As a borderland and contact zone between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus region (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) has always been a place of cross-border mobility and exchange. Migration from Russia to the South Caucasus goes back to the colonial past of the Russian Tsarist Empire, and this history continues to inform the political and economic dimensions of migration from Russia to Georgia and Armenia. Zur Auflösung der Fußnote[1]
Since the start of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens have emigrated, many of them to Georgia and Armenia. Who are these ‘new’ migrants?
As an area where the cultural and political spaces of the Russian, Ottoman and Persian worlds have historically overlapped, the Caucasus has been the subject of regional power politics since the nineteenth century. In wars with the Ottoman Empire and Persia, Russia succeeded in bringing the Caucasus region completely under its control in the mid-nineteenth century. This explains why, from the perspective of the Kremlin and Russian society, this region is viewed as a ‘southern periphery’ on the edge of Europe and Asia.
Historically, there have been several major migratory movements of different groups from different parts of Russia, with both voluntary and forced migration shaping the Caucasus region. Zur Auflösung der Fußnote[2] In the context of early Russian resettlement and colonisation policies, Russian Orthodox religious minorities, Russian peasants and administrative elites arrived alongside the military. Later in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Russians settled either as workers, skilled labourers and merchants in the larger cities of the Caucasus (Tbilisi, Baku, Batumi, Yerevan, Gyumri) or as a religious minority (Molokans, a breakaway sect from the Russian Orthodox Old Believers) in rural areas. During the Soviet era, hundreds of Russian-speaking skilled workers came to the South Caucasus, where they were mainly employed in industry. Nevertheless, this population of Russian origin formed a relatively small minority in Georgia and Armenia, much smaller than in Central Asia or the Baltic states, for example.
The political upheavals of the 1990s led to a severe recession throughout the Soviet Union, which also brought major social upheavals to the post-Soviet Caucasus – including growing nationalist sentiment and related inter-ethnic conflicts. In the 1990s, the region witnessed an exodus of ethnic Russians and other Slavic groups, mostly back to Russia.
Who are the Russians currently coming to Georgia and Armenia?
The beginning of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine in February 2022 led to a new wave of emigration from Russia to the South Caucasus. After the start of the war and the subsequent partial military mobilisation in Russia in September 2022, hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens left their homeland in search of political and economic freedom – for fear of borders being closed, conscription and, in some cases, political persecution and arrest in Russia. Georgia and Armenia were the main destination countries for these migrants; for both countries, Russian nationals do not require an entry visa. Georgia's capital Tbilisi, the third-largest Georgian city Batumi on the Black Sea, and Armenia's capital Yerevan became the most important destinations for this new migration from Russia.
Two quantitative surveys (OutRush, Krawatzek et al. 2023) showed that most Russian migrants are economically independent, young and educated with an urban consumer behaviour. Zur Auflösung der Fußnote[3] On arrival, migrants in Georgia and Armenia tended to identify themselves as ‘relocanty’ Zur Auflösung der Fußnote[4], ‘expats’ or ‘Russians in exile’. Unlike the local population and the Russian population as a whole, they are economically better off. According to the OutRush study, around 94 per cent were employed before 24 February 2022, and 46 per cent can afford relatively expensive devices, compared to 26 per cent of the Russian population as a whole. They are able to mobilise the resources and capital required to organise their lives in a new place and influence the dynamics of the local market in the process. Zur Auflösung der Fußnote[5] Nevertheless, the new migrants are legally and politically vulnerable in some situations, especially in Georgia due to the prevalence of anti-Russian attitudes. Zur Auflösung der Fußnote[6]
The moderate cost of living in Georgia and Armenia and the low regulatory requirements in the business and social spheres make it easier for Russians to arrive and adapt to life there than in Europe. Many newcomers can either work remotely (IT sector) or have sufficient savings to support themselves without an income for a while. However, as surveys show, it is not clear whether Russian migrants will stay in Georgia and Armenia in the long term. Most of them see these safe havens as transit countries from which they intend to move to Europe, the USA or Latin America. Zur Auflösung der Fußnote[7] An outflow of Russian migrants from Georgia and Armenia could already be observed at the end of 2023.
Many of the new migrants are not only young and well educated, but also politically interested and socially engaged. Zur Auflösung der Fußnote[8] According to surveys, 55 per cent of respondents had first-hand experience of political repression before leaving Russia. Zur Auflösung der Fußnote[9] Most respondents mentioned psychological pressure in this context, ten per cent had been arrested during protests and rallies, and three per cent had been the victim of a house search by the police. The remaining 45 per cent of respondents stated that they had not been exposed to political repression in Russia. The majority of new migrants were active in civil society and politics after emigrating (80 per cent).
Most politically active Russian migrants prefer to remain invisible in the host societies and have not taken part in public protests in Georgia and Armenia. They are reluctant to interfere in the domestic affairs of either country. Their willingness to learn local languages is thus very low. At the same time, visible Russian ‘enclaves’ and communities are emerging in Tbilisi and Yerevan, where migrants have their own co-working spaces, cafés, restaurants, shops, schools and meeting places. Zur Auflösung der Fußnote[10] In Georgia, for example, Russian migrants have been slow to make contact with the local population, and there are no established contacts at the level of civil society. Zur Auflösung der Fußnote[11]
Given that Georgia and Armenia were until recently predominantly countries of outmigration (labour and education), the influx of Russians represents a major challenge for both countries. While Georgia's government is tolerant of the new Russian migrants and refuses to impose economic sanctions on Russia, the majority of Georgians is more sceptical about the newcomers. The situation in Armenia is somewhat different. Russian citizens generally regard Armenia as a friendly and safe country. However, relations with Russia have recently deteriorated due to the lack of military support from Russia in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia has since openly distanced itself from Russia, for example with regard to its membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the presence of Russian troops in Armenia. Zur Auflösung der Fußnote[12] Not all Russian migrants feel safe in Armenia. This is particularly true for political activists, who fear persecution given Armenia's hitherto close ties with the Russian security services.
How have the host societies reacted?
The arrival of hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted different reactions in host countries like Georgia and Armenia. In general, the attitude of the local population towards the new arrivals is predominantly negative in Georgia, and more positive in Armenia. Zur Auflösung der Fußnote[13]
In both countries, Russian migrants quickly became important economic players and consumers, with a knock-on effect for the local economy, in particular rental prices. In 2022, for example, the influx of Russian migrants increased the pressure on the housing market in Tbilisi and led to extreme rent hikes. This accelerated gentrification processes and aroused diffuse feelings of insecurity and mistrust among the local population with regard to the new migrants and the Georgian government.
Anti-Russian graffiti in Georgia's capital Tbilisi: “Ruzzia is a terrorist state” (date taken: September 10, 2023). (© Tsypylma Darieva)
According to a representative survey conducted in 2022 by the International Republican Institute, 90 per cent of Georgian respondents see Russia as a threat. Zur Auflösung der Fußnote[14] The memory of the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, when Georgia lost control over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, is still fresh in many people’s minds and makes communication and rapprochement between Russian migrants and Georgian society more difficult. In Georgia, migration from Russia has triggered fears: many Georgians are worried that the Kremlin could launch a military attack on Georgia – as it did in Ukraine – under the pretext of ‘protecting’ Russian citizens abroad.
A critical attitude towards the presence of Russians in Tbilisi is reflected in numerous examples of urban graffiti in English and Russian with messages like ‘Russia kills’ and ‘You are not welcome’. As migrants from Russia belong to the economically more privileged section of the population, they also contribute to growing social unease and inequality in Georgia (but also in Armenia). Zur Auflösung der Fußnote[15] Many Georgians see the new migrants with Russian passports as a symbol of Russia as an occupying and colonial power and overlook their individual motives for emigrating.
Translation into English: Dr. Anne Boden