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Dokumentation: Ausschnitt aus dem „Ukraine 2025 Report“ der Europäischen Kommission zu ‚Justiz und Grundrechte‘ | Ukraine-Analysen | bpb.de

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Dokumentation: Ausschnitt aus dem „Ukraine 2025 Report“ der Europäischen Kommission zu ‚Justiz und Grundrechte‘ Ukraine-Analyse Nr. 330

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Laut dem „Ukraine 2025 Report“ der Europäischen Kommission befindet sich der ukrainische Justizsektor in einem schleppenden Reformprozess.

Taras Kachka, stellvertretender Wirtschaftsminister der Ukraine, und Marta Kos, EU-Kommissarin für Erweiterung, besprechen am 17. März 2026 in Brüssel den Fortschritt der Ukraine im EU- Beitrittsprozess. (© picture-alliance, Hans Lucas)

Zusammenfassung

Das Kapitel 23 „Justiz und Grundrechte“ ist eines von 35 Verhandlungskapiteln für den EU-Beitritt. Die EU veröffentlicht in jährlichen Berichten den Stand der Beitrittskandidaten in den jeweiligen Kapiteln. Laut dem jüngsten EU-Bericht zur Ukraine, der im November 2025 erschien, befindet sich der ukrai- nische Justizsektor in einem laufenden, aber schleppenden Reformprozess: Schlüsselinstitutionen arbeiten mit unvollständiger Besetzung und chronischer Unterfinanzierung, während fast 2.200 Posten für Richter:innen unbesetzt sind. Die Unabhängigkeit der Justiz ist formell garantiert, aber politisch wiederholt unter Druck geraten, vor allem im Juli 2025, als versucht wurde, die Unabhängigkeit der Antikorruptionsbehörden NABU und SAPO zu beschneiden. Das öffentliche Vertrauen in die Justiz bleibt niedrig, und zentrale Reformen – etwa beim Anwaltswesen, der Jura-Ausbildung und der Vollstreckung von Urteilen – stehen noch an. Im Folgenden dokumentieren wir den Ausschnitt aus dem Bericht zur Lage des Justizwesens. Die Redaktion der Ukraine-Analysen

Herausgeber der Länderanalysen

Die Ukraine-Analysen werden von der Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universität Bremen, der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde e.V., dem Deutschen Polen-Institut, dem Leibniz-Institut für Agrarentwicklung in Transformationsökonomien, dem Leibniz-Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung und dem Zentrum für Osteuropa- und internationale Studien (ZOiS) gGmbH gemeinsam herausgegeben. Die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung/bpb veröffentlicht die Analysen als Lizenzausgabe.

Functioning of the judiciary

Strategic documents

The strategic framework is partly in place. In May 2025, Ukraine adopted the rule of law roadmap outlining the key pre-accession reforms. Ukraine should still adopt a new mid-term strategy for the development of the justice system and constitutional judiciary that is aligned with and holistically complements the rule of law roadmap.

Management bodies

The management bodies are in place and continued to function adequately overall. However, issues related to the selection and appointment of their members, as well as institutional capacities, including IT and analytical tools, and access to databases, need to be resolved without delay.

Since spring 2025, the High Council of Justice (HCJ) operated with a minimum quorum of 15 members (out of 21), but in October 2025, the President appointed two internationally vetted members. The filling of two HCJ vacancies from the quota of the Congress of Judges needs to be urgently accelerated, while the Congress of Attorneys still refuses to launch the competition for its two vacancies, quoting martial law as the reason. The incomplete composition of the HCJ negatively affected how it discharged of its constitutional functions. Two international members of the Ethics Council (a body assisting in the selection of HCJ members) resigned due to personal reasons and were successfully replaced in September.

The filling of the one remaining vacancy in the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) was delayed after the HCJ, in January, did not appoint either of the two candidates put forward by the HQCJ selection commission. In May, the selection commission nominated two new candidates and in August, the HCJ appointed one of them.

The mandate of the selection commission for the HQCJ, which includes international experts, expired in June. While the mandate of the current HQCJ runs until 2027, Ukrainian law would require the formation of a new HQCJ selection commission composed of representatives from unreformed national bodies. To ensure the sustainability of judicial reform and the integrity of the reformed HQCJ, the formation of such selection commission should be discontinued and instead, the meaningful involvement of internationally nominated independent experts in the selection of HQCJ members should be extended. In parallel, Ukraine should launch the reform of the national bodies involved in the selection of the HQCJ members.

Growing resistance to the involvement of internationally nominated independent experts in various selection or vetting processes, including a pending constitutional petition and a legislative initiative challenging all internationalised processes, raises serious concern.

The State Judicial Administration (SJA) continued to operate with an acting Head following the dismissal of its previous Head on suspicion of corruption. After some delays, the HCJ relaunched a competition to select the new Head of the SJA.

The new Public Integrity Council (PIC), composed of 20 civil society representatives, was formed in August 2025. Given its workload and critical role in judicial renewal, the PIC needs to be strengthened, especially by improving its access to judicial dossiers and its analytical capacities, and by creating a sufficiently resourced secretariat. The Council of Prosecutors and the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP) need to become more independent, in particular from the Office of the Prosecutor General. There is a need to strengthen their integrity, powers and autonomous resources, and establish independent and objective pre-selection procedures for their members, following the advice of the Venice Commission.

Independence and impartiality

The independence and impartiality of the judiciary is guaranteed by the constitution and the relevant legislation, but certain shortcomings in the law and in practice persist. Public trust in the judiciary remains very low.

In September 2024, the Council of Judges approved a new version of the Code of Judicial Ethics. The HCJ and the Council of Prosecutors should be more proactive in protecting judges and prosecutors from undue interference. The automatic allocation of cases to judges should be further improved as part of the renewal of the unified judicial information and telecommunication system. The legislation on recusals and conflicts of interest needs to be strengthened. Ukraine still needs to introduce a system to randomly allocate cases to prosecutors based on clear and objective criteria, with proper safeguards against possible manipulation, ensure consistent justification for and provide appeal mechanisms against reassignment decisions.

In July 2025, the Parliament adopted a law that, inter alia, subordinated the independent specialised anti-corruption agencies—the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO)—under the authority of the politically appointed Prosecutor General. Following domestic protests and international criticism, another law was swiftly adopted that restored the independence of NABU and SAPO, but it failed to address several other problematic provisions, including those that allow, during martial law, to transfer and appoint prosecutors to regional prosecution offices and the Office of Prosecutor General (OPG) without competition, and that grant the Prosecutor General access to any pre-trial investigation materials (except those of NABU and SAPO). These provisions undermine meritocracy within prosecutorial service and raise risks of undue interference in criminal cases. They should be repealed, and in the meantime, their application should be put on hold.

In spring 2025, the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) searched the premises of the HQCJ and questioned its members as part of several criminal investigations. The HQCJ, the PIC and CSOs expressed serious concern about these actions of the SBI and considered them as an encroachment on the independence of the HQCJ.

In January 2025, the HQCJ adopted a regulation on the methodology to evaluate qualifications and on the indicators of compliance. In May 2025, Parliament adopted a law to streamline the judicial selection procedure. The judiciary still suffers from severe understaffing with 2 198 judicial vacancies remaining to be filled (as of August), due to the slow pace of selections and appointments, ongoing retirements and resignations. The HQCJ continued the competitions to recruit 1 800 first instance, 550 appeal court and High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) judges. In total, from September 2024 to August 2025, the President appointed 180 judges upon their nomination by the HCJ. Given the slow pace of work and persistent understaffing, the capacities of the HQCJ, the HCJ and PIC should be strengthened urgently.

After the resignation of the Prosecutor General in autumn 2024, a new Prosecutor General was appointed in June 2025. To reduce the risk of politicisation, the selection and dismissal procedures for the Prosecutor General should be made more objective, transparent and merit-based in line with European standards. In June, the new Prosecutor General cancelled the pilot procedure for forming a reserve list of candidates to fill managerial positions in the prosecutor’s offices, shortly before the reserve list of candidates of high integrity and professionalism was finalised. In addition, prosecutors started being transferred to regional prosecution offices and the OPG without competition by invoking the problematic legal provisions introduced in July 2025. The system for selecting management-level prosecutors needs to be improved, in particular to enhance transparency and ensure credible integrity and professionalism checks, while competitions need to be urgently restored for transfers and appointments at lower levels. Prosecutors’ salaries remain lower than those of judges even though the subsistence minimum used to calculate the salaries for prosecutors was raised as of 1 August. Overall, the prosecutorial reform process has slowed down due to the structural changes.

The transparent selection of judges to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) continued with the involvement of the Advisory Group of Experts. However, in January 2025, the CCU lost its quorum of 12 judges (out of a total of 18 judges) after the mandates of several judges expired. In February 2025, the Advisory Group of Experts recommended ten duly vetted candidates to fill five vacancies under the President’s and Parliament’s quotas. In June and September, the President appointed two new judges to the CCU, which restored the Court’s quorum. However, in October 2025, the Parliament failed to appoint two judges from its quota, delaying the renewal of the CCU. The appointing authorities must urgently proceed with the selection and appointment of the vetted candidates, avoiding further delays. In May 2025, the Supreme Court annulled the presidential decree that dismissed a former CCU judge. The Supreme Court held that the President had no authority to dismiss a CCU judge by simply revoking the previous President’s decree of appointment. This Supreme Court decision strengthened the independence of CCU judges. The Law on the constitutional procedure should still be improved in line with the 2021 Venice Commission recommendations.

Accountability

The accountability of the judiciary is broadly satisfactory but needs to be further improved and enforced in practice. The HQCJ has continued to evaluate the qualifications of sitting judges (vetting) with the involvement of the PIC, albeit at a slow pace due to persisting capacity constraints. By September 2025, 2 549 judges have undergone this procedure, while 1 413 judges still have to complete it. During the reporting period, the HQCJ recommended dismissing a total of 30 judges who failed to pass the evaluation, while the HCJ dismissed 10 judges. The capacities of all institutions involved should be strengthened urgently. In particular, the HQCJ should develop autonomous capacities to conduct credible integrity checks of candidates and should further digitalise its work. It still has to improve the reasoning of its decisions that override a negative opinion of the PIC. The HCJ needs to expedite the review of submissions from the HQCJ on the dismissal of judges who failed the evaluation of qualifications and improve the reasoning of its decisions. The Supreme Court did not reverse its controversial decision of June 2024 on the evaluation of judges’ qualifications that weakened the role of the PIC, and rendered further decisions on judicial selection and the disciplinary liability of judges that were criticised by civil society for lack of consistency and for potentially undermining judicial reforms.

The new Service of Disciplinary Inspectors (SDI) was established in December 2024 as an autonomous department of the HCJ to assist the latter in processing disciplinary cases against judges. The head and deputy head of the SDI, as well as 21 disciplinary inspectors, were appointed by the HCJ following a transparent procedure with the involvement of independent experts. In April, the HCJ launched the competition for filling five new disciplinary inspector positions. The SDI started handling the heavy backlog of about 11 000 disciplinary complaints against judges. Since December 2024, the HCJ, with the assistance of the SDI, reviewed some 6 000 disciplinary complaints. During the reporting period, 36 judges received disciplinary sanctions, and the dismissal procedure was launched for 7 judges. The HCJ rules on the prioritisation of disciplinary cases should be systematically applied, and priority cases handled without delays. The HCJ should also improve the reasoning and uniformity of practice in disciplinary cases and revise its rules to ensure that HCJ members from the judiciary do not review disciplinary complaints against judges from their own courts. The SDI should receive greater financial and institutional support to sustain its operations. Disciplinary offences relating to judges’ conduct need to be defined more precisely, in line with the recommendations of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). The current legislation still allows judges who are subject to disciplinary proceedings to resign before the HCJ’s decision on dismissal, thus avoiding negative consequences, and requires the HCJ’s approval before an appeal procedure against an HCJ decision can be launched. In March 2025, a new draft law was registered to comprehensively revise the disciplinary liability system for judges, but it was criticised by CSOs. The HCJ requested its review by the Venice Commission. Ukraine will have to take into account the latter’s recommendations and engage in further expert discussions when revising the draft law.

To increase the accountability of the judiciary, legislation improving the system of judges’ declarations of integrity should be adopted, including, as a temporary measure, the meaningful involvement of independent experts, nominated by international partners, in the verification of the declarations of integrity made by judges from the highest courts. To address corruption risks in the Supreme Court, such experts should also be temporarily involved in the selection of new Supreme Court judges.

In December 2024, following inclusive consultations, the HCJ approved the unified indicators for evaluating the integrity and professional ethics of judges. However, some of the indicators would need to be clarified to allow an effective evaluation aligned with European standards. The detailed procedures to verify declarations of assets and lifestyle monitoring for ordinary and CCU judges still need to be agreed between the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, the High Council of Justice and the CCU. In July, the CCU approved new rules on the professional ethics of judges of the CCU, which will need to be effectively applied in practice.

The attestation of prosecutors is continuing and should be completed without any further delays. Prosecutors who fail it should be dismissed in line with the law, while pending court cases should be resolved. In autumn 2024, it became known that dozens of prosecutors had been benefiting from allegedly unlawful disability pensions. As a result, administrative and criminal investigations were launched, including more than 330 disciplinary proceedings. Dismissal decisions were adopted in relation to four prosecutors. Apart from indictments in two criminal proceedings, no progress was made in related criminal cases. Ukraine should adopt legislation to improve the disciplinary system for prosecutors and strengthen the institutional capacity of the QDCP, in line with GRECO recommendations. A transparent selection procedure for all members of the QDCP should be introduced, including a credible integrity check. The power to review complaints against decisions of the QDCP should be transferred to the Council of Prosecutors.

Quality of justice

The quality of justice should be further improved. More efforts are needed to ensure the uniformity of court practice within the first, appeal and cassation instances. Periodic performance evaluations of judges and prosecutors still need to be introduced, based on objective rules and assessment criteria in line with GRECO recommendations and European standards.

No progress was made on reform of the Bar. Concerns about the abuse of disciplinary mechanisms against lawyers and uneven disciplinary practices remain. The Ukrainian National Bar Association (UNBA) has still not launched the competition for the HCJ members from its quota. In addition, the Bar’s self-governing bodies have not held elections, despite their mandates having expired. Ukraine needs to urgently launch a comprehensive reform of the Bar, with the aim to ensure that the bodies of the UNBA are created on the basis of a transparent and credible procedure and to substantially improve qualifications, admissions, disciplinary liability, financial management and continuous training systems.

Some aspects of legal education have improved and a concept on higher legal education was developed, but comprehensive reforms are still pending. New legislation should address: (i) the institutional separation of legal education and law enforcement training; (ii) the allocation of state funds based on merit; (iii) the strengthening of the admission criteria for law school and of licensing requirements; and (iv) integrity issues in legal education. Further steps are needed to develop and spread knowledge of EU law and of specialised competencies, including in the area of ethics.

The National School of Judges of Ukraine (NSJU) and the Prosecutor’s Training Centre improved international cooperation. The announcement of a competitive selection of the position of vice-rector a is a positive step towards transparency and institutional accountability. However, the selection process lacks clear criteria on integrity, competence, transparency and merit-based evaluation. Transparent and merit-based procedures are needed for the selection of its management and staff, and new accountability and anti-corruption procedures should be established. In October 2024, the NSJU launched a Training Laboratory on EU law. The curriculum, and teaching and evaluation methods should be further modernised. The budget allocation for the NSJU for 2025 meets 41.2% of its expenditure requirements, compared with 58.9% in 2024. The budget allocated for the Prosecutor’s Training Centre met 100% of its expenditure requirements and was increased for 2025.

Efficiency

The efficiency of justice is negatively affected by a persistent lack of human, financial and technical resources against the backdrop of the ongoing Russian war of aggression. Funding for the judiciary in the 2025 budget covered only around 61% of its needs, even though it was increased compared with 2023 and 2024. The budget of the prosecution service was also increased by 11% in 2025. However, prosecutors still receive lower salaries than judges. The judicial governance bodies have adjusted the judicial system to the challenging realities, facilitating remote hearings in certain cases and adopting new security protocols. While clearance rates well exceeded 90% across all court instances and specialisations, a backlog of cases continued to accumulate. Ukraine should further improve its system to collect and analyse judicial statistics to strengthen evidence-based judicial policymaking and management of the courts. Further efforts are needed to optimise the judicial network.

In autumn 2024, the SJA launched the allocation of 20 000 pending cases from the dissolved Kyiv District Administrative Court to other district administrative courts. Legislation was adopted in February and September 2025 to establish the Kyiv Specialised District Administrative Court and the Kyiv Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal to hear cases involving national state agencies. In September, the HQCJ formed the Expert Council, composed of three national and three international members, to assist in the selection of their judges. The establishment of these important courts needs to progress without further delays.

The provision, introduced in May 2024, which allows certain high-level officials (including Members of Parliament) to opt for their criminal cases in any court to be heard by a panel of three judges, regardless of the severity of the possible penalty, should be reviewed in terms of its proportionality and impact on judicial efficiency. Ukraine should also remove from the relevant legislation the provision on the automatic closure of criminal cases due to the expiry of the time limits for pre-trial investigation and review the current time limits to ensure sufficient time for criminal investigations.

To further improve the efficiency of justice, procedural reforms are needed, such as: (i) expanding simplified and written court proceedings; (ii) envisaging for alternative dispute resolution in certain categories of cases; (iii) reducing the scope for procedural delays and abuses; (iv) and further streamlining procedural codes in line with good EU practices. Reforms are also needed to modernise the digitalisation of the justice system, including for the courts and case management, and to better enforce court decisions. A detailed roadmap for the development of IT solutions in the judiciary was approved in December 2024. Ukraine also continued to develop an e-case management system in the criminal justice system and created an inter-agency working group in December.

In December 2024, the Law on judicial oversight of the enforcement of court decisions entered into force, which provides additional instruments to courts to improve the currently low rate of enforcement of decisions. Ukraine needs to adopt additional legislation on improving the enforcement of court decisions related to monetary and non-monetary obligations, on the digitalisation of enforcement proceedings, and to create a system to collect data on enforcement. The legal status of private bailiffs needs to be strengthened. Ukraine should also prepare a roadmap for the abolition and revision of existing moratoria, and continue to implement the strategy and action plan for resolving the problem of non-enforcement of domestic court decisions. More efforts are needed to execute judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.

The level of implementation of the 2021 mediation law is still insufficient. There is no national system to collect data on various forms of alternative dispute resolution. The planned mandatory mediation for specific categories of disputes still needs to be prepared and implemented, public awareness of mediation should be further promoted, and arbitration should be developed and used more frequently.

Quelle: Der Ukraine 2025 Report der Europäischen Kommission erschien am 04.11.2025 und ist zugänglich unter Externer Link: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/ukraine-report-2025_en.

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