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Migration and Migrant Integration Policy in Belgium | Western Europe | bpb.de

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Migration and Migrant Integration Policy in Belgium

Catherine Xhardez Laura Westerveen

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Belgium is a multinational and federal state. Responsibilities for immigration and migrant integration policy are divided between the federal government and the subnational governments.

The "Canon van Vlaanderen" (Flemish Canon) - with people, places and events that have a special significance for Flemish society - is, among other things, to be used in the Flemish region as a reference for integration programs for newcomers and people applying for Belgian citizenship. (© picture-alliance/dpa)

Belgian society, like many other European societies, has progressively been shaped by immigration. Understanding Belgium’s governance of immigration requires considering its political structure, which has evolved from a unitary to a federal state since the 1970s. This federalization process has had significant consequences for migration and migrant integration policies. Moreover, tensions around the governance of migration and integration are rooted in Belgium’s internal linguistic, cultural, and political tensions.

1. Immigration to Belgium: A Short History

Compared to other European countries, Belgium’s immigration history began relatively late in the 1920s. In this period, immigration to Belgium mostly consisted of labor migrants and refugees. Following World War II, Belgium—like countries such as France, Germany and the Netherlands—started to actively recruit labor migrants to fill the growing labor shortage in the heavy industry (mining and steel) in Wallonia and Flemish Limburg. Until the 1960s, immigrants mainly came from neighboring countries and Central and Southern Europe, predominantly from Italy and Poland. After the 1960s, labor migrants were also recruited from other southern European countries that would later join the European Community (EC) – such as Spain, Portugal and Greece – as well as from Turkey and non-European countries (e.g. Morocco). From the 1960s onwards, migrants also took up jobs in the construction and domestic sector and settled in other regions of Belgium. Unlike other former colonial powers, Belgium did not recruit labor migrants in its former colonies—the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi—and migration from these areas was limited until the 1990s. Starting in the early 1970s, the demand for labor in the heavy industry decreased, leading to high unemployment rates. Consequently, the Belgian government halted its active labor migration in 1974. Nevertheless, immigration rates remained relatively stable, with family reunification—which means that family members from abroad are reunited with a migrant (or Belgian citizen) residing in Belgium—becoming the main channel of immigration. After the end of the Cold War in 1989, there was an increase in the number of asylum seekers arriving in Belgium. In addition, the number of EU migrants coming to Belgium grew steadily over the years, especially after the EU’s successive Eastern enlargements.

As a result of its history of immigration, Belgium is characterized by a diverse population. On 1 January 2023, Belgium had about 11.7 million inhabitants. 13,4 percent of the people registered in the Belgian population register had a foreign nationality. Almost 85 percent of this group of non-Belgians were born abroad and have migrated to Belgium. In addition, 21 percent of Belgian citizens were of foreign origin, which means that they did not have Belgian citizenship by birth (but acquired it at a later age) or had one or two parents who did not have Belgian nationality as their first registered nationality. Almost 70 percent of them were born in Belgium and have thus not migrated to Belgium themselves. When we look at the countries of origin among people with a foreign nationality and people of foreign origin in Belgium, data from 2019 shows that the largest portion (50.7 percent) originates from European Union countries (most importantly Italy, France and the Netherlands). Beyond the EU, North African countries (most importantly Morocco) are the most common countries of origin among this demographic, constituting 16 percent of the total in 2019. Nowadays, immigration to Belgium also mostly concerns EU citizens (63 percent of migrants coming to Belgium in 2020). The most common reasons for migration within this group of EU citizens were employment (51 percent), family (27 percent) or studies (8 percent). For non-EU citizens, the reasons for migration most commonly relate to family (45 percent), studies (15 percent), employment (11 percent), and international protection (11 percent).

2. Migration Policy: A Contentious Policy Field

In Belgium, the federal government oversees immigration policy, covering admissions, removals and residence rights. The federal level also organizes the reception of asylum seekers through the Federal Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (Fedasil). The subnational level (the regions and communities) is responsible for immigrant integration. As a member state of the European Union (EU) and part of the Schengen area, Belgium must comply with EU legislation concerning migration. Citizens of the EU, the European Economic Area and Switzerland are allowed freedom of movement and do not need a visa or work permit in Belgium. Over the last 15 years, there have been significant changes in Belgium’s immigration policy. Yet, these changes in immigration policy have had the same overall goal since the 1970s: to restrict immigration. Belgium enforces the Law of 15 December 1980 (Alien Law) to regulate the immigration of non-EU citizens. This law has been subject to several amendments over the years.

Politically, immigration policy has increasingly become a point of contention. Belgium’s party system is regionalized along linguistic lines and divided into a Flemish and a Francophone party system. The are no nation-wide parties, but neither are the parties only regional since the regional parties are also present at the federal level. Furthermore, except for Brussels, the electorate of one linguistic community cannot vote for political parties of the other communities, even though the federal government is composed of political parties from both communities. In the Flemish party system, immigration became strongly politicized from the early 1990s onwards, due to the electoral success of the Flemish far-right party Vlaams Belang. From then on, immigration and migrant integration have become determining elements during elections in Flanders, far more than in Francophone Belgium. Flemish and Francophone politicians have therefore often disagreed about migration policy. They have, for instance, had opposing views on the regularization of undocumented migrants, the extension of voting rights to foreigners on the local level, the conditions for family reunification, as well as the requirements for acquiring Belgian citizenship.

Regarding asylum, in recent years, Belgium has been confronted with what has been called a “reception crisis”. Like in other European countries, there was a rise in asylum applications between 2015 and 2019, as well as after the COVID-19 crisis in 2021. Due to a persisting lack of space in reception centers, an increasing number of asylum seekers have not received the legally required accommodation by the Belgian state, particularly men. The Belgian reception authority Fedasil has already been condemned more than 8,000 times in court at national level for failing to provide asylum seekers with accommodation, and the European Court of Human Rights has issued hundreds of injunctions requiring Belgium to provide asylum seekers with accommodation and assistance. The Belgian state and Fedasil have been charged hundreds of millions of euros in fines.

3. Subnational Migrant Integration Approaches: From Divergence to Convergence

There is no single ‘Belgian model’ for migrant integration. Immigrant integration policies have diverged between the Dutch- and French-speaking parts of Belgium since the subnational level became responsible for migrant integration in 1980. Inspired by the example of France, the Francophone approach to migrant integration was characterized by a focus on social and economic inclusion and consisted mostly of universalist social policies. Assimilation of migrants into the Francophone culture was expected to happen through a “laissez-faire” approach. In contrast, the Flemish approach to migrant integration, inspired by the example of the Netherlands, was characterized by its focus on multiculturalism and consisted of targeted policies for established ethnic minority groups. However, this picture has become more complex over time.

In 2004, Flanders, following several other governments in Europe, implemented a compulsory civic integration program. The program contains Dutch language classes, professional training and a social orientation course designed to familiarize newcomers with Flemish norms and values. During the last decade, the multiculturalist features of Flemish policy have declined. The latest change of the Flemish integration policy in 2021 can be considered more restrictive and focused on the assimilation of migrants. For example, this new decree raised the level of language skills that migrants are expected to attain at the end of the integration program, added the obligation to pass both a language test and a ‘societal orientation exam’ (maatschappelijke oriëntatie) (which are now charged), and obliges migrants to sign a declaration on the ‘rights and duties they ought to respect’.

In Francophone Belgium, civic integration has also increasingly become the focus of the approach to migrant integration, albeit more recently. In 2014, Wallonia implemented an integration program for newcomers. In 2016, Wallonia even followed the policy trend in most neighboring countries, by making the program compulsory for non-EU nationals. The program includes an individual meeting with a service advisor for skills assessment, French language training, a citizenship course and career guidance or vocational training if needed. This policy shift is particularly significant as the Flemish compulsory program was previously criticized by French-speaking elites as stigmatizing migrants.

In Brussels, migrant integration governance is a complex story, because of its bilingual status and its institutional architecture. In Brussels, two different migrant integration policies have been implemented on the same territory: a Flemish and a Francophone one. Since 2004, the Flemish Community has organized a (non-compulsory) civic integration program in Brussels, in Dutch, which is similar to the civic integration program in Flanders. The French Community Commission has also established its own French-speaking civic integration program in Brussels (operational since 2016). While both programs were until recently not obligatory, since June 2022 newcomers residing in Brussels have been required to take part in one of the civic integration programs.

To sum up, subnational migrant integration policies are currently converging towards a strong insistence on compulsory civic integration. Nevertheless, the content, the operators, the public targeted and the budgetary means still vary across Belgium’s subnational units. However, even though migrant integration policies have been implemented differently across the different regions of Belgium, the Belgian regions are confronted with similar challenges regarding inequalities between people of Belgian and foreign origin. Belgium is, for instance, one of the countries with the largest gap in educational achievement between students with and without a migration background, as the PISA studies of the OECD have repeatedly shown. Similar inequalities exist in the Belgian labour market, where the employment rate of people with a migration background is considerably lower than that of people without a migration background. In addition, people with a migration background are overrepresented in sectors of employment where less favourable work conditions are common (including lower wages and more temporary or part-time contracts). They are more likely to be overqualified for the work they are doing compared to their counterparts without a migration background in Belgium.

Conclusion

Like other European countries, Belgium has been shaped by its history of immigration and is characterized by an increasingly diverse population. With similar migration flows, challenges around the reception of asylum seekers, and developments around civic integration, the Belgian case is in many ways comparable to other North-Western European immigration countries. However, what makes Belgium different compared to these other countries, is its federalized and multinational character, which creates political and institutional opportunities as well as constraints regarding the governance of migration and integration.

Fussnoten

Fußnoten

  1. For information regarding Belgium’s federal structure with both communities (the Flemish Community, the French Community and the German Community) and regions (the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region and the Brussels-Capital Region), see: Externer Link: https://www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/government/federale_staat

  2. Adam, I. (2013). Immigrant Integration Policies of the Belgian Regions: Sub-state Nationalism and Policy Divergence after Devolution. Regional & Federal Studies, 23(5), 547–569; Xhardez, C. (2020). L’intégration des immigrés entre divergence et convergence: Quatre politiques pour un petit pays. In C. Xhardez, M. Counet, F. Randour, & N. Christoph (eds.), 50 ans de fédéralisation de l’Etat belge. Institutions, acteurs, politiques publiques et particularités du fédéralisme belge. (pp. 163–180). Academia-L’Harmattan.

  3. Lafleur, J.-M., & Marfouk, A. (2017). Pourquoi l’immigration? 21 questions que se posent les Belges sur les migrations internationales au XXIe siècle. Academia-L’Harmattan; Lafleur, J.-M., Marfouk, A., & Fadil, N. (2018). Migratie in België in 21 vragen en antwoorden. Universitaire Pers Leuven.

  4. Naegels, T. (2021). Nieuw België. Een migratiegeschiedenis, 1944-1978. Lannoo.

  5. Timmerman, C., Vanderwaeren, E., & Crul, M. (2003). The Second Generation in Belgium. International Migration Review, 37(4), 1065-1090.

  6. Demart, S., Schoumaker, B., Godin, M., & Adam, I. (2017). Belgo-Congolais, Belgo-Rwandais et Belgo-Burundais. Un portrait de nos concitoyens d’ascendance africaine. Brussels: King Baudouin Foundation.

  7. Martiniello, M. (2013). Belgium, migration, 1946 to present. In Ness, I. (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration. Wiley.

  8. Vause, S. (2013). Migraties en Migrantenpopulaties in België. Statistisch en Demografisch Verslag 2013. Brussels: DEMO & Centrum voor Gelijkheid van Kansen en voor Racismebestrijding.

  9. Statistics Belgium (2023). Diversity according to origin in Belgium. June. Externer Link: https://statbel.fgov.be/nl/themas/bevolking/structuur-van-de-bevolking/herkomst.

  10. Unia and FOD WASO (2022). Socio-Economische Monitoring. Arbeidsmarkt en Origine. Brussels: Federale Overheidsdienst Werkgelegenheid Arbeid en Sociaal Overleg & Interfederaal Gelijke Kansen Centrum, 16.

  11. Myria: Federal Migration Centre (2022). Bevolking en migratiebewegingen. January. Externer Link: https://www.myria.be/nl/cijfers/migratie-in-belgie.

  12. Gsir, S., Lafleur, J-M. & Stanek, M. (2016). Migration policy reforms in the context of economic and political crises: the case of Belgium. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42(10), 1651-1669.

  13. IBZ Immigration Office (2023). Legislation. Externer Link: https://dofi.ibz.be/en/about-us/legislation#:~:text=The%20Royal%20Decree%20of%208,have%20been%20amended%20several%20times.

  14. Coffé, H. (2005). Do Individual Factors Explain the Different Success of the Two Belgian Extreme Right Parties. Acta Politica, 40(1), 74–93.

  15. Chiappa, C. (2023). “Belgium’s eternal asylum crisis”, Politico, 19 September. Externer Link: https://www.politico.eu/article/belgium-asylum-crisis-nicole-de-moor/.

  16. See for example Walker, Lauren (2023). “Fedasil penalty payments for Belgium’s reception crisis amount to €278.5 million”, The Brussels Times, 2 March. Externer Link: https://www.brusselstimes.com/386753/fedasil-penalty-payments-for-belgiums-reception-crisis-amount-to-e278-5-million (accessed: 20-12-2023).

  17. For an in-depth study on the evolution of subnational integration policies in Belgium since devolution, see: Adam, I. (2013). Les entités fédérées belges et l’intégration des immigrés: Politiques publiques comparées. Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles.

  18. Loobuyck, P. & Jacobs, D. (2010). Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Integration Policy in Belgium and Flanders. Canadian Journal for Social Research, 3(1), 29-40.

  19. Adam, I. & Xhardez, C. (2024). How substate nationalism and immigrant integration entwine over time. A spotlight on Flanders. In: Samers, M. & Rydgren, J. (eds.), Migration and Nationalism: theoretical and empirical perspectives. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 172-195.

  20. Hantson, L., Westerveen, L., & Adam, I. (2022). Immigrant Integration in Small and Medium-Sized Towns and Rural Areas: Local Policies and Policymaking Relations in Belgium. Turin: Fondazione Collegio Carlo Alberto.

  21. Xhardez, C. (2016). L’intégration des nouveaux arrivants à Bruxelles: Un puzzle institutionnel et politique/The Integration of New Immigrants in Brussels: An Institutional and Political Puzzle. Brussels Studies, 105, 1-20.

  22. Xhardez, C. (2020). From different paths to a similar road? Understanding the convergence of subnational immigrant integration policies in Belgium. Regional Studies, 54(11), 1508–1518.

  23. Adam, I., Martiniello, M., & Rea, A. (2018). Regional Divergence in the Integration Policy in Belgium. One country, Three Integration Programs, One Citizenship Law. In A. Rea, E. Bribosia, I. Rorive, & D. Sredanovic (eds.), Governing Diversity. Migrant Integration and Multiculturalism in North America and Europe. (pp. 235–255). Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles.

  24. OECD (2023). PISA 2022 Results (Volume I). The State of Learning and Equity in Education. Paris: OECD Publishing.

  25. Unia and FOD WASO (2022). Socio-Economische Monitoring. Arbeidsmarkt en Origine. Brussels: Federale Overheidsdienst Werkgelegenheid Arbeid en Sociaal Overleg & Interfederaal Gelijke Kansen Centrum.

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is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal. With a background in political science (UCLouvain Saint-Louis Bruxelles & Sciences Po Paris) and in public law (Vrije Universiteit Brussel), her research focuses on immigration, public policy and federalism. Her PhD thesis studied the relationship between substate nationalism and the integration of immigrants in Flanders and Quebec. Externer Link: www.catherinexhardez.com

is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam, and a Lecturer and Associate Researcher at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. Her research and teaching focuses on politics and policies of diversity and (in)equality in different European countries and at multiple levels of governance. In her PhD research, she studied how inequalities that migrants and racialized minorities face in European societies are framed within policy discourses.