economically. It’s unlikely to have a damaging effect' on Iran beyond the sanctions that have already been imposed, Elizabeth Rosenberg, a former Treasury sanctions specialist who is now at the Center for a New American Security, told me. 'It’s in the realm of the symbolic.' (...) The main impact of the new sanctions may be political — diminishing rather than encouraging diplomacy or de-escalation. Pompeo said that Tehran 'knows how to reach us,' if it decides to 'meet our diplomacy with diplomacy.' But Tehran immediately rejected talks. At the United Nations, the Iranian Ambassador Majid Takht-Ravanchi told reporters that Tehran would not succumb to pressure."

Mehr lesen


24.05.2019

"Charging Julian Assange Under the Espionage Act Is an Attack on the First Amendment"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/charging-julian-assange-under-the-espionage-act-is-an-attac
k-on-the-first-amendment

Die US-Justizbehörden haben ihre Anklageschrift gegen Julian Assange erweitert und wollen den WikiLeaks-Gründer nun mit Hilfe des Spionagegesetzes von 1917 wegen der Veröffentlichung von Geheimmaterial belangen. Für viele Kommentatoren ist dies ein klarer Angriff auf die Pressefreiheit. Masha Gessen, die kaum Sympathien für Assange hegt, schreibt im New Yorker: "The use of the Espionage Act to prosecute Assange is an attack on the First Amendment. Carrie DeCell, an attorney with the Knight First Amendment Institute, summed up the threat in a Twitter thread on Thursday. 'The government argues that Assange violated the Espionage Act by soliciting, obtaining, and then publishing classified information,' she wrote. 'That’s exactly what good national security and investigative journalists do every day.' (...) Like many Trumpian attacks on democracy, this one is novel but rooted in a long devolution of American institutions — it is a leap, but from a running start. Government use of law against speech goes back at least to the George W. Bush Administration. Prosecutions ramped up under Barack Obama. Prosecutions, however, focussed on whistleblowers and leakers; journalists, who, like the Times reporter James Risen, could be called up as witnesses, were targeted indirectly. But journalism has not been collateral damage in this battle — it has been the target. The Trump Administration has made that clear by jumping the fence that the Obama Administration had merely approached and charging Assange, under the Espionage Act, for practices typical of journalists."

Mehr lesen


29.04.2019

"Baghdadi Is Back — and Vows That ISIS Will Be, Too"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/baghdadi-is-backand-vows-that-isis-will-be-too

Nach fast fünf Jahren hat sich der Anführer des "Islamischen Staates", Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, wieder in einem Video an die Öffentlichkeit gewandt. Robin Wright hat einige Experten zur Bedeutung des Videos befragt. "'Baghdadi’s survival despite a massive manhunt and the successful military campaign is impressive,' Daniel Byman, a Brookings Institution scholar and the author of the new book 'Road Warriors: Foreign Fighters in the Armies of Jihad,' told me. 'It shows the Islamic State retains functioning networks and considerably clandestine capacity in Iraq and Syria.' The video was 'a way for him both to continue his claim to the leadership of the jihadist movement and to give his followers heart in what is a dispiriting time for them.' (...) 'The international community should not kid itself — isis remains a serious force, even in Syria and Iraq,' [Charles Lister, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute,] told me. 'In eastern Syria alone, isis appears to have conducted over eighty-five attacks since the loss of Baghouz, its final picket of territory. That’s no small feat. Thousands of fighters remain in operation, and the scale of the problem isis has left behind far eclipses what the U.S. left behind in Iraq, in 2010.'"

Mehr lesen


26.04.2019

"The Terrifying Potential of the 5G Network"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/annals-of-communications/the-terrifying-potential-of-the-5g-network

Sue Halpern erwartet, dass das geplante 5G-Netz mit seinem Versprechen einer "totalen Vernetzung" auch "erschreckende" Risiken mit sich bringen wird. Das erwartete "Internet der Dinge" wird demnach zum Ziel von Cyberattacken und zum Mittel völlig neuer Überwachungsmöglichkeiten werden. "5G will catalogue exactly where someone has come from, where they are going, and what they are doing. 'To give one made-up example,' Steve Bellovin, a computer-science professor at Columbia University, told the Wall Street Journal, 'might a pollution sensor detect cigarette smoke or vaping, while a Bluetooth receiver picks up the identities of nearby phones? Insurance companies might be interested.' Paired with facial recognition and artificial intelligence, the data streams and location capabilities of 5G will make anonymity a historical artifact."

Mehr lesen


13.04.2019

"Bernie Sanders Imagines a Progressive New Approach to Foreign Policy"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-political-scene/bernie-sanders-imagines-a-progressive-new-approach-to-
foreign-policy

Der demokratische Präsidentschaftskandidat Bernie Sanders plant Benjamin Wallace-Wells zufolge, in seinem kommenden Wahlkampf die Außenpolitik stärker ins Zentrum zu rücken. Unter demokratischen Experten in Washington habe Sanders dabei neue Anhänger gefunden. "'Out of frustration with some aspects of Obama’s foreign policy and anger with most aspects of Trump’s, many leaders in the Party have concluded that the challenge was not to build bridges between centrist Democrats and centrist Republicans but, rather, between centrist and progressive Democrats. That means breaking away from the so-called Blob' — a term for the foreign-policy establishment, from the Obama adviser Ben Rhodes. [Suzanne DiMaggio, a specialist in negotiations with adversaries at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,] said, 'The case for restraint seems to be gaining ground, particularly in its rejection of preventive wars and efforts to change the regimes of countries that do not directly threaten the United States.' She and others now see in Sanders something that they didn’t in 2016: a clear progressive theory of what the U.S. is after in the world."

Mehr lesen


10.04.2019

"What Netanyahu’s Win Says About Israel’s Future"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/what-netanyahus-apparent-victory-says-about-israels-future

Das Resultat der israelischen Parlamentswahlen hat nach Ansicht von Bernard Avishai bestätigt, dass sich die rechte Likud-Partei offenbar auf eine "permanente Mehrheit" der Wähler verlassen könne. "If you look at a map of the electoral results, moreover, you will see a numbingly familiar pattern. (...) These parts of Israel — Jerusalem neighborhoods, the settlements, the poor southern towns, the ultra-Orthodox communities, immigrant Russian neighborhoods — give Likud governments what’s come to feel like a permanent majority. In a television poll from the night before the elections, more than sixty per cent of the respondents who said that they would vote for the Likud were Mizrahis. Three-quarters of those who said that they were voting for Blue and White described themselves as secular. (...) even if Netanyahu is indicted in July and is forced to resign by, say, impatient Likud leaders eager to inherit his mantle, Likud’s nationalist populism has put Israel’s élites in an internal exile from which they will not emerge anytime soon."

Mehr lesen


10.02.2019

"How Liberals Can Use Nationalism for Good"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-new-yorker-interview/how-liberals-can-use-nationalism-for-good

Isaac Chotiner hat sich mit der israelischen Politikwissenschaftlerin und früheren Knesset-Abgeordneten Yael Tamir über ihr neues Buch "Why Nationalism" unterhalten. "Nationalism was the project of the élites. The people joined in later. It has now become the project of the people. And that is due to the fact that globalism, hyper-globalism, separated the interests of the people from the interests of the élite. I think the emergence of populism right now is not a coincidence. It is not as if people became less reasonable or more violent. I think they are presented with new challenges and fears and reasons to be worried about their future. I am not sure they are bringing about the right solutions, but they are voicing concerns that have been repressed for a long time. (...) Nationalism is not about breaking all international institutions. It’s about the ordering of priorities. You asked me at the beginning: Why now? I think the more social democratic forces in society are losing out and handing over this powerful tool to people who are abusing it. Every ideology, from socialism to nationalism, is easy to abuse. The fact that people abuse an ideology is not evidence it is a bad ideology or a good ideology. What I am saying is that this was a powerful tool in the twentieth century and I think it is still relevant."

Mehr lesen


31.12.2018

"Is Revolutionary Fervor Afire — Again — in Tunisia?"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/is-revolutionary-fervor-afire-again-in-tunisia

Die Proteste in Tunesien haben mit der Selbstverbrennung des TV-Journalisten Abderrazak Zorgui einen neuen Höhepunkt erreicht. Robin Wright schreibt, dass die tunesische Politik acht Jahre nach dem Ausbruch des Arabischen Frühlings keine Lösung für die sozioökonomischen Probleme des Landes gefunden habe. "More than a third of young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four are unemployed. Zorgui’s death has resonated. It sparked days of protests and clashes with police in several cities, including Tunis, the capital, in the east. A tentative calm settled in over the weekend, but activists have called for further demonstrations to mark the Arab Spring anniversary. More worrisome, the existential challenges that threaten Tunisia’s government show no sign of improving anytime soon. (...) 'It is easy to predict that Tunisia will continue to have roiling micro-protests,' [William Lawrence, a North Africa specialist at George Washington University’s Elliott School,] said. 'The current wave will not threaten the establishment like 2011, but it is a harbinger of things to come if Tunisia does not improve its socioeconomic situation.'"

Mehr lesen


17.12.2018

"How Trump Made War on Angela Merkel and Europe"

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/how-trump-made-war-on-angela-merkel-and-europe

Susan B. Glasser analysiert in ihrem Essay für den New Yorker das Verhältnis zwischen Donald Trump und Angela Merkel, das sich nicht nur aufgrund unterschiedlicher Interessen, sondern auch aus persönlichen Gründen äußerst schwierig gestalte. "The problem, it soon became clear, ran deeper than Trump’s habitual dismissal of rational argument or ordinary differences over policy. The President, the German officials concluded, harbored a deep animus toward Germany in general, and Merkel in particular. 'There’s a single-mindedness to it and almost an obsession, it seems, and this is something we are hearing from colleagues in the Administration, too: an obsession with Germany,' one of the senior German officials told me. 'It seems like it’s very often issues that can seemingly be boiled down to a single number, like two per cent, or to a single concept. ... He latches on to that with a certain fixation.' Niels Annen, a Bundestag member who is the German equivalent of the Deputy Secretary of State, told me, 'Unfortunately, Germany seems to be very high on the agenda of the President himself.'"

Mehr lesen


17.12.2018

"Iraq’s Post-ISIS Campaign of Revenge"

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/iraqs-post-isis-campaign-of-revenge

Die irakische Regierung betreibe seit dem Sieg über den "Islamischen Staat" eine systematische "Rachekampagne" gegen mutmaßliche IS-Anhänger und deren Familien, schreibt Ben Taub in seiner Reportage für den New Yorker. Dies dürfte früher oder später erneut zur Entstehung von Terrorgruppen führen, so Taubs Prognose. "The Islamic State has been mostly destroyed on the battlefield, but the war is far from over. Air strikes cannot kill an idea, and so it has fallen to Iraq’s fractured security, intelligence, and justice systems to try to finish the task. But, insofar as there is a strategy, it seems almost perfectly crafted to bring about the opposite of its intent. American and Iraqi military officials spent years planning the campaign to rid Iraq of isis, as if the absence of the jihadis would automatically lead Iraq toward the bright democratic future that George W. Bush’s Administration had envisaged when U.S. forces invaded the country, in 2003. But isis has always derived much of its dangerous appeal from the corruption and cruelty of the Iraqi state. (...) more than a year after isis lost Mosul — its largest source of legitimacy, wealth, and power — hundreds of thousands of civilians are suffering at the hands of their liberators. Anyone with a perceived connection to isis, however tenuous or unclear, is being killed or cast out of society."

Mehr lesen


30.10.2018

"A Hundred Years After the Armistice"

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/11/05/a-hundred-years-after-the-armistice

In historischen Rückblicken auf den Ersten Weltkrieg wird oft hervorgehoben, wie "sinnlos" dieser Krieg letztlich gewesen sei. Dies trifft nach Ansicht von Adam Hochschild sowohl auf den Beginn als auch auf das Ende des Kriegs zu. Er stellt eine Reihe neuer Bücher vor, die sich anlässlich des 100. Jahrestages des Waffenstillstands eingehend mit dieser letzten Kriegsperiode beschäftigt haben. Die Reaktion der deutschen Bevölkerung auf den Vertrag von Versailles erklärt er dabei folgendermaßen: "Despite its flaws, the treaty was far less harsh than many imposed on other nations that had been defeated in war. The problem was something else: when the war came to an end, at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month of 1918, few Germans considered themselves defeated. The resentment that led to a new cataclysm two decades later was really forged by the Armistice. To begin with, the Armistice was not an armistice; the Allies, in effect, demanded — and received — a surrender. Yet German civilians had no idea their vaunted military was starting to crumble. Their ignorance was a fateful result of unrelenting propaganda. (...) Small wonder that Germans were outraged to learn the Armistice terms, and to see British, French, and American occupation troops march into the Rhineland. If the Army was 'unconquered,' who was responsible for these humiliations?"

Mehr lesen


07.10.2018

"Did the Saudis Murder Jamal Khashoggi?"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/did-the-saudis-murder-jamal-khashoggi

Robin Wright hat den seit seinem Besuch im saudi-arabischen Konsulat in Istanbul vermissten Jamal Khashoggi persönlich gekannt. Sie erläutert, warum sie die Vermutung, dass der Journalist ermordet wurde, aufgrund des Charakters des neuen Regimes von Kronprinz Mohammed bin Salman nicht für ausgeschlossen hält. "(...) experts on Saudi Arabia suspect a more ominous pattern. 'The crocodile tears of the crown prince and other Saudi officials are probably for deception and prevarication,' Bruce Riedel, a former C.I.A., Pentagon, and National Security Council staffer who is now at the Brookings Institution, told me. 'The disappearance of Jamal fits with a pattern of crude intimidation and the silencing of criticism and dissent.' In words that now haunt his own case, Khashoggi told me, in August, that the crown prince has 'no tolerance or willingness to accommodate critics.' Although he is technically next in line to the throne, M.B.S. acts as the country’s de-facto leader, Khashoggi said, and has already become more autocratic than any of the previous six kings who have ruled since the death of Ibn Saud, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, in 1953."

Mehr lesen


18.06.2018

"How Trump and Three Other U.S. Presidents Protected Israel’s Worst-Kept Secret: Its Nuclear Arsenal"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-trump-and-three-other-us-presidents-protected-israels-worst-
kept-secret-its-nuclear-arsenal?mbid=social_twitter

Donald Trump ist Adam Entous zufolge der vierte US-Präsident, der sich durch die Unterzeichnung eines geheimen Schreibens bereit erklärt hat, Israel wegen des offiziell immer noch nicht bestätigten Atomwaffenprogramms nicht unter Druck zu setzen. Israel habe Trump in dieser Frage bereits im Februar 2017 zu einer Entscheidung gedrängt. "By all accounts, the American Administration was eager to please the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, whom Trump had promised to lavish with unprecedented support. But, at that chaotic moment, Trump’s aides felt blindsided by the Israeli request. They knew nothing about the existence of any letters and were confused by the sense of urgency coming from the Israelis. (...) The White House’s reaction was understandable. There had been a similar moment of surprise eight years earlier, when Barack Obama became President and received a similar request. The very existence of the letters had been a closely held secret. Only a select group of senior American officials, in three previous Administrations, knew of the letters and how Israeli leaders interpreted them as effectively an American pledge not to press the Jewish state to give up its nuclear weapons so long as it continued to face existential threats in the region."

Mehr lesen


11.06.2018

"Donald Trump’s New World Order"

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/donald-trumps-new-world-order

Adam Entous beschreibt in diesem ausführlichen Essay für den New Yorker, wie US-Präsident Trump auch in der Nahost-Politik der USA eine Ära beendet habe. Die Palästinenser seien die Verlierer dieser Neuorientierung, die sich vor allem gegen den Iran richte. "Trump had run for office as a noninterventionist, with the slogan 'America First.' 'He quite honestly had very little interest in meddling in the Middle East in general and very little interest from a philosophical point of view,' a Trump confidant told me. As far as Trump was concerned, 'all of this was an annoyance.' (...) With Obama finally out of the way, Netanyahu could concentrate on getting the Trump team to embrace his grand strategy for transforming the direction of Middle Eastern politics. His overarching ambition was to diminish the Palestinian cause as a focus of world attention and to form a coalition with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to combat Iran, which had long supported Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza and had taken strategic advantage of the American folly in Iraq and the war in Syria. (...) The Palestinians seem to be the likely losers in the new New Middle East. As a senior Arab official said of the strategic alliance, 'With or without a peace plan, it’s happening.' A senior Trump adviser said, 'Iran is the reason why this is all happening.'"

Mehr lesen


29.05.2018

"News Whiplash and a Sense of History in the Making in South Korea"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/news-whiplash-and-a-sense-of-history-in-the-making-in-south-korea

Trotz der widersprüchlichen Entwicklung des Verhandlungsprozesses mit Nordkorea herrsche in Südkorea Optimismus und Hoffnung vor, berichtet E. Tammy Kim. "[President Moon Jae-in] has become the go-between figure in this drama. Although his conservative opponents have cast doubt on the peace process and accused him of cozying up to a dictator, there is, particularly among South Korea’s journalists, academics, and mainstream policy-makers, enormous reverence for Moon, and a sense that peninsular history is in the making. (...) For decades, South Koreans have lived under the spectre of North Korea’s Kim dynasty and the legacy of violent military rule in their own country. This helps explain why Moon’s embrace of Kim Jong Un, a man with a penchant for extrajudicial murder, seems less odious to South Koreans than to Western observers. What choice does Moon have?"

Mehr lesen


02.01.2018

"Making China Great Again"

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/08/making-china-great-again

Die außenpolitische Neuorientierung der USA unter Präsident Trump wird langfristig vor allem China nutzen, ist Evan Osnos überzeugt. Dass China eine globale Dominanz nach amerikanischem Vorbild ausüben wird, bleibe allerdings unwahrscheinlich. "In dozens of interviews in China and the U.S., I encountered almost no one who expects China to supplant the U.S. anytime soon in its role as the world’s preëminent power. Beyond China’s economic obstacles, its political system — including constraints on speech, religion, civil society, and the Internet — drives away some of the country’s boldest and most entrepreneurial thinkers. Xi’s system inspires envy from autocrats, but little admiration from ordinary citizens around the world. (...) Global leadership is costly; it means asking your people to contribute to others’ well-being, to send young soldiers to die far from home. (...) China is not 'seeking to replace us in the same position as a kind of chairman of planet Earth,' Daniel Russel said. 'They have no intention of emulating the U.S. as a provider of global goods or as an arbiter who teases out universal principles and common rules.' More likely, the world is entering an era without obvious leaders, an 'age of nonpolarity,' as Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, has described it, in which nationalist powers — China, the U.S., Russia — contend with non-state groups of every moral stripe, from Doctors Without Borders to Facebook, and ExxonMobil to Boko Haram."

Mehr lesen


27.11.2017

"Egypt Is in Trouble, and Not Just from ISIS"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/egypt-is-in-trouble-and-not-just-from-isis

Auch Robin Wright stellt fest, dass der ägyptische Präsident Sisi sein Versprechen, auf zunehmend autoritäre und repressive Art und Weise für Sicherheit, Stabilität und wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung zu sorgen, nicht eingehalten habe. "Last year, Adel Abdel Ghafar warned in a Brookings Institution report that, 'in a classic authoritarian bargain,' Sisi came to power 'promising security, stability, and economic prosperity in exchange for near-total political control. Now, that bargain is in the process of breaking down, since he’s failed to deliver on all three fronts.' Unemployment among Egyptian youth, who have been the jihadi foot soldiers, is above thirty per cent — 'a ticking time bomb,' Ghafar said. (...) Egypt’s situation is reminiscent of the U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Egyptian forces hold military bases, operate checkpoints, and carry out periodic patrols in armored convoys—but they can’t control much of the countryside. Sisi may reign as the most powerful strongman among the rulers of the more than twenty Arab countries. But his strategy in Sinai, so far, is not working."

Mehr lesen


23.10.2017

"ISIS Jihadis Have Returned Home by the Thousands"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/isis-jihadis-have-returned-home-by-the-thousands

Das US-Militär ist Robin Wright zufolge davon überzeugt, die Gefahr durch überlebende IS-Kämpfer aufgrund der hohen Opferzahlen der Terrormiliz in Syrien und Irak begrenzt zu haben. Tatsächlich wisse aber niemand genau, wie viele Dschihadisten die Kämpfe überlebt hätten. Ein neuer Bericht des Soufan Centre habe nun aktuelle Informationen über IS-Rückkehrer vorgelegt. "A new report, to be released Tuesday by the Soufan Group and the Global Strategy Network, details some of the answers: At least fifty-six hundred people from thirty-three countries have already gone home — and most countries don’t yet have a head count. (...) The Islamic State’s future may increasingly depend on the returnees, the report warns. 'As the territorial caliphate shrinks and is increasingly denied an overt presence, its leadership will look to supporters overseas, including returnees, to keep the brand alive,' it says. For the jihadis themselves, the psychological impact of their past ISIS experience and their uncertain futures may be as pivotal as any ideological commitment in determining what they do next."

Mehr lesen


09.10.2017

"Rex Tillerson at the Breaking Point"

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/16/rex-tillerson-at-the-breaking-point

Dexter Filkins hat sich in diesem ausführlichen Beitrag für den New Yorker mit Rex Tillerson und dessen bisheriger Rolle als US-Außenminister beschäftigt. Die aktuelle US-Außenpolitik werde von vielen Beobachtern als chaotisch eingeschätzt, was Filkins zufolge nicht nur auf Präsident Trump, sondern möglicherweise auch auf Tillersons frühere Tätigkeit als Exxon-CEO zurückzuführen sei. "Part of the problem is that Tillerson has not entirely given up the perspective of an imperial C.E.O. He rarely meets with legislators, and has sometimes been high-handed with fellow Cabinet members. (...) His most crucial relationship, with the President, may be broken beyond repair. (...) At Exxon, Tillerson was less a visionary than a manager of an institution built long before he took over. With Trump, he appears content to manage the decline of the State Department and of America’s influence abroad, in the hope of keeping his boss’s tendency toward entropy and conflict from producing catastrophic results."

Mehr lesen


27.09.2017

"Kurds Voted. So Is the Middle East Breaking Up?"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kurds-voted-so-is-the-middle-east-breaking-up

Die Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen der irakischen Kurden haben die erneut unbequeme Frage nach der staatlichen Zukunft des gesamten Nahen Ostens aufgeworfen, schreibt Robin Wright. "The Kurdish vote reflects an existential quandary across the entire Middle East: Are some of the region’s most important countries really viable anymore? The world has resisted addressing the issue since the popular protests in 2011, known as the Arab Uprising, or Arab Spring, spawned four wars and a dozen crises. Entire countries have been torn asunder, with little to no prospect of political or physical reconstruction anytime soon. (...) The long-term impact of these destructive centrifugal forces is far from clear. But, given the blood spilled over the past six years, primordial forces seem to be prevailing at the moment, and not only among the Kurds. 'The only people who want to hold Iraq together,' Lukman Faily, the former Iraqi ambassador to Washington, opined to me recently, 'are those who don’t live in Iraq.'"

Mehr lesen


10.09.2017

"Sixteen Years After 9/11, How Does Terrorism End?"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-does-terrorism-end

Anlässlich des 16. Jahrestages der Anschläge vom 11. September hat sich Robin Wright mit acht Terrorismus-Experten aus US-Behörden und Thinktanks über die Erfolgsaussichten von Terrorgruppen unterhalten. Weniger als 5% der Gruppen hätten unmittelbaren Erfolg, so eine Einschätzung von Audrey Kurth Cronin, Autorin des Buches "How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns". Darüberhinaus gebe es fünf weitere gängige Entwicklungsrichtungen: "More common — about eighteen per cent — are terrorist movements that end up negotiating to achieve their political goals. (...) A third pattern is terrorist 'reorientation,' when groups alter tactics, sometimes even entering politics. (...) The fourth path is state repression, the most instinctive reaction. (...) Other terrorist movements collapse as the national and international political dynamics that fuelled them fade. (...) Finally, the decapitation of leaders — by capture or death — can also deflate or finish off movements. (...) Which pattern might apply to ISIS and the Taliban? 'I’m less confident those lessons apply to the groups we face today,' Brian Jenkins, the author of 'Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?,' said."

Mehr lesen


29.05.2017

"Putin’s Shadow Cabinet and the Bridge to Crimea"

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/29/putins-shadow-cabinet-and-the-bridge-to-crimea

Das ambitionierteste Bauprojekt Russlands soll die Krim mit einer Brücke über das Schwarze Meer mit dem russischen Festland verbinden. Das Projekt wird von einem Jugendfreund Präsident Putins geleitet, für Joshua Yaffa ein gutes Beispiel für den Einfluss einer neuen Schicht von Oligarchen in Putins Russland. "Rotenberg’s success is a prime example of a political and economic restructuring that has taken place during Putin’s seventeen years in office: the de-fanging of one oligarchic class and the creation of another. In the nineties, a coterie of business figures built corporate empires that had little loyalty to the state. Under Putin, they were co-opted, marginalized, or strong-armed into obedience. (...) At the same time, a new caste of oligarchs emerged, many with close personal ties to Putin. These oligarchs have been allowed to extract vast wealth from the state, often through lucrative government contracts, while understanding that their ultimate duty is to serve the President and shore up the system over which he rules."

Mehr lesen


29.05.2017

"James Mattis, a Warrior in Washington"

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/29/james-mattis-a-warrior-in-washington

Dexter Filkins schreibt in diesem Porträt von Verteidigungsminister James Mattis, dass sich Präsident Trump einen erfolgreichen Ex-General ins Team geholt habe, der nicht nur für seine Aggressivität, sondern auch für seine militärische Bildung und analytische Stärke bekannt sei. Die Folgen für die US-Außenpolitik seien bislang noch nicht absehbar. "Mattis could well turn out to be a brake on Trump’s impulsive tendencies. But it’s also possible that, with the President uninterested in many details of international affairs, the military will also lack restraint. (...) With the United States engaged in open-ended hostilities in at least five countries — and with military challenges looming from Eastern Europe to North Korea — some worry that Mattis will be left to determine foreign policy himself. 'Mattis wants to win. He wants victory. He wants to kick ass,' the former defense official, who has known Mattis for years, told me. 'The White House is much looser now. They’re turning to the military and saying, 'You do it. We trust you. You’re the pros.' I’m worried the pendulum is swinging the other way, and that the military gets whatever the hell they want. Because General Mattis is a warrior. He has spent forty years killing people, and his whole career has been built to win.'"

Mehr lesen


29.03.2017

"Donald Trump, Lost in Africa"

http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/donald-trump-lost-in-africa

Von den Streichungen bisheriger außenpolitischer Hilfsprogramme der US-Regierung ist Alexis Okeowo zufolge auch die staatliche African Development Foundation betroffen, die kleine Unternehmen in Afrika bisher mit technischer Unterstützung und Darlehen unterstützt. Damit würden die USA in Afrika weiteren Einfluss und Boden an China verlieren. "The A.D.F. functions as a kind of alternative to the aid money that the United States regularly provides to several governments in Africa; it was designed to encourage self-sufficiency and entrepreneurship, and it focusses on ventures by farmers, women, and young people, particularly those in post-conflict communities. Last year, it invested just more than fifty million dollars in five hundred active businesses, including agriculture co-operatives and solar-energy enterprises, which in turn reportedly generated new economic activity worth eighty million dollars. (...) The United States has slowly become more and more irrelevant to Africa’s economic progress. Besides foreign aid, America’s main concern in the region has been bolstering its war on Al Qaeda- and ISIS-affiliated militant groups. Meanwhile, its competitors, mainly China, have seized enormously profitable investment opportunities throughout the continent, and maintained beneficial relationships with African governments."

Mehr lesen


20.03.2017

"Rex Tillerson Is Still Acting Like a C.E.O."

http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/rex-tillerson-is-still-acting-like-a-c-e-o

US-Außenminister Rex Tillerson tritt nach Ansicht von Steve Coll immer noch wie ein Geschäftsführer von ExxonMobil auf. Tillerson äußere sich nur ungern gegenüber der Presse und zeige bislang kaum Interesse daran, seine Politik öffentlich zu rechtfertigen. "In the sort of diplomacy that Tillerson must conduct now, secret talks certainly have their place; for example, in forging breakthroughs like President Nixon’s opening to China or President Obama’s to Cuba. More routinely, however, diplomatic success requires using interviews, press conferences, social media, and speeches to address and shape public and legislative opinion simultaneously in multiple countries, including the United States. (...) In his interview with McPike, Tillerson did have some interesting things to say about policy. He talked of an 'inflection point' in relations between great powers, and of the complications facing the United States and China as they reset the discussion of how to preserve peaceful coexistence for the next fifty years. Tillerson’s remarks suggest that his problem is not that he can’t handle the press but that he is too hubristic or too set in his ways to accept the challenge — and the fundamental responsibility of holding high public office in a democratic country."

Mehr lesen


28.02.2017

"Trump, Putin, and the New Cold War"

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/06/trump-putin-and-the-new-cold-war

Evan Osnos, David Remnick und Joshua Yaffa haben sich in diesem umfassenden Beitrag des Magazins The New Yorker mit den Hintergründen der angeblichen russischen Beeinflussung der US-Präsidentschaftswahlen und mit dem möglichen neuen Kalten Krieg zwischen beiden Ländern beschäftigt. "Alexey Venediktov, the editor-in-chief of Echo of Moscow (...) suggested that, for Putin and those closest to him, any support that the Russian state provided to Trump’s candidacy was a move in a long-standing rivalry with the West; in Putin’s eyes, it is Russia’s most pressing strategic concern, one that predates Trump and will outlast him. Putin’s Russia has to come up with ways to make up for its economic and geopolitical weakness; its traditional levers of influence are limited, and, were it not for a formidable nuclear arsenal, it’s unclear how important a world power it would be. 'So, well then, we have to create turbulence inside America itself,' Venediktov said. 'A country that is beset by turbulence closes up on itself — and Russia’s hands are freed.'"

Mehr lesen


27.02.2017

"Michael Flynn, General Chaos"

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/02/27/michael-flynn-general-chaos

Nicholas Schmidle hat sich in einer Reportage mit der Person Michael Flynn beschäftigt, der am 13. Februar aufgrund von Kontakten zur russischen Botschaft in Washington während des Wahlkampfes als Nationaler Sicherheitsberater zurücktreten musste. "Some of Flynn’s former military colleagues, even those from whom he’s drifted apart in recent years, told me they were skeptical that Flynn would have conducted shadow diplomacy on his own. Despite his reputation as an agitator, he was, in the end, a soldier who followed orders, they said. 'This story is bigger than Mike Flynn,' the senior military intelligence official said. 'Who told Mike to go do this? I think somebody said, ‘Mike, you’ve got some contacts. Let them know it’s gonna be all right.’ Mike’s a soldier. He did not go rogue.'"

Mehr lesen


suche-links1 2 3suche-rechts

Hier finden Sie die Redaktion der Sicherheitspolitischen Presseschau.

Mehr lesen

Internationales

Internationales

Europa, Asien, Afrika, Amerika und weltweite Phänomene und Institutionen. Die bpb bietet ein breites Angebot zu internationalen Themen.

Mehr lesen

Online-Angebot

Informationsportal Krieg und Frieden

Wo gibt es Kriege und Gewaltkonflikte? Und wo herrscht am längsten Frieden? Welches Land gibt am meisten für Rüstung aus? Sicherheitspolitik.bpb.de liefert wichtige Daten und Fakten zu Krieg und Frieden.

Mehr lesen auf sicherheitspolitik.bpb.de

Dossier

Innerstaatliche Konflikte

Vom Kosovo nach Kolumbien, von Somalia nach Süd-Thailand: Weltweit schwelen über 280 politische Konflikte. Und immer wieder droht die Lage gewaltsam zu eskalieren.

Mehr lesen

Zahlen und Fakten

Globalisierung

Kaum ein Thema wird so intensiv und kontrovers diskutiert wie die Globalisierung. "Zahlen und Fakten" liefert Grafiken, Texte und Tabellen zu einem der wichtigsten und vielschichtigsten Prozesse der Gegenwart.

Mehr lesen

Publikationen zum Thema

Coverbild Internationale Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert

Internationale Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert

Die internationale Sicherheit ist fragil und bedroht. Wie können und müssen demokratische Systeme ...

Internationale Sicherheitspolitik Cover

Internationale Sicherheitspolitik

Seit Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts hat sich die internationale Sicherheitspolitik deutlich verändert....

Zum Shop