


Sweden

Introduction

Sweden, the biggest country in Scandinavia with a population of just under ten million people, is today a multicultural society. In recent years, the immigration of people in need of protection, family members of migrants already resident in the country, as well as foreign workers and international students, has increased. In addition, European Union (EU) citizens, Norwegians and Icelanders are free to settle and work in Sweden. While less than 60,000 people (foreign and Swedish nationals) immigrated to Sweden in 2000, annual immigration levels have been above 100,000 since 2012. In 2014, almost 127,000 people moved to Sweden. Following this trend, the share



Background Information

Capital⁷: Stockholm

Official languages: Swedish (and recognized minority languages Finnish, Meänkieli, Romani, Sami and Yiddish)

Area: 447,435 km²

Population (May 2015): 9,784,445

Population density (2014): 24 inhabitants per km²

Population growth (2014): 1.08%

Foreign-born population as a percentage of total population (2014): 16.5%

Labor force participation rate (2014): 66.2% (15 to 74-year-olds)

Percentage of foreign born in the labor force (2014): 16.7% (15 to 74-year-olds)

Unemployment rate: 7.9% (2014), 8.0% (2013), 8.0% (2012), 7.8% (2011), 8.6% (2010)

Religions: 64.6% Lutheran Christians, 35.4% other or no religious affiliation

of foreign-born residents among the total population has risen from around 11.3 percent in 2000 to roughly 16.5 percent in 2014.¹

Open Immigration Policy

Despite the fact that, since 2010, the xenophobic “Sweden Democrats” party (*Sverigedemokraterna*) has managed to strongly increase their presence in the political system, Sweden has so far maintained a relatively open immigration policy. In a factsheet about migration policy, the Swedish government confirmed in 2014 its ambition to maintain a “sustainable migration policy that safeguards the right to seek asylum and, within the framework of regulated immigration, facilitates mobility across borders, promotes demand-driven labor migration, harnesses and takes into account the effects of migration on development and deepens European and international cooperation.” It also affirmed its conviction that immigration “helps to revitalize the Swedish society, the labor market and the economy as immigrants bring new knowledge and experience from their countries of origin.”

Challenges

As a result of a strongly increasing number of asylum seekers arriving in Sweden in recent years, and subsequent immigration of family members of those asylum seekers who are granted protection, Sweden faces some challenges. There is a shortage of affordable housing for

newly arrived migrants, and it is also difficult for them to find jobs. Unemployment levels among immigrants from non-EU countries are high.³ Despite these challenges, Sweden's integration policies are still often considered successful, and even exemplary. Part of this can be attributed to the fact that Sweden has an outspoken policy of equal rights. All legal migrants who stay, or can be expected to stay, in Sweden for at least one year have access to health care, social security and other welfare benefits in the same way as Swedish nationals, regardless of where they come from and irrespective of the purpose of their stay.⁴ There has also been an ambition to increase the presence of people with a migration background and immigrants in public life, thus symbolizing the openness of the multicultural society. Not least, this is true for many mainstream media, such as public television, political parties, and the government. In the current government, which is based on a minority coalition of the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party, there are several ministers with a migration background.⁵

By comparison with the rest of Europe, Sweden takes in many refugees and actively encourages new labor migrants without prejudice to their qualifications. Recently, the Swedish Parliament introduced legislation aiming at encouraging circular migration, thus committing to facilitate inward and outward mobility.⁶

The country profile first looks at historical developments of migration to and from Sweden, followed by an overview on recent immigration trends. It then focuses on immigration policy placing special emphasis on labor migration and approaches to circular migration. Said chapters lead up to (statistical) information on Sweden's current immigrant population and the question on how to integrate immigrants into mainstream society – an issue that is closely related to possibilities of citizenship acquisition. Following this, the country profile draws a closer look at both refugee migration to Sweden, including the country's asylum and refugee protection policies, and irregular migration. Finally, future challenges with regard to immigration are discussed.

Historical Development of Migration

Migration Movements before the 20th Century

Sweden has existed within its present territorial boundaries since 1905. Prior to that, Sweden and Norway had been united under one monarch. The year of the dissolution of the union marked the end of the decline of Sweden from the status of major European empire with control over wide areas of Scandinavia as well as of the Baltic, Russia and Germany. At the time of the empire, which flourished in the 16th and 17th centuries, there had already been migration movements. In those days, Sweden was a multilingual, religious and ethnically heterogeneous kingdom, whose leaders supported immigration and regarded emigration as a loss.⁸ Immigrants with capital and spe-

cialist skills were especially welcome; they contributed to making Sweden an important political power in Europe. During the period when Sweden was a major power, 17 languages were spoken domestically.

The dissolution of the empires of Denmark-Norway and Sweden-Finland in the early 19th century created four nation states in Northern Europe that still exist today. A dominant majority population and a Lutheran state church emerged in each of the four states. Contrary to the period of the great powers, however, a sense of nationality based on ethnicity now emerged, with each ethnic group resorting to its own history and language.

Migration in the 20th Century

During the rapid industrialization of the early 20th century, waves of emigrants headed for the even faster-growing economies of Denmark and Norway, as well as America.

Social unrest, political conflicts and espionage between the warring powers during the First World War prompted the Nordic countries to tighten control of migratory movements, among other means by way of visa regulations and the creation of central state immigration authorities and registers of foreigners. About 1917 the Scandinavian countries took in refugees from the former Tsarist Empire and organized summer vacations for children from the territories of the former Habsburg monarchy. During the Second World War, in which Sweden was not directly involved, Sweden became a place of refuge for about 180,000 refugees, in particular from Finland, Norway, Estonia, Denmark and Germany.

In 1954, following the formation of the "Nordic Council", Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Iceland introduced a common labor market. Similar to the freedom of movement enjoyed by citizens of the more recently established EU, citizens of the northern European countries wishing to work in a Nordic partner country have since been able to move freely across internal borders without a work or residence permit. The agreement was also later joined by Finland. By then Sweden had developed into the North's leading economic and industrial nation. After the Second World War and until the early 1970s, labor migrants were actively recruited, first in the Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, Austria, Belgium and Greece, and later also in Hungary, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Bilateral agreements were concluded with Italy, Austria and Hungary, and the Swedish labor agency *Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen* opened recruitment agencies in Turin, Athens, Belgrade and Ankara.⁹ Many migrants also came from Finland, which at that time was less prosperous than Sweden. Unlike countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, the Swedish government did not pursue a "guest worker policy", but rather assumed from the outset that immigrant workers would stay, integrate and eventually become Swedish citizens.

In 1972/73 the recruitment of foreign workers was stopped as the economy slowed. Even after that, however, migratory movements continued. Instead of recruited workers, immigrants since then have mostly arrived to

join relatives already resident in Sweden (family reunification/family formation) and as people in need of protection (e.g. refugees).¹⁰ Since joining the European Union in 1995, the principle of freedom of movement for EU citizens has also applied to Sweden. In addition, Sweden has acceded to the Schengen Agreement, thus abolishing controls at borders with other signatories. As a result, Sweden today does not conduct border controls at any of its land borders.

Current Trends in Immigration

During recent years, immigration to Sweden reached record levels. In 2014, a total of 126,966 people came to Sweden and took residence in one of the 290 municipalities. This figure includes both people from other EU Member States, countries outside the EU and Swedish nationals who have lived abroad and returned to Sweden that year. As a rule, all persons who stay, or can be expected to stay in the country for at least one year are registered in the Swedish population registry, which serves as the basis for official population statistics, including immigration and emigration. Hence, tourists, seasonal workers, students from other countries or other groups of mobile people whose stay is only brief and temporary, are not included. More than 26,000 of the immigrants arriving in

Table 1: Immigration 2014 by country of birth

Country of birth	Number of immigrants
Syria	26,113
Sweden	15,194
Eritrea	5,322
Poland	5,138
Somalia	4,372
Afghanistan	3,436
Iraq	3,391
India	3,069
Finland	2,573
China	2,572
Other countries	55,786
Total	126,966

Source: Statistics Sweden [Statistiska Centralbyrån] (data from population registry).

2014 were refugees from Syria, and 15,000 were returning Swedes.

Emigration from Sweden was at a level of more than 51,000 people in 2014. It was thus on par with numbers last seen during the great wave of emigration to America at the beginning of the 20th century. Almost 63 percent of those who emigrated during 2014 were people who had previously migrated to Sweden. The remaining 37 percent were Swedes, the majority of whom emigrated to Norway, the USA, the United Kingdom and Denmark.


Immigration for Family Reasons

In recent years, family reunification and family formation have been the most common purpose of migration among immigrants coming to Sweden from countries outside the Nordic Council and the EU. Such persons often are close relatives of people who were once admitted as refugees. The examples of Syria and Somalia illustrate this clearly: of the 42,435 people who came to Sweden in 2014 as migrants for family reasons, 7,518 were Syrian nationals and 2,682 were from Somalia. These two nationality groups have also been among the predominant nationalities of asylum seekers in Sweden. A majority of all residence permits granted on the grounds of family reunification concerned so-called “newly established relationships”: Swedish citizens or foreigners resident in Sweden marrying a person of foreign nationality, who then acquires the right to permanent residency. In the remaining number of cases, a family relationship already existed before migration.

Immigration of European Union Citizens

Alongside family members of non-EU immigrants, persons from EU countries and countries within the European Economic Area (EEA)¹¹ are an important immigrant group. The biggest group among the EU and EEA citizens in 2014 were Poles, followed by people from Finland, Germany, Norway, Romania, the United Kingdom and Denmark.

The EU enlargement in May 2004 had an immediate impact on Sweden. Sweden was one of the few countries of the “old” EU not to put any transitional arrangements to limit the free movement of citizens of the “new” states into effect. Contrary to Germany or Austria, for example, people from the new member countries were immediately able to travel to Sweden and work there without first needing to apply for a work permit. When Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, Sweden did not introduce any restrictions either. That expansion once again resulted in a conspicuous increase in immigration, particularly from Romania. Many Romanian immigrants come from poor regions of their home country and belong to disadvantaged ethnic minorities. In Sweden, they often do not find ordinary work but try instead to make a living through begging. As this phenomenon did not previously exist in Sweden to any larger extent, there have been intensive public debates about EU migrants, begging and

Figure 1: Immigration 2014 by reason of granting a residence permit

Comment: Short, temporary stays, e.g. of asylum seekers or seasonal workers, or on the basis of a Schengen visa, are not included. “Other reasons” mainly includes people who have no right to stay in Sweden but who could not be returned to their country of origin. “Free movement rights EU/EEA” includes, for example, nationals of third-countries who have a long-term resident status in another EU Member State and moved further on to Sweden. EU citizens and Swedish nationals are included in Table 1, which is based on data from the population registry, but not in Figure 1, for which data on residence permits were used.

Source: Swedish Migration Agency [Migrationsverket] (data from residence permits database).

squatting, and a number of reports have been produced to study the causes of this phenomenon and possible reactions.¹² Some municipalities are now trying to engage EU migrants in community services and offer them temporary accommodation. At the same time, the Swedish government maintains talks with Romania and provides aid funds in order to improve the situation of disadvantaged minorities in Romania. A countrywide begging ban was also discussed but finally rejected.

Immigration of International Students

Foreign students also make up a significant proportion of new immigrants. During the academic year 2012-2013, almost one quarter (24 percent) of all people starting higher education at Swedish universities and university colleges came from other countries. Around 12,900 came from other EU-/EEA-countries, and a further 6,100 students came from third countries. Within the latter group, most foreign students came from China and India.¹³

Between 2005 and 2010, study-related immigration to Sweden increased strongly and steadily. In 2010, a total of 14,188 residence permits for study reasons were granted. In 2011 and 2012, however, the number of third-country nationals who were granted a residence permit for study

reasons was at a much lower level, mainly due to the introduction of tuition fees in 2011.¹⁴ That year, only 6,836 permits were granted. Since then, however, the numbers have been rising again. In 2013, 7,559 residence permits were granted, and 9,267 in 2014.¹⁵ The Swedish tuition fees still provoke controversy, however, not least because they only apply to incoming free-mover students. University education is still free of charge for students from EU countries, those who participate in official academic exchange programs, and people who have their usual residence within Sweden.

Labor Immigration

Labor immigration from countries outside the European Union also hovers at a considerable level despite the fact that it decreased slightly in 2013 and 2014. In 2012, a total of 19,936 labor migrants from third countries were granted a residence permit in Sweden. 19,292 such residence permits were granted in 2013, and 15,872 in 2014. Most labor immigrants in 2014, as in previous years, came from India, Thailand, China, Syria and Turkey.¹⁶ Thai citizens are a particularly strong group among la-

bor migrants because they come to Northern Sweden in late summer each year to work as seasonal laborers picking cranberries and cloudberries, prized as a delicacy. After a few weeks, at the end of the picking season, they leave again. Indian labor migrants often take temporary or more long-term employment as computing specialists.

Immigration Policy

Key Actors

The government, based in the capital city Stockholm, sets out the general guidelines for migration policy by proposing bills. It is then the responsibility of the Parliament (*Riksdag*) to pass, reject or amend proposed bills. The government can supplement laws with ordinances.

The Ministry of Justice is the government body responsible for migration policy. It is also responsible for certain aspects of integration policies, which are split between several other ministries but mainly lie within the responsibilities of the Ministry of Employment. Since 2014, Sweden does not have a minister for integration anymore since the governing parties decided that integration was

a cross-cutting topic which the government as a whole should take responsibility for.

The Swedish Migration Agency (*Migrationsverket*)¹⁷ is responsible for regulating immigration to Sweden. It processes all types of residence permit applications and decides on them. Further to this, it also decides on asylum cases, manages the reception system for asylum seekers (including the provision of housing and daily allowances), runs detention centers, and processes applications for Swedish citizenship. *Migrationsverket* has its headquarters in Norrköping but also maintains a large number of branch offices of varying size in many municipalities across the country. Border control is a responsibility of the Swedish Police.

Key Legislation

The legal system pertaining to migration in Sweden is governed by the Aliens Act (*Utlänningslagen*, Statute 2005:716), and emanating from that law, the Aliens Ordinance (*Utlänningsförordningen*, Statute 2006:97). The current Aliens Act took effect on 31 March 2006 and has subsequently been amended many times. Major policy shifts in recent years were the introduction of a new system for labor immigration in 2008, and the adoption by the *Riksdag* of several provisions aimed at encouraging circular migration to and from Sweden in 2014. Apart from these reforms, there has been a large number of minor amendments to the Aliens Act. Most of them were related to the implementation of binding EU legislation on asylum, border control and return, as well as legal immigration.

The Immigration of Workers and Circular Migration

Towards the end of 2008, new rules came into force concerning the immigration of workers from non-EU states. Most importantly, labor immigration has since been almost entirely dependent on the recruitment needs of Swedish employers; the controlling powers of government agencies have been restricted to a minimum, and labor immigration opportunities are open to workers of all skill levels. As compared to the previous governance of labor immigration, the Swedish Employment Agency no longer carries out economic needs tests (priority checks) to establish whether the immigration of foreign workers is economically necessary.

The Process of Hiring Foreign Labor

If employers have a vacancy, they are first obliged to advertise the vacancy publicly through the Employment Agency (*Arbetsförmedlingen*) and the EU job mobility portal EURES. If there is no response, or if an employer still prefers to recruit somebody from abroad, (s)he may employ a job applicant from any country in the world. After consulting the responsible trade union about the terms of employment, *Migrationsverket* handles the issuing of

a residence and work permit. The terms and conditions must be based on the applicable collective agreements or, in the absence of such agreements, on what is customary for the job in question. Residence and work permits are granted for the time of employment, or – in case the position is permanent – for a maximum of two years with the possibility of an extension. During the first two years, the residence permit is linked to a specific employer and a clearly defined occupation. After that, the foreign worker may change employer, but not occupation. After a total time of four years, a permanent residence permit can be granted which then allows for full access to the labor market.

Employers can recruit anybody, regardless of qualifications or skills. Thus, not only qualified migrants, but also workers with low skills or even none at all, may immigrate, if employers have the relevant vacancies. Labor migrants are given access to the same social rights as the rest of the country's population, provided that they are likely to stay for at least one year. They may also bring close relatives, i.e. spouses or partners as well as children up to the age of 21.¹⁸

Links between Labor Migration and the Asylum System

Another special feature of Swedish labor immigration policy is that the country dovetails the immigration of asylum seekers with labor migration. Asylum seekers normally have access to the labor market from the beginning of their stay in Sweden. When they are found not to be in need of protection they may apply, within two weeks from receiving a final negative decision on their asylum claim, for a residence permit for work purposes. It is issued whenever an asylum seeker has been working for at least four months before rejection and the employer guarantees that the contract continues. The type of work, and whether it is full-time or not, does not matter as long as the working conditions are in line with Swedish collective agreements and the monthly salary is at least 13,000 SEK (approx. 1,400 Euro). This possibility of “status change” was originally introduced in 2008, and further facilitated in 2014. Under the old rules, failed asylum seekers had to be employed for at least six months by the same company in order to qualify for a status change.¹⁹

Controversies and Reactions

The demand-driven Swedish approach to labor immigration, which the OECD has labelled “the most open labor migration system among OECD countries”,²⁰ is not uncontroversial, however. There are two main lines of criticism. One main topic of public debate has been the misuse of the system by untrustworthy employers. There have been numerous reports, for example, about employers paying their immigrant workers lower wages than originally promised. There were also reports on alleged cases of employers accepting money from applicants for giving them a job and thus making it possible for them to receive a residence permit in Sweden. In May 2013, the Swedish Trade

Union Confederation (LO) published an extensive report, documenting such issues.²¹ Another frequent criticism is that a substantial share of labor immigration takes places in sectors where there is no shortage of domestic labor.²²

Reacting to such criticism, the *Migrationsverket* iteratively introduced stricter requirements for the recruitment of foreign workers to certain industrial branches. Since 2012, businesses in the cleaning, hotel and restaurant, service, construction, staffing, commerce, agriculture and forestry, and automobile repair sectors, as well as all new enterprises, have to prove *ex ante* that they can actually pay regular salaries during the foreseen employment periods. In 2014, the Parliament passed an amendment to the Aliens Act, making it possible for the Migration Agency to carry out post-arrival checks on employers to verify whether admitted third-country nationals really start working, and whether businesses comply with the terms offered. To compensate for these additional checks, trustworthy employers that frequently hire job-seekers from third countries can now get certified, which means that the Migration Agency ensures a quick processing of applications for residence permits. Electronic applications from foreign workers with a job offer from a certified employer are now often decided upon within five days.

Table 2 displays the ten main occupational categories among incoming workers from third countries in 2014, as

compared to 2013. It shows that, overall, the number of immigrating workers in occupations requiring a high level of skills has tended to increase modestly, while the number of third-country nationals coming to work in low-skill jobs (such as “helpers in restaurants” and “helpers and cleaners”) has decreased substantially. This can be seen as a result of the stricter requirements mentioned above.

Approaches to Circular Migration

Apart from this system for labor immigration, Sweden also receives self-employed people (business owners) on relatively generous terms.²³ The country also has an interesting policy regarding circular migration. In 2009, the government appointed an independent parliamentary committee to examine the connection between circular migration and development. The final report of the committee, published in 2011, included several proposals, including allowing longer periods of absence from Sweden without the loss of residency, providing public support to diaspora groups and their development-related projects in other countries, establishing a website enabling migrants to compare fees for remittances back to their home countries, and achieving better coherence between migration and development strategies.²⁴ One of the outcomes of the report was a government bill, which was enacted by

Table 2: Work permits granted to workers from abroad, 2013 and 2014 (Top-10 occupational categories)

Employment category	2013	2014
Agricultural, fishery and related laborers	5,915	2,885
Computing professionals	3,477	2,525
IT architects, system analysts and test managers		903
Housekeeping and restaurant service workers	830	666
Architects, engineers and related professionals	415	424
Helpers in restaurants	470	364
Physical and engineering science technicians	267	335
Helpers and cleaners	397	208
Business professionals	190	199
Personal care and related workers	282	189
Total (all occupations, excluding family members of labor migrants)	15,357	12,094

Comment: Please note that before 2014, computing professionals and IT architects, system analysts and test managers were regarded as the same occupational category.

Source: Swedish Migration Agency [Migrationsverket].

Parliament in 2014 and aims at facilitating circular mobility to and from Sweden. Since then, a permanent residence permit is only revoked when a migrant stays outside Sweden for two years or more, and labor immigrants with temporary residence permits are allowed to spend certain periods of time outside Sweden and still be able to qualify for a permanent residence permit seven years after their first entry to Sweden. With this reform, Sweden made once again clear that it does not trust “managed” policies for circular migration, which, for example, allow labor migrants to stay for a predetermined period of time only. Instead, from the Swedish perspective, the migrants themselves shall be able to decide. If they want to leave and come back, they may do so; if they want to stay, that is also an option.²⁵

The Immigrant Population

Today (2015), around 1,603,551 people, or 16.5 percent of the Swedish population, were born abroad. A large number of them have come from neighboring Nordic countries. However, the number of immigrants from other European countries, Africa and Asia has recently grown significantly (see Figure 2). In 1970, the proportion of people born abroad in relation to the total population was just over one third of what it is today.²⁶

Most immigrants live in and around the cities of Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö, with smaller numbers in Örebro, Uppsala, Jönköping, Kalmar and Södertälje. By

contrast, the proportion of immigrants on the island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea, as well as in the northwestern and northern provinces of Sweden, is relatively small, although there are immigrants and refugees even in the extreme north, often running pizzerias or kiosks.


Integration Policy

Swedish integration policy has internationally been regarded both as one of the most ambitious and successful.²⁷ In the public discourse, achievements and challenges with regard to the integration of migrants are largely framed in terms of practical issues: jobs, housing, language acquisition and the take-up of social benefits.²⁸ While the Scandinavian welfare state is today an eager advocate of free trade and a liberal market economy and also accepts growing income inequality, it still boasts a relatively large public sector offering comprehensive social security systems. These are available to all registered inhabitants, irrespective of their nationality. Equality, solidarity, cooperation and consensus are core aspects of this system, which has, however, come under scrutiny many times in recent years.

Challenges Regarding Immigrant Integration

Strongly increasing immigration, especially since 2010, has raised questions as to whether the Swedish labor market has been strong enough to absorb newly arrived

Figure 2: Foreign-born residents in Sweden, 1970-2014



Source: Statistiska Centralbyrån [Statistics Sweden] (2014), S. 133 and Statistiska Centralbyrån [Statistics Sweden] (2015), Table »Utrikes födda efter födelseland och invandringsår 31 december 2014« (online publication).

migrants. There is also a severe lack of affordable housing. While this has been a problem in the larger metropolitan areas within Sweden for a long time, even less dynamic municipalities in remoter regions now face serious shortages. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the Swedish Migration Agency normally uses ordinary apartments as accommodation for asylum seekers. Those who are granted protection are required to move out of the Agency's reception facilities, but in practice, they will most often need the same type of housing even after the asylum procedure. Thus, there is competition between similar groups of newly arrived migrants at different stages of the immigration process for a more and more limited segment of the housing market.²⁹ Other groups with financial means below average, such as pensioners, students and young people leaving their parents' households, also compete in the same market segment. As a result of not being able to find affordable housing or work, many refugees with an established right to stay risk getting stuck in the reception system for asylum seekers, and in passivity. The government now envisages that 250,000 new, cheap rental apartments be built until 2020.³⁰ Efforts to speed up and facilitate labor market integration are also being discussed.

In earlier periods, such as during the 1960s and 1970s, immigrants had less difficulty finding jobs and a place to stay in Sweden. To be attractive as employers, companies with labor needs sometimes provided recruited immigrants with accommodation and trade unions assisted with integration measures. In school, children from foreign families had the right to be taught in their mother tongue for a certain number of hours a week. This still exists, but due to a lack of resources and the broad variety of languages spoken among immigrants today, municipalities are sometimes not able to provide sufficient mother tongue tuition. Municipal libraries have also played an important role for integration, in earlier times by, for example, purchasing lexicons, newspapers and books in the major immigrant languages.³¹ Today, they are popular among newly arrived migrants also because they offer access to computers and free internet.

Political Thought Guiding Integration Policies

In the 1960s and 1970s, Sweden was markedly influenced by social democratic thought, and policies were based on the assumption, that immigrants would stay. As early as 1968, the egalitarian approach already outlined was anchored in the first governmental bill about immigrant policy objectives: immigrants were to have the opportunity to achieve the same living standards as the rest of the population.³² It was argued that immigrants were to have the right to maintain the language and culture of their country of origin, but that the state needed not actively support this; rather, the migrants themselves were able to attend to the matter.³³ In 1975, the government granted foreign residents the active and passive right to vote in municipal and provincial parliament elections. Third-country nationals may participate in elections after three years of legal residence in Sweden. EU citizens,

Norwegians and Icelanders have this right after only 30 days of residence in Sweden if they notify their municipality about their wish to vote.

In the 1980s and 1990s, when the influx of refugees and family members migrating to Sweden for reunification was growing, the image of generosity and equality that had developed over the years was increasingly felt to be a burden. The government felt obliged to demonstrate that Sweden was able to restrict immigration. Stricter immigration control was now deemed a prerequisite for successful integration. In line with restrictions in asylum and immigration legislation introduced at the time, the strategy adopted with regard to integration was also changed; whereas previously multiculturalism had been stressed and at times fostered by the state, this policy was considered to have accentuated cultural differences between Swedes and immigrants, thereby gradually reinforcing mental and social boundaries. The new policy was intended, instead, to play down such differences, stress similarities and focus on social cohesion.³⁴

As a result, asylum seekers recognized in Sweden as refugees or granted a residence permit for humanitarian reasons must today, if they do not want the integration benefits be cut, attend an obligatory "Swedish for Immigrants" course, which is offered and paid for by the municipality in which they take residence. The course not only aims to teach the Swedish language but to provide knowledge of the social system and Swedish traditions. It concludes with an examination, which is deemed an important requirement for finding a job. The policy also considers the best form of integration into Swedish society to be rapid integration into the labor market. Education and training, as well as active job placement, are therefore of the utmost priority in today's integration policy. There are a number of apprentice- and internship initiatives and the state also subsidizes employment for people who have been unemployed, so-called "step-in" jobs (*instegsjobb*). Still, much remains to be done with regard to labor market participation. The unemployment rate among third-country nationals was almost 30 percent in 2012, more than three times as high as for Swedish nationals,³⁵ and further to this, there are also signs of a massive brain waste, with newly arrived migrants often performing work far below their levels of qualification.³⁶

"All Sweden" Policy

To prevent disproportionate concentrations of the immigrant population in certain places, the government once attempted to disperse newly arrived asylum seekers and recognized refugees throughout the country under what was known as the "All Sweden" policy. This was intended to counteract a strong trend in more remote regions, especially in central and northern Sweden, towards ageing populations and the de-population of smaller towns as a consequence of young people moving to the cities and the South of the country. In the course of the last decade, however, the "All Sweden" policy has brought about a dilemma: municipalities in regions suffering from emigration and ageing declared their readiness to take

in asylum seekers and refugees; however, there was often a shortage of jobs in such places, with the result that migrants accommodated there often tried to move on to bigger cities as quickly as possible. In cities such as Gothenburg, Malmö or Stockholm there may indeed be more jobs available, but there is limited low-cost housing, leading to an increased concentration of migrants crowded into the suburbs, which contributes to social tension. High-rise buildings in the suburbs of Stockholm and other cities are symbolic of this situation, having been erected between 1965 and 1975 under the so-called “Million Program” (*Miljonprogrammet*). Today some of these areas are run-down. As the rents are comparatively low, many socially disadvantaged groups live there, such as migrants, low-income single parents and poor pensioners. Social scientists speak of this as marginalization and social segregation.³⁷ Today, the “All Sweden” approach has been softened. There is no mandatory distribution system for asylum seekers, but all municipalities are encouraged to provide accommodation for asylum seekers. Those who have relatives or friends in Sweden may however choose to stay with them. In order to counteract segregation, the central government pressures the wealthier municipalities in the metropolitan areas of Stockholm and other bigger cities to receive asylum seekers.

Citizenship

Since 2001 Sweden has had a fairly liberal law on citizenship. It emphasizes both elements of the right to nationality based on parentage and the principle of birthright citizenship. According to the parentage principle (*ius sanguinis*), it is the parents’ citizenship that is decisive as to which citizenship is conferred upon the child at birth. If a Swedish woman gives birth to a child, then that child automatically receives Swedish citizenship.

In addition to *ius sanguinis*, there are strong elements of the principle of birthright citizenship (*ius soli*) as well as a generous possibility of acquiring citizenship by naturalization. Any foreigner resident in Sweden for at least five years who is of full legal age, provides proof of his or her identity, possesses a permanent residence permit and has committed no criminal act can apply for Swedish citizenship. Language skills or special knowledge of the state and social systems are not required. There are even exceptions applicable to the minimum residence period of five years: stateless persons or recognized refugees can apply for Swedish citizenship after three or four years in Sweden, respectively. Danes, Finns, Icelanders and Norwegians can even become Swedes after two years of residence. Whereas the earlier Swedish law did not permit dual citizenship, since 2001 foreigners have been able to retain their former citizenship when acquiring Swedish citizenship. Dual (and multiple) citizenship is accepted without exceptions.³⁸

Between 2009 and 2013, almost 200,000 people who were previously citizens of another country or who have been stateless, acquired Swedish citizenship.³⁹ In 2015, a number of minor changes to the Swedish Citizenship

Act came into force. The Citizenship Act now includes a preamble stating that Swedish citizenship stands for affinity with Sweden and links all citizens. It also states that Swedish citizenship consists of rights and responsibilities. In addition, all Swedish municipalities are now obliged to hold annual citizenship ceremonies for new citizens in order to celebrate their new citizenship. This change to the nationality law was intended to emphasize the symbolic value of becoming a Swedish citizen.

In addition to these provisions, which mainly aim at clarifying the significance of Swedish citizenship, rules regarding the automatic acquisition of citizenship at birth were changed so that a child now always acquires Swedish citizenship at birth if one of the child’s parents is a Swedish citizen. Before this reform, the child of a Swedish man and a foreign woman could not automatically become a Swedish citizen if the child was born abroad or the parents were not married. Children and young people’s opportunities to obtain Swedish citizenship were also improved. Children of foreign citizens can now become Swedish citizens if they are under 18 years old and have resided in Sweden for at least three years with a permanent residence permit. Young people between 18 and 21 years can acquire Swedish citizenship if they have resided in Sweden with permanent residence since the age of 13.⁴⁰

Asylum and Refugees

Despite its relative geographical remoteness, Sweden is a main destination country for people seeking protection in the European Union. In 2014, roughly 81,300 applications were registered in Sweden, an increase by almost 50 percent compared to the year before, when 54,259 applications were counted. The 2014 figure represents the highest number since 1992, when roughly 84,000 people applied for asylum in Sweden, mainly due to the war in former Yugoslavia.

In a comparative European perspective, while Sweden had the second highest number of asylum applicants in 2014 after Germany (202,815), it ranked top if counted per capita (8.4 applicants per thousand inhabitants). The five largest groups among asylum seekers coming to Sweden in 2014 were Syrian nationals (38 percent of all asylum seekers), Eritreans (14 percent), stateless persons (ten percent) as well as people from Somalia (six percent) and Afghanistan (four percent).⁴²

Reception and Accommodation of Asylum Seekers

Against the background of the strongly increasing numbers of asylum seekers in recent years, topics such as reception arrangements, integration measures, and the unbalanced distribution of asylum seekers among EU Member States,⁴³ have been much debated in Swedish society. Sweden has a comprehensive reception and accommodation system for incoming asylum seekers which during times of high numbers is put under pressure. The reception system is mainly managed by the Migration

Agency. While an application is under consideration, the applicant is enrolled at a reception unit, which will help him/her with accommodation and expenses during the waiting period. There are two different main types of accommodation: In most cases, accommodation is provided by the Migration Agency in an apartment in a normal housing area, rented by the Migration Agency anywhere in the country, or at a reception centre. The asylum applicants receive daily allowances in cash if they cannot support themselves. Urgent medical care is also provided, and families stay together and usually do not share a flat with other asylum applicants. Swedish municipalities decide for themselves whether they wish to take in asylum seekers, and, if so, how many each year, and sign an agreement with the Migration Agency. There is no mandatory distribution key. When ordinary places offered by municipalities are not sufficient, however, the Migration Board may rent temporary accommodation for asylum seekers on the free market, without consulting municipalities. These can be youth hostels, hotels, military barracks and other suitable facilities, including holiday homes, located anywhere in the country.

As an alternative to stay in accommodation provided by the Migration Agency, asylum seekers also have the possibility to arrange their own accommodation. Since applicants usually do not have the financial means to pay


the rent for a flat, they often stay with friends or relatives in such cases. Those who choose to reside with friends or family members receive a financial allowance similar to the allowance for those staying in accommodation provided by the state.⁴⁴

On the one hand, this reception system ensures relative flexibility in times of fluctuating numbers of asylum seekers and encourages a distribution across the whole country. On the other hand, however, it also provides fuel for recurrent political conflicts, as there is a tendency for wealthier municipalities in and around Stockholm, as well as in the South of Sweden, to be less willing to provide housing for asylum seekers than poorer municipalities in smaller town and remoter areas. The government has been trying to counteract this by providing financial incentives for those municipalities who accept more asylum seekers than the average. Time and again, however, mandatory distribution keys have been proposed.

Decisions on Asylum Applications

In 2014, the Swedish Migration Agency made decisions on 53,503 asylum applications, roughly 3,000 more than in 2013. In 31,220 cases (58 percent), the decision was positive. Among all positive decisions, refugee status was granted in 34 percent of the cases and subsidiary protec-

Figure 3: Number of new asylum applications, 2005-2014



Source: Swedish Migration Agency [Migrationsverket].

tion in 59 percent. In another five percent of the cases, a residence permit was granted due to particularly distressing circumstances.

Among the ten most relevant citizenship groups among asylum seekers, Syrian nationals had the highest proportion of positive decisions, 90 percent. If one excludes cases in which the Migration Agency did not consider the application materially, for example due to the responsibility of another European country for the examination of the application ("Dublin cases"), then almost 100 percent of all Syrian applicants were granted protection. Also Eritreans had a very high protection rate in cases in which the application was to be examined in Sweden.

Other important nationality groups with high shares of positive decisions were stateless asylum seekers (80 percent) and Afghans (60 percent). By way of contrast, citizens of Albania and Serbia were in almost all cases not found to be in need of protection.⁴⁵

Unaccompanied Minors

A comparative analysis of asylum applications reveals another striking feature; the number of unaccompanied minors among asylum seekers is very high in Sweden, if counted in relation to the country's population. In 2014, the number of minors arriving in Sweden without parents or guardians was almost five times as high as in 2008. 7,050 unaccompanied minors applied for protection in Sweden that year. This was the highest number across the EU. In Germany, which registered the second highest number, there were 4,400 such minors.⁴⁶ The question why Sweden apparently is an attractive destination for unaccompanied minors is not easy to answer, as there is no objective evidence. It can be assumed, however, that relatively good standards of accommodation and care, fair perspectives of being granted protection and the generally child-friendly climate in Sweden, act as pull factors.⁴⁷

Resettlement

In addition to people who come to Sweden and apply for asylum there, the country also has a long tradition of receiving refugees via official state-managed resettlement. The government sets an annual quota, and on this basis, the Migration Agency, in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), selects displaced persons or refugees in countries of origin or transit countries for protection and residence in Sweden. In recent years, the quota has been 1,900 refugees per year. In 2014, refugees were mainly resettled from Iran, Egypt, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Lebanon, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Israel and Turkey, and the largest nationality groups were Syrians, Afghans and Eritreans. Before resettled refugees arrive, they receive cultural orientation about life in Sweden, and it is established in which municipality each person will take residence. This is based on agreements between municipalities and the Migration Agency. Remoter regions of Sweden that are

scarcely populated and often face de-population, mainly in the north and northwest of the country, are especially active in providing housing for resettled refugees.⁴⁸

Irregular Migration

Quantifying the Irregular Immigrant Population

To quantify the extent of irregular migration to Sweden is a difficult task. An inquiry committee that was tasked by the government in 2010 to present proposals on how to regulate access to health care and medical services for asylum seekers and undocumented migrants estimated that there were between 10,000 and 35,000 migrants staying in Sweden without valid residence permits or visas.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, the Migration Agency assumes that most undocumented migrants who come to Sweden apply for asylum after arrival. When they are rejected, they often abscond in order to avoid forced return. It also happens that asylum seekers go into hiding to avoid to be transferred to other EU Member States under the Dublin regulation.⁵⁰ In 2014, the Swedish Migration Agency handed more than 11,000 cases over to the police for forced return, mostly rejected asylum seekers. 7,350 of them subsequently disappeared from their registered places of residence, which means that removals could not be enforced. If it is assumed that this happens in several thousand cases each year, Sweden may gradually build up a growing stock of irregular migrants. It is very unclear, however, if all rejected migrants who abscond really stay in Sweden. As the country belongs to the Schengen area, and is surrounded by other Schengen states, there are no border controls at land borders. Hence, it is impossible to know whether disappeared persons are hiding within the country, or have left Sweden for other countries. It is of course also virtually impossible to monitor arrivals. Some migrants may enter Sweden without giving notice to authorities.

In general, it can be assumed, however, that the number of irregular migrants in Sweden is smaller than in central or south European countries. This is attributable to the fact that Swedish society leaves little room for irregular stays.⁵² The Scandinavian welfare state stands out by, among other things, having a comprehensive and detailed record of the population. All citizens and legal immigrants have a personal identification number comprising the date of birth and four further digits that clearly identifies each person in the municipal tax registers.⁵³ Without such a number it is not possible to open a bank account, receive social security benefits or claim other social services, or apply for a telephone line. This makes it difficult to live without legal residence status, and due to the cold Scandinavian climate, it is not possible to live on the street during most of the year. In addition, a high degree of unionization among Swedish workers makes it difficult for an irregular worker to remain undetected.

Regularization

In 2005, Parliament reformed Swedish asylum law; thereby bringing Sweden in line with EU asylum legislation that had entered into force in previous years. In this context, a measure was introduced for regularizing rejected asylum seekers and people living in Sweden for some years under a deportation order that had not yet been carried out. Those concerned were given the right to submit a new application for asylum by March 2006. The Migration Board was required to apply particularly flexible criteria when assessing these follow-up applications. According to the Migration Agency, about 30,000 applications were submitted, of which just 60 percent were approved. The approval right was as high as 96 percent for applicants from countries to which it was impossible to carry out deportations.⁵⁴

Access to Health Care and Education

Access for irregular migrants to health care and education for undocumented children have been important topics of discussion in Sweden. As equal access to social services is an important issue, as are children's rights, a new law entered into force in Sweden in July 2013, giving irregular migrants access to basic health care on the same terms as registered asylum seekers. At the same point in time, it was also clarified by law that children without legal residence in Sweden have the same right to education as legal residents. Both issues were previously not legally regulated.

Future Challenges

In sum, Swedish policies on immigration, integration and asylum are characterized by a progressive and pragmatic stance, an overall positive view of migration and its possible effects on Swedish society, and a willingness to help people fleeing from war and persecution. Important attributes of the Swedish approach are equal treatment, trust in market economy values, and humanism. The factual immigration flows to Sweden during recent years show that many migrants use the immigration channels that Sweden has opened up for them. There are, however, some serious concerns.

High Numbers of Asylum Seekers

The exceptionally high numbers of asylum seekers that arrived in Sweden in 2013, 2014 and in the course of 2015 have created bottlenecks in the reception system and challenges with regard to integration capacities. On the one hand, the Swedish Migration Agency has so far been able to cope with the task of processing a rising number of applications and to provide the newly-arrived with a roof over their heads, also because the central government has been willing to increase funding on short notice and allowing the Migration Agency to employ hun-

dreds of new case-workers. On the other hand, there is a severe lack of affordable housing and jobs. Not being able to find a permanent place of residence or work, many refugees with an established right to stay get stuck in the reception system for asylum seekers, and in passivity. Recently, the government has announced a number of new integration measures and investments into the construction of new houses. In some regions, pilot projects have been started to quickly assess the qualifications of newly arrived asylum seekers, and to offer them internships and complementary education in order to absorb them into public sector jobs where additional manpower is needed, especially in hospitals and retirement homes. Meanwhile, the issue of brain waste, with newly arrived migrants often performing work far below their levels of qualification, also needs to be addressed.

Public Discourse: Shifting to the Right?

When it comes to the public discourse about immigration, Sweden is, in a comparative perspective, characterized by a high degree of political correctness. Politicians, journalists, academics and other public figures often take pride in emphasizing the fact that Sweden has received, in relation to the size of the country's population, more asylum seekers than any other country in the European Union, and that there were no refugee crisis if other countries acted like Sweden.⁵⁵ There is also a tendency towards highlighting, sometimes from a standpoint of moral superiority, Swedish openness and generosity in comparison to restrictive policies and "nationalist" approaches in neighboring Nordic countries, especially in Denmark, and elsewhere in Europe. However, a parallel discourse is on the rise in Sweden, predominantly taking place outside mass media, in blogs, discussion fora and social media, for example, where immigration can be openly depicted as a burden on the welfare state, and as a threat to social cohesion. In this line of thought, politicians and government agencies are accused of ignoring the many "problems" associated with immigration and asylum, to lie about its costs, and to neglect the needs of Sweden-born workers and pensioners. Along these lines of argument, the radical right-wing "Sweden Democrats" (*Sverigedemokraterna*) are gaining increasing support among the electorate. While they have been represented in municipal and regional bodies for many years, they recently managed to establish themselves both in the European Parliament and, with almost 13 percent of the votes, in the Swedish *Riksdag*. There, they hold a key position. As neither the governing red-green coalition nor the center-right and liberal block hold a majority in Parliament, the Sweden Democrats can, each time a government bill is voted, chose to either help the governing coalition to pass it, or join the opposition and make the government fail. This role gives them a lot of public attention, and the media now increasingly accept the party's representatives as "normal" politicians and frequently invite them to debate shows and news programs. Thus, while the Sweden Democrats have long been isolated and labeled as ex-

tremists, they have now become house-trained. It is thus very likely that their influence on the design of policies will further increase and that, at some point in the future, they may even become part of a coalition government.

Meanwhile, the established parties attempt to bolster the high levels of immigration with a functioning integration policy and to correct deficiencies. The situation is particularly urgent in the so-called “problem suburbs” of the bigger cities, where problems such as unemployment, a lack of prospects, a feeling of being sidelined and neglected, and hopelessness among the young people sometimes spill over into attacks on the police, vandalism and arson. Moreover, jobs will need to be created, the housing market to be improved and the recognition of foreign skills and qualifications facilitated.

Future prospects

If the Swedish municipalities, the central government, civil society and economic actors manage to resolve these challenges, recent immigration to Sweden may become a success story; the Scandinavian country could stand out as a role model for being able to absorb and integrate a high number of migrants, and for treating them fair. If they fail, and the upswing for the xenophobic Sweden Democrats continues, as it already did for similar parties in neighboring Denmark, Norway and Finland, Sweden might turn towards a more restrictive and less idealistic approach on immigration.

In autumn 2015, reacting to unprecedented inflows of asylum seekers and increasingly skeptical public opinion, the Swedish government announced a number of policy changes. During the month of October 2015, almost 40,000 people applied for asylum in Sweden, and it became obvious that the provision of sufficient accommodation, even by means of temporary solutions, had become almost impossible. Despite quick recruitment of new officers, the Migration Agency barely managed to register all arriving refugees. The Minister of Justice, Morgan Johansson, declared on 5 November that Sweden could no longer guarantee all new applicants a roof over their heads, and the Minister of Finance, Magdalena Andersson, called on refugees to stay in Germany instead of travelling on to Sweden. The minority government reached an agreement with the center-right opposition parties, which foresees, among other measures, shorter processing times for asylum requests, a harsher approach to rejected asylum seekers and the granting of temporary residence permits, instead of permanent ones, to single adult refugees and couples without children. Claiming that the pressure on the Swedish asylum system was disproportionately high, the government also issued a plea to the EU to relocate people in need of protection from Sweden to other Member States.⁵⁶

On 24 November 2015, the minority government announced further plans for a more restrictive approach to international protection. Swedish asylum law were to be adapted to minimum standards as required by EU directives. More generous Swedish standards were to be

phased out. Asylum seekers would also be required to present identity documents when boarding trains, busses or ferries to Sweden from other EU Member States.

Notes

- ¹ Source: Statistics Sweden.
- ² Government Offices of Sweden (2014).
- ³ In June 2015, approximately 6.5 percent of the Swedish-born population was unemployed. Among foreign-born people, unemployment was 17.4 percent. Source: Statistics Sweden.
- ⁴ Swedish Migration Board (2014).
- ⁵ <http://www.government.se/government-of-sweden/> (accessed: 8-24-2015).
- ⁶ European Commission/European Migration Network (2015), p. 72.
- ⁷ Sources of Background Information: Statistics Sweden, Eurostat (unemployment rate), Church of Sweden (religions).
- ⁸ Cf. Kjeldstadli (2011); Harrison (2015).
- ⁹ Cf. Kjeldstadli (2011), p. 64.
- ¹⁰ Cf. Migrationsverket (2009a).
- ¹¹ Apart from the EU countries, Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein are also members of the EEA.
- ¹² E.g. Länsstyrelsen i Stockholm (2014).
- ¹³ Universitetskanslersämbetet (2014), pp. 60f.
- ¹⁴ Cf. Swedish Migration Board (2012), p. 22.
- ¹⁵ Source: Swedish Migration Agency.
- ¹⁶ Swedish Migration Agency (2015a), p. 19.
- ¹⁷ In 2015, this authority changed its official English name from Swedish Migration Board to Swedish Migration Agency.
- ¹⁸ Swedish Migration Board (2013), p. 11.
- ¹⁹ For further information on “status changes” from asylum to immigration, see Parusel (2015) and Parusel (2014).
- ²⁰ OECD (2011), p. 11.
- ²¹ LO (2013).
- ²² Cf. Bevelander et al. (2014).
- ²³ For more information on the conditions of entry and stay for self-employed people, see Swedish Migration Agency (2015c).
- ²⁴ SOU (2011a).
- ²⁵ Parusel (2015), pp. 149f.
- ²⁶ Statistiska Centralbyrån (2014), p. 113.
- ²⁷ In the 2015 edition of the “Migrant Integration Policy Index” (MIPEX), Sweden ranked first among a total of 38 countries examined, see <http://www.mipex.eu/>. For other analyses and more information on Swedish Integration policies, see e.g. Hammar (2003), p. 238; Statistiska Centralbyrån (2013), p. 127-130.
- ²⁸ Andersson/Weinar (2014), p. 9.
- ²⁹ Boverket (2015), p. 7.
- ³⁰ “Här är regeringens strategi för hållbart asylmottagande”, Dagens Nyheter, 15. July 2015.
- ³¹ Cf. Benito (2007), p. 336.
- ³² Cf. Dahlström (2006), p. 16.
- ³³ Cf. Dahlström (2006), p. 16 and Soininen (1999), p. 687.
- ³⁴ Cf. Hammar (2003), pp. 244f.
- ³⁵ European Commission/European Migration Network (2014), p. 81.
- ³⁶ Migrationsverket (2013), p. 21.
- ³⁷ Cvetkovic (2009), pp. 101f.

³⁸For more detailed information about Swedish citizenship law and practice, see Bernitz (2012), p. 10-16.

³⁹Source: Eurostat.

⁴⁰If the young person between 18 and 21 is stateless, Swedish citizenship can be acquired if the child has been residing in Sweden since the age of 15. For further details, see Swedish Migration Agency (2015a), p. 26 and <http://www.migrationsverket.se/English/Private-individuals/Becoming-a-Swedish-citizen.html>.

⁴¹European Commission/European Migration Network (2015), p. 11.

⁴²Swedish Migration Agency (2015a), p. 10.

⁴³Regarding the unbalanced distribution of asylum seekers across the EU, see e.g. Parusel (2015b).

⁴⁴Swedish Migration Agency (2015a), p. 32.

⁴⁵Swedish Migration Agency (2015a), p. 33.

⁴⁶European Commission/European Migration Network (2015), p. 24.

⁴⁷For more information on unaccompanied minors fleeing to Europe, see e.g. Parusel (2015c), and specifically on unaccompanied minors in Sweden, see Çelikaksoy and Wadensjö (2015).

⁴⁸Swedish Migration Agency (2015a), pp. 35f. See also the country page about Sweden at <http://www.resettlement.eu/country/sweden>.

⁴⁹SOU (2011b), p. 31.

⁵⁰Migrationsverket (2011), p. 2.

⁵¹Source: Swedish Migration Agency (2015b), p. 20.

⁵²Geddes (2003), pp. 110f.

⁵³A precondition to the issuing of a personal identification number is obligatory registration with the Tax Agency at the relevant municipality. Upon registration the following personal data are stored: name, age, sex, marital status, spouse and children below legal age (if applicable), town of birth, country of birth, nationality, date of immigration or emigration with country of origin and destination, current address. Municipal tax registers can be accessed by other government organizations.

⁵⁴Migrationsverket (undated press release): Resultat av den tillfälliga lagen om prövning av beslut om av- och utvisning, Norrköping: Migrationsverket.

⁵⁵In the run-up to the last parliamentary election in 2014, then prime minister Fredrik Reinfeldt called Sweden a "humanitarian superpower", see "En öppenjärtig Reinfeldt", Dagens Nyheter, 17 August 2014. As another example, see "Tala med stolthet om Sveriges insats", Svenska Dagbladet, 22 August 2015.

⁵⁶"Flüchtlingskrise in Schweden: 'Die Aufnahmeeuphorie nimmt ab'", *Spiegel online*, 2 November 2015; Measures of the Swedish Government and the opposition to tackle the refugee crisis (English translation): <http://www.government.se/contentassets/f8effa03946941c5987f7ae76b356a02/agreement-measures-to-tackle-the-refugee-crisis.pdf> (accessed: 11-9-2015).

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About the author:

Dr. Bernd Parusel is a political scientist and migration and asylum expert. He works for the European Migration Network (EMN) at the Swedish Migration Agency and as a research officer at the Swedish Migration Studies Delegation (DELM) in Stockholm.

Email: bernd.parusel@migrationsverket.se

ABOUT FOCUS MIGRATION

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