US-Soldaten in Afghanistan

Political Violence @ a Glance


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05.09.2018

"How Assad Won the Syrian Civil War Before It Began"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2018/09/05/how-assad-won-the-syrian-civil-war-before-it-began/

Der Politikwissenschaftler Eric Mosinger führt das Scheitern des Aufstands gegen die Regierung in Syrien weniger auf die Hilfe der Verbündeten Iran und Russland oder die geschickte Strategie Präsident Assads, sondern in erster Linie auf die von Anfang an "hoffnungslose Zersplitterung" der Rebellen zurück. "By early 2013, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had compiled an index of 1,000 independent armed groups operating in Syria. These eventually coalesced into five or six major coalitions, but even then Syria’s rebel movement was the most fragmented in a dataset I constructed by a significant margin. Indeed, the Syrian rebel movement is likely the most fragmented in history. What explains this dubious achievement? My research points to a set of social and political policies employed by the Assad regime to control Syrian society in the thirty years prior to the Arab Spring uprising."

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23.05.2018

"What We Know – and Don’t Know – about Religious Civil Wars"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2018/05/23/what-we-know-and-dont-know-about-religious-civil-wars/

Desirée Nilsson und Isak Svensson von der Uppsala University haben Daten analysiert, die ihrer Ansicht nach darauf hindeuten, dass einige geläufige Annahmen über die religiöse Dimension internationaler Konflikte hinterfragt werden sollten. "Drawing on the data and findings presented in that article, we shed light on three widely held beliefs concerning religious conflicts. Claim 1. 'Armed conflicts between actors from different religious identities are becoming more common' The patterns in our data suggest otherwise. (...) If we talk about conflicts in which religion serves as an identity-marker – such as in conflicts between Shia and Sunni Muslims, or Catholics and Protestants – then religious conflicts are neither decreasing nor increasing in numbers. (...) Claim 2. 'Islamist armed conflicts are increasing' We can discern such a trend, but only in part. (...) Conflicts fought over transnational Islamist claims – involving, in particular, groups associated with ISIS and al-Qaida – have been increasing for some years now, although ISIS has now lost most of its heartland territory in Iraq and Syria. Islamist revolutionary conflicts (e.g. in Algeria involving AIS) and Islamist separatist conflicts (e.g. the Patani conflict in Thailand) – where the religious claims do not transcend borders – are not increasing in frequency. (...) Claim 3. 'Religious claims cannot be negotiated' The basic answer to this is: we do not (yet) know."

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19.09.2017

"Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2017/09/19/climate-change-and-the-syrian-civil-war/

Eine neue Studie hat für die These, dass der Klimawandel eine entscheidende Rolle beim Ausbruch des Krieges in Syrien gespielt habe, keine belastbaren Beweise gefunden. Cullen Hendrix analysiert die Hintergründe der Debatte und beschreibt seinen eigenen Standpunkt folgendermaßen: "Do I believe climate change and climate shocks can place strain on societies in ways that increase the likelihood of conflict? Yes, most definitely – there’s a relatively large literature on this now, though the findings are still somewhat muddled and context- and scale-dependent: climatic conditions affect different types of conflict in different ways. Do I believe that environmental conditions, i.e., the Syrian drought, contributed to the conflict in Syria? Probably, though the evidence is not entirely clear cut. Do I believe climate change caused the Syrian conflict? That’s an incredibly difficult claim to substantiate for at least two reasons."

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18.09.2017

"Silent Guns: Examining the Two-Year Absence of Coups in Africa"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2017/09/18/silent-guns-examining-the-two-year-absence-of-coups-in-a
frica/

Rebecca Shiel und Jonathan Powell machen darauf aufmerksam, dass es im letzten Jahrzehnt immer weniger und in den vergangenen zwei Jahren überhaupt keinen Putschversuch in Afrika gegeben hat. Diese "bemerkenswerte" Abkehr von einem lange Zeit charakteristischen Merkmal afrikanischer Politik habe regionale und internationale Ursachen, wie der bislang letzte Putschversuch in Burkina Faso gezeigt habe. "Protests immediately commenced, as activists from many backgrounds stood against the coup. (...) Apart from domestic reactions, swift condemnation from regional and international powers also played an important role. The AU, ECOWAS, the UN, and the European Union all met the coup with harsh condemnation. (...) Recent scholarly work has demonstrated that such reactions can play an important role in coups over the long term. (...) Unfortunately, so long as there exists a plethora of illegitimate regimes with few alternatives to remove dictators (and the occasional democrat), the prospects for unconstitutional seizures of power will remain. However, as recently observed, the world seems to be moving away from military-led takeovers and towards popular movements."

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03.08.2017

"Why Trump Ending Support to Syrian Rebels Might Actually be a Good Thing"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2017/08/03/why-trump-ending-support-to-syrian-rebels-might-actually
-be-a-good-thing/

Niklas Karlén, Doktorand an der Uppsala University in Schweden, hält die Einstellung der CIA-Unterstützung für "moderate" Rebellen in Syrien dagegen für richtig, da derartige Programme sich in der Vergangenheit nicht als effektiv erwiesen hätten. "State support to rebels often fails to produce the intended policy outcomes. The main findings from a still-classified internal review by the CIA, commissioned by the Obama administration, concluded that attempts to arm foreign forces covertly often have a minimal impact on the long-term outcome of conflict. (...) The unintended consequences of backing rebels even extend beyond the cessation of violence, as support negatively affects democratization trajectories and threatens post-conflict stability. Given the many negative consequences identified by research on state support to rebels, it is thus sensible for the United States to limit its involvement in Syria. In the long run, Trump’s decision might actually be a good thing."

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05.07.2017

"Why Civil Wars have Gotten Longer, Bloodier, and More Numerous"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2017/07/05/why-civil-wars-have-gotten-longer-bloodier-and-more-nume
rous/

Barbara F. Walter stellt fest, dass die Zahl der Bürgerkriege seit dem Jahr 2000 weltweit deutlich zugenommen habe. Ihrer Meinung nach hängt diese Entwicklung eng mit dem Aufstieg des Web 2.0 zusammen. "In a new paper 'The New New Civil Wars', I argue that these changes are due in part to the advent of the Web 2.0 in the early 2000s. Today’s civil wars are the first to be fought in an era of global, instantaneous communication, and this is the reason they are changing. (...) The current civil wars in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Chad, Nigeria, Somalia, and the Central African Republic (to name a few) are exhibiting all of the characteristics of internet-era conflicts. All of these wars broke out post-2003. All of them are being fought by multiple armed factions (on both the government and rebel sides). All of them include extensive involvement by outside states. All of them have resisted negotiated settlement and appear likely to last a long time. All are distinctive for their brutality toward civilians. (...) Everything we are currently seeing in these 'new new' wars suggests that the internet is likely to be far more transformative than any of us had imagined."

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21.03.2017

"How Trump’s Budget May Harm US Counterterrorism"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2017/03/21/how-trumps-budget-may-harm-us-counterterrorism/

Peter S. Henne erläutert, warum die im neuen Haushaltsentwurf des Weißen Hauses vorgesehenen Kürzungen internationaler Hilfsprogramme des Außenministeriums seiner Ansicht nach den Sicherheitsinteressen der USA schaden werden. "US foreign aid is not 'just' humanitarian work. It is also an important instrument through which America influences other states; without foreign aid, the US Global War on Terrorism may have been less effective in undermining the power of al-Qaeda. If Trump does cut US foreign aid, efforts to defeat al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other terrorist threats that emerge will be severely curtailed. The struggles of countries like Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, who are directly fighting the Islamic State and attempting to counter its messaging, may be hampered. Any serious US counterterrorism strategy must maintain foreign aid as an important element of the foreign policy toolkit."

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21.11.2016

"Understanding Duterte’s 'Dirty War' in the Philippines"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/11/21/understanding-dutertes-dirty-war-in-the-philippines/

Der philippinische Präsident Duterte verfolge seit seinem Amtsantritt einen "gnadenlosen" Krieg gegen Drogenhändler und Abhängige, bei dem bisher einem Polizeibericht zufolge 4.812 Menschen getötet worden seien, schreibt Belén González, Postdoktorandin an der Universität Mannheim. Dabei könne Duterte auf gewalttätige Milizen zurückgreifen, die seit den 1980er Jahren zur Bekämpfung von Aufständischen eingesetzt werden. "Over the last decade, the armed conflict has remained low intensity and the government even managed to sign peace agreements with some of the rebel groups. However, these developments did little to counter the influence of the militia groups. (...) Based on the omnipresence of vigilante groups in Philippine politics, we should not be surprised that violence spiked right after Duterte’s election. Historically, militias have offered the government high political benefits at low cost. Most importantly, the groups have provided a pool of skilled and battle-hardened vigilantes that Duterte could quickly (re-)activate and deploy."

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06.10.2016

"Piecemeal Settlement of the Kuril Islands Dispute?"

https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/10/06/piecemeal-settlement-of-the-kuril-islands-dispute/

Die japanische Regierung habe ihren harten Standpunkt im Streit um die Kurilen-Inseln offenbar abgeschwächt, schreibt Michaela Mattes. Der jahrzehntelange Territorialkonflikt mit Russland könnte nun möglicherweise mit schrittweisen diplomatischen Vereinbarungen entschärft und langfristig sogar beendet werden. "In recent research, I found evidence that a piecemeal approach can be a promising route to conflict resolution. My study suggests that, at times, leaders possess political will to make progress on resolving a dispute but a comprehensive deal is not (yet) possible due to a lack of trust at the international level and/or resistance by domestic actors. Whether the obstacles to conflict resolution can be found at the international or the domestic level, a piecemeal approach may prove an effective strategy. With regard to international concerns about trust, partial settlements allow actors to demonstrate their good will by undertaking smaller cooperative steps that can then build the basis for more extensive cooperation. With regard to domestic political obstacles, partial settlements can engender economic gains for locals – weakening their resistance to further concessions – and might encourage businesses that benefit from cooperation with the opponent to demand additional agreements."

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23.09.2016

"Violence in Turkey Is Increasingly Resembling Violence in Syria – Here’s Data to Show Why"

https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/09/23/violence-in-turkey-is-increasingly-resembling-violence-
in-syria-heres-data-to-show-why/

Güneş Murat Tezcür und Clayton Besaw haben empirische Daten über den militärischen Konflikt zwischen Regierungstruppen und der kurdischen PKK in der Türkei gesammelt und stellen hier ihre Ergebnisse vor. "What do we take from this? First, serious negotiations and ceasefires have the potential to stop the killing if they are successful. They were not successful in Turkey because the gap between the insurgent demands and government reforms remained vast and there was no mutually hurting stalemate given the relatively low intensity of the conflict until 2015. Second, civilians are much more likely to be the victims of war when insurgencies infiltrate cities and government forces undertakes extensive counterinsurgency operations after failed negotiations. Finally, the conflict in Turkey and the civil war in Syria are very much intermingled. The PKK adopted urban warfare tactics employed in the Syrian civil war. The Turkish state views territorial gains by the PKK-affiliated-PYD in Syria as a direct threat. Consequently, political violence in Turkey would unlikely end without a modus vivendi between the Turkish state and insurgents regarding the Kurdish question in Syria."

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25.02.2016

"Federal Syria: It’s Time to Recognize Reality"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/02/25/federal-syria-its-time-to-recognize-reality/

Eric Kaufmann, Politikwissenschaftler am Birkbeck College der University of London, macht sich bereits Gedanken über eine politische Lösung des Syrienkonflikts nach Beendigung der Kämpfe. Er empfiehlt eine Föderalisierung des syrischen Staates nach libanesischem Vorbild. "We have a chance to learn from the mistakes of the past and institute a federal system based on sectarian cantons in Syria. The idea of sectarian power-sharing underpins the model in next-door Lebanon, which has a similar ethno-sectarian patchwork. It’s not perfect, but if Lebanon did not recognize sectarian divisions as the basis of politics, disgruntled minorities would swiftly resort to violence. In Iraq, Maliki’s centralization has similarly alienated Sunnis: as other commentators note, the country has only one option, federalism. (...) As it stands, American policy in Syria is like a kite in a storm, buffeted by events and other players, rather than being guided by a clear vision. It’s time for the West to ditch the fiction of a unitary Syria, embrace federalism, and persuade all parties to move toward this goal."

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24.02.2016

"Will Iraqi Kurds Go It Alone?"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/02/24/will-iraqi-kurds-go-it-alone/

Ariel I. Ahram berichtet, dass die irakischen Kurden in diesem Jahr in einem Referendum über ihre Unabhängigkeit entscheiden könnten. Dies wäre der Abschied vom "romantischen Ideal" eines gesamtkurdischen Staates. "(...) the referendum has the potential to transform the KRG’s domestic politics. Given the number of Arabs, Turkomen, and other non-Kurds in the disputed territories and the original Kurdish region, the agglomeration of these territories would dilute the Kurdish majority and redefine notions of national identity and citizenship. The accession of non-Kurds, making up around a quarter of the total population, within Kurdistan could bring about a shift from a largely ethnically-based identity that marginalizes non-Kurdish minorities into a multi-ethnic identity focused on civic affiliation. Kurdistan may be for the Kurds, but it will also have to be for other citizens as well. Moreover, voting solely within the Iraq’s Kurdish Region (and KRG-controlled territories) signals the end of the romantic ideal of greater pan-Kurdish unity."

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29.01.2016

"Why ISIS Will Not Thrive in Indonesia"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/01/29/why-isis-will-not-thrive-in-indonesia/

Im Fall Indonesien empfiehlt Ioana Emy Matesan, die Bedeutung der jüngsten Terrorangriffe von IS-Anhängern nicht zu überschätzen. Die indonesische Regierung habe bisher in legalistischer statt militaristischer Weise auf die Gewalt reagiert, eine Abkehr von dieser klugen Strategie wäre ein großer Fehler. "To be sure, the threat of violence might not disappear in Indonesia. But it is important not to overreact to these attacks, not to overestimate the reach of ISIS, and not to conflate developments in the Middle East with developments in Southeast Asia. American involvement in counter-terrorism and harsh tactics by the police or Densus 88 (the counter-terrorism unit) have only spurred violent attacks before. Unlike many other countries countering terrorism, Indonesia has done many things right – it adopted a legalist rather than militaristic approach to counterterrorism and it has combined soft and hard tactics, understanding the importance of incentives, exit options, and respect for the rule of law. Rather than give in to an ISIS hysteria, the country should keep building on the lessons it has already learned from its tumultuous past."

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15.01.2016

"Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/01/15/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-in-peacekeeping
-missions/

Nach erneuten Berichten über sexuellen Missbrauch und Vergewaltigungen durch UN-Blauhelme in der Zentralafrikanischen Republik überlegen Sabrina Karim und Kyle Beardsley, wie sich diese Vergehen künftig verhindern ließen. "In our recent Journal of Peace Research article, we argue that the composition of peacekeeping forces also plays an important role in the level of sexual exploitation and abuse. SEA [Sexual exploitation and abuse] can arise from both an aggressive form of masculinity that is privileged in militaries (militarized masculinity) and socialized beliefs about male dominance in society (patriarchy). (...) If a part of the problem is thus due to learned and socialized behavior, then two policy levers may reduce the amount of sexual exploitation and abuse in missions: an increase in the representation of female peacekeeping personnel or an increase in the representation of soldiers that hold more gender equal beliefs. Female peacekeepers may be less likely to engage in SEA, or as some have suggested, they may serve as a deterrent, preventing their male colleagues from engaging in the behavior. Peacekeepers that come from countries with better records of gender equality may hold values that are more in line with treating women as their equal instead of potential sources of exploitation."

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04.12.2015

"More Education = Less Terrorism? Studying the Complex Relationship Between Terrorism and Education"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/12/04/more-education-less-terrorism-studying-the-complex-relat
ionship-between-terrorism-and-education/

Die Politikwissenschaftler Sarah Brockhoff, Tim Krieger und Daniel Meierrieks stellen in ihrer neuen Studie die häufig geäußerte These in Frage, dass junge Menschen durch verstärkte Bildungsangebote davon abgehalten werden könnten, sich radikalen Terrorgruppen anzuschließen. "While intuitive, the academic evidence on the terrorism-education nexus tends to be more pessimistic. On the national level, education is usually found to share little relationship with terrorism. What is more, on the individual level, there is evidence that the more educated are more likely to become terrorists. (...) In our new study, we provide a framework to better understand the apparently complex interaction between terrorism and education, trying to reconcile the popular narrative that education may remedy terrorism with the prevalent academic viewpoint that education – if anything – is associated with more terrorism. We argue that there is some truth to both the optimistic and pessimistic views regarding the terrorism-education nexus. The ultimate effect of education on terrorism is linked to country-specific circumstances which moderate whether the pacifying or inflammatory effects of education on terrorism prevail."

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29.09.2015

"Colombia: Never Again?"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/09/29/colombia-never-again/

Nach dem historischen Abkommen zwischen der kolumbianischen Regierung und den FARC-Rebellen wägt Camilo Rueda Lopez die Chancen des Landes auf einen dauerhaften Frieden ab. "(...) the agreement has already been welcomed by some victims groups and begun a paradigm shift as people begin to view the resolution of the conflict as inevitable. But will it be enough for 'never again' in Colombia? (...) Polls have shown a large proportion of Colombians have felt that requiring prison terms must be part of the peace agreement. But there are no polls yet about alternative arrangements or the actual terms that were hammered out now that they have been announced. So, support for a final agreement could rise after this breath of optimism and the setting of a date for the conflict to end next March. The justice sub-agreement is truly a historic step toward justice. Hopefully it will also be a big enough step toward 'never again.'"

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28.09.2015

"Insurgent Defection in Civil War: Lessons from Colombia for Combating ISIS"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/09/28/insurgent-defection-in-civil-war-lessons-from-colombia-f
or-combating-isis/

Die Politikwissenschaftler Ben Oppenheim, Abbey Steele, Juan F. Vargas und Michael Weintraub fragen nach den möglichen Ursachen der Berichten zufolge zunehmenden Desertion von IS-Kämpfern. Antworten finden sie bei der Untersuchung ähnlicher Entwicklungen im kolumbianischen Bürgerkrieg. "Three key lessons about combatant defection emerge from the Colombian conflict: 1. 'True believers,' those motivated by ideology, are dedicated and resilient, but are high-risk cases for defection if an armed group deviates from its core precepts. (...) 2. 'Mercenaries,' fighters motivated by economic opportunity, are more likely to defect overall. But armed groups have tools at their disposal to persuade even mercenaries to fight for ideals. (...) 3. Military pressure can lead to defections, but it can also lead to resilience. (...) The most credible attacks on ISIS’s ideological consistency are those that come from defectors themselves, and counterinsurgents have a lot to gain by offering them the opportunity to denounce former comrades. (...) A mixed strategy between military pressure and safe havens for defectors might be the best option to wear down the cohesion of ISIS."

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14.09.2015

"What Russia Might Teach the US about Establishing Order in Civil Wars"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/09/14/what-russia-might-teach-the-us-about-establishing-order-
in-civil-wars/

Jesse Driscoll und Barbara F. Walter sind der Ansicht, dass die von Russland betriebene Beendigung der Bürgerkriege in Georgien und Tadschikistan in den frühen 1990er Jahren interessante Lehren für eine mögliche Lösung aktueller Konflikte bereithalte. "Russians realized that the only way to get peace was for new national elites to selectively co-opt criminal paramilitaries and rebel field commanders to form new state security services. Deals would have to be made with local gangsters who turned out to be relatively interchangeable. Tajik warlords, for example, could be 'bought out' by the new government whether they had fought for or against the government during the war. Rebels were not so much fighting over control of the state, but about who would be allowed to keep control of assets that could be used for extortion: militias, roadblocks, and territorially-based racketeering schemes. The deals that were made weren’t pretty, but they brought peace."

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26.08.2015

"Focusing on ISIS’ Sexual Violence Misses the Bigger Picture"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/08/26/focusing-on-isis-sexual-violence-misses-the-bigger-pictu
re/

Der westliche Fokus auf die "Theologie der Vergewaltigung" (New York Times) des "Islamischen Staates" übersehe, dass die gesamte arabische Welt von einer "Epidemie der sexuellen Gewalt" befallen sei, schreibt Ariel Ahram. "While IS has sought to shock Western sensibilities with its flagrant sexual violence, as Cohen, Wood, and Ragnhild Nordås find using cross-national statistical analysis, state forces often pose as great or greater a danger to many civilians. (...) For decades human rights organizations had documented routine patterns of sexual violence against prisoners and detainees throughout the Arab world. The use of sexual violence tended to intensify and expand when regimes faced immediate dangers. (...) Humanitarian agencies are just beginning to develop effective programs to rehabilitate victims and reintegrating them with their families and communities. These measures will never get the level of attention — or funding — that a military campaign against ISIS would get. Yet they may be far more impactful in helping the region as a whole recover from the disasters of sexual violence."

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17.08.2015

"The Biggest Threat to the Middle East Isn’t ISIL. It’s Civil Wars"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/08/17/the-biggest-threat-to-the-middle-east-isnt-isil-its-civi
l-wars/

Die Bürgerkriege im Nahen Osten stellen für Barbara F. Walter, Politikwissenschaftlerin an der University of California, eine größere Bedrohung amerikanischer Interessen in der Region dar als der "Islamische Staat". "First, civil wars reduce oil production. This might seem unimportant in a moment of low oil prices, but the current dip is likely to be temporary. (...) Second, civil wars make it easy for extremist groups to organize, operate and spread. (...) Third, civil wars bring hostile new governments to power. (...) Finally, civil wars tend to spread. Neighboring states often get dragged into civil wars either because they intervene to help rebels or because rebels take refuge on their territory."

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14.07.2015

"Putin, Propaganda, and the Path to Peace in Ukraine"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/07/14/putin-propaganda-and-the-path-to-peace-in-ukraine/

Rudra Sil, Politikwissenschaftler an der University of Pennsylvania, warnt davor, die schwierige politische Situation in der Ukraine allein auf die Effektivität der russischen Propaganda zurückzuführen. Die Kritik an Putins Strategie könne nur überzeugend sein, wenn auch die Rolle andere Faktoren ehrlich anerkannt werde. "Even if one were to agree that Russia bears more of the fault for the crisis than any other actor, it is necessary to consider what other actions served to intensify the crisis before demonizing Putin and making it impossible to strike a deal Russia can accept. In this regard, two points deserve closer consideration. First, although Russia’s propaganda machine may be exaggerating the role of fascists in the escalation of the Euro-Maidan protests, denying the activities and clout of ultra-right nationalists also stands in the way of a negotiated peace. (...) Second, and perhaps even more crucial, is the lack of any attention in the West to the composition of the interim government formed right after Yanukovich’s ouster. This government was made up entirely of politicians whose base of support lay in the western regions."

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29.04.2015

"Turkey’s Puzzling Response to the Armenian Genocide"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/04/29/turkeys-puzzling-response-to-the-armenian-genocide/

Jennifer M. Dixon versucht, die für viele nur schwer verständliche türkische Weigerung zu erklären, die Ermordung von 1,5 Millionen Armeniern durch das Osmanische Reich im Ersten Weltkrieg als "Genozid" anzuerkennen. Eine Änderung der offiziellen Position der türkischen Regierung sei allenfalls langfristig zu erwarten. "Officials have long worried that acknowledging the genocide could expose the state to demands for territory and compensation, and could undermine the legitimacy of the founding narrative and key political institutions in Turkey. (...) Concerns about national identity have further deepened the perceived costs of change. The heroic story of Turkey’s founding is premised on the silencing of the genocide and ethnic cleansing that immediately preceded its birth. (...) states’ narratives are 'sticky' institutions that change slowly. Thus, to have expected this anniversary to prompt significant changes in Turkey’s narrative, even for an event that is now one hundred years in the past, was unrealistic."

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06.04.2015

"Notes on the Conflict in Yemen: Local vs. Transnational Roots of Violence"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/04/06/notes-on-the-conflict-in-yemen-local-vs-transnational-ro
ots-of-violence/

Thomas Eilers analysiert die internen und regionalen Ursachen des aktuellen Konflikts in Jemen. "Yemen is mired in a civil war overshadowed by regional rivalries. On its face, the conflict appears to fit nicely into the regional power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran and is often spun as Sunni versus Shia, but the Yemeni conflict cannot be reduced to this. Instead the war is being fought by multiple factions including the Houthis, supporters of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, 'loyalists' of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, southerners seeking the creation of their own state, tribal fighters, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In Yemen, religious sects are prioritized after regionalism, tribalism, and political party affiliations but this has not prevented outside actors from using the deteriorating situation to their advantage."

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26.01.2015

"Yemen is Even More Dangerous Than We Think"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/01/26/yemen-is-even-more-dangerous-than-we-think/

Die gegenwärtige Krise in Jemen sei für die USA nicht nur wegen der dort aktiven Al-Qaida gefährlich, schreiben Barbara F. Walter und Kenneth M. Pollack. Jemen selbst sei von nur begrenzter strategischer Bedeutung, die Einmischung des benachbarten Saudi-Arabiens gefährde allerdings auch den engen Partner der USA. "The problem is that the Saudis continue to back what appears to be the weaker side in the Yemeni civil war – the Sunnis who have lost control of the Yemeni government to Shi’a Houthi forces. The greatest danger to American interests is that the Saudis will keep doubling down in Yemen and in so doing will overstrain themselves—politically, militarily and possibly even economically. The Kingdom cannot afford to get dragged deeper into a Yemeni quagmire it cannot stabilize on its own."

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08.12.2014

"Who is Doing What in Counter-ISIS Campaign?"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2014/12/08/who-is-doing-what-in-counter-isis-campaign/

Steve Saideman erläutert eine vom Atlantic Council veröffentlichte Grafik, in der die Beteiligung verschiedener Nationen an der Militärkampagne gegen den islamischen Staat aufgeschlüsselt worden ist. The US, unlike Libya, is doing the overwhelming majority of the strikes. "Is 63 non-US strikes divvied up by five Arab countries token or more than token? Hmm. Eight non-US countries have 126 strikes among them –15 or so per. It is certainly an allied effort as the Atlantic Council graphics depict, with other countries contributing money and training for the Kurds, Iraq, and even for some Syrian forces. But some notable omissions even in those less 'kinetic'/risky efforts: that Turkey has only given humanitarian aid, for instance."

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07.08.2014

"Why Are There No Nuclear Weapons in South America?"

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2014/08/07/why-are-there-no-nuclear-weapons-in-south-america/

Taylor Marvin erläutert, warum Lateinamerika trotz zahlreicher politischer Konflikte bis heute atomwaffenfrei geblieben ist. "(...) if several Latin American countries have the resources to develop nuclear weapons, and arguably at least some incentive to do so, why does the region remain nuclear weapons-free? The simplest answer is that nuclear weapons have gone out of style. (...) As the threat of major war has receded both around the world and in the region — which is partially due to US hegemony in Latin America, as Joe Young noted — the practical security gains from nuclear weapons have declined. (...) Beyond security, nuclear weapons are no longer seen as a path to international status."

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Informationsportal Krieg und Frieden

Wo gibt es Kriege und Gewaltkonflikte? Und wo herrscht am längsten Frieden? Welches Land gibt am meisten für Rüstung aus? Sicherheitspolitik.bpb.de liefert wichtige Daten und Fakten zu Krieg und Frieden.

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Dossier

Innerstaatliche Konflikte

Vom Kosovo nach Kolumbien, von Somalia nach Süd-Thailand: Weltweit schwelen über 280 politische Konflikte. Und immer wieder droht die Lage gewaltsam zu eskalieren.

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Zahlen und Fakten

Globalisierung

Kaum ein Thema wird so intensiv und kontrovers diskutiert wie die Globalisierung. "Zahlen und Fakten" liefert Grafiken, Texte und Tabellen zu einem der wichtigsten und vielschichtigsten Prozesse der Gegenwart.

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Publikationen zum Thema

Coverbild Internationale Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert

Internationale Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert

Die internationale Sicherheit ist fragil und bedroht. Wie können und müssen demokratische Systeme ...

Internationale Sicherheitspolitik Cover

Internationale Sicherheitspolitik

Seit Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts hat sich die internationale Sicherheitspolitik deutlich verändert....

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