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05.03.2019

"The Inevitable Return of Muddling Along in North Korea"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/03/inevitable-return-muddling-along-north-korea/155308/?oref=d-rive
r

Richard Fontaine vom Center for a New American Security erwartet, dass das Verhältnis der USA zu Nordkorea nach dem Scheitern des Gipfeltreffens in Hanoi schnell wieder in die gewohnten Bahnen zurückkehren wird. "We’ve been here before, more or less. In 2008, President George W. Bush overruled his more hard-line advisers to seek a deal with Pyongyang, removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. In return, North Korea was supposed to provide a faithful account of its nuclear program and destroy the cooling tower at its Yongbyon production facility. (...) No such luck. It turned out that Pyongyang’s account wasn’t faithful at all: It included only plutonium stores and left out enriched uranium. Although North Korea did destroy the cooling tower (and then sent the bill to Washington), within a year Yongbyon was back to reprocessing spent fuel. The North Korean nuclear arsenal didn’t shrink; it grew. Washington had no choice but to reduce the scope of its ambitions and return to managing the problem. Trump’s best option is to do the same."

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20.02.2019

"ISIS Might Come Back. That’s Just One More Reason to Get Out of Syria"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/02/isis-might-come-back-s-just-one-more-reason-get-out-syria/154973
/?oref=d-river

Die drohende Rückkehr des "Islamischen Staates" ist nach Ansicht von Bonnie Kristian kein Grund, den beschlossenen Abzug der US-Truppen aus Syrien hinauszuzögern. "'If Sunni socio-economic, political, and sectarian grievances are not adequately addressed by the national and local governments of Iraq and Syria,' the [Pentagon inspector general Report] notes, 'it is very likely that ISIS will have the opportunity to set conditions for future resurgence and territorial control.' U.S. military intervention cannot address these grievances, and there is no sign whatsoever that either the Syrian or the Iraqi government will do so soon. This decision point at which we find ourselves with Syria is a chance to learn from recent history, to avoid making again the mistakes of Afghanistan and Iraq. And the crucial lesson here is that there will always be another enemy who will reemerge in six to 12 months absent U.S. military pressure, because we cannot force the regimes we assist to reform their politics or their armies. (...) There is no credible case that our 2,000 troops could accomplish anything more than they already have by staying. As this potential resurgence itself demonstrates, our military intervention is capable of mowing the grass but not digging out the roots. It is fundamentally mismatched to the task of political and social change needed to move ISIS and its like from suppressed or defeated to unthinkable. We cannot and will not transform Syria by war."

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13.02.2019

"Cyber Deterrence Done Right: The Coordinated Actions Against Huawei"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/02/coordinated-actions-against-huawei-are-cyber-deterrence-done-rig
ht/154870/?oref=d-river

Annie Fixler von der Foundation for Defense of Democracies hält die amerikanische Strategie bei der Verfolgung des chinesischen IT-Konzerns Huawei für wegweisend. Der US-Regierung sei es gelungen, "demokratische Verbündete" wie Kanada und Polen dazu zu bewegen, koordiniert gegen den "Cyber-Widersacher" vorzugehen. "(...) where previous investigations and lawsuits appeared to make no measurable impact on the company’s growth, the new coordinated campaign by U.S. allies and aggressive diplomatic outreach by Washington is beginning to take its toll. At Davos last month, Huawei Chairman Liang Hua admitted that the company may withdraw from countries where it does not feel welcome. (...) These coordinated efforts demonstrated that joint punitive actions can be more powerful than unilateral measures. When the United States and European Union banned equipment and software from Russia’s Kaspersky Lab within three days of each other, the company’s CEO lashed out in frustration. But to date, these have all been ad hoc initiatives. It is time for Washington to create a standing consortium of likeminded nations to identify companies and technology that pose risks to the integrity of critical infrastructure and communications systems and take joint action to excise them from allied systems."

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11.02.2019

"Two Ideas That Might Stop a Post-INF Arms Race, and One That Won’t"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/02/two-ideas-might-stop-post-inf-arms-race-and-one-wont/154789/?ore
f=d-river

Seit dem absehbaren Ende des INF-Vertrags werden Überlegungen darüber angestellt, wie die atomare Rüstungskontrolle neu organisiert und ein neues internationales Wettrüsten verhindert werden könnte. Die Idee eines "INF-Plus"-Vertrags unter Einbeziehung Chinas wird von Daryl G. Kimball von der Arms Control Association (ACA) als aussichtslos abgelehnt. Er plädiert stattdessen für eine Vereinbarung, die die NATO und Russland zum Verzicht auf eine zu nahe Stationierung neuer Raketen verpflichten würde. "One option would be for NATO to declare, as a bloc, that no alliance members will field any INF Treaty-prohibited missiles or any equivalent new nuclear capabilities in Europe so long as Russia does not deploy treaty-prohibited systems where they could hit NATO territory. This would require Russia to move at least some currently deployed 9M729 missiles. As the United States and Russia dispute the range of that missile; perhaps they could agree to bar deployments west of the Ural mountains. (...) Key allies would likely view this as the best post-INF alternative. Germany has already declared its opposition to stationing new intermediate-range missiles in Europe. And Moscow may already be open to a new agreement along these lines."

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25.01.2019

"The INF Treaty Is Doomed. We Need a New Arms-Control Framework"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/01/inf-treaty-doomed-we-need-new-arms-control-framework/154428/?ore
f=d-river

Eugene Rumer vom Russia and Eurasia Program der Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hält den Kampf um den INF-Vertrag für gescheitert. Weder die USA noch Russland seien am weiteren Bestehen der Vereinbarung interessiert. Nun müsse es darum gehen, künftigen atomaren Abrüstungsbemühungen einen neuen Rahmen zu verschaffen. "It is impossible to separate the fate of the INF Treaty from the geography of the NATO-Russia standoff. NATO expansion has provided a robust security guarantee to the countries of Eastern and Central Europe — a guarantee they wanted as a hedge against precisely the kind of Russia they are dealing with today. But Russia rejects the European security order with NATO at its core, and the alliance’s expansion has resulted in a new climate of insecurity along its eastern edge. The asymmetry of the INF Treaty, which allows some intermediate-range systems, but not others, has doomed it in the eyes of Russian defense planners confronted with the new map of NATO and ever-improving U.S. offensive capabilities. (...) The arms control framework built during the Cold War is growing obsolete. It does not keep up with the rapid pace of technological change and the new geography of threats."

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16.01.2019

"Army Chief Confirms US Will Hand off ISIS Fight in Syria"

https://www.defenseone.com/news/2019/01/army-chief-confirms-us-will-hand-isis-fight-syria/154237/?oref=d-
topstory

Wenige Stunden nach dem IS-Anschlag in Manbij habe mit Mark Milley zum ersten Mal ein hochrangiger US-General die Abzugspläne der USA für Syrien bestätigt, berichtet Patrick Tucker. "'We are determined to finish that off and then hand the battle off to our indigenous partners,' Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley said on Wednesday. His comments came hours after a suicide bomber killed four people in Manbij, Syria, including two U.S. troops, a Defense Department civilian, and one contractor. Three more were injured in the blast, for which ISIS declared responsibility. Milley did not say when U.S. troops would leave Syria, but his characterization suggests a change of one mission goal for the Americans, who until Trump’s tweet last December were intending to remain in country until UN-brokered talks reached a peace deal in Geneva."

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15.01.2019

"China’s Military Is Getting Better at a Lot of Things at Once: Pentagon Intelligence"

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2019/01/chinas-military-getting-better-lot-things-once-pentagon-intell
igence/154194/?oref=d-topstory

Einer neuen Pentagon-Analyse zufolge hat sich das chinesische Militär in vielen Bereichen rasant weiterentwickelt. "China’s military power remains limited and its leaders want no war with the United States, but its desire for regional hegemony, global reach, and advanced technology means the U.S. military has much more to watch out for in the years ahead, according to a new unclassified assessment by the Pentagon’s intelligence agency. This is the Defense Intelligence Agency’s first public and unclassified report on the People’s Liberation Army’s arsenal and intentions; the agency released a similar report on Russia’s military last year. (...) one factor will continue to rein in Beijing’s ambitions: experience. China has not fought a war in four decades; moreover, there is a generational gap between newer Chinese military officers, who are being trained for joint warfare across military service branches, and older officers whose have limited experience extends only to their own service branches and regional assignments inside China."

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15.01.2019

"Trump’s Wall Fixation Is Impeding Border Security"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/01/trumps-wall-fixation-impeding-border-security/154192/?oref=d-riv
er

David Fidler meint, dass US-Präsident Trump mit seinem Bestehen auf der Errichtung einer Mauer an der Grenze zu Mexiko die modernen Möglichkeiten zur Sicherung nationaler Grenzen vernachlässige und dem Grenzschutz so eher schade. "The president’s obsession that only more concrete slabs or steel slats can better secure the U.S. southern border fundamentally misunderstands what walls have always been. This failure goes deeper than his inability to accept the evidence that no security or humanitarian crisis exists along the border with Mexico. Worse, the wall debate is preventing policymakers from deliberating effectively on how to re-calibrate the utilization of personnel, technology, and physical barriers for improved border security. (...) The course on which the president insists will, if taken, make border patrol agents and advanced technologies subservient to the physical barrier, rather than having agents, technologies, and barriers configured, networked, and deployed in the most effective ways to serve the various national interests and ideals touched by border security.“

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08.01.2019

"Moscow’s Little-Noticed Islamic-Outreach Effort"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/01/moscows-little-noticed-islamic-outreach-effort/154011/?oref=d-ri
ver

Hassan Hassan berichtet, dass Russland ein international bisher kaum beachtetes Programm zur Förderung eines moderaten Islams auf den Weg gebracht habe. Dabei bemühe sich Moskau um eine enge Kooperation mit arabischen Staaten, was dort positiv aufgenommen worden sei. "The Russian emissary for this effort is Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Chechen Republic. For Kadyrov, opposition to Islamic extremism is an extension of the war in Chechnya, in which he fought on behalf of Moscow against the separatist Chechen movement. (...) Over the summer, Kadyrov was welcomed like royalty in Saudi Arabia. Saudi authorities let him inside Prophet Mohammed’s room, which is closed to all but special guests. (...) Russia’s Islamic outreach is driven by several factors, first among them domestic worries. Muslims constitute nearly 15 percent of the Russian population, and Moscow fought two religious and nationalist insurrections in the Muslim-majority North Caucasus region. The rise of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in Syria increased Moscow’s concerns about an extremist threat, especially given the sizable role of jihadis from North Caucasus within the two groups."

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28.11.2018

"Something We Can Agree On: Close Some Overseas Bases"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/11/something-we-can-agree-close-some-overseas-bases/153108/?oref=d-
river

Miriam Pemberton vom Institute for Policy Studies gehört zu den Unterzeichnern eines offenen Briefs an den US-Senat, in dem eine überparteiliche Gruppe von Sicherheitsexperten die Reduzierung der Zahl der internationalen US-Militärstützpunkte fordert. "Our group, which calls itself the Overseas Bases Realignment and Closure Coalition, or OBRACC, finds agreement from the right, left, and center that doing so would be an important step toward making the United States and the world safer and more prosperous. (...) The strategy of maintaining U.S. military dominance with a network of about 800 military bases spread across the globe has left us seriously overstretched. It has diverted our resources from our domestic needs, as well as from constructive, non-military forms of global engagement. This strategy has created nationalistic resentments, and even spurs to terrorism, in places where U.S. bases sit. Nobody likes to be occupied. (...) The damage to our national standing and reputation from our empire of bases also extends to the environmental damage to local communities caused by toxic leaks, accidents, and the dumping of hazardous materials. (...) All of these factors argue for shrinking America’s military footprint around the world."

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19.11.2018

"Space Force Actually May Be Bargain, New Cost Estimate Says"

https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2018/11/space-force-actually-may-be-bargain-new-cost-estimate-says/15
2939/?oref=d-river

Die von US-Präsident Trump geforderte Weltraumarmee würde einer neuen Schätzung zufolge weitaus weniger kosten als bisher angenommen, da es sich im Wesentlichen um eine Neuorganisation bestehender Militärstrukturen handeln würde. "Space Force — the new branch of the U.S. military desired by President Trump — could cost taxpayers as much as $21.5 billion per year, but only $550 million of that would be new money, according to a budget analyst. The estimate from Washington’s resident defense spending guru Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that creating a Space Force, large or small, amounts to nothing more than a reorganization in which money would be transferred out of the Air Force, Army and Navy into the new military service."

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16.11.2018

"Russia Has Started to Train Its Entire Military to Fight Drones"

https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/11/russia-has-started-train-its-entire-military-fight-drones/1
52889/?oref=d-river

Das russische Militär hat Patrick Tucker zufolge aus einem Drohnenangriff auf einen russischen Militärstützpunkt in Syrien Konsequenzen gezogen und das umfassende Training entsprechender Abwehrmaßnahmen angeordnet. "While the U.S. military and others have developed tactics, techniques, and procedures to fight off drones, Russia is the first country to implement such training on such a wide scale. The move follows a January attack by anti-Assad forces on a Russian military base in Syria, using ten small drones modified to carry explosives. Russian military officials frequently cite attacks by armed consumer drones flown by 'terrorist' groups, said Samuel Bendett, a researcher at the CNA Corporation and a fellow in Russia Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council. 'This threat was judged to be great enough to introduce training to counter such small drones with small fires across so many Russian services – airborne troops, marines and land formations. The training will concern everyone in uniform - from a cook, medic and logistician to front-line forces,' Bendett said."

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06.11.2018

"China Is No Reason to Abandon the INF"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/11/china-no-reason-abandon-inf/152607/?oref=d-river

Zac Brown hält das Argument, dass der INF-Vertrag eine angemessene amerikanische Reaktion auf das chinesische Raketenprogramm verhindere, nicht für überzeugend. Eine Stationierung von landgestützten Mittelstreckenraketen im Pazifik wäre seiner Ansicht nach "taktisch ineffektiv und strategisch destabilisierend". "First, virtually no allies would be willing to host new American ground-based missiles aimed at China. Japan has come out in defense of the INF Treaty, calling a U.S. withdrawal 'undesirable,' while Australian officials have indicated they have low thresholds for U.S. actions they perceive as needlessly provoking Beijing. Moreover, neither country is likely to view Taiwan as a core security interest in the same way as Washington. (...) This leaves the tiny island of Guam — nearly 2,000 miles from China — as the only realistic base for ground-launched missiles, an option which poses severe challenges for both survivability and military utility. (...) Guam is already a high-value target for Beijing, and any new missile deployment would only raise the incentives strike the island quickly in a fight. Moreover, it’s not completely obvious what this new force would do. (...) Simply put, there’s no need for ground-based, intermediate-range missiles when we have those aplenty in the air and at sea, all of which would be able to get in closer to China before launching."

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04.11.2018

"John Bolton Keeps Citing This 2002 Pact as an Arms-Control Model. It’s Really Not."

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/11/john-bolton-keeps-citing-arms-control-pact-option-its-really-not
/152553/?oref=d-topstory

Nach dem Ende des INF-Vertrags würde es mit dem "New START"-Abkommen nur noch einen Abrüstungsvertrag geben, der die Atomwaffenarsenale der USA und Russlands limitiert, schreibt Steven Pifer von der Brookings Institution. Präsident Trump und sein Sicherheitsberater Bolton hätten bereits angedeutet, dass sie auch diesen Vertrag nicht besonders schätzen. Bolton habe den 2002 unterzeichneten "SORT"-Vertrag als alternatives Modell vorgeschlagen. "That model, however, will go nowhere. The Russians would not agree. Moreover, it is not serious arms control. (...) SORT was short, fitting neatly on two pages. One reason for its brevity: it contained no agreed definitions, no counting rules, and no monitoring measures. (In contrast, START I and New START each ran hundreds of pages in length.) The Russians hoped for more, but they desperately wanted an agreement. Offered SORT essentially on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, Mr. Putin took it. Could the United States negotiate something like SORT with Russia today? No."

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29.10.2018

"Russia, US Offer Competing Vision of Cyber Norms to the UN"

https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2018/10/russia-us-offer-competing-vision-cyber-norms-un/152382/?oref=
d-river

Die USA und Russland haben Alex Grigsby zufolge bei der UN unterschiedliche Modelle zur Schaffung internationaler Cyber-Normen vorgelegt. "I’m not a UN process expert, so it’s hard to say how this will play out. But if I were a betting man, I’d put my money on the U.S. approach coming out on top. As an institution, the United Nations prefers incrementalism over radical change. That makes it much harder for Russia, China and the rest of the SCO members to drum up support for a twenty-five paragraph code of conduct that contains vague language mostly unfamiliar to many states. By contrast, the U.S. resolution has more similarities to Russia’s previous resolutions, an advantage given that they will be familiar to diplomats at the UN who prefer sticking to previously agreed text. No matter what happens as diplomats haggle over the particulars of the resolution, expect a new GGE [UN Group of Governmental Experts] next year."

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23.10.2018

"How to Keep a Cyberattack from Turning into Nuclear War? Keep Talking"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/10/how-avoid-cyberattack-turning-nuclear-war-keep-talking/152236/?o
ref=d-topstory

Ankit Panda hält die Möglichkeit, dass ein Cyberangriff auf kritische Infrastrukturen in den USA mit einem Atomangriff beantwortet werden könnte, angesichts der Änderungen in der Nuklearstrategie der US-Regierung für durchaus realistisch. "One danger that merits special attention is the possibility of a North Korean cyberattack escalating out of control – one that sparks an American counterstrike using conventional weapons so intense that Pyongyang responds with an attempted nuclear missile attack on the United States. Or, a scenario where a North Korean cyberattack hits an American target so vital that it elicits an American nuclear missile strike in return. It’s not fantasy. These dynamics are particularly salient given certain policy changes introduced by the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR. (...) The Trump administration never should have specified the 'extreme circumstances' that might lead to the United States considering nuclear use. (...) Before a miscalculation or provocation has a chance to test the Trump NPR’s boundaries, U.S. officials in their ongoing talks with North Koreans should make their intentions on nuclear weapons and cyberattacks crystal clear."

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21.10.2018

"Nothing About Trashing the INF Treaty Makes the US Safer"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/10/nothing-about-trashing-inf-treaty-makes-us-safer/152187/?oref=d-
topstory

Michael Krepon hält die Drohung von US-Präsident Trump, den INF-Vertrag mit Russland aufzukündigen, sowohl aus diplomatischer als auch aus strategischer Sicht nicht für überzeugend. Die vorgetragenen Vertragsverletzungen Russlands könnten seiner Ansicht nach mit effektiven Gegenmaßnahmen innerhalb des Abkommens beantwortet werden. "There are effective treaty-compliant counters to the Russian violation by means of air-delivered and sea-based capabilities that the Pentagon is already pursuing. The White House could also push Vladimir Putin to return to treaty compliance by linking American restraint on deploying more missile defenses in Europe to the removal of Russia’s noncompliant missiles. But neither Trump nor Bolton has demonstrated a fondness for diplomacy or an interest in reaffirming the INF Treaty. This move is about freedom of U.S. action and a deep, abiding distrust of treaties. Trump’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty fits into an 'America First' strategy that undermines diplomatic ties. That’s the take-away by U.S. friends and allies — along with a foreboding sense of an intensified nuclear competition."

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17.10.2018

"US Military Leaders Keep Quiet on Saudi Arabia Amid Khashoggi Outrage"

https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2018/10/us-military-leaders-keep-quiet-saudi-arabia-amid-khashoggi-ou
trage/152082/?oref=d-river

Kevin Baron bezweifelt, dass das Pentagon seine engen Beziehungen zu Saudi-Arabien aufgrund der Affäre um den verschwundenen Journalisten Jamal Khashoggi in Frage stellen wird. Das US-Militär habe bisher in seinen Äußerungen immer wieder die strategische Bedeutung des Bündnispartners hervorgehoben. "Is the Saudi partnership still a matter of necessity? Should it be? That’s not likely the question Mattis and Dunford are asking for the near term. For them, the answer is yes. But for the long term, it’s also question for Pompeo and Trump. It’s a question of whether 'Saudi interests' under bin Salman still align with American interests, or just with American military and intelligence interests. (...) This week, national security press has been inundated with commentaries asking if the U.S.-Saudi relationship has been worth the cost. At the Pentagon, no matter the outcome of the Pompeo fact-finding trip or the Khashoggi investigation, the answer is most likely going to be a resounding yes."

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16.10.2018

"China’s Moon Missions Could Threaten US Satellites: Pentagon"

https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/10/chinas-moon-missions-could-threaten-us-satellites-pentagon/
152084/?oref=d-river

Das Pentagon fürchtet Patrick Tucker zufolge, dass sich das chinesische Mondprogramm künftig zu einer ernsten Bedrohung für amerikanische Satelliten entwickeln könnte. "The Chinese government has said the mission is part of a four-stage plan to build a moon base. 'We hope to start the construction of the [robot-manned] lunar base around 2025 and realize a manned landing on the moon around 2030,' Zhao Xiaojin of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Group told Xinhuanet in March. But [Jeff Gossel, the senior intelligence engineer in the Space and Missile Analysis Group at the Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center,] said putting a satellite at L2 could also enable Chinese attack spacecraft to zoom past the moon — about a quarter-million miles away — and then sneak up on critical U.S. intelligence and communications satellites in geosynchronous orbit, just 28,300 miles up — as occurred in the 2011 apocalypse-themed film 'Melancholia.'"

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08.10.2018

"Police-Grade Surveillance Technology Comes to the Playground"

https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/10/police-grade-surveillance-technology-comes-playground/15185
4/?oref=d-river

Schulen in den USA werden aus Furcht vor neuen Amokläufen immer häufiger mit Sicherheits- und Überwachungssystemen ausgerüstet, die üblicherweise von der Polizei eingesetzt werden, berichtet Sydney Fussell. Ethische Fragen zum Einsatz dieser Sicherheitsmaßnahmen rücken dabei auch auf Seiten der Schüler weitgehend in den Hintergrund. "Rather than seeing surveillance technology, broadly, or face recognition, specifically, as invasive or disruptive to the learning environment, he has noticed the opposite: Students accept the presence of the tech without question. 'As our kids get older, they’ve been through all that before,' [Greg Bronson, a Lockport native and the president of the local teachers’ union,] says, referring to a number of emergency drills mandated by the state. Lockport students run school-shooting drills almost monthly. Bronson hypothesizes that, soon enough, face recognition and other technologies will just become part of the architecture of the modern school day, much the same as the drills. 'If anything,' he said, 'the bigger issue is getting them to take it seriously, because they have become so routine.'"

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05.10.2018

"Winning 'Like War': A Conversation about Social Media and Conflict with Peter Singer"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/10/winning-war-social-media-and-conflict-conversation-peter-singer/
151806/?oref=d-topstory

Patrick Tucker hat sich ausführlich mit Peter W. Singer über dessen neues Buch "Like War: The Weaponization of Social Media" unterhalten. "A new book looks at how 'likes' and lies are reshaping the nature of war and peace around the globe. We sat down with the author."

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25.09.2018

"Two Reasons Not to Build Fort Trump in Today’s Poland"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/09/two-reasons-not-build-fort-trump-todays-poland/151551/?oref=d-ri
ver

Die Regierung in Warschau strebt die Errichtung einer ständigen US-Militärbasis in Polen an und möchte den US-Präsidenten durch den vorgeschlagenen Namen "Fort Trump" auf ihre Seite ziehen. Michael Fitzsimmons vom Strategic Studies Institute des U.S. Army War College nennt zwei Gründe, die seiner Ansicht nach gegen diesen Schritt sprechen. "In military terms, its merits are debatable. There are certainly some potential benefits, such as strengthening NATO’s ability to respond to Russian territorial aggression in Northeastern Europe, reassuring Poland and other countries on NATO’s eastern flank of the alliance’s commitment to collective defense, and offering greater efficiency than long-term rotational presence. As to deterrence of Russian aggression, however, the effects of a new U.S. base would be subject to the famous 'security dilemma': the time-worn truth that capabilities one rival builds for defense and deterrence appear provocative to the other rival supposedly being deterred, who then responds in kind. (...) even if Washington determines that the benefits of 'Fort Trump' would outweigh the costs in terms of deterrence and operational capability, there is another crucial but underappreciated security dilemma confronting this policy choice: the imperative to resist the Polish government’s recent turn toward illiberalism."

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18.09.2018

"Cognitive Science Helps Explain How We Blunder Into War"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/09/cognitive-science-helps-explain-how-we-blunder-war/150905/?oref=
d-river

Brian VanDeMark von der U.S. Naval Academy hat in seinem neuen Buch "Road to Disaster" aus der Perspektive der Kognitionswissenschaft untersucht, wie die USA nach 1945 immer tiefer in die Krise des damaligen Indochinas hineingezogen wurden und schließlich den Krieg in Vietnam begannen. "In 1945, Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh wrote to President Truman, thanking him for U.S. assistance in their mutual fight against the Japanese and asking for help against France’s effort to reassert colonial control in Indochina. Truman never got the letter — but there’s little reason to think it would have diverted America from its path to war in Southeast Asia. In his new book, Road to Disaster, U.S. Naval Academy professor Brian VanDeMark explores why. By using the insights of cognitive science to dissect the flawed perceptions and decisions of the Vietnam era, he teaches today’s leaders to spot their own."

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04.09.2018

"Washington Won’t Keep Rebuffing Moscow’s Cyber Proposals Forever"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/09/washington-wont-keep-rebuffing-moscows-cyber-proposals-forever/1
51003/?oref=d-river

Alex Grigsby erwartet, dass die USA mit Russland trotz der Vorkommnisse während der Präsidentschaftswahlen und anderer Vorbehalte bei der Bekämpfung von Cyberangriffen auf kritische Infrastrukturen zusammenarbeiten werden. Moskau habe ein entsprechendes Angebot zuletzt auf dem Gipfeltreffen in Helsinki unterbreitet und werde dies im Herbst bei der UN wiederholen. "The United States and Russia recognize that despite their significant differences, they have to talk to each other to avoid uncontrolled escalation in cyberspace. That’s why even after the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States kept meeting with Russian cyber experts despite having cut cooperation elsewhere. (...) The most promising opportunity for U.S.-Russia cyber cooperation will come this fall at the United Nations. (...) The United States is unlikely to be enthused at the prospect of another GGE [Group of Governmental Experts on Information Security] process when it would rather spend its time enforcing existing cyber norms instead of talking about creating new ones. Despite these misgivings, it is one of the few options that keeps Moscow and Washington at the bargaining table."

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21.08.2018

"Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact"

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2018/08/boko-harams-deadly-impact/150697/?oref=d-river

Einer neuen Studie zufolge sind dem Terror der radikalislamischen Gruppe Boko Haram deutlich mehr Menschen zum Opfer gefallen als bisher angenommen. "The study shows that though Boko Haram’s territorial control is now limited to some small villages and pockets of countryside, a shift in tactics has helped the group stay a threat to millions. It has turned to suicide bombings, which accounted for almost a third of all casualties in the first half of 2018, and has increasingly attacked Muslim places of worship. (...) This new compilation of data is based on an analysis of publicly available data from CFR’s Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), an independent nongovernmental organization based at the University of Sussex. (...) From June 2011 through June 2018, the NST documented 2,021 incidents involving Boko Haram, in which 37,530 people were killed, nearly double the conventionally cited estimate of twenty thousand. Over the same period, ACLED identified 3,346 incidents, in which 34,261 people were killed. Both totals reflect deaths of alleged Boko Haram fighters, government forces, and civilians combined."

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10.08.2018

"Trump’s Secret War on Terror"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/08/trumps-secret-war-terror/150448/?oref=d-river

Präsident Trump habe den Drohnenkrieg der USA gegen mutmaßliche Terroristen "dramatisch" ausgeweitet, berichtet Daniel Rosenthal. Details und Regeln der Operationen würden der Öffentlichkeit und dem Kongress dabei weitgehend vorenthalten. Neben der Tötung möglichst vieler feindlicher Kämpfer sei zudem keine weitergehende Strategie erkennbar. "According to leaks to The New York Times and other outlets, last fall he introduced a new policy that moved responsibility for counterterrorism operations outside traditional war zones to lower-level commanders, and lowered the threshold for such strikes. (Targets are no longer required to pose a 'continuing, imminent threat' to the United States, but rather may be lower-level foot soldiers, and there is purportedly no longer a requirement for 'near certainty' that the target be on-site for strikes.) (...) The narrow objective for drone strikes, of course, is to kill the terrorists who are targeted and, thus, remove them from the battlefield. By that standard, the program may be deemed a success insofar as, according to government-released statistics, the program has resulted in the deaths of over 3,000 combatants. (...) But there has been insufficient attention, both within government and from NGOs, in assessing the broader-view net result of the drone program; said differently, and channeling former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, are we killing more terrorists than we are creating?"

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31.07.2018

"Pentagon To Start Creating Space Force — Even Before Congress Approves It"

https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2018/07/pentagon-create-space-force/150157/?oref=d-topstory

Das Pentagon hat Marcus Weisgerber zufolge erste Schritte unternommen, um die von US-Präsident Trump geforderte Weltraum-Armee ("Space Force") aufzubauen. Ob es dabei tatsächlich zur Schaffung eines eigenständigen Teils der US-Streitkräfte kommen wird, hängt allerdings vom Kongress ab. "In coming months, Defense Department leaders plan to stand up three of the four components of the new Space Force: a new combatant command for space, a new joint agency to buy satellites for the military, and a new warfighting community that draws space operators from all service branches. These sweeping changes — on par with the past decade’s establishment of cyber forces — are the part the Pentagon can do without lawmakers’ approval. Creating the fourth component — an entirely new branch of the military with services and support functions such as financial management and facilities construction — will require congressional action."

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24.07.2018

"The US and Russia Have Plenty of Areas for Cooperation. Let’s Get to Work."

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/us-and-russia-have-plenty-areas-cooperation-lets-get-work/149996
/?oref=d-river

Debra Decker vom Stimson Center nennt einige konkrete Sachgebiete, auf denen die USA und Russland künftig stärker kooperieren könnten. Bei der Organisation der Zusammenarbeit sollte die US-Regierung ihrer Ansicht nach einen Vorschlag Wladimir Putins aufgreifen. "Trump promised that 'representatives from our national security councils will meet to follow up on all of the issues we addressed.' But who? Neither Trump’s heavy-handed National Security Advisor John Bolton nor some of the staff new to the National Security Council and diplomacy are the best choices for leading this work. President Putin — surprised? — has a better suggestion: seek positive 'points of contact' for U.S.-Russian engagement, as he called them (at least in the English translation), assisted by 'an expert council that would include political scientists, prominent diplomats and former military experts from both countries.' Such experts would know the history of Russian-U.S. engagement — the duplicity but also how the two countries can work positively together."

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10.07.2018

"Don’t Give Russia the Gift of Extending New START"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/dont-give-russia-gift-extending-new-start/149605/?oref=d-river

Matthew Costlow würde eine Verlängerung des START-Vertrags ohne russische Gegenleistung dagegen als "Geschenk" an Russland betrachten, das nicht leichtfertig vergeben werden sollte. "Prudence (...) dictates waiting until February 2021 to see whether the extension of the New START Treaty remains in the U.S. national interest. (...) This is not to say that President Trump should not pursue risk reduction measures when he meets with President Putin, he should. But extending the New START Treaty now is unnecessary, would reduce future bargaining leverage, and sends a signal of accommodation to President Putin – the opposite of what he needs."

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10.07.2018

"A No-Cost, No-Brainer of a Nuclear Deal"

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/no-cost-no-brainer-nuclear-deal/149603/?oref=d-river

US-Präsident Trump sollte das Gipfeltreffen mit Russlands Präsident Putin nach Ansicht von Joe Cirincione nutzen, um eine Verlängerung des START-Vertrags zu vereinbaren und damit die nukleare Rüstungskontrolle neu zu stärken. "The New START Treaty will expire in 2021. If it does, both nations could bust through the ceiling the accord places on each side’s long-range nuclear forces — the missiles and bombers that can span oceans to deliver nuclear bombs in as little as 30 minutes after launch. For the first time since President Richard Nixon negotiated the SALT Treaty in 1972, there would be no limit to the number or types of strategic weapons Russia and the United States deploy. Worse, Russia and the United States would lose all inspections, tracking and verification of these arsenals, which account for over 92 percent of all the nuclear weapons in the world. (...) With little effort and no cost, Trump can secure five more years of verified limits on Russian forces. It would be the best deal of his presidency so far."

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