Jana Kärgel (ed.)
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Radicalization, Departure, Return – Between Prevention and Intervention
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Today, in autumn 2018, calm has descended on the subject of departures for Syria. The so-called Islamic State (IS or ISIS) has lost most of its territory in Syria and Iraq and the number of young people who have left Germany to join it has stagnated at around one thousand. Much the same can be said of returnees from the Syrian war zone. About one departee in three has now returned to Germany and that number too is marking time.

Three years ago it was another matter entirely. It was a few weeks after the November 2015 Paris attacks. There were almost daily reports of young people who had left for Syria to join ISIS or other jihadist groups. At the same time there were frequent reports about returnees, young men and women, some maybe highly ideologized, others traumatized or disillusioned, who had rendered themselves liable for prosecution for travelling to a jihadist battle area. That made them a case for the security authorities, for prosecution and possibly for psychological counselling and advice on how to quit, but not for civic education – or maybe for civic education after all.

That was a question we at the Federal Agency for Civic Education’s Extremism department simply could not get out of our heads in those restless weeks (the Paris attacks were quickly followed by many others, including in Istanbul and Brussels). It began with the idea that when young people return from a jihadist war zone the impact would be much wider than just on them and the security authorities. They would sooner or later return to their everyday lives, to this society, and meet their families, former friends and acquaintances and other people. Many questions arise. How should parents behave when their child is back home? What about siblings and former friends? Can and should teachers simply integrate a female returnee into their class or would that be to risk her indoctrinating other students or them hailing her as a “heroine”? And how are the firms where these young people may have worked as apprentices to respond? Similar questions could well arise for youth centre, mosque community and sports club staff if an encounter of this kind were to arise or occurred. Who can help them? They might be assisted by a counselling centre, they may be in touch with the security authorities, and maybe a psychologist needs to be consulted to work with the returnee on what happened.
The longer we thought about it, the wider the immediate social environment extended that the return of a young person of this kind might affect. It affects people in Wolfsburg and Dinslaken just as it does people in Hamburg, Bonn, Berlin or Stuttgart. Security authority statistics indicate that there are more than three hundred localities to which young people have returned where the actors require wide-ranging support. It is not always a matter of direct dealings with the returnee, of ideological confrontation or theological debate. Many actors in the immediate social environment are totally unprepared and have very much more fundamental issues. They lack the detailed knowledge about radicalization processes, Salafist ideology, jihadism and much more that they need if they are to understand the returnee’s world, and this lack of knowledge leads straight to uncertainty about what to do.

Imparting knowledge, initiating opinion-forming processes, promoting political thinking and creating confidence and participation opportunities – are these not the very basics of civic education? Are returnees and their immediate social environment a subject for civic education after all?

We wanted to find out. In a one-day seminar we tried to learn from the experiences of experts, those who had already been dealing with returnees – from the neighbourhood youth worker and the prison chaplain to the teacher – and to draw out potential tasks for civic education. We succeeded. Imparting expertise on radicalization, Islamism, Salafism and prevention of extremism was identified as one of the central work areas – and a task that the various civic education providers have long performed by means of projects with young people, conferences, publications and training courses. The Federal Agency for Civic Education in particular might in the future, it was felt, take on the role of a “network moderator”. With its nationwide reach and open mind on the subject it is ideally suited for bringing together the entire range of actors involved and getting security authorities and social workers talking with one another, for example. In the final analysis, this publication is one of the seminar’s outcomes – to make the knowledge on the subject gained from different perspectives available to as many people as possible.

The seminar also showed us something else: that we should on no account narrow our vision to the problem of returnees simply because everyone happens to be talking about them. We must instead take a look back and arrive at the trivial but important realization that a returnee must have gone somewhere in the first place and that someone who is prepared to depart must previously have undergone a process of radicalization.
That must be our starting point because our profession’s core competence is communicating with young people, and those close to them, locally and directly with a wide range of civic education offers in the run-up to and at the beginning of a radicalization process of this kind.

Developments over the past year have borne out our decision not to concentrate solely on returnees. In Syria ISIS has been on the retreat for quite some time now and departee and returnee numbers have stagnated too. ISIS has long revised its strategy and now advises its supporters to stay in their own countries and carry out attacks locally at low cost and to great effect using, say, kitchen knives or motor vehicles. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees raises new issues and poses new challenges such as fears that they might include ISIS supporters sent to Germany on a “mission”. Volunteer and full-time refugee helpers are therefore uncertain. How can they recognize whether one of their “protégés” is showing signs of being radicalized? And what are they then to do?

The situation today may not be the same as it was three years ago, but the questions are no less pressing. The high demand for knowledge, practical experience and networking at federal and state government level led to the establishment of the “Infodienst Radikalisierungsprävention”, another mainstay of our work in this field. It is an online information service that consists of a website with expert materials (some of which are part of this volume), a database, a media library and material for practical pedagogical use, plus a regular newsletter in which we take up current debates and issues. For only those who know what is going on in the scene, where the attraction of Salafist appeals to young people lies, and have understood what young people are looking for, can offer credible alternatives for young people at risk of radicalization. Civic education thus has a fundamental function to perform in the prevention of radicalization and extremism: that of strengthening by means of information and by the sensitization of those who work with young people at risk of radicalization.

This volume is based mainly on the seminar and the “Infodienst Radikalisierungsprävention”. It aims to impart basic knowledge and to present successful approaches from prevention practice. In the hope that we can learn from mistakes it does not shy away from discussing failed projects and pitfalls of prevention work. It also performs the above-mentioned function of “network moderator” by succeeding in giving a broad spectrum of prevention and intervention actors a chance to speak. So it is not least the result of a learning process that we as a department have been through over the past three years.
We know that nobody is radicalized in total isolation. We are all surrounded by a social environment that moulds and influences us: family, friends, school, leisure activities and maybe mosque, counselling centre or prison. All of these are social environments and systems that can be of importance in the course of radicalization and must therefore be involved in dealing with the subject.

We have internalized the fact that radicalization prevention (understood as a bundle of measures that can include prevention, intervention and exit work) is a macrosocial task in which numerous actors are involved: from family members and teachers to street workers and exit counsellors.

We have found that this task is one for the whole of society and that this is more than just an empty phrase. None of the actors involved can prevent, interrupt or reverse radicalization on their own. The success of any such measure depends on the interaction of individual actors who keep each other informed, share information, support each other and act in concert. It is important to be aware of one’s limits and to respect the work of others. Successful action presupposes clear and unambiguous clarification of the different actors’ roles.

We have understood that civic education can also have a role to play. It can bring the actors together and enable them to share information. It can keep an eye on the “big picture” and recruit new partners in order to promote the widest possible understanding of radicalization and prevention. It can provide information that helps to understand the complexities of the subject, to form an opinion and to attain competence. It can promote dialogue between research and practice and create transfer opportunities. It can devise advanced training offers and help develop quality standards. It can develop prevention projects independently or with cooperation partners or support them financially and thereby help safeguard sustainability – to name just a few examples.

Civic education can thereby make its own contribution to what we see as a task for the whole of society: that of joint action against radicalization, extremism and terrorism. Preventing, interrupting and reversing radicalization of any kind should be our common concern, and with this volume we would like not least to make a contribution toward doing so.
Eyes alert, Christian L. looks at the camera. An ISIS flag hangs behind him. Alongside it on the wall a propaganda video flickers. “And that’s it, my story, how I accepted Islam and took up the path of a mujahed [fighter],”¹ he says pointing to the video running in the background. This scene is the final sequence of a propaganda video the twenty-eight-year-old convert to Islam made for the so-called Islamic State (IS or ISIS) at the end of 2016. In it he outlines his way to the caliphate: the search for meaning – realization – purification – decision – planning – departure – arrival – everyday life. It is the course of his radicalization.

The beginning of a radicalization of this kind is seldom spectacular. Like many others, Christian L. was a normal teenager. “He played computer games, loved playing football and often travelled to Spain and Italy in the summer to surf,”² according to the Erasmus Monitor blog, which monitors the German Salafist and jihadist scene. It goes on to say that “at school he was a student representative and was considered to be well-read and intelligent”³. In 2009 he fell seriously ill. It was, he says, a time when he set out to find God and promised to devote himself to him if He allowed him to survive. Christian L. survived and did not forget his promise. He began to study the monotheistic religions but was not convinced by Christianity and Judaism, he recalls. In 2012 he converted to Islam.

The propaganda video shows him studying the Quran and various books about Islam. The deeper he delved, the more he came to feel he must depart. Why? He was looking for somewhere he could lead a life that was pleasing to God, he recalls in the video. Many countries in the Middle East to which he might have emigrated disappointed him. They did business with “the West” and disowned their mujaheddin (fighters). The only option left to him was the caliphate that ISIS had proclaimed at the end of June 2014 in parts of Syrian and Iraqi territory. At the beginning of August 2015 he and his wife left Germany for Syria.

Having arrived in Syria, Christian L. looks relaxed. It is the first time that the propaganda video shows him from the front and his face can be seen. He seems literally to have “arrived”. The camera follows him around a town in Syria. Proudly he explains that he now lives in a country where sharia law

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¹ mujahed
² Erasmus Monitor blog
³ well-read and intelligent
applies – and is shown giving a punishment whipping. He feels he is in the right place and asks no critical questions. Neither his own acts of violence nor the many public executions, stonings, beheadings, attacks, rapes and daily humiliations by which ISIS seeks to defend its tyrannical reign are a problem for him. He is looking for clarity, and life in the “caliphate” offers him precisely that: a clear image of “the enemy”, strict rules, regulated procedures.

Abide by the rules and you can live a good life here, Christian L. implies in the video. Can? No, must. It is “the true Islamic state, the hijra [departure] to it: living here and supporting it is the duty of every Muslim”. Promises increasingly turn into obligations: perform the hijra, lead a life that is pleasing to God and defend the front lines of the caliphate – like a prayer wheel Christian L. repeats the duties of a “good” Muslim so that they will stick in the minds of people who watch his video. But he always does so with a happy, relaxed look on his face as if to suggest that he has finally found what he had sought for so long.

The film, nearly nine minutes long, ends with an appeal. Those who are unable to head for the caliphate themselves should adopt as a role model the brothers “in Germany, in France, in Brussels and in Orlando who have testified to their iman [belief] by their deeds”. Christian L. has long become part of a cruel system: he has internalized the ideology, since he is fighting for ISIS and he may even be killing for it. What had previously been a young man’s ethereal quest for clarity in his personal life is now, in this final sequence, a clear appeal to all Muslims to resort to violence and attacks in the West. It testifies at the same time to a process of radicalization that has reached a new quality with the acceptance and exercise of violence.

In August 2017 it was reported that Christian L. had died in fighting with Syrian government forces.4

Radicalization Research and Current Debates

Christian L.’s story is a tale of seeking and finding of the kind that ISIS has frequently told in its highly professional propaganda videos and one that is well known from the records of what returnees from Syria have said. They are tales, told by young people, that show frequent parallels. They are about upheavals and crises in their biographies, the quest for meaning, experiences of exclusion, role models and expectations, self-realization and self-efficacy – and all in a world that has no simple answers to these problems and questions. They are the pattern of a radicalization that is the same as or similar to hundreds of others.
Are these, then, the reasons why young people today are radicalized and join ISIS or similar groups? If it were that simple, no think tanks and institutes would be set up to carry out research into radicalization processes and no special research programmes would be established and additional funding provided. The fact is that the reality is much more complicated. It can be a search for meaning, escaping from their old lives, a desire for adventure, an experience of community and belonging, a boost to identity, a fascination with violence. It can be a deliberate orientation process or occur gradually and almost unnoticed. One can be a passive supporter or play an active role. In short, every case is different, yet they all have certain similarities. That is probably one of the central findings of the security authorities, academics and practitioners in radicalization prevention and distancing work who have contributed to this volume. It may seem sobering and trivial, but it is essential: radicalization processes, whose very definition is contested, whose beginning and end cannot be specified precisely, may have much in common – yet a hundred different cases will have at least as many sets of causes.

One of the central debates in radicalization research, which is also a search for motives and causes, is being conducted in France, where the positions of renowned scholars Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel appear to be irreconcilably opposed. Kepel’s approach is often summarized as the “radicalization of Islam”. In other words, one of the most radical interpretations of Islam – Salafism and the attraction of its simple answers, clear rules and black-and-white thinking – is largely responsible for promoting radicalization processes in young people. He thus ascribes to religion an important role in orientation processes. Roy, in contrast, advocates the “Islamization of radicality” thesis to describe the radicalization of young people in recent years. By this he means that the religious factor is not what drives radicalization processes; they are more of a youth culture phenomenon involving a radical break with society. Islam and its fundamentalist interpretation are merely a backdrop against which this radical break takes place. It could just as easily be an extreme right-wing ideology against which the break occurs.

While Roy is repeatedly accused of underestimating the role of religion and ideology, Kepel is said not to attach sufficient importance to specific youth and subculture aspects such as rifts between generations, youth rebellion and nihilism. The truth probably lies somewhere between the two.

Regardless whether or not one assigns great importance to religion and ideology, it seems to be clear what many young people engaged in departure and orientation processes of this kind are looking for: cognitive security and certainty. They want clarity, clear rules and requirements, in
order to reduce the world’s increasing complexity. Once they reach this state of inner closure by means of progressive radicalization there is little or no going back. “They have no Plan B.” The title of this book, which goes back to a statement by Olivier Roy, says it all. Nobody travels to a jihadist combat zone thinking: “If it doesn’t work out here I can always go back to my old life in Germany.” So a return cannot be interpreted as a “Plan B”. Most returnees are disillusioned and traumatized, with nowhere else to go now that their dream of life in the caliphate has been shattered.

No way out? Prevention, Intervention and Distancing as a Possible “Plan B”

In Germany returnees are observed with concern. We do not know why they have returned. Are they traumatized? Do they regret their decision to depart? Or are they “sleepers” sent back with orders to follow?

The rejection and mistrust they encounter are correspondingly serious. In the discussions on social media – a place to which many of our societal debates have moved in recent years – demands are either to “deport them all” or for “the full force of the law” to be brought to bear on “this pack of terrorists”, including “the death penalty for beheaders”. One need not necessarily share the tone, but there is an important question at the heart of these discussions. Why should we bother with people who have made a (conscious) decision to commit crimes, be it by joining a terrorist organization, ISIS, or by supporting it in other ways?

To put it bluntly, one could also ask why the perpetrators seem to interest us more than the victims. From the perspective of preventing radicalization the answer must be to prevent there being future victims. It is, of course, right and important to suitably punish those who have committed offences in connection with their radicalization, imposing prison sentences if necessary. But it is no less important not to abandon them. Hatred of the society by which they previously felt rejected and which now takes a hostile view of them, memories and traumas from the Syrian battle zone that could cause long-term psychological harm if not treated professionally and the emptiness that the shattered dream of the caliphate has left behind are only some of the factors that, if they are not dealt with, have the potential to prompt these young people to commit tomorrow’s attacks.

In reality, however, returnees are only a small proportion of the people in the focus of radicalization prevention. The addressees of prevention are much more often young people who are believed to have shown first
signs of radicalization or have already made contact with the radical Islamist scene. That is why the basic idea behind a holistic approach to preventing radicalization is to prevent, interrupt or reverse radicalization of any kind, regardless of whether the addressees are still right at the beginning of a radicalization process or are returnees from Syria.

Prevention, intervention and distancing or deradicalization work as understood here are thus tasked with giving young people (back) the “Plan B” mentioned above. That means offering them alternatives to their previous life plans, breaking through the pattern of thinking solely in terms of black and white and structuring the world as either “good” or “bad,” as “friend” or “foe”, and making grey areas and nuances visible. Young people need to be helped to come to terms with ambiguities and uncertainties. Radicalization prevention of this kind is aimed at making young people think for themselves (again), at making them stop and think.

To achieve this objective, (radicalization) prevention is pursued on three different levels using a classical funnel model. A distinction is drawn between primary or universal prevention, secondary or selective prevention, and tertiary or indicated prevention, although the bounds are sometimes fluid. Primary prevention is widely defined, openly designed and can be aimed at a wide range of target groups because it “seeks primarily not to prevent but to strengthen existing desirable attitudes and is aimed at stabilizing young people’s living conditions”.$^8$ Secondary prevention is more specific and kicks in when young people show first signs of problems or are seen as being exposed to certain risk factors. Preventive measures can be direct (for the young people themselves) or indirect (for their immediate social environment, such as their parents) and are customized for the respective target group. Tertiary prevention is aimed at young people “in manifest problem situations”.$^9$ who are already deeply involved in the Islamist scene, seeking to turn them away from the scene with the aid of direct and/or indirect prevention measures.

At this point the line between intervention and distancing/deradicalization begins to blur because it is no longer a matter of prevention but of interruption (intervention if, for instance, departure is imminent) or reversal (distancing or deradicalization of, say, returnees who want to quit the scene) of radicalization processes. What all measures seek to accomplish, however, be they prevention, intervention, distancing or deradicalization is to offer young people the option of a “Plan B”. Once equipped with a “Plan B,” or so a holistic understanding of prevention would hope, they no longer pose a threat to our society. This is a concept from which we all can benefit – if it works.
About This Book

As the reference to different levels of prevention already indicates, preventing radicalization is not a field of work for loners. A holistic approach to prevention requires everyone of influence in a young person’s immediate social environment to be involved. Enabling actors from the many different disciplines of radicalization prevention to have their say and thereby mapping the breadth of approaches, difficulties and unresolved issues is the strength of this volume – and one of its greatest challenges. Social workers and security officers talk differently, have different priorities and in connection with radicalization processes they are interested in different questions to which they find even more different answers. That is why we chose from the outset not to give the authors a prescribed terminology – simply because that would not have done justice to the complexity of the subject matter and the spectrum of disciplines involved. Many of them stated cogent reasons why they refer to neo-Salafism rather than to Salafism, to anti-democratic and violent Islamism rather than just to Islamism, to Daesh rather than to the so-called Islamic State, to processes of orientation rather than to processes of radicalization and to distancing rather than to deradicalization. All of these terms have their justification in certain contexts, or so it seems: the debates on concepts shape the research and work of radicalization prevention and testify to its dynamism. And that process is nowhere near completion – which a glossary or fixed terminology might erroneously have suggested.

This book seeks not only to cover the full breadth of disciplines involved in preventing radicalization, but also to bring many disparate elements together:

For one, it aims to provide basic knowledge about violent Islamism and facilitate an understanding of radicalization (Part I) and to do so by:

• Tracing the complicated process from radicalization via departure to return and the “life thereafter” by means of a very personal story (Britta von der Heide);
• Presenting current developments and trends, especially in Germany (Holger Münch);
• Providing a definition of the concept of radicalization and outlining its complexity without disputing its analytical value (Peter Neumann);
• Debunking myths such as “those who watch propaganda videos on the Internet will be radicalized in next to no time” without trivializing the Internet’s influence (Patrick Frankenberger);
• Telling us more about what life is like in the jihadist war zone to enable us to understand those who later return to Germany (Behnam Said);
• Enabling us to visualize the difficulties faced by the immediate social environment, law enforcement authorities and reintegration measures when young people return from jihadist war zones (Gerwin Moldenhauer);
• The authors hold a mirror up to remind those of us who may work for the security authorities, in prevention or distancing practice, or in academia that we must integrate our activities and findings much better if we are to arrive at a holistic understanding of radicalization and violent Islamism – keyword research-practice transfer (Janusz Biene and Julian Junk).

This volume also aims to take a wider look beyond the German horizon and include perspectives from other European countries (Part II): How is Belgium dealing with departures for Syria or Iraq, given that it is the western European country with the highest ratio of departees to overall population? What approaches are there at the local authority level to call a halt to this trend? (interview with Hans Bonte and Jessika Soors). To what extent have prevention endeavours become established, institutionalized or changed in the UK, which has had a national prevention strategy for over a decade? How is it that well-meant prevention measures can change into the opposite and lead to stigmatization? (Paul Thomas). How does prevention function in a centrally organized state like France and how can we learn from our mistakes, such as projects that failed? (Farhad Khosrokhavar). How is it that a country like Denmark, which has so far been mostly spared large-scale attacks and presumably would not be in urgent need of action on radicalization, developed a prevention model long ago, the Aarhus Model, that has caught on all over Europe? (Preben Bertelsen).

Finally, this book takes up the demand for prevention as a task for society as a whole and attempts to do justice to this aspiration too by allowing a broad spectrum of experts in practical prevention and intervention to describe their experiences and approaches (Part III of this book). Before taking this step, however, we undertake a thorough appraisal of the field of radicalization prevention. Who has been doing what since when and which difficulties have been observed? (Katja Schau, Joachim Langner, Michaela Glaser and Carmen Figlestahler) With so much current “hype” about Islamism prevention and deradicalization must we not ask whether we have been there before? Must we really reinvent the wheel or can certain approaches be taken over from prevention and distancing work on right-wing extremism and applied to the Islamist-Salafist spectrum too? (Michaela Glaser.)
Zooming in from the “big picture” to the details, the third part is characterized by a differentiation between the immediate social environment of the young person – whether at risk of radicalization, about to depart or already returned – and the question of who has dealings with this young person (or might potentially have) and who might work on radicalization with him or her? Family members, for example. Since the attacks on the offices of the French satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* in January 2015 by the brothers Chérif and Saïd Kouachi it has been clear that family ties can be crucial in creating radicalization processes. This finding was confirmed by the August 2017 attacks in and around Barcelona in which two brothers and their cousins were involved. At the same time we know from field reports that parents, especially mothers, are often the last link with the »old« life. Counselling services have long been aware of this special role played by family members but also take many other potential target groups such as young and traumatized refugees into consideration and are constantly adding to their portfolio (interview with Claudia Dantschke and article by André Taubert and Christian Hantel).

Recalling the above-mentioned attacks or many others in recent years – be they in Brussels, Paris, Manchester, Berlin or Istanbul – one visualizes young male Islamist perpetrators of violence. But according to the security authorities 20 per cent of the departees for Syria or Iraq were women\(^\text{10}\) such as the sixteen-year-old Linda W., who was detained in Iraq in July 2017. Radicalized young women do not always leave for the Middle East; some simply follow an appeal for local violence (as made by Christian L. in his video). In February 2016 at the tender age of fifteen, Safia S., for example, tried to kill a police officer at Hannover central railway station with a knife. Along with the central question of what fascinates girls and women about radical Islamist ideology – an ideology that subordinates women and propagates life in accordance with strict rules and laws – we must clarify the extent to which prevention must be (or maybe already is) gender-sensitive in order to be able to work on the orientation motives of young women (Silke Baer).

Another seemingly trivial yet important finding that many experts have noted in this book follows from the question: Where are young people always to be found? The answer: in the social environment of school. Civil society organizations can, for example, develop approaches for use in project days at schools. They can be about strengthening social work at school or the prevention potential of Islamic religious instruction and civic education. Bringing together the different school and extracurricular actors can be a topic or, specifically, how to hold discussions with radicalized students (articles by Michael Kiefer, Götz Nordbruch and Kurt Edler and the dis-
So school and the actors in and around it have a firm place in the prevention of radicalization. But where are young people to be found after school? Are they out and about in their neighbourhood, at a youth centre or a sports club? Anything is possible and that is why Dinslaken (known as the home of the so-called “Lohberg Brigade” who headed to Syria) has a youth neighbourhood management that keeps an eye on young people in Dinslaken-Lohberg, maintains close ties with sports clubs and the local Muslim community, and offers young people services such as job application coaching as alternatives to withdrawal into seclusion (Önay Duranöz). Networking is the keyword that also best describes the approach adopted by the city of Augsburg. At the local authority level everybody who is affected by the subject in their daily work meets regularly – a good example of how the idea of preventing radicalization can actually be implemented on a day-to-day basis as a task for society as a whole (Diana Schubert). In Augsburg, as in Dinslaken, there is also a focus on involving mosques and Muslim communities in the prevention of radicalization: a worthwhile approach? Mosques and Muslim communities certainly have potential in this field of work and could in the future develop offers for and with young people, always assuming that they professionalize their approach and are funded accordingly (Samy Charchira).

A similarly significant potential is regularly attested to facilities in prison. Rather than sensitizing with preventive measures, provoking or pointing out errors, in the prison context it is often mainly a matter of listening. Listening plays a large part in pastoral work of the kind offered in prison for people of different religions. Young people who are seldom allowed to receive visitors are delighted to be able to talk with an imam. He in turn can keep an eye on their development and take counter-measures as required. But like mosques and Muslim communities, many pastoral services suffer from a lack of sound professional and financial foundations for their work (Husamuddin Meyer). And once a person has served their prison sentence, what next? How are (erstwhile) radicals to be reintegrated in society? Can someone be “deradicalized” or is that just an illusion? And if it is possible, what does it mean? Have they merely forsworn violence, or also distanced themselves ideologically? (Thomas Mücke).

The diversity of the articles in this book demonstrates yet again that this broad spectrum of actors and disciplines is precisely what radicalization prevention needs because nobody can do everything on their own (nor should they try). Radicalization processes occur in many different places in
the midst of our society and are thus a matter for all of us. They should be met with a response from the whole of society. And prevention never takes place at just one location such as the counselling centre; it also takes place at school, the sports club, in the street, at the mosque or youth centre – or indeed in prison. Bringing all relevant actors together and constantly sharing news and views are the nucleus of a radicalization prevention that, if it is successful, acknowledges everyone’s responsibility and from which we in society as a whole can only benefit.

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Notes

1 For this and the following quotations from Christian L. see *The Islamic State: From Darkness to Light – Wilāyat al-Furāt*, video, 8:40 minutes, 2 September 2016, http://jihadology.net/category/countries/germany/(accessed 9 September 2017).


3 Ibid.


9 Ibid. p. 114.