Am Wochenende haben sich US-Außenminster John Kerry und sein russischer Kollege Sergej Lawrow in Genf auf ein Chemiewaffen-Abkommen für Syrien verständigt. Darin fordern sie die syrische Regierung unter Baschar al-Assad auf, binnen einer Woche sämtliche Chemiewaffenbestände offenzulegen. Bis Mitte November 2013 müssen UN-Inspekteure Zugang zu allen Chemiewaffendepots und Herstellungsanlagen erhalten. Ziel sei es, bis Mitte 2014 alle syrischen Chemiewaffen zu vernichten.
Überwacht und umgesetzt werden soll die Vernichtung der Chemiewaffen von der Organisation für das Verbot chemischer Waffen (OVCW). Deren Generaldirektor Amet Üzümcü sprach im Januar 2013 von schätzungsweise 1.000 Tonnen chemischer Kampfstoffe in syrischer Hand.
Das Abkommen im Wortlaut:Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons
Taking into account the decision of the Syrian Arab Republic to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the commitment of the Syrian authorities to provisionally apply the Convention prior to its entry into force, the United States and the Russian Federation express their joint determination to ensure the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons program (CW) in the soonest and safest manner.
For this purpose, the United States and the Russian Federation have committed to prepare and submit in the next few days to the Executive Council of the OPCW a draft decision setting down special procedures for expeditious destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons program and stringent verification thereof. The principles on which this decision should be based, in the view of both sides, are set forth in Annex A. The United States and the Russian Federation believe that these extraordinary procedures are necessitated by the prior use of these weapons in Syria and the volatility of the Syrian civil war.
The United States and the Russian Federation commit to work together towards prompt adoption of a UN Security Council resolution that reinforces the decision of the OPCW Executive Council. This resolution will also contain steps to ensure its verification and effective implementation and will request that the UN Secretary-General, in consultation with the OPCW, submit recommendations to the UN Security Council on an expedited basis regarding the UN’s role in eliminating the Syrian chemical weapons program.
The United States and the Russian Federation concur that this UN Security Council resolution should provide for review on a regular basis the implementation in Syria of the decision of the Executive Council of the OPCW, and in the event of non-compliance, including unauthorized transfer, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in Syria, the UN Security Council should impose measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
The proposed joint US-Russian OPCW draft decision supports the application of Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which provides for the referral of any cases of non-compliance to the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.
In furtherance of the objective to eliminate the Syrian chemical weapons program, the United States and the Russian Federation have reached a shared assessment of the amount and type of chemical weapons involved, and are committed to the immediate international control over chemical weapons and their components in Syria. The United States and the Russian Federation expect Syria to submit, within a week, a comprehensive listing, including names, types, and quantities of its chemical weapons agents, types of munitions, and location and form of storage, production, and research and development facilities.
We further determined that the most effective control of these weapons may be achieved by removal of the largest amounts of weapons feasible, under OPCW supervision, and their destruction outside of Syria, if possible. We set ambitious goals for the removal and destruction of all categories of CW related materials and equipment with the objective of completing such removal and destruction in the first half of 2014. In addition to chemical weapons, stocks of chemical weapons agents, their precursors, specialized CW equipment, and CW munitions themselves, the elimination process must include the facilities for the development and production of these weapons. The views of both sides in this regard are set forth in Annex B.
The United States and the Russian Federation have further decided that to achieve accountability for their chemical weapons, the Syrians must provide the OPCW, the UN, and other supporting personnel with the immediate and unfettered right to inspect any and all sites in Syria. The extraordinary procedures to be proposed by the United States and the Russian Federation for adoption by the OPCW Executive Council and reinforced by a UN Security Council resolution, as described above, should include a mechanism to ensure this right.
Under this framework, personnel under both the OPCW and UN mandate should be dispatched as rapidly as possible to support control, removal, and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons capabilities.
The United States and the Russian Federation believe that the work of the OPCW and the UN will benefit from participation of the experts of the P5 countries.
The United States and the Russian Federation strongly reiterate their position on Syria as reflected in the Final Communique of the G-8 Summit in Northern Ireland in June 2013, especially as regards chemical weapons.
The two sides intend to work closely together, and with the OPCW, the UN, all Syrian parties, and with other interested member states with relevant capabilities to arrange for the security of the monitoring and destruction mission, recognizing the primary responsibility of the Syrian Government in this regard.
The United States and the Russian Federation note that there are details in furtherance of the execution of this framework that need to be addressed on an expedited basis in the coming days and commit to complete these details, as soon as practicable, understanding that time is of the essence given the crisis in Syria.
Annex A
Principles for Decision Document by OPCW Executive Council
1. The decision should be based on para 8. Art. IV and para. 10 of Art V of the CWC.
2. The decision should address the extraordinary character of the situation with the Syrian chemical weapons.
3. The decision should take into account the deposit by Syria of the instrument of accession to the CWC.
4. The decision should provide for the easy accessibility for States Parties of the information submitted by Syria.
5. The decision should specify which initial information Syria shall submit to the OPCW Technical Secretariat in accordance with a tightly fixed schedule and also specifies an early date for submission of the formal CWC declaration.
6. The decision should oblige Syria to cooperate fully on all aspects of its implementation.
7. The decision should address a schedule for the rapid destruction of Syrian chemical weapons capabilities. This schedule should take into account the following target dates:
A. Completion of initial OPCW on-site inspections of declared sites by November.
B. Destruction of production and mixing/filling equipment by November.
C. Complete elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014.
The shortest possible final deadline, as well as intermediate deadlines, for the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons capabilities should be included into the schedule.
8. The decision should provide stringent special verification measures, beginning within a few days, including a mechanism to ensure the immediate and unfettered right to inspect any and all sites.
9. The decision should address the issue of duties of the OPCW Technical Secretariat in this situation and its need for supplementary resources to implement the decision, particularly technical and personnel resources, and call upon states with relevant capacities to contribute to this end.
10. The decision should refer to the provisions of the CWC obliging the Executive Council, in cases of non-compliance with the Convention, to bring the issues directly to the attention of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council.
Annex B
Joint Framework on Destruction of Syrian CW
The Russian Federation and the United States of America agree on the need to achieve rapid elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons, thus reducing the threat posed to the people of Syria. They are each prepared to devote high-level attention and resources to support the monitoring and destruction mission of the OPCW, both directly and in cooperation with the United Nations and other States concerned. They agree to set an ambitious goal of eliminating the threat in a rapid and effective manner.
Both parties agree that a clear picture of the state of Syrian chemical weapons could help advance a cooperative development of destruction options, including possible removal of chemical weapons outside of the Syrian territory. We agree on the importance of rapid destruction of the following categories:
1. Production equipment
2. Mixing and filling equipment
3. Filled and unfilled weapons and delivery systems
4. Chemical agents (unweaponized) and precursor chemicals. For these materials, they will pursue a hybrid approach, i.e., a combination of removal from Syria and destruction within Syria, depending upon site-specific conditions. They will also consider the possibility of consolidation and destruction in the coastal area of Syria.
5. Material and equipment related to the research and development of chemical weapons
The two parties agree to utilize the “universal matrix”, developed in the course of consultations by our two National Security Councils, as the basis for an actionable plan.
They agree that the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria should be considered an urgent matter to be implemented within the shortest possible time period.
The parties agree to set the following target dates:
A. Completion of initial OPCW on-site inspections by November.
B. Destruction of production and mixing/filling equipment by November.
C. Complete elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014.
The Russian Federation and the United States will work together closely, including with the OPCW, the UN and Syrian parties to arrange for the security of the monitoring and destruction mission, noting the primary responsibility of the Syrian government in this regard.
U.S. Department of State
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
September 14, 2013
PRN: 2013/2121
Externer Link: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214247.htm
Unterdessen haben UN-Inspektoren bestätigt, dass am 21. August bei einem Angriff in der Nähe von Damaskus Giftgas eingesetzt wurde. UN-Generalsekretär Ban Ki-moon hat den Bericht der Inspektoren am Montag Nachmittag (16. September) den Mitgliedern des UN-Sicherheitsrates vorgestellt.
Die UN-Inspektoren kommen unter anderem auf der Grundlage von Bodenproben und Zeugenaussagen zu dem Urteil, dass "eindeutige und überzeugende Beweise" für den Einsatz von mit dem Nervengas Sarin befüllten Raketen vorliegen (Externer Link: Originaltext des Berichts). Aussagen über die Verantwortung für den Giftgasangriff treffen die Inspektoren allerdings nicht.
Aus dem UN-Bericht zum Giftgaseinsatz am 21. August in Syrien:Conclusions
On the basis of the evidence obtained during our investigation of the Ghouta incident, the conclusion is that, on 21 August 2013, chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, also against civilians, including children, on a relatively large scale.
In particular, the environmental, chemical and medical samples we have collected provide clear and convincing evidence that surface-to-surface rockets containing the nerve agent Sarin were used in Ein Tarma, Maodamiyah and Zamalka in the Ghouta area of Damascus.
The facts supporting this conclusion are:
Impacted and exploded surface-to-surface rockets, capable to carry a chemical payload, were found to contain Sarin.
Close to the rocket impact sites, in the area where patients were affected, the environment was found to be contaminated by Sarin.
Over fifty interviews given by survivors and health care workers provided ample corroboration of the medical an scientific results.
A number of patients/survivors were clearly diagnosed as intoxicated by an organophosporous compound.
Blood and urine samples from the same patients were found positive for Sarin and Sarin signatures.
This result leaves us with the deepest concern.
United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic: Externer Link: Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, Seite 5.
Neue Syrien-Resolution
Die syrische Regierung will den Forderungen zur Chemiewaffen-Kontrolle nachkommen. Am 12. September hatte Damaskus bei den Vereinten Nationen einen Antrag auf Beitritt zum Externer Link: internationalen Chemiewaffen-Übereinkommen (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC) gestellt. Zusätzlich arbeiten die USA, Frankreich und Großbritannien an einer neuen UN-Resolution zu Syrien. Der Resolutionsentwurf, der das russisch-amerikanische Abkommen zur Grundlage nimmt, soll bis Ende dieser Woche (22. September) stehen.
Sollte Syrien das Chemiewaffen-Abkommen verletzen, verweist das Abkommen auf Kapitel VII der UN-Charta . Dieses sieht konkrete Sanktionsmaßnahmen bei Bedrohung oder Bruch des Friedens und bei Angriffshandlungen vor. Stellt der UN-Sicherheitsrat eine Verletzung fest, kann er zunächst zu gewaltlosen Maßnahmen wie Wirtschaftssanktionen oder dem Abbruch der diplomatischen Beziehungen greifen (Artikel 41). Sollten sich diese nicht als wirksam erweisen, kann der UN-Sicherheitsrat laut Artikel 42 militärische Mittel beschließen.
Chemiewaffenkonvention
Die Externer Link: Chemiewaffenkonvention (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC) verbietet die Entwicklung, Herstellung, Besitz, Weitergabe und Einsatz chemischer Waffen. Das Abkommen, das 1997 in Kraft trat, wurde bislang von 189 Staaten ratifiziert. Israel und Myanmar haben den Vertrag unterzeichnet, aber bislang nicht ratifiziert. Zu den Nichtunterzeichnern gehören Angola, Ägypten, Nordkorea und Süd-Sudan. Überwacht wird die Einhaltung der Chemiewaffenkonvention von der Externer Link: Organisation für das Verbot chemischer Waffen (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW).
Militärschlag bleibt als Option
Russland pocht weiterhin auf ein völkerrechtliches Mandat für eine militärische Intervention: Jede angebliche Verletzung des Chemiewaffen-Abkommens durch das Assad-Regime müsse vor dem UN-Sicherheitsrat eindeutig bewiesen werden. Als Veto-Macht bleibt Moskau die Option, militärische Maßnahmen gegen Syrien im UN-Sicherheitsrat zu blockieren. Allerdings schließt US-Präsident Barack Obama einen militärischen Alleingang auch ohne eine entsprechende UN-Resolution gegen Syrien nach wie vor nicht aus, sollte Damaskus die Abrüstungspläne blockieren.
Internationale Reaktionen
International wurde das Abkommen unterschiedlich aufgenommen. Frankreichs Präsident François Hollande sprach von einer "wichtigen Etappe". UN-Generalsekretär Ban Ki-moon versprach die Unterstützung der Vereinten Nationen bei der Umsetzung. Auch die deutsche Regierung begrüßte das Abkommen.
Allerdings gibt es auch Zweifel am Kooperationswillen des Assad-Regimes. Führende US-amerikanische Oppositionspolitiker bezeichneten die russisch-amerikanische Vereinbarung als "Akt provokativer Schwäche", der das syrische Regime nur Zeit gewinnen lasse.
Auch die syrische Opposition reagierte mit Ablehnung. Salim Idriss, der Generalstabschef der Freien Syrischen Armee (FSA), kündigte am Sonntag in Istanbul an, die FSA werde den Vorschlag vollständig ignorieren.
Hintergrund des Abkommens
Am 21. August kam es nahe der syrischen Hauptstadt Damaskus zum Einsatz von Giftgas, bei dem mehr als 1.400 Menschen getötet worden sind. Syrische Rebellen und die USA machen das Assad-Regime verantwortlich, das die Schuld von sich weist. Die USA drohten daraufhin mit einer militärischen Intervention. Auch Großbritannien, Frankreich und die Türkei forderten ein entschiedenes Vorgehen gegen Syriens Führung, sollten sich die Giftgasvorwürfe bestätigen.
Russland lehnte einen Militäreinsatz ohne UN-Mandat ab und brachte stattdessen den Vorschlag eines Chemiewaffen-Abkommens ins Spiel. Moskau ist