US-Soldaten in Afghanistan

War on the Rocks


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"Satire, Religion, and Terror: A Conversation with the Editor-in-Chief of Charlie Hebdo"

Ryan Evans hat sich in diesem Podcast mit dem Chefredakteur des französischen Satiremagazins Charlie Hebdo, Gérard Biard, über die Zeit seit dem Terroranschlag auf das Redaktionsbüro am 7. Januar 2015, den französischen Säkularismus und das Wesen von Satire unterhalten. "Gérard spoke with Ryan about everything from the impact of the attacks on Charlie Hebdo, how the ideal of French secularism contrasts with its American counterpart, the nature of the satire they do better than anyone, and why some people still don’t get it. They discussed why satirizing Islam and other religions when they the political arena is not just fair game, but even important. And they close with Charlie Hebdo’s origins (Did you know the name in part comes from the fact that its predecessor magazine was the first to publish Charlie Brown in France?) and the challenges of satirizing Trump ('What could we write that would be funnier than a tweet from Donald Trump?')."

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"Mali is France’s Afghanistan, But With a Difference"

In einem Artikel der Le Monde hat der französische Journalist Christophe Ayad den Militäreinsatz in Mali mit der US-Intervention in Afghanistan verglichen. Nach Ansicht von Stephanie Pezard und Michael Shurkin gibt es durchaus Parallelen, aber auch fundamentale Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Einsätzen. "Ayad is largely correct. Both the United States and France now seem stuck in intractable wars, frustrated by the apparent fruitlessness of their best efforts. (...) There are, however, some important differences between the two cases that give one at least a glimmer of hope for the French. First, notwithstanding Ayad’s assertion that Western forces are unqualified, the French military in Mali knows well the environment in which they are operating and the people with whom they are interacting. (...) Second, France benefits from its ability to act with and through the security services of Mali and its neighbors, who are willing, if not the most capable, allies in the fight. (...) Third, and relatedly, there is no Pakistan in the Sahel. There is no country providing Islamist fighters support and the benefits of a safe haven, no regional spoiler to steer the conflict in directions that it sees as beneficial. (...) France has more at stake, given the direct relationship between stability in the Sahel and France’s own well-being. The Sahel is France’s backyard."

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"What Political Science Tells Us About the Risk of Civil War in Spain"

Eine politikwissenschaftliche Analyse frühere Sezessionsbewegungen zeigt nach Ansicht von Sara Plana, Politologin am MIT, dass der aktuelle Konflikt zwischen der spanischen Zentralregierung und den Anhängern einer katalonischen Unabhängigkeit durchaus in einen bewaffneten Bürgerkrieg münden könnte. "One common pathway to civil war involves the weakening or collapse of the state, which can embolden revolutionary challenges to its central authority or create a whirlwind anarchy in which groups compete for security, a dynamic known as a 'security dilemma.' (...) In perhaps the most alarming parallel to Yugoslavia, a number of nations within Spain have separatist aspirations, and an independent Catalonia could be just the first of many dominos to fall. Basque Country, for instance, has similar grievances as Catalonia. (...) Political science not only helps us predict conflict; it also offers insight on how to avoid it. The Catalan regional government has indicated that it prefers negotiations, giving Spain several opportunities to pump the brakes on the looming conflict. The Spanish government could negotiate some appeasement of Catalonia’s economic grievance over redistribution (...)."

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"NATO’s Expanding Military Exercises Are Sending Risky Mixed Messages"

Ralph S. Clem, früherer Nachrichtenoffizier der U.S. Air Force, meint, dass die Nato-Übungen in Osteuropa widersprüchliche geopolitische Signale an Russland senden. "This invigorated NATO exercise activity is intended to assure allies and deter Russia, a policy the alliance underscored at its Warsaw Summit in 2016, and Washington affirmed with the European Reassurance and, later, Deterrence Initiatives. However, the deterrence element, as manifested in what NATO capabilities are being exercised and where these exercises are taking place, is confusing and potentially destabilizing. (...) these NATO exercises as they exist certainly do not, in and of themselves, contribute to deterring Russian aggression in any meaningful way. First, they are too small, largely lacking in heavy armor and artillery (where the Russians have a significant advantage), and do not typically involve all combat arms. Second, they do not fully engage the huge logistics train that would be required to move forces of sufficient size to halt a large-scale Russian attack through the Baltic states or Belarus."

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"Not-So-Soft Power: Russia’s Military Police in Syria"

Mark Galeotti erläutert die offenbar auf Dauer angelegte Rolle der russischen Militärpolizei in Syrien, die nicht nur militärische Aufgaben übernehme, sondern auch Teil der "Soft Power"-Strategie Moskaus sei. "According to the accounts of both journalists and others I have spoken to who have seen them on the ground, these military police appear to be relatively effective and professional, and they are likely to stay. (...) This is also part of Russia’s domestic and foreign PR campaign for a war that is not especially popular at home (in a recent survey, half wanted Russian forces pulled out of Syria). The presence and activities of the military police have been hyped heavily for domestic consumption, not just playing to the general militarist and nationalist agenda of the state-controlled media but also suggesting that Russia’s role is both humanitarian and relatively casualty-free."

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"A U.N. Peacekeeping Operation is the Only Way Forward in Ukraine"

Die Minsker Verhandlungen zur Lösung der Krise in der Ostukraine befinden sich heute in einer Sackgasse, stellt Alexei Arbatov vom Center for International Security in Moskau fest. Die von Präsident Putin vorgeschlagene Entsendung von UN-Blauhelmen sollte deshalb von allen Seiten als Gelegenheit genutzt werden, den "Teufelskreis" aus gegenseitigen Sanktionen und militärischen Demonstrationen zu durchbrechen. "There is probably no other way to solve the Ukraine crisis, given current political realities. Three years of declarations, diplomacy, military moves, and sanctions have not brought stability let alone positive results. As the old saying goes, 'However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.' A U.N. peacekeeping operation would not imply renegotiating the Minsk II agreement. Instead, it would be a vehicle for allowing the parties to meet their obligations and move on to resolve broader problems of Russian-Ukrainian relations and Moscow’s deeply troubled relationship with the West."

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"The Myth of Russia’s Lowered Nuclear Threshold"

Einige Russland-Experten sind der Ansicht, dass das russische Militär die Bedingungen für einen Einsatz von Atomwaffen in konventionellen Konflikten gelockert habe. Kristin Ven Bruusgaard meint, dass es für diese Behauptung keine echten Belege gebe. "First, there is very little hard evidence that de-escalation is part of Russia’s nuclear doctrine. In fact, Russia’s doctrinal statements indicate an increased rather than a decreased nuclear threshold. Second, the idea of lowering the nuclear threshold logically flows from a lack of conventional capabilities, while in fact Russia’s conventional capabilities are rapidly improving. Third, it is difficult to understand why Russia would want to pursue military adventurism that would risk all-out confrontation with a technologically advanced and nuclear-armed adversary like NATO. While opportunistic, and possibly even reckless, the Putin regime does not appear to be suicidal."

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"Facts About the Vietnam War, Part V: Bad Strategy, Bad Leadership Doomed South Vietnam as Much as the Curtailing of U.S. Aid"

Der Vietnamkrieg erfährt in den USA seit kurzem wieder verstärkte Aufmerksamkeit. Der frühere Kriegskorrespondent Arnold R. Isaacs hat in einer fünfteiligen Artikelserie einige Fakten zusammengetragen, die seiner Ansicht nach in der Diskussion über Ursachen und Verlauf des Krieges oft verfälscht wiedergegeben werden. "We’ll begin with the myth that American troops fought the war with one hand tied behind their backs. Proponents of this belief hold that the United States failed to win in Vietnam because it did not use enough of its military power. But those who think this might do well to remember some statistics that do not indicate anything remotely resembling an unduly limited war effort".

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"Want to Avoid Nuclear War? Reject Mutual Vulnerability With North Korea"

Vince A. Manzo und John K. Warden sind der Ansicht, dass die USA das Prinzip der gegenseitigen Verwundbarkeit durch Atomwaffen, das im Verhältnis zu Russland seit Jahrzehnten anerkannt sei, im Fall einer Atommacht Nordkorea in keinem Fall akzeptieren sollten. "(...) accepting U.S. vulnerability to North Korean nuclear forces would improve the credibility of North Korea’s coercive strategy and increase the risk of both war and nuclear use. (...) Thus, rather than accepting North Korea’s ability to cause significant destruction to the United States with a nuclear strike, the United States should field damage limitation capabilities, a combination of strike and missile defense armaments that would allow the United States to disarm the majority of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability and prevent significant retaliatory strikes against U.S. cities. If the United States has a credible damage limitation option, the Kim regime is more likely to calculate that crossing the nuclear threshold would be a strategy for suicide, not survival, because North Korea would lack a reliable second-strike capability to deter regime change."

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"How to Deal with Authoritarianism Inside NATO"

Die NATO versteht sich nicht nur als Militär-, sondern auch als ein Wertebündnis. Die autoritären Tendenzen in Mitgliedsländern wie der Türkei, Ungarn und Polen stellen dieses Selbstverständnis in Frage. Lisa Sawyer erinnert allerdings daran, dass dies in der Geschichte des Bündnisses nicht zum ersten Mal geschieht. "NATO leaders would be prudent to consider what lessons can be learned from managing these difficult moments in the organization’s history. Here are three that stand out: Lesson 1: Understand NATO’s Limits (...) Understanding the limits of NATO’s ability to play a forceful role in reversing or halting a member’s slide into dictatorship is an important starting point for allied leaders as they consider their options. (...) Lesson 2: NATO Requires Unity; Unity Requires Compromise (...) Lesson 3: Beware the Consequences of an Overly Accommodating Approach (...) Short-term security interests should, of course, be considered and protected to the extent possible — but the price to NATO’s long-term credibility must also be carefully weighed. The Washington Treaty opens with a recitation of common values for a reason. NATO is more than just a security alliance; it would do well to remember that."

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"Are Cyber Weapons Too Dangerous to Use?"

Joshua Rovner schreibt, dass der heute am besten bekannte offensive Einsatz einer Cyberwaffe, der Stuxnet-Angriff auf Iran, auch die Probleme dieser neuen Taktik aufgedeckt habe. Der für einen begrenzten und spezifischen Einsatz programmierte Computerwurm sei nicht zu kontrollieren gewesen und habe sich schnell international ausgebreitet. "The more this happens, the more these operations risk eroding faith in cybersecurity. Ordinary internet users may be less willing to log on. Businesses could be increasingly wary of operating online. Computer scientists and engineers may become less enthusiastic about volunteering their time and expertise to sustain the internet. And if states believe their rivals are actively undermining cybersecurity for their own purposes, they will be less likely to cooperate on shared issues like cybercrime. Policymakers thus face a dilemma. Should they stay on the offensive in cyberspace, even if it puts everyone’s cybersecurity at risk? Should they pursue parochial national interests like espionage and sabotage at the expense of a global public good?"

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"A Deadly Delusion: Were Syria’s Rebels Ever Going to Defeat the Jihadists?"

Nach der Einstellung der CIA-Unterstützung für syrische Rebellen fragt Sam Heller, ob die Vorstellung, dass diese "moderaten" Gruppen den Dschihadisten vor Ort entgegen treten können, jemals realistisch gewesen sei. "The fact of rebel cooperation with jihadists was consistently excused away as a tactical necessity, or as a function of insufficient U.S. support. But there were only so many times U.S.-backed rebels could function as jihadists’ battlefield auxiliaries, sit and watch as jihadists liquidated other rebel factions, or prove generally unmotivated to fight jihadists before it became impossible to take them seriously as a counter-terrorism force. (...) The factional dysfunction and personal entanglements of the rebels meant that jihadists were more central and powerful within the armed opposition than Washington and other rebel backers appreciated or acknowledged. In the end, that not only meant that rebels were useless for counter-terrorism, but also that they couldn’t serve as a viable tool of pressure on the Assad regime or represent a realistic alternative to Assad’s rule."

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"What Thucydides Teaches Us About War, Politics, and the Human Condition"

Eric W. Robinson von der Indiana University erklärt, warum man vom antiken griechischen Historiker Thukydides auch heute noch viel über sicherheitspolitische Fragen lernen könne. Allerdings gebe es dabei auch viel Raum für Missverständnisse und falsche Analogien. "What can we truly learn from Thucydides, a writer who lived over two millennia ago, about power relations today? Quite a bit, in my view, but not necessarily in the way people like to. (...) Years of working with Thucydides in the classroom and as a scholar tell me that what his book teaches most of all is what we might call historical mindfulness. By this I mean a generalized understanding about the workings of history: what kinds of forces tend to inspire people, drive politics, create crises and bring (or prevent) resolution, with what consequences for human communities? Thucydides was not a prophet nor a political scientist, but a keen observer and explicator of the human condition in collective conflict. And we can gain much wisdom by studying his work with this in mind."

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"The Future of Military Robotics Looks Like a Nature Documentary"

Gregory C. Allen fühlt sich durch die aktuellen Visionen von der Zukunft des militärischen Einsatzes von Robotern und intelligenten Kampfsystemen weniger an den Hollywood-Film Terminator als an die Naturdokumentationen der BBC erinnert. "Leading roboticists have long been attempting to copy nature’s A+ homework. MIT, UC Berkeley, and dozens of other universities boast biology-inspired robotics laboratories. The Department of Defense, especially DARPA, has been instrumental in funding much of this research. DARPA-funded programs have produced robotic hummingbirds, cheetahs, and pack mules that – while not yet battlefield-ready – clearly illustrate how biology-inspired robotics will be an integral part of future warfare."

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"Cyber-Attacks: Who’s Keeping Score?"

Sean McBride vom IT-Unternehmen FireEye schreibt, dass Hacker-Angriffe staatlicher Akteure international trotz vieler entsprechender Berichte keineswegs ein seuchenartiges Ausmaß erreicht hätten. Mit Hilfe einer Scorekarte gibt er einen Überblick über die bekannten Vorfälle der letzten Jahre. "To my team and me, an attack is not an intrusion. It’s not a compromised machine. It’s not stolen intellectual property, embarrassing leaks, or credit card numbers. To us, an attack is delivering the blow. It’s an effort to destroy, degrade or deny access to a computer system or to manipulate the physical, real-world processes – like electricity transmission or distribution – that computers control. Intrusion or exploitation of a computer system often precede an attack, but serve a different objective – to gather information. (...) Relying on this definition and open-source reporting, our team identified 17 occasions on which state-nexus perpetrators attacked organizations in other countries. Four countries conducted the attacks, and seven have been attacked."

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"A Cultural Failure: U.S. Special Operations in the Philippines and the Rise of the Islamic State"

Die Bemühungen des "Islamischen Staates", in den Philippinen Fuß zu fassen, seien den philippinischen und amerikanischen Sicherheitskräften bereits seit 2014 bekannt gewesen, schreibt Cole Livieratos. US-Spezialeinheiten hätten versucht, die Kooperation des IS mit lokalen islamistischen Gruppen zu verhindern. Diese Strategie sei offensichtlich gescheitert, meint Livieratos, der an diesen Operationen selbst teilgenommen hat. "For the time being, Special Forces, SEALs, and MARSOC will train and advise Philippine Security Forces in tactical missions as they attempt to recapture Marawi and physically push the Islamic State out of the city. It is likely that the aforementioned forces will succeed in its tactical missions and will probably mount successful operations to counter the Islamic State in the short-term. But with its current priorities and organization, Special Operations Command is not positioned to defeat the Islamic State because it does not prioritize operations to limit the Islamic State’s global appeal."

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"Germans Should Accept What a Military is For, or Get Used to Disappointment"

Mario Schulz vom Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin, der selbst in der Bundeswehr gedient hat, sieht den Bundeswehr-Skandal der vergangenen Monate als Folge der Distanz zwischen der deutschen Gesellschaft und dem deutschen Militär. Das fehlende Verständnis der Öffentlichkeit für den militärischen Beruf habe die Tür für rechte Ideologen geöffnet, die militärische Werte und Tugenden exklusiv für sich beanspruchen. "Where extremism and excessive violence occur, the Bundeswehr regularly turns a blind eye to misconduct within its own ranks, expecting blanket condemnation of their profession if failures come to light. Germans need to understand what sets the military apart: the readiness to serve, kill, and die for society. Otherwise, the Bundeswehr will retain the painful sense of rejection that lies behind the cowardly failures of its leadership to prevent and prosecute criminal acts and breaches of honor."

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"Don’t Believe the Hype About European Defense"

Luis Simon ist nicht überrascht, dass viele Brüsseler Verteidigungsexperten den Brexit und die Präsidentschaft Donald Trumps als Gelegenheit für eine Vertiefung der europäischen Sicherheitspolitik nutzen wollen. Bisher sei allerdings fast jede Krise als "Weckruf für Europa" behandelt worden, ohne dass dies weitreichende Folgen gehabt habe. Dies werde auch diesmal so ein, so die Erwartung Simons. Ein Grund seien die unterschiedlichen Militärphilosophien Deutschlands und Frankreichs. "France looks at military force not just through the lens of defense and deterrence, but also as a means of advancing its foreign policy and economic interests. And it makes a proactive use of it. Germany rejects that vision. It sees the military as a last resort defensive instrument. These are deeply ingrained differences of strategic culture. And any serious effort on the part of Germany to overcome its cautious and defensive attitude towards military power is likely to cause discomfort amongst some of its European partners, France included. In many ways, when it comes to defense spending and its attitude towards the use of force, Germany is damned if it does and damned if it doesn’t."

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"Trump, NATO, and Establishment Hysteria"

Benjamin H. Friedman und Joshua Shifrinson glauben nicht, dass US-Präsident Trump bei seiner jüngsten Europa-Reise die europäischen Verbündeten wirklich aufgegeben habe. Trump habe die Alliierten mit seiner Unhöflichkeit zwar vor den Kopf gestoßen, greifbare politische Änderungen in der Beziehung seien bislang jedoch nicht zu beobachten. "With all of the wailing and rending of garments among the Washington foreign policy establishment, it is easy to miss that neither the United States nor its NATO allies have made big defense policy changes since Trump took office. Merkel’s electorally-driven comment essentially repeated what she said in January in response to Trump’s election and the Brexit. She seemed to endorse further integration of common E.U. defense policies — an old objective. If there’s new policy here, it’s more support for an E.U. defense procurement fund and something called 'Permanent Structured Cooperation,' which vaguely promises to coordinate security cooperation among groups of E.U. states — significant but hardly revolutionary developments in Europe’s fitful path towards a common defense. U.S. military policy in Europe has changed even less. (...) Even if it turns out Trump has set off a process leading to unprecedented European military independence, the United States will not have jettisoned a holy and continuous postwar goal. U.S. leaders did not craft a postwar order with the idea of forever serving as its center."

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"Abandon the 2 Percent Obsession: A New Rating for Pulling Your Weight in NATO"

Die Beurteilung der Lastenverteilung in der NATO sollte nach Ansicht von Garrett Martin und Balazs Martonffy nicht nur von der nominellen Höhe der Militärausgaben der Mitgliedstaaten abhängig gemacht werden. Das viel diskutierte Zwei-Prozent-Ziel der Nato für Verteidigungsausgaben sei zwar leicht vermittelbar und deshalb politisch attraktiv: "But for all its political appeal, the 2 percent figure is fatally flawed and does not accurately capture a state’s contributions to all of NATO’s core tasks. First, 2 percent is a rather arbitrary number. (...) Second, there is a clear lack of a universal definition of what should be included in 'defense spending.' (...) Third, (...) comparing American defense spending with that of other NATO allies is misleading. (...) Fourth, the 2 percent figure only focuses on inputs and not outputs. (...) That the 2 percent guideline endures indicates a lack so far of a viable alternative rather than any strong inherent value. Officials and experts are, however, starting to propose different metrics that could either complement or replace the 2 percent guideline."

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"In His Own Words: Vladimir Putin’s Foreign Policy Analyzed"

Stephen Benedict Dyson und Matthew J. Parent haben die außenpolitischen Äußerungen des russischen Präsidenten mit einer Technik analysiert, die von der US-Regierung bereits nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges genutzt wurde. "What we found was surprising: On most issues of foreign policy, Putin scores as a fairly mainstream world leader. (...) We established that great power leaders talk about international politics differently than rogue state leaders, and found that Putin spoke (and by implication, thought) more like the standard great power leader than the rogue leader. Except for one thing: his obsession with control. Putin talks about his own and Russia’s control over events to an extent rarely seen, scoring consistently above the normal levels of other political leaders. All politicians want to stay in charge, and all states-people like to think of their country as shaping international affairs, but Putin represents an extreme case."

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"Evacuation is America’s Moral and Strategic Imperative in Idlib"

Sam Heller ist der Überzeugung, dass der Westen kein Recht und kein Interesse daran habe, sich im Kampf zwischen den syrischen Regierungstruppen und den von Dschihadisten dominierten Rebellengruppen in der Idlib-Provinz auf eine Seite zu stellen. Stattdessen sollte der Schutz der dort festsitzenden geschätzten 2,3 Millionen Zivilisten im Vordergrund stehen. "Threatening the regime with a section of Syria’s insurgency spearheaded by al-Qaeda-style jihadists will not somehow convince the regime to negotiate a compromise. And Idlib’s rebellion is distinct from smaller enclaves in east Aleppo or north of the Jordanian border, areas whose rebels are more attractive to the West but, for various reasons, incapable of making a run at Damascus. As monstrous as the Assad regime is, the West does not and should not want to see Idlib’s rebels overrun the regime and win the country. (...) For rebels, the northwest may be their defiant last stand. But for millions of civilians, it’s a cage. (...) I am not arguing that the United States and its allies should force the displacement of the northwest’s residents, which would amount to a war crime. But if a cataclysm is coming — and I’m convinced one is — the West needs to ensure these civilians are able to flee to safety."

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"Russia is an Asian Power Too: Japan Understands, but Does the United States?"

In ihrer geopolitischen Analyse der komplizierten Beziehungen zwischen Russland, China und Japan betonen Chris Miller und Joshua Walker, dass Russland heute auch als asiatische Großmacht auftrete. In der amerikanischen Außenpolitik werde dies bisher allerdings kaum berücksichtigt. "In the past, Washington has cautioned Japan against improving relations with Moscow lest it be seen as breaking the united front against Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Yet just as Japan must realize the value of unified positions on issues such as Ukraine and Syria, Washington should consider the long-term when looking at Tokyo’s efforts to mend ties with Moscow. On some issues of Asia-Pacific security, the United States and Russia might even find that they agree. Yet Washington too often only sees Russia through a European lens. Japan’s effort to rebuild its relations with Moscow just might help us see Russia and Asia in a new light."

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"The Al-Shayrat Strikes and Escalation Control in Syria"

Noel Anderson macht darauf aufmerksam, dass die USA bei der Planung und Durchführung des Militärschlags in Syrien alles getan hätten, um eine direkte Konfrontation mit russischen Soldaten vor Ort auszuschließen. Zwei Entwicklungen könnten diese Strategie in Frage stellen: Die russische Aufkündigung der Vereinbarung zur Vermeidung von Zusammenstößen über Syrien und die Interpretation des Militärschlags als Beginn einer grundlegenden Richtungsänderung der USA. "By warning Russia in advance of the strikes, avoiding Russian personnel and infrastructure targets, and explicitly linking the target of the strikes with the chemical weapons attack in Khan Sheikhoun, the United States demonstrated its unwillingness to tolerate the use of chemical weapons while at the same time providing the necessary space for Russia to save face and avoid a forceful counteraction. Analysts and policymakers should interpret Thursday’s strikes, and indeed the wider Syrian conflict, in this light: a delicate U.S.-Russian dance that seeks to secure competing national interests while avoiding dangerous and damaging escalation."

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"Trump’s Middle East Policies Boorish and Belligerent, But Surprisingly Normal"

Einige Monate nach dem Amtsantritt Donald Trumps stellt Marc Lynch fest, dass der US-Präsident eine "überraschend normale" Nahost-Politik verfolge. Am wichtigste sei dabei, dass Trump das vielkritisierte Atomabkommen mit dem Iran nicht aufgekündigt habe. Auch in der Israelpolitik und im Krieg gegen den IS weiche Trump nicht so stark wie von einigen Experten befürchtet vom bisherigen Kurs der USA ab. "The foreign affairs community may, understandably, be in a state of perpetual outrage over the Trump team’s amateurish gambits and penchant for shocking statements, and foreign diplomats understandably bemused by a president who appoints his son-in-law to top policy positions and tweets about Snoop Dogg. But thus far, Trump’s actual Middle East policy has been shockingly conventional. He talks a big game but has proven largely unable or unwilling to actually change all that much in America’s Middle East policy. Instead, he has mostly been managing Obama’s Middle East in a more boorish and belligerent way."

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"Germany’s New Defense Pragmatism is Not Measured in Euros"

Niklas Helwig meint, dass die weitreichenden Veränderungen der vergangenen Jahre in der Bundeswehr nicht nur auf die finanziellen Aspekte und die immer wieder diskutierten zwei Prozent des Bruttoinlandsprodukts reduziert werden sollten. Der neue militärpolitische Pragmatismus Deutschlands gehe über erhöhte Ausgaben hinaus und sei z.B. in vielen bilateralen Initiativen erkennbar. "While most observers focused on the attempts from both sides of the Atlantic to promote renewed trust in the NATO alliance, in recent weeks Germany has taken concrete action in bolstering European defense with its neighbors on the continent. (...) The new push for bilateral agreements and integration of military capabilities and structures is part of a larger pragmatism on defense integration in Europe. Many politicians in Europe carefully avoid any mention of the traditional 'European Army' buzzword that has captured the imagination of Europhile politicians for decades. (...) Instead of standing still, however, Europe started to integrate its military through a bottom-up approach. Rather than organizing Europe’s national forces from the E.U. level, defense ministries interwove their militaries through bilateral agreements."

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"Counter-Terrorism from Bush to Obama to Trump"

Ryan Evans unterhält sich mit Colin Kahl und Stephen Tankel über die Entwicklung der amerikanischen Antiterror-Politik seit 2001. "How has counter-terrorism changed from 9/11 to today over three presidencies? To answer that question, Ryan Evans sat down with two guests with deep perspective on counter-terrorism: Colin Kahl was the national security adviser to Vice President Biden and, earlier in the Obama administration, was the deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East. He is now associate professor in the Security Studies Program at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service. Stephen Tankel is an assistant professor in the School of International Service at American University, an adjunct senior fellow at CNAS, and a senior editor at War on the Rocks. He previously served as a senior adviser for Asian and Pacific security affairs at the Department of Defense. Stephen is the author of the forthcoming book, With Us and Against Us: America’s Partners in the War on Terror."

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"A Comparative Guide to Russia’s Use of Force: Measure Twice, Invade Once"

Michael Kofman schreibt in seiner Analyse der russischen Militärstrategie, dass Moskau seine Truppen, deren Modernisierung immer noch viel zu wünschen übrig lasse, geschickt einsetze, um ganz bestimmte politische Ziele zu erreichen. "Although Russian military power remains a blunt force instrument, the state wields it more like a rapier, demonstrating discretion and timing. (...) The Russian military itself has a long way to go in terms of modernization, but conversely, America’s political leadership needs to reexamine how great powers, with far fewer resources, use the so-called 'big stick' to get the job done. The unipolar world order appears to be rapidly melting, while great powers are back on the agenda. When it comes to use of force by peer rivals contesting America’s interests, it is only going to get harder from here on out. The United States may not wish to emulate Russian approaches, but American strategists should certainly study then."

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"The Coming of the Russian Jihad, Part II"

Leon Aron mit dem zweiten Teil seiner Analyse dschihadistischer Bewegungen in Russland. "By all indications, the Russian jihad continues to remain alive and dangerous. As outlined in the first installment, this development has multiple and deep roots. Changing demographics due to migration which have made Russia the largest ethnic Muslim country in Europe and Moscow a key international ISIL recruiting ground. Additionally, pan-European trends such as alienation, unemployment, discrimination, and prison radicalization play increasingly prominent roles in converting citizens of the Russian Federation. Perhaps the most troubling development has been a gradual shift of the locus of militant Islamism from the north Caucasus and into the Russian heartland of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. In this installment, I explore the domestic impact of Russia’s involvement in Syria’s civil war and the strategies deployed by the Russian authorities to contain these effects."

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Europa, Asien, Afrika, Amerika und weltweite Phänomene und Institutionen. Die bpb bietet ein breites Angebot zu internationalen Themen.

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Informationsportal Krieg und Frieden

Wo gibt es Kriege und Gewaltkonflikte? Und wo herrscht am längsten Frieden? Welches Land gibt am meisten für Rüstung aus? liefert wichtige Daten und Fakten zu Krieg und Frieden.

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Innerstaatliche Konflikte

Vom Kosovo nach Kolumbien, von Somalia nach Süd-Thailand: Weltweit schwelen über 280 politische Konflikte. Und immer wieder droht die Lage gewaltsam zu eskalieren.

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Zahlen und Fakten


Kaum ein Thema wird so intensiv und kontrovers diskutiert wie die Globalisierung. "Zahlen und Fakten" liefert Grafiken, Texte und Tabellen zu einem der wichtigsten und vielschichtigsten Prozesse der Gegenwart.

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Publikationen zum Thema

Coverbild Internationale Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert

Internationale Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert

Die internationale Sicherheit ist fragil und bedroht. Wie können und müssen demokratische Systeme ...

Internationale Sicherheitspolitik Cover

Internationale Sicherheitspolitik

Seit Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts hat sich die internationale Sicherheitspolitik deutlich verändert....

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