US-Soldaten in Afghanistan

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13.05.2020

"Pandemics Go Hand in Hand with Conspiracy Theories"

https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/pandemics-go-hand-in-hand-with-conspiracy-theories

Frederick Kaufman erinnert daran, dass Pandemien in der amerikanischen Geschichte immer mit der Popularisierung von Verschwörungstheorien verbunden gewesen seien. "When medical systems fail, so do logic and reason, clearing a path for contagions of fear and blame. The Illuminati panic, exploding in a country battered by a covert enemy, which experts could neither explain nor contain, brought to the fore a theme that historians would later call the 'paranoid style' of American politics. It endures, from Pizzagate to the Deep State to Fake News, and presently flourishes amid the chaos brought on by covid-19. (…) Out of work, out of sorts, and armed with nothing but digital media in the struggle against seas of uncertainty, solitary thinkers have time to imagine all sorts of scenarios. Distrust accrues in quarantine, perhaps for good reason: our most intimate home — our metabolism — has turned into a potential subversive. Our own bodies can betray us, unknowingly becoming the sources of contagion. America had to wait until 1901 for an Army physician named Walter Reed to demonstrate that yellow fever came from a mosquito bite, and a vaccine did not appear until 1937. Medicine remains a battle against the unknown — and fertile ground for writers of all stripes to infect readers with fear."

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08.05.2020

"Can the Middle East Recover from the Coronavirus and Collapsing Oil Prices?"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/can-the-middle-east-recover-from-the-coronavirus-and-collap
sing-oil-prices

Die Coronakrise und die fallenden Ölpreise hätten den Nahen Osten schwer erschüttert, schreibt Robin Wright. "The twin crises of sickness and sliding oil prices coincided with rumbling instability: three ongoing civil wars — lasting for five years in Yemen, six years in Libya, and nine years in Syria — plus months of deadly protests in Iraq; the implosion of Lebanon’s monetary system; the third Israeli election in a year; the presence of millions of refugees and displaced people in rudimentary camps in Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon; and the resurgence of suicide attacks and assassinations by isis. With the exception of Israel, most Middle Eastern countries don’t have the medical staff, hospitals, and equipment necessary to provide adequate care during a pandemic, nor the financial resources to bail out their economies. The crises have set the stage for the Middle East to become even more volatile. (…) If leaders were wise, Salem posited, they could cut back on defense spending, end direct or indirect involvement in wars, and focus instead on issues of health and public welfare. The waves of protests before the pandemic proved the Middle East is indeed ripe — even overripe — for change. But given the region’s long history of dictators, warlords, militias, and corrupt élites, prospects seem dim. And that does not bode well for the Middle East’s post-pandemic future."

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17.04.2020

"Seoul’s Radical Experiment in Digital Contact Tracing"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/seouls-radical-experiment-in-digital-contact-tracing

Max S. Kim stellt in dieser Reportage aus Seoul das "radikale" digitale Überwachungsprogramm vor, mit dem die südkoreanische Regierung die Ausbreitung von COVID-19 eindämmen möchte. "When a patient tests positive here, Kim’s team retraces their movements based on their oral testimony, and then combs through relevant C.C.T.V. footage in order to locate others who might have been exposed. Restaurants, where people must take their masks off to eat, are the most common sites of exposure. (…) Behind this model of contact tracing is a vast surveillance apparatus expressly designed for such outbreak scenarios. Under South Korea’s Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, health authorities, with the approval of the police and other supervising agencies, can make use of cell-phone G.P.S. data, credit-card payment information, and travel and medical records. (…) Although some had anticipated a backlash to such sweeping electronic surveillance, public outrage has been nearly nonexistent. According to Kim Min-ho, a law professor and one of the country’s human-rights commissioners, this is because these measures can be used only in the context of disease outbreaks, making it impossible for them to be co-opted for, say, anti-terrorism campaigns."

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09.03.2020

"Dressing for the Surveillance Age"

http://https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/03/16/dressing-for-the-surveillance-age

John Seabrook hat für seine Reportage Experten besucht, die auf die allgegenwärtigen Überwachungskameras in großen Städten mit der Entwicklung von "stealth streetwear" zum Schutz der Anonymität im öffentlichen Raum reagieren wollen. "When you come from a small town, as I do, where everyone knows your face, public anonymity — the ability to disappear into a crowd — is one of the great pleasures of city living. As cities become surveillance centers, packed with cameras that always see, public anonymity could vanish. Is there anything fashion can do?"

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02.03.2020

"Coronavirus Is Causing Panic but Not Lawlessness"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-coronavirus-is-causing-a-global-panic-but-thats-a-good-
thing

Die gesellschaftliche Reaktion auf die schnelle und scheinbar unaufhaltsame Ausbreitung des Coronavirus werde von zunehmender "Panik", aber nicht von einem Zusammenbruch der öffentlichen Ordnung begleitet, stellt Robin Wright fest. "Baruch Fischhoff, a psychologist at Carnegie Mellon University and a former president of the Society for Risk Analysis, said that panic comes in three forms, only one of which applies to the range of reactions to the coronavirus crisis. The most basic form is feeling panicky, which most people feel at some time, Fischhoff said. It’s bad for quality of life, but it’s not associated with specific behavior; most people feel it at some point but don’t act on it. The second type of panic is allowing stress to overcome normal, reasoned responses. But it, too, is fairly rare, research shows. Most people don’t lose control of themselves. 'The idea of mass panic — people running in the streets and abandoning normal behavior — is the myth of panic,' Fischhoff said. 'That’s the kind of panic you see more in movies than in everyday life. In fact, most people band together.' (…) The third kind of panic is the type witnessed — among people in widely diverse societies — since the outbreak of the coronavirus. It includes panic buying and hoarding. (…) panic buying also reflects a lack of faith in government. 'If you don’t believe that the people whose job it is — whether elected or appointed — to manage a crisis or take care of everyone in a difficult situation, then you think it’s everyone for themselves,' Fischhoff said. That behavior may be ill-informed, but it’s still a reasoned response."

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03.02.2020

"Qassem Suleimani and how nations decide to Kill"

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/02/10/qassem-suleimani-and-how-nations-decide-to-kill

Adam Entous und Evan Osnos haben sich in ihrem Essay mit den Hintergründen der gezielten Tötung des iranischen Generals Suleimani im Kontext der langen Geschichte staatlicher Attentate beschäftigt. "As a tool of statecraft, assassination has had a fluctuating reputation. In contrast to plainly political murders — from Caesar to Lincoln to Trotsky — killing a person in the name of national defense rests on a moral and strategic case. (…) In the twentieth century, however, nation-states embraced lethal operations. During the Second World War, British spies trained Czechoslovakian agents to kill the Nazi general Reinhard Heydrich, and many governments — Soviet, British, and American among them — plotted, in vain, to kill Adolf Hitler. (…) the terrorist attacks of September 11th inaugurated a new phase in America’s relationship with lethal action, as President Bush permitted the use of unmanned drones, raids by commandos, and cruise-missile strikes far outside recognized war zones. (…) By the end of Obama’s second term, after fifteen years of drone attacks, Americans no longer paid much attention to them. In polls, a large majority of Americans say they support targeted killings; in most other countries, the majority is firmly against them. According to the New America Foundation, in the past three years Trump has launched at least two hundred and sixty-two attacks: an increase, on an annual basis, of twenty per cent."

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26.01.2020

"Netanyahu, Putin, and the Politics of Memory at the World Holocaust Forum"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/netanyahu-putin-and-the-politics-of-memory-at-the-world-holo
caust-forum

Bernard Avishai berichtet über die politischen Auftritte während der Feierlichkeiten zum 75. Jahrestag der Befreiung des Konzentrationslagers Auschwitz am vergangenen Donnerstag beim World Holocaust Forum in Jerusalem. "'I have never seen a time when European governments are so quiescent with regard to the Netanyahu government — so willing to accommodate its uses of the Holocaust,' Amos Goldberg, an expert on Holocaust history and a professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, told me. He added, 'The Israeli, Polish, and Russian governments, all custodians of grim histories, are also reactionary populists — all using memory to make their nations dangerously self-justifying. For Israel, this means insisting that Polish anti-Semitism is endemic; for Poland, it means seeing Polish anti-Semitism as episodic. But this is not a real fight over history. It is a rival 'memory' in the service of a similar politics.'"

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15.01.2020

"The Anger and Anguish Fuelling Iran’s Protests"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-anger-and-anguish-fuelling-irans-protests

Robin Wright betrachtet die Proteste tausender Demonstranten gegen die iranische Führung als politische Kehrseite der vorhergehenden Massenproteste nach dem Tod von General Suleimani. "The protests have been a stunning contrast to the emotional outpouring by millions of demonstrators, just a week ago, at memorials for General Qassem Suleimani. (…) Iran is a society deeply polarized between those who hate the regime and those still loyal to its rigid revolutionary ideology. The back-to-back outpourings are not a contradiction. Iranians are passionately proud of their country — which dates back millennia, before Persia’s seventh-century conversion to Islam or the 1979 Iranian Revolution — whether or not they like their leaders or political system. (…) Suleimani, beyond his support among the regime’s hard-line base, was admired by many Iranians for protecting the country as well as the Revolution. But the shooting down of the Ukrainian flight, further defaming Iran’s already deeply tarnished image, also struck a nationalist nerve."

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02.01.2020

"How Anti-Semitism Rises on the Left and Right"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/how-anti-semitism-rises-on-the-left-and-right

Isaac Chotiner hat sich mit dem Antisemitismus-Experten David Nirenberg von der Divinity School der University of Chicago über die zunehmenden Vorurteile und gewaltsamen Übergriffe gegen Juden unterhalten. "Yeah, it does feel to me like we are in an era worth defining in terms of anti-Semitism or anti-Judaism, by which I mean we are in an era where many different societies are reviving ways of explaining the complexity of the world in terms of the dangers posed by Judaism or Jews. (…) I wouldn’t draw a distinction between a Muslim in Paris who suffers all kinds of discrimination at the hands of the French state, but who enacts his rage first and foremost against a Jewish target, and a white nationalist or a black nationalist or a left-Labour politician in England. I think all of them — to the degree that they are explaining what needs to be overcome in their world in terms of overcoming the Jews — are participating in a similar kind of thought. I do think what is very dangerous for us today is if, on the right, we think that only the left is anti-Semitic because of the critique of Israel, and if, on the left, you think that only the right is anti-Semitic because of white nationalism — and I am speaking as someone whose face has been put up on white-nationalist Web sites as an enemy of the white race. I do feel there is a danger there. But I think the real danger is imagining that it is only the other where anti-Judaism is doing its work and thereby not being able to see it in your own affinity group."

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12.11.2019

"What Do Lula’s Release and Morales’s Ouster Signal for Latin America?"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/what-do-lulas-release-and-moraless-ouster-signal-for-latin-a
merica

Lateinamerika hat in nur wenigen Tagen sowohl den Rücktritt von Boliviens Präsident Morales als auch die Freilassung des brasilianischen Ex-Präsidenten Lula erlebt. Jon Lee Anderson analysiert vor diesem Hintergrund den aktuellen Zustand der Demokratie auf dem Kontinent. "While the consequences of neither Lula’s release nor Morales’s ouster can yet be fully understood, it’s clear that, while the far right appears to be gaining strength again in Latin America, as it is in Europe, the left can’t be completely discounted. And neither can the military, which largely retreated to the barracks a generation ago, in the post-Cold War restoration of democracy across the continent, but in some countries has lately begun, if not to seize power outright, then to assume the role of institutional arbiter. (…) Yet signs of a new levelheadness, or perhaps of fairness, are beginning to emerge. Lula’s release demonstrated a refreshing independence on the part of the Brazilian Supreme Court and seemed to offer a belated counter to the politically and ethically tarnished judiciary that had convicted him. In Chile, an effort is building to amend the constitution, which was rewritten during the dictatorship of the late general Augusto Pinochet, and has been little modified since then. And the Organization of American States, or O.A.S., a multilateral body long repudiated by the left as an overly U.S.-influenced institution, may have resurrected its viability as a more balanced regional player, after Morales agreed to settle his disputed reelection by authorizing it to carry out an independent investigation. (…) Morales accepted that verdict and announced that new elections would be held — only to be told by the military that he should go. And he did leave. It was not a good ending for anyone."

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04.11.2019

"The Hostage Drama in Iran Drags On — Forty Years Later"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-hostage-drama-in-iran-drags-on-forty-years-later

40 Jahre nach dem Beginn der Geiselkrise von Teheran, bei der 52 US-Diplomaten vom 4. November 1979 bis zum 20. Januar 1981 festgehalten wurden, erinnert Robin Wright an den Vorfall, der die Beziehungen beider Länder bis heute prägt. "On Friday, in the run-up to the fortieth anniversary of the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, a prominent Iranian cleric called on Iraqis to seize the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. (…) Speaking for the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Saidi urged Iraqis to do as the Iranians had forty years ago. 'Right now, the only way for salvation, healing, and release from the American strife in Iraq is for the Iraqi people to draw the lesson from the successful experience of Islamic Iran' — and take over the American Embassy there. The crowd responded with chants of 'Allahu akbar!' ('God is great!') and 'Death to America! Death to England! Death to the hypocrites and the infidels!' It was the same rallying cry invoked by students when they seized the American Embassy in Tehran four decades ago. All these years later, nothing seems to have changed. And it’s hard to see that it will."

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29.10.2019

"The Making of Lebanon’s October Revolution"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-making-of-lebanons-october-revolution

Helen Sullivan erläutert die ökonomischen Ursachen der "Oktober-Revolution" in Libanon, die bereits zum Rücktritt von Premierminister Hariri geführt hat. "Months before the protests started, Lebanon was already 'deep inside an economic crisis,' Bassel Salloukh, a professor of political science at the Lebanese American University, in Beirut, told me. Its economy grew just 0.2% in 2018, and its public-debt burden is the third highest in the world. In January, the credit-ranking agency Moody’s downgraded Lebanon’s status to junk. Unemployment had reached twenty per cent, with youth unemployment at thirty per cent, according to a report released on October 17th by the International Monetary Fund. The report also notes 'a high level of corruption in Lebanon' and lists 'the government’s failure to achieve its fiscal targets and advance reforms; political infighting; and social tensions' as a risk with a 'high likelihood' of occurring."

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10.09.2019

"How John Bolton Got the Better of President Trump"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/how-john-bolton-got-the-better-of-president-trump

In seiner recht positiven Bestandsaufnahme der Amtszeit des entlassenen Nationalen Sicherheitsberaters hält Dexter Filkins es für einen Glücksfall, dass John Bolton sich in drei außenpolitischen Fällen erfolgreich gegen den US-Präsidenten durchsetzen konnte. "Someone has to contain [Trump]. My sense was that Bolton understood this from the start (...) A case in point: Trump favored direct negotiations with Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s erratic chieftain (...). Bolton told his aides to support the President, but he made it clear that he believed the strategy was a bad idea. No deal emerged. Another: Trump seems determined to take all remaining American troops out of Afghanistan, and he appointed a special envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, to make a deal with the Taliban. (...) Bolton opposed all of it. And now the deal appears dead. And a third: At Bolton’s urging, Trump withdrew from the deal, forged by the Obama Administration, to restrain Iran’s nuclear-weapons program. But the President was clearly confused about what to do next. Bolton and the others around him wanted to crush the Iranian economy, launch air strikes, and provoke a confrontation. Trump felt uncomfortable with Bolton’s aggressive posture and appeared to long for a chance to do a deal; in 2017, before appointing Bolton, he sent eight invitations, including a dinner request, to the Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani. But no deal has happened. (...) on these three crucial issues, Bolton was able to get the better of Trump. Not all of the outcomes were the direct result of his actions, but his views mostly prevailed."

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09.09.2019

"The Moral Logic of Humanitarian Intervention"

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/09/16/the-moral-logic-of-humanitarian-intervention

In der Amtszeit von Barack Obama war Samantha Power als Beraterin und UN-Botschafterin des US-Präsidenten tätig. Dexter Filkins schreibt, dass die frühere Aktivistin in dieser Zeit konsequent ihrem Verständnis von humanitären Militärinterventionen gefolgt sei und entsprechende US-Einsätze in Syrien oder Libyen befürwortet habe. Allerdings habe sich schnell herausgestellt, dass wohlmeinende Motive oft katastrophale Folgen haben können, so Filkins. "Power advocated greater interference in countries’ internal affairs in defense of an unwavering principle of humanitarianism. 'Given the affront genocide represents to America’s most cherished values and to its interests, the United States must also be prepared to risk the lives of its soldiers in the service of stopping this monstrous crime,' she wrote. The book inspired a generation of activists, helping to establish the doctrine of 'responsibility to protect,' which held that the United States and other wealthy countries had an obligation to defend threatened populations around the world. (...) The biggest reason that memoirs from the Obama Administration tend to avoid lingering on humanitarian intervention is simply that the record provides little to brag about: a disaster in Libya and in Syria, and a quagmire in Afghanistan, where the prospects of millions of women, empowered by the removal of the Taliban, hang in the balance. (...) Could Obama have done more? In retrospect, the answer is always yes. Would the results look better? Knowing the answer would require, as Power said of the decision to intervene in Libya, a crystal ball."

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26.08.2019

"Are Spies More Trouble Than They’re Worth?"

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/09/02/are-spies-more-trouble-than-theyre-worth

Adam Gopnik stellt das Buch "The Secret World: A History of Intelligence" von Christopher Andrew vor, dessen komplexe und widersprüchliche Spionagegeschichten bei Gopnik Zweifel am Nutzen staatlicher Nachrichtendienste wecken. "There seems to be a paranoid paradox of espionage: the better your intelligence, the dumber your conduct; the more you know, the less you anticipate. Again and again, a reader of Andrew’s history finds that the countries with the keenest spies, the most thorough decryptions of enemy code, and the best flow of intelligence about their opponents have the most confounding fates. Hard-won information is ignored or wildly misinterpreted. It’s remarkably hard to find cases where a single stolen piece of information changed the course of a key battle."

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24.06.2019

"Trump Sanctions Iran’s Supreme Leader, but to What End?"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/trump-sanctions-irans-supreme-leader-but-to-what-end

Die neuen Iran-Sanktionen der USA richten sich gegen den Obersten Religionsführer Ajatollah Chamenei. Robin Wright berichtet, dass Präsident Trump bei der Verkündung der Sanktionen kurz davor gestanden habe, formell einen Regimewechsel in Teheran zu fordern. Davon abgesehen schätzen Experten die wirtschaftlichen Folgen der Sanktionen eher gering ein. "Ironically, the punitive new measure may not have major economic impact — at least not to the degree that the Administration advertised. 'It’s a lot of hype, but it doesn’t mean much economically. It’s unlikely to have a damaging effect' on Iran beyond the sanctions that have already been imposed, Elizabeth Rosenberg, a former Treasury sanctions specialist who is now at the Center for a New American Security, told me. 'It’s in the realm of the symbolic.' (...) The main impact of the new sanctions may be political — diminishing rather than encouraging diplomacy or de-escalation. Pompeo said that Tehran 'knows how to reach us,' if it decides to 'meet our diplomacy with diplomacy.' But Tehran immediately rejected talks. At the United Nations, the Iranian Ambassador Majid Takht-Ravanchi told reporters that Tehran would not succumb to pressure."

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24.05.2019

"Charging Julian Assange Under the Espionage Act Is an Attack on the First Amendment"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/charging-julian-assange-under-the-espionage-act-is-an-attac
k-on-the-first-amendment

Die US-Justizbehörden haben ihre Anklageschrift gegen Julian Assange erweitert und wollen den WikiLeaks-Gründer nun mit Hilfe des Spionagegesetzes von 1917 wegen der Veröffentlichung von Geheimmaterial belangen. Für viele Kommentatoren ist dies ein klarer Angriff auf die Pressefreiheit. Masha Gessen, die kaum Sympathien für Assange hegt, schreibt im New Yorker: "The use of the Espionage Act to prosecute Assange is an attack on the First Amendment. Carrie DeCell, an attorney with the Knight First Amendment Institute, summed up the threat in a Twitter thread on Thursday. 'The government argues that Assange violated the Espionage Act by soliciting, obtaining, and then publishing classified information,' she wrote. 'That’s exactly what good national security and investigative journalists do every day.' (...) Like many Trumpian attacks on democracy, this one is novel but rooted in a long devolution of American institutions — it is a leap, but from a running start. Government use of law against speech goes back at least to the George W. Bush Administration. Prosecutions ramped up under Barack Obama. Prosecutions, however, focussed on whistleblowers and leakers; journalists, who, like the Times reporter James Risen, could be called up as witnesses, were targeted indirectly. But journalism has not been collateral damage in this battle — it has been the target. The Trump Administration has made that clear by jumping the fence that the Obama Administration had merely approached and charging Assange, under the Espionage Act, for practices typical of journalists."

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29.04.2019

"Baghdadi Is Back — and Vows That ISIS Will Be, Too"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/baghdadi-is-backand-vows-that-isis-will-be-too

Nach fast fünf Jahren hat sich der Anführer des "Islamischen Staates", Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, wieder in einem Video an die Öffentlichkeit gewandt. Robin Wright hat einige Experten zur Bedeutung des Videos befragt. "'Baghdadi’s survival despite a massive manhunt and the successful military campaign is impressive,' Daniel Byman, a Brookings Institution scholar and the author of the new book 'Road Warriors: Foreign Fighters in the Armies of Jihad,' told me. 'It shows the Islamic State retains functioning networks and considerably clandestine capacity in Iraq and Syria.' The video was 'a way for him both to continue his claim to the leadership of the jihadist movement and to give his followers heart in what is a dispiriting time for them.' (...) 'The international community should not kid itself — isis remains a serious force, even in Syria and Iraq,' [Charles Lister, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute,] told me. 'In eastern Syria alone, isis appears to have conducted over eighty-five attacks since the loss of Baghouz, its final picket of territory. That’s no small feat. Thousands of fighters remain in operation, and the scale of the problem isis has left behind far eclipses what the U.S. left behind in Iraq, in 2010.'"

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26.04.2019

"The Terrifying Potential of the 5G Network"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/annals-of-communications/the-terrifying-potential-of-the-5g-network

Sue Halpern erwartet, dass das geplante 5G-Netz mit seinem Versprechen einer "totalen Vernetzung" auch "erschreckende" Risiken mit sich bringen wird. Das erwartete "Internet der Dinge" wird demnach zum Ziel von Cyberattacken und zum Mittel völlig neuer Überwachungsmöglichkeiten werden. "5G will catalogue exactly where someone has come from, where they are going, and what they are doing. 'To give one made-up example,' Steve Bellovin, a computer-science professor at Columbia University, told the Wall Street Journal, 'might a pollution sensor detect cigarette smoke or vaping, while a Bluetooth receiver picks up the identities of nearby phones? Insurance companies might be interested.' Paired with facial recognition and artificial intelligence, the data streams and location capabilities of 5G will make anonymity a historical artifact."

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13.04.2019

"Bernie Sanders Imagines a Progressive New Approach to Foreign Policy"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-political-scene/bernie-sanders-imagines-a-progressive-new-approach-to-
foreign-policy

Der demokratische Präsidentschaftskandidat Bernie Sanders plant Benjamin Wallace-Wells zufolge, in seinem kommenden Wahlkampf die Außenpolitik stärker ins Zentrum zu rücken. Unter demokratischen Experten in Washington habe Sanders dabei neue Anhänger gefunden. "'Out of frustration with some aspects of Obama’s foreign policy and anger with most aspects of Trump’s, many leaders in the Party have concluded that the challenge was not to build bridges between centrist Democrats and centrist Republicans but, rather, between centrist and progressive Democrats. That means breaking away from the so-called Blob' — a term for the foreign-policy establishment, from the Obama adviser Ben Rhodes. [Suzanne DiMaggio, a specialist in negotiations with adversaries at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,] said, 'The case for restraint seems to be gaining ground, particularly in its rejection of preventive wars and efforts to change the regimes of countries that do not directly threaten the United States.' She and others now see in Sanders something that they didn’t in 2016: a clear progressive theory of what the U.S. is after in the world."

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10.04.2019

"What Netanyahu’s Win Says About Israel’s Future"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/what-netanyahus-apparent-victory-says-about-israels-future

Das Resultat der israelischen Parlamentswahlen hat nach Ansicht von Bernard Avishai bestätigt, dass sich die rechte Likud-Partei offenbar auf eine "permanente Mehrheit" der Wähler verlassen könne. "If you look at a map of the electoral results, moreover, you will see a numbingly familiar pattern. (...) These parts of Israel — Jerusalem neighborhoods, the settlements, the poor southern towns, the ultra-Orthodox communities, immigrant Russian neighborhoods — give Likud governments what’s come to feel like a permanent majority. In a television poll from the night before the elections, more than sixty per cent of the respondents who said that they would vote for the Likud were Mizrahis. Three-quarters of those who said that they were voting for Blue and White described themselves as secular. (...) even if Netanyahu is indicted in July and is forced to resign by, say, impatient Likud leaders eager to inherit his mantle, Likud’s nationalist populism has put Israel’s élites in an internal exile from which they will not emerge anytime soon."

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10.02.2019

"How Liberals Can Use Nationalism for Good"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-new-yorker-interview/how-liberals-can-use-nationalism-for-good

Isaac Chotiner hat sich mit der israelischen Politikwissenschaftlerin und früheren Knesset-Abgeordneten Yael Tamir über ihr neues Buch "Why Nationalism" unterhalten. "Nationalism was the project of the élites. The people joined in later. It has now become the project of the people. And that is due to the fact that globalism, hyper-globalism, separated the interests of the people from the interests of the élite. I think the emergence of populism right now is not a coincidence. It is not as if people became less reasonable or more violent. I think they are presented with new challenges and fears and reasons to be worried about their future. I am not sure they are bringing about the right solutions, but they are voicing concerns that have been repressed for a long time. (...) Nationalism is not about breaking all international institutions. It’s about the ordering of priorities. You asked me at the beginning: Why now? I think the more social democratic forces in society are losing out and handing over this powerful tool to people who are abusing it. Every ideology, from socialism to nationalism, is easy to abuse. The fact that people abuse an ideology is not evidence it is a bad ideology or a good ideology. What I am saying is that this was a powerful tool in the twentieth century and I think it is still relevant."

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31.12.2018

"Is Revolutionary Fervor Afire — Again — in Tunisia?"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/is-revolutionary-fervor-afire-again-in-tunisia

Die Proteste in Tunesien haben mit der Selbstverbrennung des TV-Journalisten Abderrazak Zorgui einen neuen Höhepunkt erreicht. Robin Wright schreibt, dass die tunesische Politik acht Jahre nach dem Ausbruch des Arabischen Frühlings keine Lösung für die sozioökonomischen Probleme des Landes gefunden habe. "More than a third of young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four are unemployed. Zorgui’s death has resonated. It sparked days of protests and clashes with police in several cities, including Tunis, the capital, in the east. A tentative calm settled in over the weekend, but activists have called for further demonstrations to mark the Arab Spring anniversary. More worrisome, the existential challenges that threaten Tunisia’s government show no sign of improving anytime soon. (...) 'It is easy to predict that Tunisia will continue to have roiling micro-protests,' [William Lawrence, a North Africa specialist at George Washington University’s Elliott School,] said. 'The current wave will not threaten the establishment like 2011, but it is a harbinger of things to come if Tunisia does not improve its socioeconomic situation.'"

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17.12.2018

"How Trump Made War on Angela Merkel and Europe"

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/how-trump-made-war-on-angela-merkel-and-europe

Susan B. Glasser analysiert in ihrem Essay für den New Yorker das Verhältnis zwischen Donald Trump und Angela Merkel, das sich nicht nur aufgrund unterschiedlicher Interessen, sondern auch aus persönlichen Gründen äußerst schwierig gestalte. "The problem, it soon became clear, ran deeper than Trump’s habitual dismissal of rational argument or ordinary differences over policy. The President, the German officials concluded, harbored a deep animus toward Germany in general, and Merkel in particular. 'There’s a single-mindedness to it and almost an obsession, it seems, and this is something we are hearing from colleagues in the Administration, too: an obsession with Germany,' one of the senior German officials told me. 'It seems like it’s very often issues that can seemingly be boiled down to a single number, like two per cent, or to a single concept. ... He latches on to that with a certain fixation.' Niels Annen, a Bundestag member who is the German equivalent of the Deputy Secretary of State, told me, 'Unfortunately, Germany seems to be very high on the agenda of the President himself.'"

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17.12.2018

"Iraq’s Post-ISIS Campaign of Revenge"

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/iraqs-post-isis-campaign-of-revenge

Die irakische Regierung betreibe seit dem Sieg über den "Islamischen Staat" eine systematische "Rachekampagne" gegen mutmaßliche IS-Anhänger und deren Familien, schreibt Ben Taub in seiner Reportage für den New Yorker. Dies dürfte früher oder später erneut zur Entstehung von Terrorgruppen führen, so Taubs Prognose. "The Islamic State has been mostly destroyed on the battlefield, but the war is far from over. Air strikes cannot kill an idea, and so it has fallen to Iraq’s fractured security, intelligence, and justice systems to try to finish the task. But, insofar as there is a strategy, it seems almost perfectly crafted to bring about the opposite of its intent. American and Iraqi military officials spent years planning the campaign to rid Iraq of isis, as if the absence of the jihadis would automatically lead Iraq toward the bright democratic future that George W. Bush’s Administration had envisaged when U.S. forces invaded the country, in 2003. But isis has always derived much of its dangerous appeal from the corruption and cruelty of the Iraqi state. (...) more than a year after isis lost Mosul — its largest source of legitimacy, wealth, and power — hundreds of thousands of civilians are suffering at the hands of their liberators. Anyone with a perceived connection to isis, however tenuous or unclear, is being killed or cast out of society."

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30.10.2018

"A Hundred Years After the Armistice"

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/11/05/a-hundred-years-after-the-armistice

In historischen Rückblicken auf den Ersten Weltkrieg wird oft hervorgehoben, wie "sinnlos" dieser Krieg letztlich gewesen sei. Dies trifft nach Ansicht von Adam Hochschild sowohl auf den Beginn als auch auf das Ende des Kriegs zu. Er stellt eine Reihe neuer Bücher vor, die sich anlässlich des 100. Jahrestages des Waffenstillstands eingehend mit dieser letzten Kriegsperiode beschäftigt haben. Die Reaktion der deutschen Bevölkerung auf den Vertrag von Versailles erklärt er dabei folgendermaßen: "Despite its flaws, the treaty was far less harsh than many imposed on other nations that had been defeated in war. The problem was something else: when the war came to an end, at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month of 1918, few Germans considered themselves defeated. The resentment that led to a new cataclysm two decades later was really forged by the Armistice. To begin with, the Armistice was not an armistice; the Allies, in effect, demanded — and received — a surrender. Yet German civilians had no idea their vaunted military was starting to crumble. Their ignorance was a fateful result of unrelenting propaganda. (...) Small wonder that Germans were outraged to learn the Armistice terms, and to see British, French, and American occupation troops march into the Rhineland. If the Army was 'unconquered,' who was responsible for these humiliations?"

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07.10.2018

"Did the Saudis Murder Jamal Khashoggi?"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/did-the-saudis-murder-jamal-khashoggi

Robin Wright hat den seit seinem Besuch im saudi-arabischen Konsulat in Istanbul vermissten Jamal Khashoggi persönlich gekannt. Sie erläutert, warum sie die Vermutung, dass der Journalist ermordet wurde, aufgrund des Charakters des neuen Regimes von Kronprinz Mohammed bin Salman nicht für ausgeschlossen hält. "(...) experts on Saudi Arabia suspect a more ominous pattern. 'The crocodile tears of the crown prince and other Saudi officials are probably for deception and prevarication,' Bruce Riedel, a former C.I.A., Pentagon, and National Security Council staffer who is now at the Brookings Institution, told me. 'The disappearance of Jamal fits with a pattern of crude intimidation and the silencing of criticism and dissent.' In words that now haunt his own case, Khashoggi told me, in August, that the crown prince has 'no tolerance or willingness to accommodate critics.' Although he is technically next in line to the throne, M.B.S. acts as the country’s de-facto leader, Khashoggi said, and has already become more autocratic than any of the previous six kings who have ruled since the death of Ibn Saud, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, in 1953."

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18.06.2018

"How Trump and Three Other U.S. Presidents Protected Israel’s Worst-Kept Secret: Its Nuclear Arsenal"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-trump-and-three-other-us-presidents-protected-israels-worst-
kept-secret-its-nuclear-arsenal?mbid=social_twitter

Donald Trump ist Adam Entous zufolge der vierte US-Präsident, der sich durch die Unterzeichnung eines geheimen Schreibens bereit erklärt hat, Israel wegen des offiziell immer noch nicht bestätigten Atomwaffenprogramms nicht unter Druck zu setzen. Israel habe Trump in dieser Frage bereits im Februar 2017 zu einer Entscheidung gedrängt. "By all accounts, the American Administration was eager to please the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, whom Trump had promised to lavish with unprecedented support. But, at that chaotic moment, Trump’s aides felt blindsided by the Israeli request. They knew nothing about the existence of any letters and were confused by the sense of urgency coming from the Israelis. (...) The White House’s reaction was understandable. There had been a similar moment of surprise eight years earlier, when Barack Obama became President and received a similar request. The very existence of the letters had been a closely held secret. Only a select group of senior American officials, in three previous Administrations, knew of the letters and how Israeli leaders interpreted them as effectively an American pledge not to press the Jewish state to give up its nuclear weapons so long as it continued to face existential threats in the region."

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11.06.2018

"Donald Trump’s New World Order"

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/donald-trumps-new-world-order

Adam Entous beschreibt in diesem ausführlichen Essay für den New Yorker, wie US-Präsident Trump auch in der Nahost-Politik der USA eine Ära beendet habe. Die Palästinenser seien die Verlierer dieser Neuorientierung, die sich vor allem gegen den Iran richte. "Trump had run for office as a noninterventionist, with the slogan 'America First.' 'He quite honestly had very little interest in meddling in the Middle East in general and very little interest from a philosophical point of view,' a Trump confidant told me. As far as Trump was concerned, 'all of this was an annoyance.' (...) With Obama finally out of the way, Netanyahu could concentrate on getting the Trump team to embrace his grand strategy for transforming the direction of Middle Eastern politics. His overarching ambition was to diminish the Palestinian cause as a focus of world attention and to form a coalition with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to combat Iran, which had long supported Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza and had taken strategic advantage of the American folly in Iraq and the war in Syria. (...) The Palestinians seem to be the likely losers in the new New Middle East. As a senior Arab official said of the strategic alliance, 'With or without a peace plan, it’s happening.' A senior Trump adviser said, 'Iran is the reason why this is all happening.'"

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29.05.2018

"News Whiplash and a Sense of History in the Making in South Korea"

https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/news-whiplash-and-a-sense-of-history-in-the-making-in-south-korea

Trotz der widersprüchlichen Entwicklung des Verhandlungsprozesses mit Nordkorea herrsche in Südkorea Optimismus und Hoffnung vor, berichtet E. Tammy Kim. "[President Moon Jae-in] has become the go-between figure in this drama. Although his conservative opponents have cast doubt on the peace process and accused him of cozying up to a dictator, there is, particularly among South Korea’s journalists, academics, and mainstream policy-makers, enormous reverence for Moon, and a sense that peninsular history is in the making. (...) For decades, South Koreans have lived under the spectre of North Korea’s Kim dynasty and the legacy of violent military rule in their own country. This helps explain why Moon’s embrace of Kim Jong Un, a man with a penchant for extrajudicial murder, seems less odious to South Koreans than to Western observers. What choice does Moon have?"

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