30 Jahre Deutsche Einheit Mehr erfahren
US-Soldaten in Afghanistan

East Asia Forum


suche-links1 2 3suche-rechts


"Why the Taliban are no easy pushovers on the negotiating table"


Sajjad Ashraf berichtet über die beträchtlichen Probleme der aktuell ruhenden Verhandlungen zwischen den Taliban und der afghanischen Regierung. "The talks between the Taliban and the Kabul regime that began on 12 September are on hiatus over disagreements about how to frame a code of conduct to guide the talks. Their differences over the procedures are wide and demonstrate how difficult substantive negotiations will be. (…) The alignment of political positions on either side is likely to be slow. There will be stalemates or even walkouts in frustration. Pushing the interlocutors to hasten process will produce results that either side may not to be fully committed to hold. External powers should let Afghan interlocutors move at a pace they are comfortable with in order to arrive at a durable peace."

Mehr lesen


"Chinese-style censorship is no fix for the COVID-19 infodemic"


Lotus Ruan und das Citizen Lab der University of Toronto haben die chinesische Zensur-Strategie zur Bekämpfung der "COVID-19-Infodemik" analysiert. "The Citizen Lab found that rather than controlling misinformation, leading Chinese social media platforms primarily controlled content deemed critical and destabilising to the government, sometimes even removing neutral references to the coronavirus. (…) The broad scope of censorship in reaction to the COVID-19 outbreak is partly due to the 'self-discipline' system under which China’s social media censorship operates. The burden of censorship is placed on private companies who are held liable for content on their platforms. Failure to remove sensitive content in time can result in fines, temporary suspension of platform operations or revocation of business licenses. To comply with content regulations, companies often self-censor to avoid official reprimands. This 'self-discipline' system has created a black box in China. In it, government actors and private companies negotiate content moderation outcomes clandestinely and the decision process is not subject to any public scrutiny or oversight."

Mehr lesen


"How Russia emerged as key mediator in the China–India dispute"


Russland habe im Konflikt zwischen China und Indien im Himalaya eine wichtige Vermittlerrolle eingenommen, berichtet Artyom Lukin. "The conflict coincides with Russia’s presidency of two key international forums: BRICS, a grouping of major non-Western powers Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This presents Moscow with both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge is that the India–China clash could derail BRICS and the SCO precisely when Moscow is chairing them. At the same time, Russia’s chairing of the two institutions gives it extra capacity to conduct pacifying diplomacy with New Delhi and Beijing and, in the process, raise its stature on the international stage. So far it seems the Kremlin has expertly taken advantage of the opportunity."

Mehr lesen


"The rise of lockdown radicalism"


Weltweit haben Regierungen auf die Corona-Pandemie mit Lockdown-Strategien geantwortet. Farooq Yousaf von der australischen University of Newcastle stellt fest, dass dies soziale und politische Ungleichheiten besonders auf der südlichen Halbkugel gefährlich verschärft habe. "Various terrorist, radical and violent extremist groups, especially the so-called Islamic State, are trying to cash in on these inequalities to propagate hate-filled narratives. In Nigeria, for instance, Boko Haram has called the closure of mosques — a precaution taken in response to COVID-19 — a direct 'attack on Islam'. Similarly, there remains fear among security experts that as the lockdowns continue to confine people to their homes, radical and violent extremist groups are gaining an opportunity to radicalise 'younger' audiences who are spending more unsupervised time on the Internet. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation’s (ASIO) Deputy Director-General Heather Cook, speaking at the Australian Parliament’s Joint Intelligence and Security Committee, also warned that the conditions arising out of the pandemic have provided extremist groups, including neo-Nazi organisations, the means to radicalise more people."

Mehr lesen


"Short-term nuclear stability on the Korean Peninsula"


Liang Tuang Nah von der S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapur erwartet, dass Nordkorea zumindest in nächster Zeit auf neue Raketen- und Atomwaffentests verzichten wird. "In the short term, North Korea is unlikely to resume nuclear warhead or long-range missile tests. Three of the more salient reasons for Pyongyang’s restraint are the effectiveness of sanctions, societal and political realities in the North and the preservation of bargaining prospects. Notwithstanding the reality that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has authorised more serious tests than both his father and grandfather combined, a fair case can be made that the Korean Peninsula will see strategic stability in the short term, with no nuclear or long-range missile tests. Grim predictions have been made that North Korea will test a seventh nuclear warhead or a long–range nuclear missile at the end of 2020. The months ahead may still pass without either of these destabilising acts of nuclear aggrandisement."

Mehr lesen


"Hyper-surveillance under COVID-19"


Tamara Nair und Alan Chong erinnern an den französischen Philosophen Michel Foucault, der einmal gesagt habe, dass moderne Medizin nicht ohne Überwachung praktiziert werden könne. Die Umsetzung dieser Maxime sei aktuell in der weltweiten Coronakrise zu beobachten. "This is not to undermine the earnest and life-affirming work of medical professionals worldwide. But it is important that the general public becomes aware of the implications of the intrusive climate of hyper-surveillance that is advancing stealthily in the name of tackling a global emergency. To date, this climate has three aspects: contact tracing, electronic surveillance and an incipient fellowship among infected persons. This ultimately leaves us in a Catch-22. (…) We are living today in a globalised surveillance culture. It is widely legitimised by national authorities as our collective saviour, pending the creation of a vaccine against COVID-19. We blindly embrace it as the price of joining the modern world. But we must also be aware that it should enhance our human rights, instead of trampling them in the name of a science that cures populations by any unscrutinised means. Otherwise, overbearing surveillance risks emerging as the more lasting social virus."

Mehr lesen


"COVID-19 entrenching poverty in the developing world"


Die Bekämpfung der Armut sei durch die Corona-Pandemie in vielen Entwicklungsländern weit zurückgeworfen worden, schreibt Omkar Shrestha, früherer Mitarbeiter der Asian Development Bank. "Gains made in poverty alleviation through decades of economic growth are being shattered. It is a sober reminder of humanity’s fragility and it will be a tragedy if we do not emerge wiser and more united from this savage crisis. The number of COVID-19 fatalities in developing and emerging Asian countries is relatively small so far, but their economies are still set to be hit by post-pandemic economic disaster. More than 90 per cent of the labour force in Asia work in the informal sector without any job security and little by way of healthcare or institutional protection. (…) The pandemic has suggested that over-reliance on foreign employment as an answer to domestic unemployment is an imprudent strategy. As COVID-19 spread, millions of migrant workers were sent home while millions more were stranded in their host countries. Those who returned found their home economies struggling for survival. Increasing fiscal deficits have also disabled many countries’ ability to address the consequences of the pandemic."

Mehr lesen


"Will COVID-19 temper Pyongyang’s belligerence?"


Die Coronakrise könnte dem "kriegerischen Auftreten" Nordkoreas Einhalt gebieten und zu mehr diplomatischer Kompromissbereitschaft des Regimes führen, meint Liang Tuang Nah von der S. Rajaratnam School of international Studies (RSIS) in Singapur. "Could this outbreak, with its significant negative economic impact and fatality rate, lead to enduring changes in North Korea’s strategic deterrence and nuclear weapons policy? Looking to the past under the rule of the previous North Korean leader Kim Jong-il might provide hopeful clues. The North’s decrepit healthcare system means COVID-19 could breed great misery. It might have a similar impact to the series of devastating natural disasters including hailstorms, flooding and tidal waves that plagued North Korea from 1994 to 1997. This triggered a famine which killed as many as three million people and hobbled the already-weak economy. (…) Kim Jong-un could follow his father’s playbook and use the current epidemic to negotiate medical aid — which isn’t strictly sanctioned — in return for security or nuclear compromises. This would at least induce short-term strategic stability. If the COVID-19 situation worsens and Kim is forced to focus on containing the spread of the virus rather than engaging in coercive strategies against Washington and Seoul, there could be hope for preserving stability on the Korean Peninsula. If Kim is prepared to offer arms limitation compromises like his father, prospects for denuclearisation could brighten."

Mehr lesen


COVID-19 threatens democracy in Southeast Asia


In Südostasien stellt die Corona-Pandemie auch eine Gefahr für demokratische Bewegungen in der Region dar, schreibt Murray Hiebert. In vielen Ländern nutzten autoritäre Regierungen die Krise, um Aktivisten und Oppositionelle mit "drakonischen" Einschränkungen zu unterdrücken. "Efforts to control the virus are giving authoritarian rulers the perfect cover to adopt draconian levers to rein in their opponents and critics. (…) 'The authoritarian leaders of Cambodia and the Philippines certainly rode the COVID-19 wave to their advantage in accruing political power and controls, while Thailand and Myanmar are poised to lean in further if they determine the political situation requires it', says Phil Robertson, Human Rights Watch’s deputy director in Asia. (…) No opinion polls in Southeast Asia have measured public perceptions about the more authoritarian measures governments introduced to tackle the pandemic. A Gallup poll of Thai attitudes toward the government’s overall handling of the virus in late April found 81 per cent disapproval — the highest among 18 countries. In contrast, 80 per cent of people in the Philippines approved of their government’s handling of the virus, in line with Duterte’s approval ratings during his war on drugs. Interestingly, the poor rating of the Thai government seems to be due to perceptions of officials not going far enough rather than being too draconian. Veteran politicians criticised Prayut’s administration for not using ‘hard measures’ earlier to control the virus. There is no evidence that the use of tough policies in Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand or Myanmar are producing a more effective pandemic response."

Mehr lesen


"Small states show the world how to survive multipolarity"


Wer wissen möchte, wie Staaten sich in der neuen multipolaren Welt zurechtfinden können, sollte einen Blick auf den aktuellen Umgang kleinerer Länder mit China werfen, meint Jason Young vom New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre. In der neuseeländischen Strategie spielten internationale Organisationen wie die WTO eine zentrale Rolle: "Existing international organisations are the best starting point to manage the rise of non-liberal countries and allow a contest of ideas with fairly applied rules. They are the best hope for finding consensus on common challenges like climate change and for promoting orderly competition. The experience of small states navigating these institutions is instructive for traditionally dominant states and rising powers alike. (…) While there is good reason for existing powers that fear the erosion of their dominance to pursue their interests unilaterally, there is also good reason for rising powers that fear that the international system does not reflect their preferences to do the same. Understanding that long-term interests are best served through international cooperation and agreed principles of engagement is the cornerstone of a civilised world. This will require compromise and a degree of acceptance of difference if not agreement. Small states shouldn’t have to go it alone but may need to join together to lead. New Zealand and Singapore, for example, are already working together to create a plurilateral agreement to maintain open trade and commerce during the COVID-19 pandemic."

Mehr lesen


"The geopolitical contours of a post-COVID-19 world"


Deepanshu Mohan von der O.P. Jindal Global University in Indien hat sich ebenfalls mit den möglichen Konturen der "Post-Corona-Welt" beschäftigt. Er erwartet eine "radikale Verschiebung" in den globalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen und eine neue Popularität "starker Führer" und autoritärer Politikmodelle. "In a post-COVID-19 world, many developed nations may consider disentangling direct trade relations with China and decoupling supply chains to restrict the flow of goods and services into and from China. We are also witnessing signs of authoritarian leaders deepening their control over citizens and redefining sovereign command. (...) While parallel insinuations might be appealing, the post-COVID-19 political machinery might witness a shift towards the adoption of and preference for authoritarian, command-control governance too. A plea for both national and social security is likely to follow. For nations where authoritarianism is already deeply entrenched, there might be a centrifugal effect induced by the pandemic taking public sentiment away from a central-command model of governance."

Mehr lesen


"Hong Kong’s coronavirus response adds fuel to protests"


Die Reaktion der Sonderverwaltung Hongkongs auf den Coronavirus habe die Protestbewegung neu angefacht, berichtet Jeffrey Wasserstrom. "Hospital-based healthcare workers are an example of a new group that is becoming more central to the protests. In late February, they went on strike to express their disagreement with local government policies aimed at dealing with the coronavirus, such as keeping the borders between Hong Kong and mainland China open. They were also upset that their input, as health experts on the frontline of the crisis, was not solicited and were even ignored when they offered it. The way that Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam and her government have handled the public health crisis has angered many local residents who were previously apolitical. (…) Well before 2020 many Hongkongers viewed their predicament as one of living in a place that was subject to British colonial rule and then became part of a China that behaves like an imperial power. The handling of the coronavirus will not convince all Hong Kong residents to embrace that view, but it will likely trigger perhaps a sizable portion of those who were previously disengaged or hostile to the movement to shift towards activism."

Mehr lesen


"German unification is a cautionary tale for Korea"


Die deutsche Wiedervereinigung sollte von Südkorea als warnendes Beispiel betrachtet werden, meint Max Nurnus von der Seoul National University. "The unification of the two states didn’t result in a unifying experience. In the country’s west, there continues to be little interest in the experience of East Germans: in what was lost, how it felt and how it feels today. Many continue to look at the east as a backwater and at unification as an event from decades ago. This experience of unification and how it was never acknowledged and appreciated by West Germans continues to echo in Germany’s east. For all the good that the unification brought, it also left behind disappointments, resentment over perceived paternalism and injustice and feelings of loss and exclusion. And in these attitudes, as well as the lack of understanding and communication around them, Germans continue to be separated. (...) Unification should not be imagined only as a political and economic project. It should also be imagined as the unification of two peoples and as a project of experiences, emotions and identities. It should not be imagined as an event, but as a process that takes decades. And it should be imagined not only with an eye to what German unification was, but also what was missing."

Mehr lesen


"Why Seoul and Tokyo will keep fighting"


Der Korea-Experte Jiun Bang von der University of Southern California erläutert die geopolitischen Hintergründe des Streits zwischen Japan und Südkorea. Er schreibt, dass insbesondere der langjährige US-Partner Südkorea seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges eine autonomere Rolle anstrebe. "One of the most fundamental shifts in the post-Cold War period in Northeast Asia has been the re-alignment of great powers. Prior to the Cold War, South Korea and Japan were clearly nested under the US security framework. This came under doubt as China emerged as a potential counterbalance to the United States. Japan has remained within the US orbit for the most part, but South Korea has walked a more delicate path owing in part to Seoul’s efforts to fulfil its growing ambition for status and autonomy — both within the US alliance and abroad. (...) Yet no matter how much Seoul contends that it acts according to its own national interests, it is constantly tested about its 'dual loyalties' and is accused of 'trying to have it all'. (...) Unfortunately, an intensified US-China rivalry will demand greater transparency from state actors, not less. Therefore, the Japan–South Korea dissonance will only continue so long as alignments become more rigid and South Korea’s actions are framed as hurting the US–Japan–South Korea partnership."

Mehr lesen


"The rules based economic disorder after Osaka G20"


Auch Shiro Armstrong vom Australia-Japan Research Centre in Canberra meint, dass der G20-Gipfel in Osaka keinen erkennbaren Beitrag zur Rettung der multilateralen Wirtschaftsordnung geleistet habe. "At stake is the future of the multilateral trading system and global economic cooperation. The current global hegemon is intent on tearing down the rules in the face of a rising power that is challenging its supremacy. The United States has gone from underwriting the order for the past 70 years to becoming its biggest threat. (...) After recognising the need to update the WTO rules at the last G20 summit in Argentina only 7 months ago, the leaders in Osaka could barely manage lowest common denominator language in their Osaka communique that raises more doubt than confidence. Gone are the empty words copy and pasted into past communiques denouncing protectionism. The best that could be managed was a single watered down paragraph on trade that did not mention protectionism or multilateralism. For a group that is essentially the steering committee for the global economy, there is no mention of the importance of markets in their long-winded and at times farcical communique. There is an America First paragraph shoe-horned in explaining the US disdain for the Paris Climate Accord. It’s difficult to know what to make of the other dozen or so pages."

Mehr lesen


"Japan should mediate in the Persian Gulf"


Trotz des missglückten Iran-Besuchs von Präsident Abe vor zwei Wochen meint Mari Nukii vom Japan Institute of International Affairs, dass Japan eine wichtige Vermittlerrolle in der aktuellen Krise spielen könnte. "Japan presently enjoys good relations with both countries and could offer the most suitable setting for mediation. During the Japan–US summit, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed mediating and was, in mid-June, the first Japanese prime minister in 40 years to visit Iran. On the same day as when Abe met Khamenei, a Japanese tanker was attacked in the Gulf of Oman. Although the United States quickly blamed Iran for attacks, Iran firmly denied it and Japan also refrained from making a quick conclusion. The Japanese mediation attempt unfortunately faced harsh sabotage from groups who don’t want Iran and the United States to improve relations. But Japan should not give up its efforts. One possible approach would be to, at the 28–29 June Osaka G20 summit, discuss how to de-escalate the tensions in the Persian Gulf and to protect the safe oil supply route."

Mehr lesen


"Europe’s search for a China strategy"


Die EU nehme die geopolitische Herausforderung, die China auch für Europa darstelle, bisher nicht angemessen wahr, meint Lucrezia Poggetti vom Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) in Berlin. "(...) governing elites in some European Union member states look at China through the prism of economic opportunity, downplaying the risks. They believe that close political ties with Beijing are key to unlocking greater economic opportunities, which cripples the EU’s efforts to devise a common strategy. This approach is based on the naive assumption that politically cosying up to the Chinese leadership fosters a special relationship that translates into privileged economic treatment. Such an approach also assumes that a bilateral partnership on equal terms with China is possible. It disregards the fact that the Chinese government can retaliate any time, should it consider it necessary for its own agenda, regardless of whether memoranda, 'strategic partnerships' or any other agreements have been signed. (...) Democracies in China’s wider neighbourhood — like Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan — have been at the forefront of dealing with China’s systemic challenge. Exchanging notes with these partners would provide European countries with useful information on Chinese activities and response measures to adopt."

Mehr lesen


"The United States is past engaging with China"


Kanishka Jayasuriya, Politikwissenschaftler an der Murdoch University in Perth, erkennt im aktuellen Handelsstreit zwischen den USA und China eine grundlegende und vor allem innenpolitisch motivierte Kehrtwende in der amerikanischen China-Strategie. "Past US administrations based their China policies on the assumption that China’s economy will move to a more liberal market order via institutional adjustments imposed through global rules. These strategies led to a complex and intertwined relationship between the United States and China. The changes signalled by Trump’s executive order reflect a post-engagement policy supported by the US security community. A significant element of this post-engagement policy is the overt disregard for the WTO rules which have been a US political project since the Cold War. (...) The policies of the Trump administration are a response to the domestic political failures of using engagement strategies to manage the various ups and downs of the US–China relationship, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and its security counterpart, the ‘Pivot to Asia’. (...) The turn towards coercive instruments signals a move away from the technocratic management of global trade rules. But rather than a move towards US economic nationalism, it reflects an authoritarian right-wing version of globalisation that has roots in domestic political crisis."

Mehr lesen


"South Korea steps up on the Korean Peninsula"


Sarah Teo lobt die diplomatische Strategie der "Mittelmacht" Südkorea im Umgang mit Nordkorea und den USA. "South Korea’s middle power diplomacy leans towards a functional strategy that is premised on managing the North Korea challenge. This is contrasted against a normative strategy, which sees middle powers focussing more on establishing broad behavioural standards and norms in the region. While the two strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive, such a typology of middle power behaviour points to how differences in levels of resources and threat perceptions can shape the foreign policies of regional middle powers. (...) This is not to overplay South Korea’s influence on the issue. Without US and North Korean willingness to negotiate, there would be little that Seoul could do. (...) South Korea’s role is rather that of a facilitator and mediator. Its value lies in shaping a conducive environment for North Korea and the United States to hold discussions. This is reflective of middle power roles in most regional and global issues — rather than being the single most influential player, middle powers help to lay the groundwork for action."

Mehr lesen


"Moon’s North Korea policy in danger"


Eun Hee Woo, Koreaexperte an der Freien Universität Berlin, warnt, dass die erfolgreiche Nordkorea-Diplomatie des südkoreanischen Präsidenten an dessen innenpolitischen Problemen scheitern könnte. "A poorly performing economy could (...) become a serious obstacle for Moon Jae-in. Shortly before Moon’s inauguration, more than 85 per cent of the South Korean population felt that North Korea’s nuclear weapons constituted a major threat. More than 60 per cent answered ‘yes’ when asked whether or not ‘the South Korean government should agree to American military actions against the North’. But even amid such keen security anxieties, the public still saw economic recovery as the most urgent issue facing President Moon. National security was third on the list after job creation. (...) If history is anything to go by, Moon’s successful North Korea policy will not be enough to offset public frustrations with a sluggish economy. His dipping approval rating should worry supporters of a more conciliatory North Korea policy as it heralds the coming of Moon’s lame-duck period."

Mehr lesen


"Normalising, not denuclearising, North Korea"


Gi-Wook Shin und Joyce Lee vom Asia-Pacific Research Center der Stanford University halten das von den USA angestrebte Ziel einer kurzfristigen vollständigen Denuklearisierung Nordkoreas für unrealistisch. Besser wäre es ihrer Ansicht nach, in einem langfristigen Prozess auch den Wandel Nordkoreas zu einem "normalen" Staat voranzutreiben. "CVID [complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization] is not a realistic goal, as any denuclearisation deal — big or small, vague or specific — with the current North Korean regime is almost certainly reversible. With too much focus on CVID, there is a risk that recent productive developments will be scrapped, in the same way that previous flashes of hope have quickly dimmed. The most pressing goal with North Korea is obviously denuclearisation but any efforts towards this goal should be in accord with a bigger, more comprehensive picture — that is, to transform the North Korean regime into a denuclearised normal state. The objective of the United States and its allies should not be to defeat the regime but rather to help it build normal relations with the outside world and to secure its future as a normal state."

Mehr lesen


"Could permanent neutrality be the answer for Korea?"


Sangpil Jin erläutert, warum eine vertraglich abgesicherte Deklaration der "dauerhaften Neutralität" durch die Regierungen Nord- und Südkoreas ein "game changer" in der Sicherheitsarchitektur Ostasiens sein könnte. "A permanently neutralised Korean Peninsula would reassure China that this gateway to the heart of continental Eurasia would become less affected by Washington’s geopolitical designs. From the United States’ standpoint, this Sun Tzu-esque balancing mechanism of subduing the enemy without fighting could contain China’s hegemonic ambition by exploiting a neutral Korea’s geography, since the Peninsula would provide a natural buffer between continental and maritime Asia. Moreover, Korean neutrality could serve as a test case for future cooperation between these two rivals in other conflict zones. Russia and Japan also stand to gain from neutrality. (...) Following in the footsteps of the Congress of Vienna — which formalised Switzerland’s neutrality — the final step would see a special session that hammers out a binding treaty on Korea’s permanent neutrality, with China, Japan, Russia and the United States acting as its guarantors. Washington would also agree to end its military presence in South Korea (a strategy that is already gaining traction in policy circles) and terminate the US–South Korean alliance after Korean unification. These steps would pave the way for a non-aligned and neutral Korea."

Mehr lesen


"Are arms exports a tool of Chinese foreign policy?"


Lucie Béraud-Sudreau und Meia Nouwens vom International Institute for Strategic Studies kommen in ihrer Analyse der chinesischen Waffenexporte zu dem Schluss, dass es sich bisher nicht um ein Instrument der chinesischen Außenpolitik handle. "Chinese arms sales appear to be more transactional than an instrument of foreign policy. For instance, there has been no uptick in Chinese arms deliveries to core Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) partner countries since this initiative was announced in 2013. Indeed, out of the 74 countries that are directly linked to BRI projects, only 23 of them — 31 per cent — have received Chinese major weapon systems since 2013. (...) Arms sales take place if and only if recipient states have the need for new weapons systems and have a preference for Chinese products. China still traditionally sells to states where Western exporters will not sell due to sanctions (like Iran), states that cannot afford to purchase Western weapons systems (like Zambia) and states that fall into both categories (like Sudan and Venezuela)."

Mehr lesen


"The two Korea’s tryst with destiny"


Sourabh Gupta vom Institute for China–America Studies in Washington DC. meint dagegen, dass die Erklärung Nordkoreas, unter bestimmten Bedingungen auf seine Atomwaffen verzichten zu wollen, nicht voreilig als Täuschung abgetan werden sollte. "Kim Jong-un already enjoys the assured ability to inflict unacceptable damage to his adversary — the logic of possessing nuclear weapons — by way of thousands of artillery tubes located within 50 kilometers or so of Seoul. An actual nuclear weapon mated to an inter-continental or intermediate range ballistic weapon is a leverageable asset that can be traded away for the right price — the full denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, revocation of the United States’ extended deterrence guarantee to Seoul, security assurances by Washington and Beijing to the North Korean regime and state, conversion of the armistice agreement into a peace treaty, and normalisation of diplomatic relations with the United States. In this regard, Kim’s circumstances are markedly different from those of Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi."

Mehr lesen


"China’s vision for a new world order"


Yong Wang, Politikwissenschaftler an der Peking University, erläutert Chinas Vision einer neuen Weltordnung, die generell darauf basieren soll, dass Staaten in ihrer internationalen Politik die "legitimen Interessen" anderer Länder berücksichtigen. "The ideal of this model would be mutually beneficial and win-win international partnership, as opposed to the current dominant conception of international relations — namely one of anarchy, power politics and a winner-takes-all dynamic. Under Xi’s plan, the security alliances formed during the Cold War would be replaced by ‘common security’. Under traditional models of collective security, the focus is the security of the alliance, and this exclusivity can easily lead to tension between rival security groups. (...) In China’s proposed community, the world would continue in the general direction of economic liberalisation but would also work towards a new global system that is more equitable, inclusive and fair. (...) The first challenge is whether the West can adapt to and accept the changes brought about by the rise of China. The West — the United States in particular — has grown accustomed to making the rules of the international order, which all other countries are then expected to follow. The rise of China and other emerging economies has changed this pattern of relations."

Mehr lesen


"Squeezing North Korea will not result in revolution"


Die Vorstellung, dass harte Sanktionen gegen ein Land wie Nordkorea eine Revolte der Bevölkerung gegen die Regierung auslösen können, werde von Forschern seit langem hinterfragt, schreibt Andrew David Jackson von der Monash University in Melbourne. "Anger, hunger and deprivation may be features of revolutions, but they are not their sole cause. If they were, revolutions would be a great deal more predictable. The 'paradox of revolution', to borrow Jack Goldstone’s phrase, is that, in hindsight, revolutions appear inevitable but no one ever sees them coming. The 2011 Arab Spring is a case in point. North Korean citizens have a lot to be angry about, but there is no reason to believe revolution is inevitable. Other important variables must be factored into predictions of revolutionary change. (...) If unrest occurs again on North Korea’s border with China, it is unlikely that rebels will receive any support from Beijing. Wendell Philips observed that ‘revolutions are not made, they come’. If there is to be a revolution in North Korea, it may be better to just let it come."

Mehr lesen


"Democracy isn’t receding in Southeast Asia, authoritarianism is enduring"


Thomas Pepinsky von der Cornell University interpretiert die stagnierende Demokratisierung in Südostasien als Zeichen der Widerstandsfähigkeit der autoritären Strukturen vor Ort. "Trends from 1980 to 2016 for all eleven Southeast Asian countries show that the general picture of regional democracy has been one of institutional stagnation over the past three decades. The only Southeast Asian country where civil liberties and political rights have consistently deteriorated is Thailand. By contrast, liberalisation has been real (if limited) in Myanmar and substantial in Indonesia. Even in hard authoritarian Vietnam, there has been an expansion of civil liberties, even if no progress at all in political rights. (...) What makes the politics of disorder a thorny problem for Southeast Asian democracy is that these illiberal policies are popular among many citizens. The trend towards illiberal politics and authoritarian leadership styles is a consequence of the perceived weaknesses of democratic politics, which has proven unable to eliminate poverty, crime, identity-based conflict or political instability."

Mehr lesen


"Multiple risks and limited options on the Korean peninsula"


In seiner Analyse der Situation auf der koreanischen Halbinsel kommt Ramesh Thakur, Direktor des Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, zu dem Schluss, dass es an der Zeit sei, Nordkorea als Atommacht anzuerkennen und die internationale Strategie gegenüber dem Regime entsprechend anzupassen. "By 2020, North Korea will either be a post-atomic wasteland; an active war zone; or a de facto nuclear-armed state with a fully developed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability, and grudgingly accepted as such. To paraphrase Churchill’s familiar bon mot on democracy, learning to live with that reality would be the worst outcome, except for all the alternatives. (...) Denuclearisation is dead and should be buried. (...) Engagement must focus on the elements of a 'grand bargain' as was done with Iran: a freeze-for-freeze as proposed by China and backed by Russia, meaning a suspension of US–South Korean military exercises in return for a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile testing programs; formal diplomatic recognition of and relations with Pyongyang by the United States; and a formal peace treaty following the armistice that has been in operation since 1953."

Mehr lesen


"Ending North Korean brinkmanship"


Vinod Saighal, indischer Generalmajor im Ruhestand, warnt noch einmal eindringlich vor den Folgen eines atomaren Krieges, der durch die Provokationen Nordkoreas ausgelöst werden könnte. Ein möglicher Ausweg aus der Krise wäre ein gemeinsames Ultimatum der Großmächte USA, China und Russland, das Diktator Kim Jong-un an den Verhandlungstisch zwingen würde. "Kim is unlikely to agree to this even if two of his supporters were to join with the United States. Here is where compellance comes in. After authorisation by the UN Security Council, China, Russia and the United States carry out a full-scale blockade of North Korea by land, sea and air. Simultaneously, leaflets would be regularly dropped over North Korea by China and Russia (not the United States) urging the population to force their leader to come to the negotiating table, failing which the army and the people would be urged to topple the leader before complete starvation sets in. The blockade would be lifted only when neutral observers are allowed to come into Pyongyang to monitor the agreement, and the three powers feel assured that there is no possibility of the North Korean leader reneging on the deal."

Mehr lesen

suche-links1 2 3suche-rechts

Hier finden Sie die Redaktion der Sicherheitspolitischen Presseschau.

Mehr lesen



Europa, Asien, Afrika, Amerika und weltweite Phänomene und Institutionen. Die bpb bietet ein breites Angebot zu internationalen Themen.

Mehr lesen


Informationsportal Krieg und Frieden

Wo gibt es Kriege und Gewaltkonflikte? Und wo herrscht am längsten Frieden? Welches Land gibt am meisten für Rüstung aus? Sicherheitspolitik.bpb.de liefert wichtige Daten und Fakten zu Krieg und Frieden.

Mehr lesen auf sicherheitspolitik.bpb.de


Innerstaatliche Konflikte

Vom Kosovo nach Kolumbien, von Somalia nach Süd-Thailand: Weltweit schwelen über 280 politische Konflikte. Und immer wieder droht die Lage gewaltsam zu eskalieren.

Mehr lesen

Zahlen und Fakten


Kaum ein Thema wird so intensiv und kontrovers diskutiert wie die Globalisierung. "Zahlen und Fakten" liefert Grafiken, Texte und Tabellen zu einem der wichtigsten und vielschichtigsten Prozesse der Gegenwart.

Mehr lesen

Publikationen zum Thema

Internationale Sicherheitspolitik Cover

Internationale Sicherheitspolitik

Seit Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts hat sich die internationale Sicherheitspolitik deutlich verändert....

Das Herz verlässt keinen Ort, an dem es hängt

Das Herz verlässt keinen Ort, an dem es hängt

16 Autor*innen aus Krisengebieten wünschen sich für ihre Zukunft weiterschreiben zu können. In di...

Sicherheitspolitik verstehen

Sicherheitspolitik verstehen

Wie sieht eine zeitgemäße Sicherheitspolitik angesichts einer zunehmend komplexer werdenden und st...

Am Hindukusch – und weiter?

Am Hindukusch – und weiter?

Ende 2014 zogen die letzten deutschen ISAF-Truppen aus Afghanistan ab. Dieser Band zieht Bilanz, fra...

Fluter Terror


Terrorismus bedroht die offene Gesellschaft und die kulturelle Vielfalt. Er ist uns fremd, aber er k...

Zum Shop