US-Soldaten in Afghanistan

European Council on Foreign Relations


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22.05.2020

"How to repair multilateralism after covid-19"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_to_repair_multilateralism_after_covid_19

Anthony Dworkin rät den Europäern, das multilaterale System angesichts der Rivalität zwischen den USA und China zu schützen und dabei neue Verbündete zu suchen. "For Europeans, the manoeuvring around the WHO repeats a pattern that is becoming all too familiar: the US turns its back on or attacks multilateral institutions, while China attempts to shape the system around values and interests that Europeans do not share. Most European governments believe that there are questions to answer about the international public health response to the coronavirus, and would like to see the system strengthened, but also want to avoid a divisive blame game at the height of a global pandemic. In this instance, Europe was able to score at least a minor diplomatic victory, winning consensus support for a compromise resolution at the World Health Assembly (…). This was the second time that the European Union has had some success in fostering international cooperation in response to the pandemic, following the pledging conference to raise money for global health that it organised two weeks ago. But these limited successes should not blind Europe to the scale of the challenge that remains in trying to restore an effective and cooperative international response. (…) The EU will find allies around the world who are eager to work in a more cooperative way – but any effort to repair the international system will also need a strategy to deal with the US-China standoff."

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13.05.2020

"The meaning of systemic rivalry: Europe and China beyond the pandemic"

https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_meaning_of_systemic_rivalry_europe_and_china_beyond_the_pand
emic

Die strategische Einschätzung Chinas hat sich in Europa aufgrund des chinesischen Auftretens in der Coronakrise spürbar verschoben, stellt Andrew Small in seiner Analyse fest. Aufgrund der aktuellen Krisensituation sei eine unmittelbare Wende der europäischen China-Politik zwar nicht zu erwarten, langfristig werde sich die Haltung der EU gegenüber Peking jedoch ändern. "In recent weeks, Europe’s interactions with China have been bruising but clarifying. Long-held assumptions about Beijing’s behaviour and intentions towards Europe were already creaking under pressure; they have now collapsed altogether. European officials and analysts have become firmer in their hypotheses about issues ranging from the risks of closer Sino-Russian coordination to the Chinese party-state’s willingness to use its power to advance an ideological agenda hostile to European values. (…) In the short term, Europe’s priorities in its relationship with Beijing will remain highly conditioned by the pandemic itself. The need to deal with immediate health needs and to fix the economic situation will hang over bilateral dynamics for much of the rest of the year. China’s earlier recovery from the virus-induced recession will inevitably affect Europe’s calculations too. The cooperative agenda in areas such as climate change remains essential. Yet European leaders should be aware of the risks of exacerbating the same problematic dynamics with China that have been evident throughout the crisis."

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11.05.2020

"A burning issue: How to restart the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_a_burning_issue_how_to_restart_the_dialogue_between_serbia_and_k

Vessela Tcherneva erläutert, wie die EU aus der aktuellen Sackgasse im Dialog zwischen Serbien und Kosovo herausfinden könnte. "The EU can only break the deadlock in the dialogue if it takes a new course of action, one that runs along parallel technical and political tracks. This approach should involve parliaments and citizens in Serbia and Kosovo; stakeholders in the region such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia; the EU member states who are invested in the region – such as Germany and France, along with Italy, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Greece – as well as the US and the United Nations. Ultimately, it is the EU’s responsibility to normalise relations between Kosovo and Serbia in the long term. Therefore, the EU should set the principles of, and drive, the dialogue."

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30.04.2020

"The post-coronavirus world is already here"

https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_post_coronavirus_world_is_already_here

Der EU-Außenbeauftragte Josep Borrell erläutert in diesem Beitrag, vor welchen Herausforderungen die EU in der neuen geopolitischen "Post-Corona-Welt" stehen wird. "Once the sense of shock has passed, we must assess the consequences of this event, avoiding two pitfalls. Firstly, given the uncertainty surrounding this crisis, we must not draw hasty conclusions. Secondly, we must not let ourselves be overcome by shock, concluding too quickly that everything will change. In the history of human societies, major crises are always heralded by warning signs or events. And major crises usually have an accelerating effect on trends. This is why it would make more sense to look at the consequences of covid-19 from the point of view of how this crisis could magnify dynamics that are already at work. What are these dynamics? I can see three: - the future of globalisation and neoliberalism; - the evolution of global governance; - the resilience of the European Union and democratic European political systems when coping with serious and unforeseen risks. These three dynamics will shape the post-coronavirus world – a world which, to a certain extent, is already here."

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30.03.2020

"How the coronavirus threatens a geopolitical Europe"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_the_coronavirus_threatens_a_geopolitical_europe

Die EU könnte aus der Coronakrise spürbar geschwächt hervorgehen, meint Nicu Popescu. Europa werde vor denselben geopolitischen Problemen stehen, allerdings mit weniger innerer Solidarität und internationaler Glaubwürdigkeit. "There is a risk that covid-19 will reinforce the most herbivorous foreign policy instincts of EU citizens and governments alike. Of course, among the key lessons of the crisis will be that states’ healthcare systems need more resources; that their economies need stimulus measures; that the EU needs to turn a blind eye to budget deficits; and that all countries need to engage in greater international cooperation to preventing, limit, and combat pandemics. (…) After the crisis, the EU will face the same geopolitical problems it did before. But, this time, it might need to tackle them with less internal solidarity and external credibility than it once had. To avoid this outcome, the EU and its member states need to devote greater attention and resources to saving their economies and boosting their healthcare capacity, while preserving enough political bandwidth and capital to establish a more geopolitical Europe."

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13.02.2020

"The slow death of ambition: German foreign policy after Kramp-Karrenbauer's resignation"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_slow_death_of_ambition_german_foreign_policy_after_akks_resi

Jana Puglierin bedauert den angekündigten politischen Rückzug von Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, da diese den "schwerfälligen" Status Quo der deutschen Außenpolitik zumindest ansatzweise in Frage gestellt habe. "AKK’s resignation will make things even worse. The leadership dispute in the CDU – which is, in reality, a fundamental disagreement about the party’s political direction – will take up even more energy than before. The grand coalition will continue to be a kind of caretaker government in its lack of vision and big ambitions. (…) Moreover, AKK is one of the few political figures who dares to position herself outside the ponderous foreign policy status quo. Even if her proposals were not always convincing or well timed (…) she at least dared to tackle issues that others had left in a vacuum."

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07.02.2020

"The search for freedom of action: Macron’s speech on nuclear deterrence"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_search_for_freedom_of_action_macrons_speech_on_nuclear_deter

Tara Varma begrüßt die jüngste Rede von Präsident Macron zur nuklearen Abschreckung als "kühnen" Beginn eines strategischen Dialogs über die Rolle französischer Atomwaffen in der europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur. "True to the established 'Macron method', the president’s deterrence speech presents Europeans with a bold move: an offer of a strategic dialogue on the role of French deterrence in European security with those who are willing to engage in one, holding out the possibility of association with exercises conducted by French nuclear forces. Moreover, the speech makes clear that the force de frappe (military strike force) still remains a national prerogative, but that France endorses its responsibilities in contributing to the common strategic culture Europeans need to survive in an increasingly disrupted world. (…) Macron uses the speech to remind his fellow Europeans that French decision-making independence in use of the nuclear deterrent is fully compatible with 'the unshakeable solidarity with our Europeans partners'. He reiterates that French nuclear forces play a major role in Europe through their very existence and, as a consequence, have 'a genuinely European dimension'. In all, Macron reaches out to the rest of Europe on Russia, the transatlantic relationship, and European solidarity."

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05.02.2020

"Insecurity in the Sahel: Europe’s next fight against jihadism"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_insecurity_in_the_sahel_europes_next_fight_against_jihadism

Andrew Lebovich kritisiert, dass die Antiterror-Strategie der G5-Sahel-Gruppe, Frankreichs und anderer europäischer Länder die politischen und Governance-Probleme in der Region vernachlässige. "To be sure, as only the outline of a plan, the road map needs a lot of work before implementation. Nonetheless, the fact that recent discussions in Pau and elsewhere heavily focused on security – while failing to grapple with core political issues of governance and the security forces’ sometimes abusive treatment of communities they are meant to protect – is a cause for concern. Ultimately, these provisions focus on the return of the state to troubled areas. But there remain questions about what kind of state should return, and how to avoid repeating the errors and oversights that helped destabilise the Sahel in the first place."

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22.01.2020

"War and pieces: Political divides in southern Yemen"

https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/war_and_pieces_political_divides_in_southern_yemen

Raiman al-Hamdani und Helen Lackner mit einer Analyse der historischen und politischen Hintergründe des Konflikts zwischen der Regierung Jemens und den separatistischen Bewegungen im Süden des Landes. Die beiden Experten bezweifeln die Umsetzung der Vereinbarung vom 5. November 2019, die den bewaffneten Konflikt eigentlich beiliegen sollte. "This paper focuses on the origins, development, and prospects of political challenges in southern Yemen. It begins with an analysis of historical divisions in the south, outlining key issues within specific governorates – including the political fragmentation that has occurred since 2015, when the war in Yemen first gained an international dimension. The paper concludes by examining the significance of the Riyadh Agreement, as well as the implications for the south of current attempts to end the war. It argues that EU policymakers need to address the diverse, complex problems facing southern Yemen if they are to create a sustainable solution to the conflict – and makes several recommendations for how they could achieve this. The EU should continue to support development and state-building in Yemen, and should increase its efforts to mediate between southerners, as well as between southerners and northerners. This would promote cooperation and coexistence, encouraging the development of institutional and democratic platforms upon which southerners can achieve self-determination."

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16.01.2020

"Will he stay or will he go? Putin’s role will change"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_will_he_stay_or_will_he_go_putins_role_will_change3

Kadri Liik erwartet angesichts der angekündigten Verfassungsreformen in Russland, dass sich Wladimir Putins politische Rolle in jedem Fall verändern wird. "Ever since the presidential election of 2018, the big, though quietly debated, political question in Russia has been about Putin’s plan for 2024. Will he groom a successor to take over his current duties? Will he seek to stay on in the Kremlin and amend the constitution accordingly? Or will he reshape the political system so that it allows him to leave? Ultimately, it is a combination of the three – as it probably had to be. (…) And this is exactly what Putin announced on 15 January: some diversification of power that makes the presidency less powerful than it has been recently and the State Duma more important, and that carves out a newly influential role for the State Council. Putin will still groom a successor – whoever steps into the diminished presidency will need his approval. And Putin himself will not slip into obscurity – we’ll no doubt hear from him after 2024. But he will act in a new capacity on a changed landscape."

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07.12.2019

"Mapping European leverage in the MENA region"

https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/mapping_eu_leverage_mena

Experten des European Council on Foreign Relations haben sich in diesem Dossier mit dem europäischen Einfluss in der MENA-Region beschäftigt. "Turmoil in the Middle East and north Africa directly affects Europeans. Yet their influence in the region has never been weaker. This project maps Europe’s role across the Middle East and north Africa, making the case that Europeans can do more to leverage their influence in pursuit of core interests".

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20.11.2019

"Germany’s quiet leadership on the Libyan war"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_germanys_quiet_leadership_on_the_libyan_war

Die deutsche Bundesregierung spiele in Libyen seit einiger Zeit eine weitgehend unbeachtete, aber durchaus wichtige Vermittlerrolle, berichten René Wildangel und Tarek Megerisi. Der Erfolg dieser schwierigen Aufgabe hänge nicht zuletzt vom Verhalten des engen Partners Frankreich ab. "Germany mediates between not the warring groups in Libya but their foreign backers. The German government is widely seen as the perfect arbiter in the conflict, given its neutrality, its good relationships with all involved, its status as the leading funder of stabilisation efforts in Libya, and its prominence in European politics. Yet Germany has its work cut out – due not least to the actions of its closest ally, France. In the last few months, French President Emmanuel Macron has launched proposals for European foreign and security policy at dizzying speed – although most of them have received lukewarm responses from Berlin and, as a consequence, foundered just as quickly. While Macron appears to be concerned about Europe’s lack of strategic sovereignty, he has demonstrated a commitment to ruthlessly pursuing his vision of foreign policy in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. Nowhere is this more apparent than in French support for General Khalifa Haftar’s attempt to grab power in Libya."

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12.11.2019

"Two people separated by a common idea: Why Macron and AKK agree"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_two_people_separated_by_a_common_idea_why_macron_and_akk_agree

Trotz ihres unterschiedlichen Auftretens verfolgten Frankreichs Präsident Macron und die deutsche Verteidigungsministerin Kramp-Karrenbauer ähnliche Ziele, schreibt Ulrike Esther Franke. "(…) beyond (…) rhetorical differences, they largely share the same analysis of the world. They both worry about the rise of China, the return of great power competition, and the risk that Europe will be marginalised. They agree that 'the United States remains our major ally, we need them, we are close and we share the same values' (Macron), but that 'both the willingness and ability to do more than its fair share are dwindling in the United States. This is why we must step up in future, just like others who are defending a reliable, free and democratic order.' (AKK). Given that there is no evidence that the two politicians coordinated their interventions, their many points of agreement are all the more meaningful. (…) In general, the two interventions show that AKK and Macron agree on the need to improve Europe’s defence capabilities – to strengthen the European pillar of NATO, as she argues, or to step in if NATO fails, as he suggests. German and French ideas on European defence remain divided by language, style, and even by some important substantive issues. But AKK’s and Macron’s interventions show that German and French leaders now share a common idea more than ever before. This is something they should build on."

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30.09.2019

"Trump’s Ukrainegate could help Ukraine"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_trumps_ukrainegate_could_help_ukraine

Die Ukraine könnte nach Ansicht von Joanna Hosa vom jüngsten Skandal um Donald Trump durchaus profitieren. "While the focus on corruption is not ideal, being in the spotlight might be good for Ukraine. Oscar Wilde’s observation that 'there is only one thing in life worse than being talked about, and that is not being talked about' holds true for Ukraine. World leaders are again hearing that the war in Ukraine is not over and that it is an important European country. Zelensky’s message that 'Ukraine needs more support fighting its two wars: with corruption and in Donbas' has a new audience. There will now be more scrutiny of American support for Ukraine, which will help protect the country from threats to withhold it – explicit or otherwise. Ukraine is gaining prominence – so much so that Trump has even stopped calling it 'the Ukraine', which is quite something."

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24.09.2019

"Can Germany stop Libya becoming the new Syria?"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_germany_libya_conference_new_syria

Die geplante internationale Libyen-Konferenz in Deutschland sollte nach Ansicht von Tarek Megerisi als Gelegenheit für einen diplomatischen Durchbruch genutzt werden, um das Abgleiten des Landes in ein Chaos nach syrischem Vorbild zu verhindern. Dabei werde viel auf die Vorbereitung des Gipfels durch die Bundesregierung ankommen. "If Germany wants its new initiative, and rare foray into north African foreign policy, to result in greater Libyan stability, then it will have to work hard to ensure that the right agenda is on the table, and that it has enough allies present to make it count. (...) Germany knows the problem facing it all too well, given that Haftar’s assault coincided with its presidency of the Security Council, during which time its attempts to see through resolutions in special sessions were blocked or watered down. Recent statements by Merkel and Germany’s ambassador to Libya suggest that Germany is aware of the perils of allowing Libya to continue down its current path, and of the importance of constraining international interference in Libya. (...) The follow-up matters too: if the Germany conference is to be the first step towards stability, then it will inevitably be followed by a mediation process. Berlin should work to ensure that this event is used to provide [UN Special Representative Ghassan Salamé] with the space to resume his bottom-up process as that mediation process."

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03.09.2019

"Mapping armed groups in Mali and the Sahel"

https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/sahel_mapping

Andrew Lebovich hat die Einflusszonen radikalislamischer Gruppen und internationaler Akteure in Mali, Niger und Burkina Faso in einer informativen Karte dargestellt. "Violence is tearing Mali and the Sahel apart. But who are the armed groups behind the bloodshed? Where are international actors stationed in the region? And what motivates them all? This project maps jihadist and non-jihadist groups and pinpoints the presence of external actors in the region as of May 2019."

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05.08.2019

"Nothing to see here: Europe and the INF treaty"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_nothing_to_see_here_europe_and_the_inf_treaty

Die Europäer hätten das Ende des INF-Vertrags mit demonstrativer Gleichgültigkeit aufgenommen, stellt Nick Witney fest. Dahinter stehe keineswegs ein gestiegenes Selbstbewusstsein, sondern eine tiefsitzende Weigerung, die neue Bedeutung der Atomwaffenfrage anzuerkennen. "As ECFR found in a comprehensive recent survey of attitudes towards nuclear deterrence across Europe, Europeans are choosing to address these issues with, in the words of the report’s title, 'eyes tight shut'. In some member states, folk memory of the domestic conflicts sparked by the Euromissile Crisis is evergreen. Others – particularly non-NATO members – retain a deep-seated attachment to unilateral nuclear disarmament. Few have any appetite for facing up to the wider implications of the deterioration of the US security guarantee to Europe under Trump. So, if the Russians and the Americans seem ready to view the painfully constructed arms control regimes of the twentieth century as disposable, most Europeans seem ready to go with the flow. (...) it is myopic to refuse to take the elevated Russian nuclear threat seriously. As the ECFR report cited above argues, Europeans need to take their heads out from under the duvet and start thinking seriously about how to create a 'Euro-deterrent' – that is, about how to effectively extend the deterrence capacity of the French and British nuclear arsenals to cover European partners and allies."

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17.07.2019

"From plaything to player: How Europe can stand up for itself in the next five years"

https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/how_europe_can_stand_up_for_itself_in_the_next_five_years_eu_for
eign_policy

Der frühere schwedische Ministerpräsident Carl Bildt und Mark Leonard vom European Council on Foreign Relations erläutern in diesem Strategiepapier ihren sicherheitspolitischen Fahrplan für die neue EU-Kommission. "The coming five years herald acute pressure on Europe, particularly as Russia, China, and the US undermine multilateral institutions and treat trade, finance data, and security guarantees as instruments of power rather than global public goods. The new high representative should move quickly to rewire European foreign policymaking to exercise strategic sovereignty. The high representative needs more support on this strategy – from deputies, special representatives, and foreign ministers tasked with specific roles. The new leadership team in Brussels needs to reoperationalise European defence, build Europe’s self-sufficiency through a strong European pillar in NATO, and consider innovations such as a European Security Council. Europe will only build greater unity by tackling controversial issues head on in the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council. The high representative needs to play a much more active role in these debates."

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31.05.2019

"A tribunal for ISIS fighters?"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_a_tribunal_for_isis_fighters

Der Fall der drei im Irak zum Tod verurteilten französischen IS-Kämpfer hat erneut die Frage aufgeworfen, was mit europäischen Anhängern des "Islamischen Staates", die in Irak oder Syrien aufgegriffen worden sind, geschehen sollte. Anthony Dworkin zufolge findet die Idee eines internationalen Tribunals zunehmend Anklang. Vor der Einrichtung eines solchen Tribunals müssten allerdings einige wichtige Fragen geklärt werden. Dworkins Fazit lautet: "For the moment, Europe’s newfound enthusiasm for an international tribunal remains more a political aspiration than a well-developed and credible policy. Next week’s meeting may start the process of transforming this aspiration into a clearly defined project that can decide between the different options and generate support for a path forward. A tribunal would provide a powerful way of ensuring that those most responsible for the crimes of ISIS were held accountable. But it would not generate a magical solution to the problems posed by the broad mass of European fighters and ISIS supporters in Syria. Europe should not put off the task of devising other ways to handle the detainees while discussions on an international tribunal gradually advance."

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09.05.2019

"The strange influence of the Macedonian model"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_strange_influence_of_the_macedonian_model

Vessela Tcherneva schreibt, dass die begrüßenswerte politische Entwicklung in Nord-Mazedonien auch in anderen Balkan-Ländern eine positive Wirkung zeige. "After almost a decade at the bottom of the list of Western Balkans’ aspirants entering the European Union, North Macedonia climbed a steep slope to catch up, even overtaking some along the way. Its path included public protests and external pressure (from the United States and the EU) which brought down long-time authoritarian prime minister Nikola Gruevski. His successor – Zoran Zaev, a relatively unknown politician from a small town – led an SDSM government that concluded a friendship treaty with Bulgaria and resolved the long-standing dispute with another neighbour, Greece, over North Macedonia’s name. (...) Zaev’s victory was the last episode in a process that began more than three years ago and proved that a clear vision and strong political will can defeat authoritarian leaders, resolve symbolic issues with neighbours (even in the Balkans!), and reinstate a country’s as a credible EU candidate. (...) Meanwhile, several waves of protest have spread across the Western Balkans in recent months. All have been influenced by the events in North Macedonia (...)".

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05.04.2019

"The march of Haftar: Why Europeans should stand in the way of the Libyan National Army"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_march_of_haftar_why_europeans_should_stand_in_the_way_of_the

Tarek Megerisi meint dagegen, dass sich die Europäer dem Vormarsch der Libyschen Nationalarmee (LNA) von General Haftar auf Tripolis entgegen stellen sollten. Die Hoffnung, dass Haftar Libyen stabilisieren könnte, hält er für illusorisch. "The key point to understand is that Haftar is not as strong as he appears and cannot in the end deliver stability to Libya. He cannot make good on all the promises he has made either to his Libyan counterparts or to the international partners to whom he has promised preferential access and authoritarian stability. Despite the effective branding, Haftar is not actually in control of an army in the traditional sense of the term. The LNA is a shaky alliance between various militias of tribal, religious and local interests around a core of more traditional forces (who themselves are highly compromised by Salafist components.) (...) At this point, his forces are overextended, his finances stretched, and if he’s forced to fight, he may be more fragile than many realise. Indeed, his recent escalation was, in part, driven by these vulnerabilities and his need for quick success. In the end, Haftar has no unifying ideology on which to build a legitimate system of governance and no army to supplant the existing patchwork of militias and local forces controlling Libya. So, it is unlikely that any rule he concocts will be stable for long after his expansion ceases."

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08.03.2019

"France's strongman strategy in the Sahel"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_frances_strongman_strategy_in_the_sahel

Tarek Megerisi und Andrew Lebovich schreiben, dass Frankreich derzeit versucht, die Sahelzone durch die Unterstützung der dort herrschenden autoritären Regierungen zu stabilisieren. Langfristig könnte diese Strategie allerdings zu einer Stärkung extremistischer Kräfte führen, so ihre Warnung. "While this may look like Françafrique redux in which France controls or exerts undue influence on its African partners, the situation is in many ways more complicated than this. France is now highly dependent on auxiliaries and partners – be they national leaders or armed groups that patrol the borders of Mali and Niger. Such partnerships can have dangerous consequences, as can be seen when these auxiliaries commit human rights abuses or pursue policies that may threaten broader French stabilisation goals. Indeed, some of the instability in the region may partly result from these interventions and partnerships. (...) Each country in the region is facing a different kind of internal threat: worsening jihadist violence in Mali and Burkina Faso; a potential increase in militancy and trafficking in northern Niger; various rebellions in northern Chad; and now a return to violence in southern Libya. If the European – particularly French – response in each case is to merely reinforce authoritarian rule, it could inflame such militancy in the long run."

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27.02.2019

"Negative energy: Berlin’s Trumpian turn on Nord Stream 2"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_negative_energy_berlins_trumpian_turn_on_nord_stream_2

Gustav Gressel wirft der Bundesregierung wegen deren Festhalten an der Gaspipeline Nord Stream 2 vor, die sicherheitspolitischen Umstände des Projekts zu ignorieren und "Doppelstandards" zu offenbaren. "Germany has no capacity or domestic mandate to deal with the geopolitical fallout of its choices on Nord Stream 2. It cannot prevent Russia from absorbing Belarus, nor from escalating the war in Ukraine. In environmental and climate politics, German leaders often emphasise that one should not commit to policies whose ramifications one cannot control. But, in a mirror image of Trump’s approach to climate policy, Merkel simply bows to ideological stubbornness and the lobbying efforts of domestic industry and special interest groups.“

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22.02.2019

"Europe should do better on Venezuela"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europe_should_do_better_on_venezuela

Pawel Zerka lobt die bisherige Reaktion der EU auf die Krise in Venezuela, kritisiert aber zugleich, dass es keine gemeinsame Position der europäischen Regierungen gebe. "So far, the European Union has coped with the challenge surprisingly well. It has allowed its members a reasonable degree of flexibility in dealing with Venezuela. (...) However, there are clear limits to what the EU can achieve without establishing a common position on Venezuela. It failed to do so, largely as a result of Italy’s veto. (...) the EU’s lack of a unified position is becoming a serious practical and diplomatic handicap. Individual member states can impose limited sanctions on Maduro’s regime, such as travel bans and asset freezes. But it is hard for them to impose meaningful economic sanctions on Venezuela given the existence of the EU’s single market. Such measures are key to European efforts to place Maduro under real pressure."

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06.02.2019

"Russia, Germany, and the INF: Will Berlin break its silence?"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_russia_germany_and_the_inf_will_berlin_break_its_silence

Gustav Gressel warnt nach dem Ende des INF-Vertrags vor einer atomaren Überlegenheit Russlands in Europa und wirft der deutschen Politik vor, auf die drohende Gefahr nicht angemessen zu reagieren. "(...) Berlin has not yet come to terms with the seriousness of the situation and that wider parts of the political establishment do not feel threatened by Russia’s build-up of nuclear-capable carrier means. This, in turn, is causing further suspicion in European capitals that actually feel threatened. (...) It is not a matter of whether NATO should counter-deploy; instead the debate should focus on how to counter-deploy, and who should do this. For the moment there is no indication that the US would deploy intermediate-range systems to Europe other than the next generation cruise missiles deployed on submarines. (...). With submarine-based deterrence off the European coast, along with some rather symbolic freefall bombs in western Europe, the balance of risks and losses looks significantly different to how it did in 1985. But there is no idea in Europe of how to properly relink American and European security, what the burden-sharing within such an arrangement would look like, or what kind of capabilities the Europeans would have to increase on their own in order to change the stakes for Russia. Without an answer to these questions, Russian nuclear superiority over Europe will be a done deal."

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03.01.2019

"Top ten foreign policy trends in 2019"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_top_ten_foreign_policy_trends_in_2019

Mark Leonard und Jeremy Shapiro haben zehn außenpolitische Trends zusammengestellt, die das neue Jahr ihrer Erwartung nach prägen werden. "1. Trump takes control of US foreign policy (...) 2. The Democratic House impeaches Trump (...) 3. The North Korea “de-nuclearisation” process breaks down (...) 4. China applies to join the CP-TPP (...) 5. The Ukraine crisis flares up (...) 6. A global downturn triggers a financial crisis in Turkey (...) 7. Saudi Arabia reconciles with the US and Europe (...) 8. The WTO de facto collapses (...) 9. Populists begin a double movement (...) 10. Europe considers a digital tax (...) Bonus: Brexit neither succeeds or fails"

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03.12.2018

"The 'European army', a tale of wilful misunderstanding"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_european_army_a_tale_of_wilful_misunderstanding

Ulrike Esther Franke analysiert die aus ihrer Sicht von Missverständnissen geprägte Debatte über die Bildung einer Europäischen Armee und schreibt, dass viele Experten das Konzept am liebsten "begraben" würden. "Initially intended as a rallying point, the European army idea is thus becoming a liability. Many military and political experts have grown tired of the concept and would prefer to retire it quietly. But, as I argued in the latest episode of Sicherheitshalber, it is not enough for experts to reject the term and move on. (...) It would, therefore, be useful if politicians such as Macron or German Chancellor Angela Merkel could be more precise in their rhetorical support for the long-term vision of a European army: what do they want to achieve, and when? Such precisions would likely reveal that the French and the Germans already have significantly different interpretations of a European army which would be worth addressing. My sense is that the European army idea is similar in scope and ambition to the 'United States of Europe' or former US president Barack Obama’s 'Global Zero' (a world free of nuclear weapons). But, if the concept is a more substantive target for the current European defence procurement and coordination programmes, it is high time that European leaders explained what it would look like in greater detail."

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11.10.2018

"Russia, Ukraine, and the battle for religion"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_orthodox_redox_russia_ukraine_and_the_battle_for_religion

Der Konflikt zwischen Russland und der Ukraine hat sich nun auch auf die Religion ausgeweitet. Andrew Wilson berichtet, dass die orthodoxe Kirche der Ukraine auf einer Bischofskonferenz Schritte unternommen habe, um sich von der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche abzuspalten. "This is an event of potentially huge historical importance. It will add religion to language, war, and patriotism as factors consolidating Ukrainian national identity since 2014. Poroshenko thinks it will help sway his re-election in 2019. More than 12,000 of the Russian church’s almost 35,000 parishes are in Ukraine, and losing even a small number of these would be a terrific blow to Russia and to Vladimir Putin’s concept of a 'Russian world'. So catastrophic, in fact, that the Russian church is hardly likely to acquiesce quietly in the loss."

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04.10.2018

"Berlin’s untenable foreign-policy strategic vacuum"

https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_berlins_untenable_foreign_policy_strategic_vacuum

Josef Janning hält die deutsche Debatte über außenpolitische Strategien angesichts der Umbrüche in Europa und im internationalen System für "trivial". "Firstly, the European Union, though a principal framework of German policy, is more politically fragmented than ever, and lacks a stable centre. (...) Secondly, great power politics is transforming the multilateral system. (...) Thirdly, Europe’s and thus Germany’s neighbourhood has lost the fragile stability it once had. (...) The German strategic debate has yet to adapt to any of these challenges. Admittedly, neither Germany nor Europe has broken down under the pressure. But to take this as a guarantee for the future would be utterly naïve."

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