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4.2 US-Außenpolitik
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http://harpers.org/archive/2010/03/hbc-
90006695
Scott Horton hat Rechtsprofessor Michael Scharf, Autor des
Buches "Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis",
gefragt, ob internationales Recht in der US-Außenpolitik
als gesetzlich verbindlich behandelt werde. "(...) our
research was based on a series of meetings with the ten
living former State Department legal advisers, from the
Carter, Reagan, elder Bush, Clinton, and Bush
Administrations. The legal advisers provided remarkably
candid accounts of the role international law actually
played in behind-the-scenes deliberations on foreign policy
during the major crises that occurred during their tenure." |
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http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?art
icle=no_need_to_sacrifice
Matthew Yglesias stellt das Buch "Arsenal of Democracy: The
Politics of National Security - From World War II to the
War on Terrorism" von Julian E. Zelizer vor, der sich mit
der amerikanischen Sicherheitspolitik der letzten
Jahrzehnte beschäftigt hat. "(...) under George W. Bush the
long-festering conservative alternative to Truman's liberal
internationalist consensus finally got a full airing.
Zelizer convincingly makes the case that though the rise of
neoconservatives (...) was an interesting sociological
development, there was nothing particularly 'neo' about
Bush's foreign policy. A paranoid, belligerent nationalism
(what Zelizer politely terms 'conservative
internationalism') had long been a mainstay of the
conservative movement, and the Bush doctrine outlined in
the 2002 National Security Strategy 'tapped into ideas
about regime change that were common in conservative
circles since World War II.'" |
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2
010/03/11/what_the_neocons_got_right
Steven A. Cook verweist auf einige außenpolitische Erfolge
der heute weitgehend diskreditierten neokonservativen
Bewegung hin, die unter US-Präsident Bush großen Einfluss
auf die US-Außenpolitik hatte. "So what did the neocons
get right? Syria, Iran, and democracy. (...) Needless to say,
Washington's position in the Middle East was far worse
after the ascendance of the neoconservatives during the
Bush years. The region was further from peace, stability,
and prosperity than when they found it in early 2001.
Still, the neocons' perspective on the nature of the Syrian
and Iranian regimes were largely accurate, and their
forceful advocacy of democracy and freedom in the Middle
East may have grated on many, but it did much to advance
those causes in a region once described as 'democracy's
desert.'" |
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2
010/03/10/how_to_win_the_war_of_ideas
James K. Glassman, früherer Mitarbeiter von George W.
Bush, gibt US-Präsidenten Obama einige Ratschläge für
den "Krieg der Ideen" in der muslimischen Welt. "Public
diplomacy needs to be sharp, not flaccid. It needs to focus
on key foreign-policy problems, not merely on vague, feel-
good improvements in the far-off future. It needs to be
primarily an activity of national security, not of public
relations. It needs to be mobilized and sent into battle to
win the ideological conflicts of our time. When I served as
undersecretary of state for public diplomacy, we tried to
achieve our war-of-ideas goals in two ways: first, by
pushing back and undermining the ideology behind violent
extremism while at the same time explaining and advocating
free alternatives and, second, by diverting young people
from following a path that leads to violent extremism." |
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http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/09/opini
on/09iht-edcohen.html
Roger Cohen glaubt nicht, dass US-Präsident Obama zu den
Transatlantikern alten Schlages gezählt werden könne. Die
ersten Monate seiner Präsidentschaft seien für Europa in
dieser Hinsicht ein "Schock" gewesen. "In fact, Obama is a
pure pragmatist. He wants Europe's help, particularly in
Afghanistan, but he has no misty-eyed vision of Atlanticism
and sees more pressing strategic priorities in China,
India, the Middle East and Russia. He is transitioning the
United States to the post-Western world, which is another
way of saying he is adapting America to a world in which
its relative power is eroding." |
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http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/0,15
18,682342,00.html
"Spiegel-Online" berichtet über das Vorhaben der USA,
Unrechtsregime mittels Chats und Fotos unter Druck zu
setzen. "Offenbar um Demokratiebewegungen in
Unterdrückungsregimes zu unterstützen, will das US-
Finanzministerium Exportbeschränkungen für
Internetdienste wie Instant Messaging, Chat- und
Fotoportale aufheben. Profitieren sollen davon laut 'New
York Times' Bürger in Staaten wie Iran, Kuba und Sudan,
für die in den USA Handelsbeschränkungen gelten." |
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http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opi
nion/2010/0304/The-Obama-bid-to-rid-the
-world-of-nuclear-weapons-boosts-US-sec
urity-minus-the-threat-of-Armageddon
Robert Dujarric vom "Institute of Contemporary Asian
Studies" an der "Temple University" verteidigt Barack
Obamas Vision einer atomwaffenfreien Welt. Die
Machtposition der USA würde ohne Atomwaffen erheblich
gestärkt. "A nonnuclear environment will favor the
technologically advanced, since postnuclear systems are
more sophisticated. As the country with the largest
military- industrial complex, the US would benefit the most
from the transition to a postnuclear world. Mr. Obama's
detractors say this push to rid the world of nuclear
weapons is dangerous, or a product of a lofty attitude. The
Nobel Peace Prize Committee says this is a noble goal. But
it's much more probable that Obama sees just how much more
powerful the US can be with a nonnuclear sword held over
its enemies' heads." |
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http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/
wrm/2010/03/03/thinking-the-unthinkable
-war-with-iran/
Walter Russel Mead spricht sich dagegen aus, einen
Militärschlag gegen den Iran kategorisch auszuschliessen.
Eine subtile Drohkulisse sei notwendig, um Angriffe gegen
US-Truppen auszuschliessen. "The Obama administration quite
rightly does not want a war with Iran and it does not want
to contribute unnecessarily to a crisis atmosphere. I don't
think Washington should rattle its saber and issue
hotheaded threats; that hasn't worked in the past and
there's no reason to think it will now. But there are cool
and quiet ways of communicating a truth that for their own
sakes as well as ours the Iranian leaders must never
forget: that an attack on the forces of the United States
would be an act of suicidal folly. But we should not be so
polite and so low key that they miss the main point." |
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2
010/03/03/bipartisan_spring
Robert Kagan stellt fest, dass sich in Washington trotz der
erbitterten innenpolitischen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen
Demokraten und Republikanern ein neuer aussenpolitischer
Konsens herausbilde. "On Iran, differences are rapidly
narrowing now that engagement is giving way to pressure.
Republicans may complain, along with many Democrats, that
the administration has been too slow to support the Iranian
opposition and took too long to pivot to sanctions. Yet
some also realize that Obama's prolonged effort at
engagement accomplished what George W. Bush never could:
convincing most of the world, and most Democrats, that Iran
is uninterested in any deal that threatens its nuclear
weapons program." |
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http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2
010/0303/Admiral-Mullen-foreign-policy-
is-too-dominated-by-the-military
Admiral Mike Mullen, Vorsitzender der "Joint Chiefs of
Staff", hat beklagt, dass die amerikanische Aussenpolitik
zu stark vom militärischen Denken dominiert werde. "Adm.
Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said
Wednesday evening that there are limits to American
military power and diplomatic efforts must be just as
important if not more so. But despite recognition of this,
the military has become the default for American foreign
policy. 'It's one thing to be able and willing to serve as
emergency responders, quite another to always have to be
the fire chief,' Mullen said in prepared remarks at Kansas
State University." |
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2
010/03/01/partners_in_decline
Daniel Korski widerspricht der gegenwärtigen Europa-Kritik
in Washington und meint, dass die USA und Europa trotz
aller Probleme immer noch die besten Partner füreinander
seien. "Yes, they have similar traditions, share values,
and have a long history of cooperation behind them. But
most importantly, they are on the same side of today's
geopolitical dividing line: Both are declining powers." |
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19. März 2010
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